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1 INTRODUCTION: THE CASE FOR ESSENTIALIST PHILOSOPHY 
 
Since Nietzsche announced the death of God, there has been a tendency 
to think that we are living in a godless universe. This is mistaken. Instead of a 
thoroughgoing secularisation, these theological and, indeed, teleological 
assumptions have come to be detached from their true objects and, instead, 
have come to be attached to secular powers, which in turn have become new 
idols determining the fate of human beings.  
That Nietzsche announced the death of God is well known. Much less well 
known is that he demanded a thorough revaluation of all values, involving the 
shedding of all the theological assumptions which underpinned the belief in 
God. I argue that this revaluation of values has not happened. Instead of the 
end of religion, we live under the sign of a secular myth of progress. Detached 
from their true moral object, theological assumptions have come to be 
attached to new gods, the new idols of capitalist modernity – the state, 
bureaucracy, capital, money, commodities. These idols are the social powers 
of human beings in alien form. In the place of the salvation promised by the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition and in place of the reason and freedom promised 
by the Enlightenment, there is a secular religion of ‘progress’ in which 
salvation is conditional upon the propitiation of new gods of monetary and 
state power. The old theological and teleological assumptions have come to 
be attached to industry, science, technology to create a secular religion which 
promises salvation through progress. This progress is not measured in terms 
of human or spiritual growth, but in terms of economic growth, state power, 
military expansion, space exploration ….. 
 
We now have planetary engineers like Stewart Brand asserting that, through their 
technology, men have become as gods. Whereas God was conceived to be in the 
world but not of it, these new ‘men as gods’ are of the world but not in it. They are 
busy creating a surrogate world, a Heaven on Earth, a Heaven created above, 
beyond and against the Earth. Every natural resource will be used up in order to 
create a heaven out of and outside of the Earth. The foundations of life on Earth will 
be destroyed in the process.  
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Whereas the Judaeo-Christian tradition is founded upon the moral 
autonomy of human beings from indifferent natural cycles and biological 
imperatives, the secular religion of progress attempts to achieve 
transcendence in terms of technical autonomy, an endless expansion of 
technical and economic power that is of the world but not in it. On a planet of 
finite resources, this endless journey into the infinite can only end in 
ecological destruction and catastrophe. Detached from our biological matrix, 
we may exist for a while in the outer landscape of ‘the machine’; but we will 
die in the inner landscape. 
 
Planetary engineering is threatening to abstract human power so much from 
Nature that Nature ceases to exist. This will achieve a complete transcendence, 
but only at the cost of detaching human beings from the ground of their being. 
This means not so much the end of God as the end of Nature. And the end of 
human nature. As biologist Jonathan Kingdon warns, we have become 
‘orphans of our own technology’. ‘Drawn further and further out of our biological 
matrix we have become more and more dependent on an all-embracing but 
loveless technology to see us through.’ We have become totally reliant on our 
morally neutral and neutered technology in seeking to ward off starvation, 
disease and the rigours of climate. This has encouraged us to think and to act 
as though natural limits have been abolished. They have not. Human beings 
can produce and consume and expand to the extent that they have been only 
through an almost complete detachment from their local environmental and 
biological underpinnings. We have become so ensconced in the technosphere 
that we think that the biosphere no longer exists. This is an illusion, fuelled by a 
subsidy from a nonrenewing capital reserve. Instead of living off Nature’s 
interest, we have been dissipating the capital. As Kingdon comments: ‘This 
cuckoo syndrome is a luxury that can only be temporary.’ When finite resources 
are exhausted, the repercussions will be swift and harsh, hitting with all the 
impact of the old amoral natural necessity. And technology will be little help. 
Technology is us, it is we who have to change. 
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We cannot make a scapegoat of the technological revolution that has pampered 
us yet passed by the emaciated victims we see on television. It is an extension of 
what we are. If we are greedy and selfish technology will be a faithful mirror. Left 
to its own dynamics technological and industrial innovation trashes products, 
places and people. Technology is at once social shredder, racial churn and 
political furnace. It is for the children of technology to humanise their parent or, 
like Saturn, it will consume them. Self-made Man and his society will be undone. 
If the twenty-first century sets out to build a new sense of family it has powerful 
tools to help in the task. If it doesn't, its antithesis - increasing conflicts between 
haves and have-nots - is inevitable. 
 
Kingdon 1993: 316/7 
 
For Kingdon, the solution lies in ‘a return of much fuller and more 
demanding responsibilities to the men and women who choose to have 
children’, finding ‘the ways and means of giving a greater value to fewer 
offspring.’ Kingdon is correct to argue that ‘this cannot be a mere technical fix 
but will involve a social and spiritual revolution.’ But I think such a 
transformation entails something richer and much more profound than a 
concern with population. Giving ‘greater value’ entails a qualitative 
transformation in the human condition. This is nothing less than human self-
realisation and the attainment of the truly human society, humanisation as a 
naturalisation. 
 
I propose to argue that immanence and transcendence are the twin 
poles around which the most important issues and arguments of the 
contemporary world are organised. Maybe it has always been thus, since 
the founding of civilisation. Few lives, since the expulsion from the Garden 
of Eden, have escaped the echo of the warning and lamentation in 
Ecclesiastes: "Man is born to trouble as the spark flyeth upwards." 
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We have been bent on flying upwards ever since, as if denying, by escape, 
our roots in a fallen originary nature. My view is that set at extremes, immanence 
and transcendence lead to a precarious, restless, unhappy and unsustainable 
way of life. As against the extremes of absorption into a world of amoral natural 
necessity on the one hand and flight from/suppression of nature on the other, I 
wish to argue for a genuine balancing of immanence and transcendence in terms of 
the process by which the inherent potentiality of a natural essence is realised and 
thus becomes actual. 
 
The problem with an alienated system of production is that the realisation of an 
essence which is frustrated in reality comes to be projected upwards into a false 
transcendence, to achieve an unreal or illusory universality rather than a concrete 
reality. With the inversion of means and ends, things come to be invested not only 
with existential significance but also with divine significance, coming to be projected 
upwards into the historical process operating according to a purpose which is beyond 
and above real individuals. This is not teleology, but a substitute; it is the false 
necessity of false gods. 
 
I wish to set this problem within a philosophical frame. 
 
Philosophy does its best work in the gap between what Is and what Ought to be — 
between the world we see around us, the immediate world presented to the senses, and 
the world of the true, the good and the beautiful revealed by the mind. The awareness of 
this gap characterises the philosophical system; attempts to close this gap brings 
philosophy to its fullest expression. The unity of the true, the good and the beautiful 
constitutes the "Ought-to-be" of philosophy. 
 
Without the gap between what “is” and what “ought to be”, philosophy 
ceases to exist. Marx understood this to mean that the realisation of 
philosophy is also the abolition of philosophy; the world becomes 
philosophical as philosophy becomes worldly. (Heller 1984). 
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Philosophy apprehends and arranges what “is” from the viewpoint of what ought 
to be. The reality or unreality of being is assessed in accordance with the philosophical 
‘ought to be’ - the unity of the true, the good and the beautiful. The attainment of this 
unity requires a correct method of investigation, and, in consequence, a well-
structured and well-presented theory. As Marx argues, the 'faulty architectonics' of a 
theory is 'not accidental, rather it is the result of. . .  and . . . expresses the scientific 
deficiencies of the method of investigation itself.’ (Marx TSV vol. II, 1968: 
166/167). I shall later set Marx within the essentialist tradition of Aristotle. His 
reference to architectonics savours a great deal of Plato, who argued that to 
discover the true nature of political and social justice it is necessary to ‘first look for 
its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the 
likeness of the greater in the form of the less’ (Plato, Republic, trans. Paul Shorey, in 
Hamilton and Cairns, eds., Collected Dialogues, 368e-369a). Plato’s approach was a 
strong influence upon philosopher Immanuel Kant, who tended to state his 
argument in architectonic terms: 'there is yet another consideration which is more 
philosophical and architectonic in character; namely to grasp the idea of the 
whole correctly and thence to view all parts in their mutual relations' (Preface to 
the Critique of Practical Reason).  
The architectonic is a crucial concept and it is clear that it influenced Marx. 
The reference to architectonics indicates that Marx believed that a true theory is 
compelled by the very force of its 'deep insight' to develop an elegant conceptual 
structure. That ‘deep insight’ is what Plato called ‘the eye of the mind’. Marx, 
therefore, is working in the tradition of Pythagoras and Plato in affirming the harmony 
between truth, goodness and beauty in a rational universe.  
 
That rational universe is philosophy’s ‘ought to be’. The big question is, could this 
‘ought’ ever be realised to form the ‘is’? Philosophy is therefore a critical mode of 
thinking which seeks to penetrate beyond the fetish systems of the world as it is and 
expose the true, the good and the beautiful behind the veil of illusion. The 
defetishisation of the world is the criticism of what “is” from the viewpoint of what “ought 
to be”.  
In later chapters I shall develop the arguments of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and Marx at 
length. I work out of the essentialist tradition of philosophy which is concerned with the 
ethical development of human nature. Dating from Plato and Aristotle, essentialism is 
'rational' tradition of philosophical anthropology and is characterised by a normative 
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concern with the most appropriate regimen or mode of life for human beings as 
social, rational and moral beings. The essentialist tradition therefore exhibits a 
qualitative interest in the history of humankind. The self-realisation and affirmation of 
essential subjective qualities therefore emerges as the means by which to evaluate 
the differential modes of conduct of life (Hennis 1988:107ff; 1983). The essentialist 
philosophical anthropology therefore leads in the direction of a mode of life which 
corresponds to and enhances the human ontology rather than contradicts and 
inhibits it. Such a mode of life realises the telos of human nature. The philosophers in 
this tradition defined what “ought-to-be” as "essence", the true reality which contrasts 
with the "phenomenal" nature or "appearance" of what merely exists. In an essentialist 
metaphysics, essence and appearance refer to different cognitive abilities. In collapsing 
the distinction, empiricism leaves on the surface level of existence, trapped within a world 
of appearances, unable to apprehend the true reality that lies underneath. Nevertheless, 
the distinction between "essential" and the "inessential" are always present in any 
attempt to apprehend reality in some form. As Marx argued, without the distinction 
between appearance and reality, there can be no science. 
In philosophy, the ‘ought to be’ is true reality, not just the real but the most real: the 
unity of the true, the good and the beautiful. The end of philosophy is therefore ens 
perfectissimum — ens realissimum. The “ought to be” is not an illusion, a fantasy, a dream 
which exists only in our subjective wishes, but the very opposite. This comes out clearly 
in the Symposium, where Plato writes of seeing with the mind’s eye ‘the true beauty—
the divine beauty,’ ‘pure and clear and unalloyed’, ‘the true beauty simple and divine’. 
“Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will 
be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image 
but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God 
and be immortal, if mortal man may.” (Plato Symposium in Plochmann 1973: 294/5).  
 
Philosophy deals with realities, not illusions and fantasies. Philosophy affirms the 
capacity of the human mind to discard subjective wishes and come to connect with 
the bedrock rationality of the universe. That connection takes us beyond the surface 
reality of appearances and discrete events and accidents.  
 
Pursuing the “ought to be” in order to accessing "the true" or "the most real reality" 
implies a certain "topographical location". In metaphysics there are "heights" and 
"depths", levels of cognition which we ascend as we seek to access the ‘most real’. 
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Clearly, such a view has implications with respect to politics and the landscape itself, 
implying the erection of ideal institutions and hierarchies in order to guide people but 
which, in truth, become relations of domination based on epistemologies of rule. 
 
It is in light of this danger that Ernesto Laclau writes: 
 
The dictatorship of the proletariat bases its legitimacy on the same privileged 
access to knowledge as the Platonic philosopher king, with the difference that in 
the latter the unity between monarchical power and knowledge was 
fortuitous, while in the case of the dictatorship of the proletariat there is a 
millennialist-naturalist theory of history explaining why the latter incarnation of 
the universal has an objective and necessary character. 
 
Laclau 1990:77  
 
This is caricature in that it cuts out the crucial aspects of an essentialist philosophy. 
Laclau writes as if the telos in essentialist philosophy is written into history 
independently of human moral choice, will, and action. Such a notion makes no sense 
whatsoever of the central thesis of essentialism – that human beings are essentially 
something and something essentially in terms of their social, rational and moral 
character. It is precisely the possession of that essence that precludes the imposition 
of the theoretico-elitist model that Laclau mistakenly presents as Plato’s view. 
Ultimately, the topographical location of true reality lies in humanity itself— in human 
freedom as the factum of reason. There is no privileged access to true reality in this 
conception at all; that access is available to all on account of the essential rationality of 
humanity. For Marx, this implies the truly realised society of realised human beings. 
 
In passing, we should note that Laclau’s denial of naturalist essences leads him 
to a view in which identities are constructed, a far more totalitarian notion than 
anything proposed in the essentialist tradition. According to essentialist metaphysics, 
there is a true reality. This is the bedrock rational universe which guards against any 
external agency manipulating reality and the people in it according to subjective whim 
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and fancy. Laclau’s constructivism asserts existence over essence and invites 
external manipulation and management. Where essentialism holds that all as rational 
beings are capable of accessing the rational universe, Laclau’s strategy denies the 
existence of such a universe, reality is made-up, with power and knowledge going to 
those who make it up. Frankly, it’s mere pseudo-philosophy that retreats before the 
big questions of the true, the good and the beautiful and instead remains in the safety 
of the shallow end of the pool.  
 
We have to be clear here, and avoid misinterpretation. Jacob Bronowski lost 
many members of his family in Auschwitz. He writes: ‘We have to cure ourselves of 
the itch for absolute knowledge and power. We have to close the distance between 
the push-button order and the human act. We have to touch people.’ (Bronowski 
2011: 284/5). 
 
We now have planetary engineers writing of humanity as ‘the god species’ and of 
human beings becoming as gods (Mark Lynas 2011, Stewart Brand 2009). 
Bronowski makes short work of that old delusion. ‘When people believe that they 
have absolute knowledge, with no test in reality, this is how they behave. This is 
what men do when they aspire to the knowledge of gods.’ (Bronowski 2011: 
284/285). The key phrase there is ‘with no test in reality’. Bronowski is not 
abandoning the question for knowledge, far from it. He is just concerned to ground 
it in reality. We have to close the distance between the rational order and the 
human act. ‘We have to touch people’. In a TV interview with Michael Parkinson, 
promoting his series The Ascent of Man, Bronowski states that despite all he has 
suffered, he ‘never had any uncertainty about the meaning of the word good, the 
meaning of the word true, the meaning of the word beautiful.’ Despite the world of 
accidental events, the ultimate reality exists. That is the world we are charged with 
accessing, that is the ultimate test of our knowledge. 
 
For Kant humankind is the universal, for Feuerbach human-ness is the singular 
— the concrete, individual sensuous being, for Marx it is the species being 
differentiated and realised throughout the historical process. Rather than proposing a 
theoretico-elitist model based upon privileged access to knowledge and power, the 
essentialist tradition seeks the democratisation of power, politics and philosophy. 
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It was from an essentialist position that Antonio Gramsci argued against the view 
that philosophy is the specific intellectual activity of specialists and professionals. 
Pointing to the rational capacity as universal in the human species, Gramsci argues 
that ‘all men are "philosophers"’. Since this is the case, Gramsci argued that ‘It is 
essential to destroy the widespread prejudice that philosophy is a strange and 
difficult thing just because it is the specific intellectual activity of a particular category 
of specialists or of professional and systematic philosophers. It must first be shown 
that all men are "philosophers"’. (Gramsci 1971 Prison Notebooks ch 7). 
 
Gramsci describes language, common and good sense and popular 
religion as a kind of ‘spontaneous’ philosophy that most individuals engage in. 
Human beings are rational and moral beings and so engage in such 
‘spontaneous’ philosophy every day. As an intellectual discipline concerning 
the framing of arguments and definition of terms, philosophy goes much 
further than this. Nevertheless, rather than remain in academic abstraction as 
the province of the professional philosophers, philosophy, in the essentialist 
tradition, must be drawn back into the everyday habitus of human beings. In 
pointing to the common moral reason that each and all possess by virtue of 
their humanity, Kant is able to go beyond Plato’s conception of the 
philosopher-ruler. In true Socratic fashion, there is no pretence at attempting 
to teach moral reason to individuals from outside their own reason, in the role 
of a philosopher. Any change in behaviour derives from the common moral 
reason which is innate to all human beings, not from some abstracted 
rationality which the philosopher imparts to human beings from the outside. 
The role of the philosopher is not to rule the people, but to goad the people 
into using their reason. In this way, Kant democratises Plato’s philosopher 
ruler with the idea that philosophy should rule come to rule. Kant, the epitome 
of the professional philosopher, thus undercuts claims to the superiority of 
theoretical reason, showing human beings how little they need with respect to 
theory if they just rely on their common moral reason. (KGS XXIV, pp. 
212,330.) Kant’s Socratic spur to human self-knowledge is also a legislating of 
the difference between wisdom about ends which arises from common moral 
reason, and theoretical knowledge or science. (KGS XVIII, Reflection 4902). 
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In fine, the essentialist tradition therefore affirms what Kant called the 
common moral reason innate to human beings, not some abstracted 
rationality given to human beings by professional, academic philosophers. 
(see Peter Critchley The Socratism of Immanuel Kant, Praxisphilsophie.de, 
2012).  
 
It is the essentialist assumption of a common moral reason on the part of 
each and all that the hope of realising the “ought to be” and thereby making 
the world philosophical rests. It is in the assumption of a rational capacity on 
the part of all human beings as members of the species homo sapiens that 
allows us to democratise Plato’s ‘Philosopher-Ruler’ so that philosophy should 
rule through all men and women becoming philosophers. In becoming 
philosophers, human beings make the world philosophical. 
 
It was in this vein that Gramsci defined the fundamental question of politics:  
 
‘Is it the intention that there should always be rulers and ruled, or is 
the objective to create the conditions in which this division is no 
longer necessary ?’ (Gramsci 1971:144). 
 
Such a notion recalls Aristotle’s definition of the citizen as one who rules 
and is ruled in turn. 
 
The realisation of the unity of the true, the good and the beautiful constitutes the 
unity of what “ought to be” and what “is” as the ‘most real’, the ens realissimum. Every 
philosophical system worthy of the name throughout history has been predicated on 
this assumption. Against the world of the shadows, the world of Becoming, Plato 
opposed the world of ideas, the world of Being; Aristotle opposed pure form to 
matter; for Spinoza, the substance is the most real, with every individual 
existence being merely an extension of it; against the empirical world of the 
‘will of all’, as the will of selfish individuals, Rousseau opposed the ‘general will’ 
as the true human will; Kant contrasted homo phenomenon, a world of 
empirical necessity, with homo noumenon, a world of moral goodness; Hegel 
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opposes reason as the consciousness of freedom to an unconscious humanity; 
Marx opposes truly human society of realised human beings to alienated 
humanity; in History and Class Consciousness, Lukacs distinguished empirical 
consciousness with imputed consciousness.  
 
All of these examples contrast an empirical world of appearances and discrete, 
accidental events and subjective wishes with the essential reality we must access if 
we are to be free. The “ought to be” is therefore the rational capacity of human 
beings coming to confront a given, immediate existence with an appreciation of what 
is most real. There is a gap between “is” and “ought to be” and it is in this 
gap that philosophy works. Not only is what “is” criticised by what “ought to be”, it 
is constituted by it, only to be dissolved by it. That is, what “is” becomes inessential 
when what “ought to be” reveals what is essential. Shakespeare’s Hamlet expresses 
this creative role of reason in realising the truly real: "There is nothing either good or 
bad, but thinking makes it so." (Hamlet act II, scene 2).  
Whilst philosophy works in the gap between the “is” and the “ought to be”, 
philosophy and reality do not stand in external relationship to each other; each 
requires the other to exist. Philosophy articulates ultimate reality by way of 
reason. Ultimate reality is true reality, the most real. But at the level of philosophy, 
something is true to the extent that every thinking person can recognise it to be 
true according to the use of their own innate reason. Kant’s motto of the 
enlightenment encapsulates this view - "Sapere aude", meaning 'Have the 
courage to use your own reason!' Dare to be rational! Dare to be wise! Dare to be a 
philosopher (Kant Political Writings Reiss ed 1996:54).  
 
Philosophy's function is, with the, help of rational thought, to induce human 
beings to use their reason so as to recognise what “ought to be” — that true, good 
and beautiful which philosophy already knows as the ultimate reality. This is to 
expose the inessentiality of what merely “is” in light of essence. Marsilio Ficino 
writes of ‘the ascent of the mind from the lower regions to the highest, and from 
darkness to light.’ (Marsilio Ficino 1433-1499 Letters). This ascent is the core of the 
philosophical approach to reality. The idea of a ladder leader from earth to the 
heavens used to be familiar. It can be found all over the medieval world, in Jewish 
and Christian thought, also in Averroes and Avicenna. It means no more than the 
use of reason gives us access to higher truths, truths beyond the senses and 
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beyond the empirical world of accident and necessity. We no longer live in 
philosophical times. Here we reap the whirlwind of Derrida and post-modernism. We 
live on the surface and mistake appearance for the one and only reality. To think of 
a truth that is somewhere beyond the veil of illusion is to be guilty of ‘totalitarianism’ 
in some form or other. 
 
Plato’s philosopher-ruler is forever wheeled out here by people who have clearly 
never bothered to read or understand the Republic let alone Plato’s other works. 
The Republic was not a political blueprint, despite critics constantly arguing as 
though it was; it was an elaboration of philosophical principles. Rather than do the 
difficult thing and actually engage in philosophical argument, Plato is condemned by 
the simplest of reasoning by association. Plato argued for a philosopher-ruler, such 
an idea is undemocratic, therefore Plato and the thinking he inspired is totalitarian. 
Caricature that might be, but it’s what passes for thinking in these superficial times. 
We are losing the ability to think deeply.  
 
The looming ecological catastrophe is taking us beyond our specialisms, beyond 
even the realm of cognition. We need to recover teleology. We need to reject the 
bogus forms that teleology has assumed in coming to be attached to alien powers 
and system imperatives; we need to reclaim those purposes which are central to the 
realisation of natural essences. This requires a philosophical anthropology in which 
reason is equipped with a moral component. We are being pulled into a destiny not 
of our own election, that bears no relation to our essential being. Reclaiming our 
future requires that we have the courage to look deeply into human nature with a 
view to bringing about that society which corresponds with the human essence. And 
that means having the epistemic guts to shake off intellectual slumbers and do some 
hard thinking on deep issues, regardless of which favoured nostrums are upset. For 
far too long the world of words has wallowed in mental torpor and timidity. The mere 
mention of a reason that is more than personal wish, selfish desire or subjective 
opinion is condemned as elitist and totalitarian and anti-democratic. A time of social 
and ecological crisis is the time for intellectual realignment. The big ideas are out 
there. They have always been out there. It’s just that, clinging to surface level 
appearances, people have stopped thinking big. Time and again before the ascent 
into the light of essence, people retreat. So I make no apologies for recovering the 
thought of Plato and Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and Marx. My purpose is to recover the 
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richness in essentialist thinking that the modern mechanistic world has discarded. 
This recovery of a genuine metaphysics is crucial if, at long last, we are to address 
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2 THE DIALECTICS OF PROGRESS 
 
To continue to believe in progress seems to be an act of blind faith today. To 
economic depression we can add a psychological depression, a loss of hope in the 
future and in ourselves. The further we go into the twenty first century, the more 
pessimistic people seem to be becoming . Pollyanna-ish predictions of a restoration of 
economic growth are not persuasive. Magazines like The Economist point to the facts 
that living standards are higher for more people the world over. They are right. The 
question is why we refuse to believe it. The price of progress has been a great 
insecurity that constantly unsettles human being and denies a moral sense of place and 
identity. All the economic growth in the world is incapable of filling the hollowness at the 
heart of the human condition in a disenchanted, rationalised, commodified world.  
 
And at all times, the looming ecological catastrophe casts a giant shadow. The 
shadow of death hangs over us all. Those of a more theological persuasion would 
refer to the mark of Cain, here. But is seems much more than this. The sin of 
brother murdering brother has been magnified by our technology. Rosa 
Luxemburg gave us the choice ‘socialism or barbarism’. If we fail to use our 
powers constructively, we will use them destructively. Means of production come 
to be turned into means of destruction. Instead of socialism, a social production 
for social need, we have the military-industrial complex, a protective apparatus 
perpetuating capital’s objective, ‘unsocial’ socialisation. The capital system does 
not automatically maximize human happiness and economic efficiency, as a belief 
in Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ maintains. Rather, it socializes the world in an 
unsocial way. In making the distinction between capital’s unsocial socialisation 
and a genuine socialisation, Michael Harrington argues that ‘socialism … is the 
hope for human freedom and justice under the unprecedented conditions of life 
that humanity will face in the twenty-first century.’ (Harrington 1993 ch 1). 
 
 
That’s a variation of the socialism or barbarism thesis, and it can only 
be defended on the basis of an essentialist metaphysics. I shall develop 
the essentialist position at length later in the book. For the moment, I shall 
introduce the terms of the debate, highlighting essentialist categories and 
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modes of reasoning.) Socialism is the creative realisation of the inherent 
potentiality of the capitalist social organism. Through creative human 
agency, the unsocial, objective socialisation of the capital system is thus to 
be actualised as a social socialisation.  
But there are people who think that such an argument is not politics but faith. 
It evinces an unwarranted belief in ‘progress’. I shall come to John Grey  and ‘the 
delusions of progress’ later. Again, I shall argue that an essentialist metaphysics 
allows us to separate necessary and realisable lines of future development – a 
progress grounded in realities – from projections that are no more than fantasies. 
Lacking an awareness of necessary lines based on natural essences, we become 
prisoners of the narrow horizon of surface level appearances. On this level, it is 
easy to be overimpressed and overwhelmed by discrete facts.  
 
The facts are indeed gloomy. The frustration of socialist expectations turned 
the twentieth century into a charnel house.  
 
 
The Charnel House 1945 Picasso 
 
Well over one hundred million human beings were killed in the twentieth century, 
whether directly by being shot, bombed, starved, or gassed during war, or indirectly by 
the famine and disease that follow in the trail of organised war. And was is an organised 
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killing. Figures like this are not achieved by accident, they are a matter of conscious 
purpose, deliberate decision, planning and preparation. A world that has been 
brainwashed into repeating that socialism is an impossible utopia that is beyond technical, 
financial and institutional reach accepts unthinkingly a $1.7 trillion global arms budget and 
killing on a mass scale. The modern world is characterized by technology, war, military 
power and death. The near total silence about possibilities for socialism is as 
deafening as the endless talk about war. We are in the world of human sacrifice, the 
price that human beings have to pay for their veneration of the new idols of state, 
capital, money and technology. 
In 1906, in The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, Edward Westermarck 
wrote optimistically:  
 
"We find that various peoples who at a certain period have been addicted to 
the practice of human sacrifice, have afterwards at a more advanced stage of 
civilization voluntarily given it up. . . . With the growth of enlightenment men 
would lose faith in this childish method of substitution, and consequently find it 
not only useless but objectionable; and any sentimental disinclination to the 
practice would by itself, in the course of time, lead to the belief that the deity no 
longer cares for it, or is averse to it." 
 
Westermarck p. 468 
 
Anthropologists thus saw human sacrifice as a sinister but passing vice which 
would come to be discarded in the name of progress. We can now see the fallacy 
of this view. With ‘progress’, human sacrifice has taken another form, a more 
indirect bribe offered to the new gods. What is different is the loss of the direct 
psychological link between priest and sacrificial victim, the meaning that sacrifice 
once conveyed. In the past, human sacrifice was a staging post on the road 
toward renewal in life. Modern sacrifice is wholly without such meaning.  
In Human Sacrifice In History and Today (1981), Nigel Davies argues that 
today, ‘people can still be mentally programmed to kill themselves en masse.’ And 
kill each other. Davies looks at the numbers of deaths and argues that the mass 
killings of the modern world are a form of human sacrifice that has lost its purpose 
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and is out of control. He is being provocative when he asks: ‘faced with the mass 
brutality of our century, real as well as simulated, one may ask whether, in its place, 
man might not do better to revert to the ritualized killings of the past.’ He writes of 
sacrificial victims in the past dying with dignity for the common good. The sacrifice 
was controlled. Modern sacrifice is excessive, a psychological excess as well as a 
physical excess. ‘If violence is endemic, sacrificial violence is at least a more restrained 
form… At the root of human sacrifice lay a belief in a hereafter that was not unlike life 
on earth. Even where victims were not slain with the precise end of serving their 
master in the next world, they never doubted the future blessings in store for 
them.’ Davies points out the hopeless character of modern mass killing as a form 
of sacrifice. 
 
In almost all cultures but our own the living and the dead belonged to one 
single community, and death did not signify separation from a man's loved ones. 
Only in the world of today has death been demythologized. It has become a 
separate state, divorced from life, and we strive obsessively to save the dying 
from crossing this great divide. Once people share the belief that this life is the 
be-all and end-all of their existence, ritual sacrifice must abate, regardless of 
what other forms of killing take its place. In this respect, the modern ideologies 
differ absolutely from the old religions. However elusive their new promise of 
paradise, its gates are to be sought in this world, not the next. If modern dogmas 
also claim their victims, they die without hope and their end is not sacrificial.  
 
Davies 1981: 289 
 
The word ‘religion’ derives from the Latin religere, meaning to bind together. The 
rationalised, disenchanted world of capitalist modernity is said to be secularised, a 
world beyond such religion. Traditional society catered for both material and spiritual 
needs, seeing religious rituals as a vital uniting force in the community. Human 
sacrifice was an integral part of the human striving to live in harmony with the 
cosmos. That cosmic need is a permanent feature of the human condition. The 
problem is that the disenchantment of the world has enclosed human beings within 
the physical, temporal sphere. There is no meaning beyond this world. But that 
doesn’t mean that secularisation is irreligious. Instead, the cosmic striving has 
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come to be invested in things, the new gods of state, bureaucracy, capital, money, 
commodities, technology. These all come with imperatives of their own. These are 
the gods that human beings need to bribe or propitiate; and these gods demand an 
endless human sacrifice. With the death of God, a whole range of theological 
assumptions and religious impulses lose their moorings, and come to be attached 
to objective powers, ‘things’; systemic imperatives and objectives come to acquire 
the force of necessary belief; human beings come to obey ends which are external 
to them. The full extent of this overwhelming power can be measured in the tens of 
millions of human beings killed in the twentieth century. Instead of the realisation of 
the telos of human social nature, we have had the veneration of alien powers, 
modern idols demanding human sacrifice. When asked to describe the twentieth 
century, Rene Dumont (agronomist, ecologist) said: 'I see it only as a century of 
massacres and wars.' Well, neither wars nor massacres are modern inventions. 
What is distinctive about the modern world is the scale and intensity with which mass 
murder has been waged. When Picasso saw the Palaeolithic art in the caves at 
Lascaux he remarked ‘We have invented nothing. We have made no progress in 
culture, although we have invented organized war on a massive scale’. 
There will be no progress until human beings start to live in cosmic harmony, 
and that means recovering a sense of cohesion in our modern disenchanted and 
fragmented society. It means recovering a genuine sense of religere, a binding 
together of human beings in society and of society with nature. 
 
 
Massacre in Korea 1951 Picasso 
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Picasso ranges the forces of death against the forces of life. I find it significant 
that Picasso ranges technologically sophisticated, tooled and armoured men in a 
flat landscape against peaceful women and children, set against a natural 
backdrop. It sets the dualism of nature and civilisation at extremes, certainly, but 
this has the merit of expressing the issue with a force and vigour that cannot be 
overlooked. In calling for balance in the use of our technology, we are presuming 
that balance is achievable. But what if our technological overdevelopment is driven 
by an urge to escape nature in the first place? What if the triumph of thanatos over 
eros is part of an ineliminable psychosexual conflict between feminine and 
masculine nature? If so, the human species is forever sailing precariously between 
the twin reefs of immanence and transcendence. I would compare the dilemma to 
the labours of Sisyphus, the human species has to strive ever onwards and 
upwards in order to avoid being crushed on the ground. The only problem is that 
there is no end point, nothing at journey’s end. The human species seems doomed 
to be forever going up and down, yet round and round within nature’s circularity. I 
get the impression that we are beginning to the attempt to escape from nature as 
futile, but rather than abandon the climb to nowhere, there is one last throw of 
technology against nature. 
To those who die as a result of war and conflict, famine, disease and 
poverty, Doomsday comes every day in the modern world. Organised killing on 
a vast scale is a singular achievement of modernity. 
 
'Ten million people died in the First World War, with the indecisive battle of Verdun 
alone costing 700,000 casualties and the Somme a million. The Turks massacred 
nearly a million Armenians. In the early 1930s the building of socialism in the Soviet 
Union involved the death of perhaps 10 million peasants; as many as another 10 million 
died during the Purges, mostly in forced labour camps. The Second World War in 
Europe killed more than 40 million, including 6 million Jews, The Asian Second World 
War killed perhaps 20 million in the twenty years from the Japanese invasion of China 
through to the victory of the Chinese Revolution.’ (Based on Elliot, The Twentieth 
Century Book of the Dead, 1972). 
 
The First World War marks a turning point in human history. We had seen 
mechanised wars in the nineteenth century, in Crimea and in the American Civil War. 
But the First World War was the war of machines without purpose. All sides 
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subscribed to the war as a noble and heroic cause, and many poets and artists in all 
countries – Brooke in England, Marc and the Expressionists, the Futurists in Italy – 
succumbed to the delusion. In no time, the war reduced to a purposeless machine 
grinding out mass death with relentless, uncontrollable regularity. For four years, six 
thousand soldiers a day were killed. In the aftermath we got the battle between 
Communism and Fascism/Nazism, in turn followed by the Cold War. Purposeless mass 
killing thus gained an ideological that added some kind of much needed meaning to an 
utterly meaningless machine war. The foundations of mass military attrition were laid in 
the First World War, with the ideological dimension that came later bringing a mass 
civilian attrition. 
 
Achieving mass death on this scale is not accidental but requires political, 
institutional, psychological and technical preparation. Bertrand Russell was clear what 
was at stake, arguing that the era of Enlightenment and Progress came to an end in 
1914. The First World War began the process of brutalization that would come to make 
mass murder thinkable and hence possible.  
 
 
In 1914, Russell contemplated whether humankind was hopelessly addicted to 
violence and self-destruction. His considered view was that whether the world would 
become heaven or hell depended upon human choice. (Has Man a Future?) Those who 
seek to evade the question entertain the view that life may well carry on as now, some 
sub-paradisaical, but also sub-infernal. In this complacent view, humankind carries on 
disliking its existence under the shadow of nuclear holocaust, but coming to accept risks 
and diminish anxieties and thus reduce the dangers of catastrophe. That sounds like a 
permanent dis-ease to me, with all manner of psychological consequences. And 
catastrophe has now taken the form of an unavoidable ecological crisis. Whether or not a 
nuclear holocaust is avoidable, an eco-catastrophe as a result of the irresponsible use of 
human technology cannot be avoided. Russell’s point with respect to human choice 
remains valid. To fail to exercise choice is to make a choice by default, it is to choose the 
status quo and its death dealing beliefs and practices. 
 
We are still living in the maelstrom unleashed by the First World War. Rather than 
being the war to end all wars, the 1914-18 set the model for the technical and 
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organizational commitment to mass killing that came in the century after. Organised 
mass murder presupposes a mindset of total warfare, a brutalized population which 
accepts the need to kill in order to 'save' itself. The preparation continues to this day, 
as the techniques of total war are brought to perfection. We seem permanently placed 
on the edge of oblivion. The many Doomsdays that people suffer along the way make 
the singly Doomsday all the more comprehensible. 
The ‘scale of man-made death is the central moral as well as material fact of our 
time,' Gil Elliot writes in The Twentieth Century Book of the Dead (1972: 6). The 
capital system is the world of the dead. Marx wrote of capital as ‘dead labour’, meaning 
the creative power of labour taking alien, objectified form. Sociologist Max Weber 
argued that the ‘iron cage’ of modernity will determine the lives of all the individuals 
who are born into it with irresistible force ‘until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt.’ 
(Weber 1985: 181). Fossil fuels are ancient wastes with Mother Nature in her 
wisdom has sealed up beneath her skin. The capital system is fuelled by dead 
labour and dead matter. This is not progress as an organic growth, it is a necropolis.  
 
The ancient cosmogony would cater for matter and spirit, life and death, this world 
and the next. A disenchanted world collapses all of this into a single flatland. It should 
come as no surprise, therefore, that we have created a veritable world of the dead that 
dwarfs the world of the living in size and significance. Frustrated expectations are 
diverted into the world of the dead. The meaning we once saw in life is now sought in 
death, the hopes for a better future, a better life, are made conditional upon sufficient 
sacrifice, in quantity and quality. The faith that it is possible for human beings to come 
to create and dwell in the peaceable land is more and more difficult to hold. A hundred 
years war waged against socialism had the result of channelling revolutionary hopes 
into a defensive, limited, distorted politics, the terrain coming to be dominated by world 
war, Fascism, Nazism, Communism, the Cold War. Whatever the rights and wrongs of 
this struggle, it was the rational hope for a better life that was deliberately and 
systematically subjected to assault. The continual defeat of hopes has the effect of 
sapping energy, undermining commitment and encouraging cynicism and despair. If 
the road to Hell is paved with good intentions, why have those intentions in the first 
place? Socialism or barbarism, Luxemburg argued. But what if Stalinism turned 
socialism into barbarism? What hopes can we have in the aftermath of the defeat of 
socialist hopes?  
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A great deal that has been humanly positive in the modern age seems inseparable 
from a own negative side. Progress seems to be accompanied by regress, 
achievements being offset by crises. In these circumstances it is relatively easy to 
become lost and confused in the thicket of accident. It is easy to succumb to 
pessimism. There are plenty of reasons for pessimism. But that reveals the limitations 
of atomism and empiricism, to become overimpressed by the world of accidental 
events and to fail to see the bigger picture. Marx’s essentialism involves an organic 
dialectics that can see alienation as a progressive force. 
 
There is one great fact, characteristic of this our nineteenth century, a fact which 
no party dares deny. On the one hand, there have started into life industrial and 
scientific forces which no epoch of former human history had ever suspected. 
On the other hand, there exist symptoms of decay, far surpassing the horrors 
recorded of the latter times of the Roman empire. In our days everything seems 
pregnant with its contrary. Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of 
shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving-and overworking it. 
The new-fangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into 
sources of want. The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. At the 
same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to 
other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable 
to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress 
seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying 
human life into a material force. This antagonism between modern industry and 
science on the one hand, modern misery and dissolution on the other hand; this 
antagonism between the productive powers and the social relations of our epoch is 
a fact, palpable, overwhelming, and not to be controverted. Some parties may wail 
over it; others may wish to get rid of modern arts, in order to get rid of modern 
conflicts. Or they may imagine that so signal a progress in industry wants to be 
completed by as signal a regress in politics. On our part, we do not mistake the 
shape of the shrewd spirit that continues to mark all these contradictions. We know 
that to work well the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered 
by new-fangled men - and such are the working men. (Marx AB SE 1973). 
 
In other words, it is fairly easy to spot the downside of progress. But to 
conclude from this that progress is a delusion not only betrays a superficial 
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metaphysics, it is to miss the potentialities for progress that are available. Marx 
is well aware of the extent to which, in an alienated system of production, 
human beings come to invest material things with an existential significance. 
As a result of such alienation, all our invention and progress end up stultifying 
human life into a material force. This condition is revocable. Marx took the high 
road beyond capitalist modernity, seeing alienation as a progress force, a 
condition that could be redeemed by the practical reappropriation of human 
power. Others are overwhelmed by the scale of the crisis and sound the 
retreat. 
 
To ask about progress is a pertinent question given the extent to which it 
seems that modernity has come to the end of a historic phase of intense 
industrial expansion, and yet the problems that economic growth were 
supposed to have solved have become all the more pressing, war, famine, 
poverty. Even worse, we are now seeing the costs of such growth in the shape 
of the fundamental ecological limits which are increasingly encroaching on 
modern society. It has become imperative to redefine 'the good life', moving 
away from the emphasis upon quantity and possession towards a more 
qualitative experience. As the century is unfolding, the false hope that has 
been invested in the expectations  of an of ever-expanding economy is 
becoming manifest. 
 
But none of this offers a reason for abandoning progress as a delusion. 
What is required is a disillusionment with respect to the dominant conceptions 
which see economic expansion, industrialisation, military might etc as itself the 
march of human progress. That is to mistake the objective preconditions for 
progress for the real thing, the means for the ends.  
 
But pessimism with regards to progress has been around for a while. Spengler 
and Toynbee wrote about modernity in terms of the decline of civilisation. Whilst this 
could look like a reactionary rejection of progress, thinkers of more left wing 
persuasions have also expressed pessimism. There was a cultural pessimism at the 
core of much of the writing of the Frankfurt School, in notions of the ‘administered 
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society’ (Adorno and Horkheimer) and the ‘one dimensional society’ (Marcuse). Back 
in the 1970s, Robert Heilbroner, a writer in the marxist tradition, wrote An Inquiry into 
the Human Prospect (1974). His view was that basic transformations in the modern 
world were creating a bleak prospect for the long term good. 
 
Perhaps, in one sense, thinkers were at last starting to think deeply about 
human agency, at last taking morality seriously in terms of its centrality to 
human freedom and choice. The idea that progress is uni-linear always 
risked undermining morality, with human beings transferring responsibility for 
the good life from their own agency to economic expansion. A moral position 
affirms the radical indeterminacy of the future. We can explain past events 
with a view to understanding the present, but we are ourselves called upon to 
make the future. Only then can we ensure that progress ensues with a 
human face. So, a certain disillusionment with progress is a condition of 
investing the historical process with moral meaning. 
 
Certainly, there have always been profound critics of the modern world, those who 
could see no basis for progress at all in those ‘dark satanic mills'. But what distinguishes 
the marxist tradition from the likes of Blake, Baudelaire, and Balzac, from Tolstoy, 
from the Symbolist poets and Spengler and Nietzsche, is the ability to identify the 
redemptive qualities of the capitalist system. Capital shows the scale of human 
power in alien form; the solution to the modern crisis is the reclamation of that 
power. More easily said than done, Max Weber argued. The modern institutional 
machinery possesses an inexorable force that is beyond the intentions and wills 
of human agents, Weber argued. Instead of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ 
sought by the socialists, we would get the ‘dictatorship of the officials’. History 
seems to have proven Weber right on this point. But, to repeat the point about the 
radical indeterminacy of the future, it remains within our moral power to prove 
otherwise. A pessimistic belief in an inevitable regress is just as much a delusion 
as a naïve optimism in an inevitable progress. It’s the same disempowering 
mentality, they are merely two sides of the same coin of determinism. 
 
Since Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, there has been 
increasing uncertainty and foreboding with respect to the future. In 1980, Robert 
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Nisbet wrote pessimistically with respect to the idea of progress: 'Disbelief, doubt, 
disillusionment and despair have taken over, or so it would seem from our literature, 
art, philosophy, theology, even our scholarship and science.' (Nisbet, 1980: 318) 
For Nisbett, the modern world is 'almost barren of faith in progress'. (Nisbet 1980: 
353) 
 
It is significant that this doubt has not brought about a change in the prevailing 
social and characterological structures. Modern identities and psychologies remain 
organized around a belief in progress. This is generating a painful bifurcation in the 
modern psyche. Doubt is becoming pervasive, yet the dominant faith in progress 
remains unchallenged and unaltered. Modern society remains firmly committed to 
the old assumptions of progress through economic growth, technological 
innovation and scientific advance. For all of the evidence of regress, we are 
unable to shed this faith in progress through ‘things’. This conception of progress 
structures our identities and perceptions. To abandon them would cause an 
existential crisis. We lack a compelling alternative vision. The problem is that such 
distorted lenses render it well nigh impossible to entertain appropriate visions of the 
present.  
 
Can we find a reason to sustain a belief in progress? Only by recognising that 
progress is not a given, it is not written into the historical process and it is not an 
inevitable consequence of human action. As A. O. Lovejoy argues, the hope invested in 
the idea of progress is based on 'a tendency inherent in nature or man to pass 
through a regular sequence of stages of development in the past, the present and the 
future, the latter stages being—with perhaps occasional retardations or regressions—
superior to the earlier.'  
Nisbet defines 'superior' in terms of an improvement in knowledge and in 'man's 
moral or spiritual condition on earth, his happiness, his freedom from torments of nature 
and society, and above all his serenity or tranquility.' That’s progress as something 
more than an accumulation or expansion of material things. Yet, modern society is 
organised entirely around such material enlargement, the belief that industrialization 
and modernization as such automatically lead to a better life. The growth of the industrial 
system and the development of human powers are understood to be concomitant.  
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Ernst Bloch defines a qualitatively different kind of progress. 'Once man has 
comprehended himself and has established his own domain in real democracy, 
without depersonalization and alienation, something arises in the world which all men 
have glimpsed in childhood: a place and a state in which no one has yet been. And the 
name of this something is home or homeland.' 
An argument like this is easily dismissed as utopian. The philosopher Immanuel Kant 
could defend such a view in terms of the moral freedom of human beings. 
 
This perfect state may never, indeed, come into being; none the less 
this does not affect the rightfulness of the idea, which, in order to bring the 
legal organisation of mankind ever nearer to its greatest possible 
perfection, advances this maximum as an archetype. For what the highest 
degree may be at which mankind may have to come to a stand, and how 
great a gulf may still have to be left between the idea and its realisation, are 
questions which no one can, or ought to, answer. For the issue depends on 
freedom; and it is in the power of freedom to pass beyond any and every 
specified limit. 
 
Kant CPuR 1965 
 
Such a view affirms the radical indeterminacy of the future, highlighting the moral 
praxis of human beings in pursuit of an ideal as the object of their willing. 
My argument is that a belief in progress goes beyond the accidental world 
of the surface and sees a deeper meaning and linkage in the apparently 
discrete events of the present. An essentialist position sees beyond events, 
both positive and negative, identifies lines of development and thereby 
reveals a path for action towards the realisation of future goals. As such, 
Marx’s essentialism absorbs the dialectics of progress contained in an earlier 
teleology expressing the human longing for the good life, and reveals this 
alternative to be a realistic tendency unfolding within the immanent 
potentialities of the present. In Marx’s hands, the age old human longings 
became an emancipatory project to be struggled for in this world, not 
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postponed to the next. I shall come later to assess John Gray’s view that 
such thinking represents a secular myth of progress taken over from religious 
eschatology. Such a view is plausible in general outline but breaks down 
under analysis. 
 
But there is a plausibility in John Gray’s view. To question ‘progress’ is to express 
the crisis of the modern world and to highlight the increasing inability of the modern 
world to point the way to progress as the twenty first century unfolds. To doubt the 
existence of progress in theory presumes its absence in practice. Nevertheless, the 
increasingly pervasive scepticism with respect to progress has yet to transform the 
old identities. People are clinging on to the failing gods out of existential faith, and 
no more. 
A dialectics of progress must be able to separate positive directions from negative 
directions, placing the discrete events of the present within an essentialist 
framework which comprehends them as a  whole and is therefore capable of 
identifying alternative paths of development. A dialectics of progress, therefore, is 
capable of identifying necessary lines of development leading beyond the present, in 
the process exploring the meaning and capacity of creative human agency. And 
that includes taking morality seriously.  
It isn’t surprising that philosophers and thinkers are asking whether there is 
reason to believe in progress anymore. This questioning of the central belief system 
of modernity implies that there is something awry within the modern project. 
Evidence for that view is not difficult to find. The progressive assumptions of 
capitalist modernity are crumbling. But a failure to make fine distinctions here 
can lead to perfectly possible and feasible forms of progress coming to be 
discarded with unwarranted assumptions. The question is how we can 
reconstruct progress on defensible philosophical and psychological foundations.  
Progress is not, ultimately, a belief, it is a practice. Progress depends upon 
human agency, combing objective condition and subjective expectation: action 
firmly grounded in the real potentialities of essential organisms. The problem with 
the modern world is that it has lost the essential appreciation of immanent 
potentialities which was central to Marx’s understanding. Of course, progress 
detached from essence becomes delusional. For Marx, progress always depends 
on human agency within social relations. Whilst human beings may continually 
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project a field of images, dreams, desires, reality is a field of materialist immanence 
in which the essential conditions for realizing ideals are decisive. 
 
The purpose of this book is to expose the death-dealing delusions of progress as a 
bogus teleology attached to alien powers. With disillusionment we can begin to 
construct an alternative progress founded upon an essentialist metaphysics. Confined 
to surface level appearance and events, we cannot help but find the likes of John Gray 
plausible as a witness of catastrophe. There does indeed seem to be little point to the 
attempt to return the world to its normal categories. My point is that the modern 
catastrophe is morally, politically, emotionally and intellectually too much to grasp within 
an atomist and empiricist metaphysics. Gray flounders without the essentialist 
categories, he can find no meaning in the world as he wrestles with it in his own little 
corner.  
 
We should not allow ourselves to be derailed by a faulty metaphysics. Atomism and 
empiricism give a misleading impression of the whole from the perspective of a particular 
time and place. The world is always more than a series of discrete facts. 
To question progress is most appropriate, however. Humanity is caught up in the 
ruins of a dominant conception of progress without knowing it; dominated by past hopes 
which have failed, yet unable to pull clear by taking an alternative path. Unable to make 
connections between events and facts, humanity is unable to identify a path leading 
beyond the failing present. Rather than retreat in the face of the destruction of hopes, it 
makes more sense to examine the ruins and try to understand why these events 
happened, make the necessary connections, penetrate to underlying structures, 
relations and dynamics so as to distinguish emancipatory lines from dead-ends, and 
thus be wiser about which paths to pursue and which to avoid. Those who fail to do this 
have no option but to turn back. But that’s a road that leads to nowhere. 
 
To question progress means to avoid a cosmic pessimism in which an event is merely 
one more fact in a series of facts through which we make our way blindly, without 
meaning, without hope. It is to trace events to human agency. It is to see both good and 
bad as a human praxis, to see whatever happens in history as the more or less 
conscious, deliberate project of human individuals within various kinds of 
collectivities.  
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Unravelling the dialectics of progress means identifying the social structures, 
contexts and dynamics out of which human beings act. To ask what kinds of social 
relations, dynamics and contradictions produce death and destruction is also to 
ask what relationships and contexts are the conditions of the flourishing life. To 
point to evidence for the former in the shape of the events of the past hundred 
years or more is the easy task. To point to events in support of the contrary 
position – the rising living standards for larger numbers of the world’s population 
– is also inadequate. This is to remain within an atomistic metaphysics which 
lacks an essential grounding for progress. This is to be permanently perplexed 
by a condition that seems to be forever split between progress and catastrophe. 
Reality is more than a field of possibilities and the future is more than the 
projection of possibilities. To argue for reality as a field of materialist immanence 
is to argue that the good society is more than one possibility, on the same level 
as the bad society of death and destruction, but is the necessary society, 
necessary, that is, in the sense that this is what is required if an essence is to 
realise its inherent potentiality and flourish in actuality.  
Without that essentialism, we remain trapped within that feeling that every 
positive possibility, every possibility for progress, seems to be accompanied by a 
contrary. The more we progress, the more we are brought closer to the abyss. I 
return here to Marx’s passage concerning the new-fangled productive forces 
requiring new fangled men and women to liberate their potentialities for the good. It is 
in precisely this essentialist sense that Rosa Luxemburg set out humanity’s future in 
terms of the alternate paths of socialism or barbarism. Socialism is the necessary society 
if we are to avoid regress, a technically sophisticated and efficiently organised regress, 
but a regress all the same. Marx, in the footsteps of Hegel, articulated progress in the 
most sophisticated and nuanced terms, one which recognised alienation and 
contradictory dynamics as a spring of advancement. This is to see the negative as a 
source of the attainment of the positive. It should be emphasised that for Marx, these 
necessary lines of development are not inevitable, but frustratable.  
 
There has been a systematic war waged against socialism in defence of a capital 
system. All the effort that should have gone into the realisation of the social essence 
has gone into its frustration. It should come  as no surprise then, when there has been a 
deliberate attempt to frustrate progressive forces, that progress should seem beyond 
our grasp. History shows social reality to be more petrified and more alienated than Marx 
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imagined. There is an inertia in institutions and in psychologies that Marx 
underestimated. Alienation is itself a praxis, and it draws everyone into an habitual cycle. 
But Marx’s point concerning revolutionary-critical praxis remains. Alienation is a 
revocable condition. What we are dealing with here is not a failure of essentialism but a 
failure to accent the subjective factor as the creative element in realising necessary 
lines of development – developing political, moral, organisational and psychological 
capacities so as to bring about the good society.  
 
The End of Progress 
 
"But in contemplating history as the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of 
peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals have been sacrificed, a 
question necessarily arises: To what principle, to what final purpose, have these 
monstrous sacrifices been offered?' Hegel’s answer is Progress:  
 
‘The events which make up this picture of gloomy emotion and thoughtful 
reflection are only the means for realizing the essential destiny, the absolute and 
final purpose, or, what amounts to the same thing, the true result of world history.' 
 
The easiest thing to write here is that war and violence and organised murder has 
ended progress. But that would be to remain firmly within an atomistic conception that 
sees only a meaningless succession of events. There is nothing new about war and 
disorder. The axial religions were born in an era cruelty and violence, as any cursory 
reading of the Bible will show. However dramatic, however destructive, such events 
leave the fundamental telos of things unchanged, unfulfilled, certainly, but unaltered in 
themselves. War, crisis, disaster, the nuclear bomb, ecological destruction certainly put 
human beings in the moral spotlight. We are no longer allowed to have faith in a 
transcendent law that saves us independently of our own moral effort. That kind of 
teleology can no longer be sustained. ‘Progress’ in this form was a form of secular 
religion, a convenient faith for those who had abandoned God but not the theological 
assumptions which supported a belief in God.  
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When written in capital letters, ‘Progress’ denotes the operation of vast impersonal 
forces changing the world above and beyond human thoughts and actions. It makes no 
difference whether these forces are natural (biological necessity) or divine (Providence) 
or human (alienation) in origin, they represent a force which is independent of conscious 
human control and moral responsibility. This is a bad teleology, one that proceeds 
without regard to human moral freedom and choice and action. Such teleology 
drags humanity in its wake, with the promise that suffering is an involuntary sacrifice 
that will nevertheless be redeemed in the better world to come. To those sacrificed in 
the eighteenth or nineteenth century, there is no consolation in the supposed 
redemption that was achieved in the twentieth century, war and extermination is no 
reward for past sacrifices. And those living in the twenty first century are still being 
called upon to make sacrifices. The process never ends, it is endless, it lacks 
purpose, it is a false teleology. It is a false form of sacrifice. 
 
This is ‘Progress’ as an anonymous force, something detached from natural essences 
and human agency and becoming a reification. This is ‘Progress’ hypostatised in being 
raised above realities. Essentialism grounds progress upon natural essences, society 
as a social organism, human beings as social beings. ‘History’, Marx wrote, does 
nothing. It is human beings who act. And ‘Progress’ is nothing if it is not the realisation 
of essential potentialities. To sacrifice human beings in the cause of some anonymous 
history is not progress in essentialist terms, it is the denial of progress. When he 
simplified, Marx occasionally gave the impression that alienation is a sacrifice 
inevitably leading to progress. Marx is actually working with the essential category of 
necessity, which is not an inevitability. Marx’s position is that alienation is a 
progressive force to the extent that it reveals human powers in an externalised form. 
These  powers need to be, and can be, reclaimed and given fully human form. 
Alienation is a condition which is to be abolished (Aufhebung), that is, positively 
transcended (as a realisation of an essence). Rather than remain within the sphere of 
alienation, the positive human path must be taken by means of human choice and 
agency.  
 
Events associated with war, violence, economic crisis, misapplication of technology, 
eco-catastrophe do not demand that we abandon progress as such, only that we 
identify and abandon the illusions which accompany a certain assertion of progress — 
illusions in which military expansion, state power, economic growth are made the single 
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and permanent tendency, projecting imperatives and necessities which are 
independent of actual human beings. An essentialist metaphysics is based upon 
categories such as law, necessity, lines of development, but these proceed on the 
basis of a purpose inherent to an essence. This essentialism is the condition of an end 
to illusion; it reinstates realities as against transcendental fantasies. We need to 
abandon projections out of and beyond natural essences and instead ground 
transcendence in those essences. 
A defensible conception of progress is possible if it is grounded not in reified concepts 
and passive hopes, but in what Marx called ‘concrete reality’, creative human agency 
within specific social relations. 
Marx, with his critical understanding of alienation, never fell for the delusions of 
progress. His various critiques were all designed to identify the reasons behind 
unreason.  
 
Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form. Hence the critic can 
take his cue from every existing form of theoretical and practical consciousness 
and from this ideal and final goal implicit in the actual forms of existing reality he 
can deduce a true reality. Now as far as real life is concerned, it is precisely the 
political state which contains the postulates of reason in all its modern forms, even 
where it has not been the conscious repository of socialist requirements. But it does 
not stop there. It consistently assumes that reason has been realized and just as 
consistently it becomes embroiled at every point in a conflict between its ideal 
vocation and its actually existing premises. (Marx EW Letters 1975: 208/9). 
 
Reason has always existed, but not always in a rational form. Progress is a highly 
nuanced concept in Marx. Capital is an unsocial socialisation; Marx demands its 
realisation as a genuine socialisation. Modernity is an unreasonable rationalisation; Marx 
demands a genuine rationalisation. And this realisation is an act of political and moral 
agency. Marx’s argument is essentialist to the core. It is impossible to make sense of the 
above passage without an understanding of essentialist categories. Marx, the critic, is 
seeking to identify and bring to light the ideal and final goal implicit in the actual forms of 
existing reality;  he is seeking to deduce a true reality immanent within an existing reality. 
Marx is seeking to expose the postulates of reason in all its modern forms, bring them to 
consciousness and inspire human agency in the cause of their realisation. In pointing to 
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a conflict between the ideal and actually existing premises, Marx is seeking to inform and 
inspire human agency to realise the ideal immanent within the real. The argument is 
essentialist to the core, identifying inherent potentialities and pointing to a line of 
development to be pursued beyond the present. Pursuing a goal implicit in the actual 
forms of existing reality is the essentialist argument in a nutshell. And Marx’s critical 
conception makes clear the extent that essentialism is not a passive evolution or 
biological determinism, but is based upon intellectual thought, moral values and political 
action. 
 
What we see in the modern world is not rationality but its mockery. Much of 
progressive activity in the twentieth century has been delusional, murderous and mad. 
The intuitive good sense of people can see the madness associated with the 
organisation of war, arms production, nuclear power. They also see that intuition 
routinely ignored and overridden by the 'serious' discourse of officials and experts, 
people whose rational stances presume disaster as delivered by functionally minded 
intelligence. Such a conflict invites cynicism with respect to reason, showing the extent 
to which normal good sense has been drastically subverted, with fantastical 
constructions taking the place of the real world. In the process, human reality, and the 
people who live in it, comes to be systematically bent to fit a caricature of reason, a 
distortion that fits the distorted reality of the modern world. 
 
Back in 1959, sociologist C Wright Mills argued that our major orientations ‘have 
virtually collapsed as adequate explanations of the world and of ourselves' (1970:184). 
He declared that 'we are now at the ending of an epoch, and we have got to work out 
our own answers'. (Wright Mills 1970:184). Ideas of freedom and reason, which were 
once inextricably connected in the Enlightenment tradition, have become 'ambiguous'. 
We can no longer assume the automatic connection of reason and freedom. As Wright 
Mills observes, what characterises the new age is that 'the ideas of freedom and of 
reason have become moot; that increased rationality may not be assumed to make for 
increased freedom' (1970:185/6). Crucially, Wright Mills accents the ambiguous nature 
of reason. 'The increasing rationalisation of society, the contradiction between such 
rationality and reason, the collapse of the assumed coincidence of reason and freedom 
- these developments lie back of the rise into view of the man who is 'with' rationality but 
without reason, who is increasingly rationalised and also increasingly uneasy' (Wright 
Mills 1970:187). 
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Wright Mills is concerned with the anthropological consequences of this 
rationalisation. Individuals, alienated from their production and consumption, adapt 
themselves to a managed and manipulated world, subject themselves to a 'self-
rationalisation' in which they come to systematically regulate their impulses and 
aspirations. 'There is then rationality without reason. Such rationality is not 
commensurate with freedom but the destroyer of it. It is no wonder that the ideal of 
individuality has become moot' (Wright Mills 1970:188/9). 
 
But none of this is new at all. This dialectical relationship between reason and 
freedom is at the core of the organic dialectics of Hegel and Marx. At the root of the 
essentialist conception of progress is the sense of history as the contradictory 
realization of Reason and Freedom through human action and struggle. Marx saw a 
progressive unfolding from lower to higher forms of social life, history as a self-
conscious undertaking leading to socialism as the realised society of realised 
individuals. This may be a secular hope, and it may even be a disguised religion, but it 
is not a delusion to the extent that progress remains tied to real purposes and real 
potentials. Once ‘Progress’ is hypostatised, detached from concrete reality, then it 
becomes a secular myth tied to a belief in some abstract ‘Reason’ at work in an 
anonymous history. Such a view is a caricature of Hegel and Marx. 
 
The Drift Towards Catastrophe 
 
Both policy and the system's drift point towards ecological catastrophe. There is a 
mindset of denial but also an institutional practice. It is no wonder that the governed 
follow the politicians and strategists into the fog. It is easier for people to dissociate 
themselves from this catastrophic reality, and thus suppress fears and anxieties about 
it, simply to meet the routine demands of everyday life. The fog of climate change 
denial is more than a denial of scientific facts. It is a fog of dissociation, abstraction and 
illusion which makes it possible to turn away from the actual terror that confronts us. 
Rather than respond to a threat once it has been identified, denial above, in governing 
institutions, encourages a psychic numbing below. In terms of instinct, fear alerts us to 
danger and causes us to take action and avoid harm. But when denial takes the form 
of rationalisation, we simply hide from real fears and put ourselves in increasing 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
38 
danger. Indeed, psychic numbing is a maladaptive response that in time degenerates 
into sickness and madness. The systematic denial of danger encourages a condition 
of living within fantasies/illusions, so that more and more of the same thing will issue 
in a different result, that crisis can be resolved by the very things that have brought it 
about. We get a split between reality and representations/rationalisations of reality. 
We get a displacement of the concern with life and civilization to external forces like 
economic growth, war and conflict.  
 
Human praxis ceases to be revolutionary and critical, understanding the world 
and ourselves as we transform our own reality. Instead, beyond the control and 
comprehension of human beings, human praxis becomes alienated and remakes the 
human world in its own petrified image. Max Weber wrote of ‘mechanised petrification’. 
(Weber 1985:181 182). And that is where we are today, unable to command the vast 
productive potential at our disposal. It is no surprise, then, in a condition of alien 
mediation and determination, that the conventional political realm is unable to question 
the main postulates of economic growth, despite all that we know about the 
deleterious impact upon the environment. 
 
The system drives itself, with its own endless imperatives, and not surprisingly 
human thought and practice within its institutions becomes inertial. The system has 
obtained an independent of the human agents. The inertia we witness at the 
international climate conferences is merely the impotence of human moral choice and 
will in face of system needs and imperatives. Each power justifies its positions with 
respect to rational self-interest but, instead of a complementarity leading to a 
general reason, there is a self-cancellation so that the whole becomes irrational. 
 
Technology and Domination 
 
The question is what kind of social relations produces this irrationalism, and 
normalises it to such an extent that it becomes impossible to penetrate. Ecological 
catastrophe is the ultimate ‘unintended consequence’ of industrial civilization. Whereas 
Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ was said to produce the general good indirectly, instead we get a 
general bad in the form of unliveable conditions. How ironic that progress achieved 
through the mastery of nature is brought down by the reality of natural constraints.  
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Bahro refers to our 'misdirected civilization, which is aggressive in its innermost 
being, based on the principles of expansion and explosion.' Economic growth is 
about to explode the foundations of civilisation. This calls 'into question that traditional 
historical optimism for which the very essence of the human species points towards 
socialism, and not to barbarism, let alone a premature self-destruction.' It does, but 
that doesn’t mean it requires that optimism be abandoned, only that it is put on a firmer 
foundation than illusions and projections based on alienated power.  
 
 
For Bahro 'it cannot be accidental that our civilization should generate a tendency 
towards the self-destruction of its subject as a defining trait of its most recent stage.' 
Bahro is thinking of exterminism with respect to nuclear power. It also applies to 
ecological catastrophe. Bahro sees this question of self-destruction as 'the 
quintessence of the whole complex of tools and machines operative on humanity 
and the planet.' Aggressive and destructive practices have characterised industrial 
capitalism from the first, exterminist practices which 'break up and destroy natural 
conditions, degrade energy potentials, suffocate the Earth's surface and isolate 
human beings from spontaneous energy cycles. The result is inevitably a distortion of 
both body and mind, whose consequences range from cancer to crime.' 
 
Bahro's provocative sketch calls for a 'fundamental critique of human nature itself’ 
and for 'a practical critique of the industrial system and its military spearhead.' 
 
Here are the roots of the delusions of progress. And an understanding of human 
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3 THE DELUSIONS OF JOHN GRAY 
 
The philosopher John Gray has written a number of books on the theme of the 
delusions of progress. I believe Gray is misguided, hence the title of this piece. I 
should start, however, with a few words of praise. In an age characterised by the 
worship of money and power, with a facile and hubristic view of the capacities of 
science and technology to bring about Heaven on Earth, John Gray has had the 
intellectual nerve and moral courage to break rank and expose something very mad 
and very ugly at the heart of the whole modern enterprise. Those who consider the 
human species to be unique, a god species, need to consider this point made by 
biologist E.O. Wilson. Should all the insects be wiped out overnight, life on Earth 
would seize up in six months; should the human species be wiped out overnight, the 
planet would be a paradise teeming with life. A strictly biological perspective certainly 
deflates human pretensions. It’s not that I agree with Gray that progress is a 
delusion. I certainly agree that the belief in and pursuit of progress can most 
definitely be delusional, and dangerously so. But human beings are inevitably 
anthropomorphic and cannot adopt a strictly biological perspective. That sense of 
human importance and dignity is natural to the species. My point is that we need to 
shed the delusions of the modern world and start to identify the conditions of a 
genuine progress, in terms of human flourishing in a form of common life, according 
to a conception of the common human good. There was a time when Gray 
entertained some such conception. Unfortunately, it has been buried within a 
relentless negativity that sees no meaning, no hope, no purpose to human life. That’s 
a dead end, whichever way we look at it. 
In False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism (1998), Gray argues that free 
market globalization is an unstable Enlightenment project currently in the process of 
disintegration. But Gray’s target is not just the philosophical humanism deriving from 
the Enlightenment. Gray sees utopianism of all kinds as originating in religion. This is 
made clear in Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals (2003), and 
Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (2007). For Gray, the 
whole notion of ‘progress’ derives from a religious millenarianism. He rejects human 
volition, and therefore morality, as an illusion. Progress is a mere human pretence 
that flatters the human self-image, the delusion that there is such a thing as the self.  
The result is a ‘progress’ that is directly implicated in the assault on the planet. 
For Gray, though, this is not so much the destruction of the planet as the self-
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destruction of the human species. Gray pulls no punches. For him, humanity is a 
ravenous species actively engaged in wiping out other forms of life. Gray writes that 
'humans ... cannot destroy the Earth, but they can easily wreck the environment that 
sustains them.' (Gray 2003: 12). 
 
That may be true. But that would amount to the denial of the human essence, not 
its realisation; that is, it would be a denial of a natural teleology, not its realisation. 
Such self-destruction issues not from a teleology of progress grounded in the human 
essence, but from its frustration. I shall deal with this point at length later. For now, I 
want to argue that some such notion of the natural human essence is entailed by an 
argument that Gray has advanced in the past. 
 
Gray’s Beyond the New Right Markets, Government and the Common 
Environment (1993), contains a thoughtful article, ‘An Agenda for Green 
Conservatism’, which is concerned to challenge the easy identification of Green 
politics with a left wing politics. For Gray, concern for the integrity of the common 
environment, human as well as ecological, is most in harmony with the outlook of 
traditional conservatism. Gray cites the Burkean idea of the social contract, not as the 
liberal agreement among anonymous, ephemeral individuals, but as a compact 
between the generations of the living, the dead and those yet unborn. Ecologists are 
certainly concerned with the condition we leave the planet in for generations to come. 
Gray also cites scepticism about progress, and awareness of its ironies and illusions; 
resistance to untried novelty and large-scale social experiments. That would certainly 
apply to the permanent revolutionising of the conditions of life as a result of economic 
expansion.  
 
Most important of all, however, Gray emphasises the idea that individual flourishing 
can occur only in the context of forms of common life. (Gray 1993: 125). That latter 
view is central to Aristotle and all thinking that can be classed as Aristotelian or 
essentialist. I make this point now because I shall be coming back to it when defining 
an essentialist metaphysics to found the idea of flourishing within the common life on 
the basis of natural essences. In my view, this essentialism offers a way out of the 
perils and pitfalls of progress as identified by Gray. Closer analysis reveals the real 
problem to be the atomistic and individualist mentality and modality deriving from the 
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modern scientific and industrial revolutions, not religious eschatology or essentialist 
teleology. The neo-liberalism and new right conservatism that Gray rejects as 
variants of Enlightenment humanism and religious utopianism are, in truth, examples 
of a false teleology and eschatology, not the real thing. It is interesting that, despite 
tracing the delusions of progress to religious notions of salvation, Gray still quotes 
the Catholic C.S. Lewis to good effect. 
 
Man's conquest of nature, if the dreams of some scientific planners are realized, 
means the rule of a few hundreds of men over billions upon billions of men. There 
neither is nor can be any simple increase of power on man's side. Each power 
won by man is a power over man as well. Each advance leaves him weaker as 
well as stronger. In every victory, besides being the general who triumphs, he is 
also the prisoner who follows in the triumphal car.  
 
C.S. Lewis The Abolition of Man 1947 
 
That view is central to Catholic social teaching and rests upon an essentialist 
metaphysics. The great achievement of St Thomas Aquinas was to have made 
Aristotle’s concept of nature, designating birth, growth, decay, the basis of Christian 
cosmology. But Aristotelian essentialism is central to the thought of Karl Marx, too. 
Compare C.S. Lewis’ argument above to what Marx writes: ‘Not the gods, not nature, 
but only man himself can be this alien power over men.’(Marx EW EPM 1975). It’s the 
same point, and it derives from the same essentialist metaphysics. 
 
The idea of flourishing within forms of the common life is central to the 
essentialist tradition. The ethic of the common good was central to the Christian 
middle ages. This ethic was eroded by the individualism of the modern capitalist age. 
This is worth emphasising, given Gray’s tendency to conflate whole ideas and 
epochs. The delusions of liberalism and humanism stemming from the Enlightenment 
may well have their roots in religion, but as a distortion of those roots, hence the 
delusions of progress that Gray is so effective in denouncing.  
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Gray calls this a ‘secular liberal utopianism’ and a ‘species of rationalism’ which is 
based upon a faulty conception of human nature. Whilst human beings require a 
sphere of independent action, ‘their deepest need is a home, a network of common 
practices and inherited traditions that confers on them the blessing of a settled 
identity. Indeed, without the undergirding support of a framework of common culture, 
the freedom of the individual so cherished by liberalism is of little value, and will not 
long survive.’ (Gray 1993 ch 4).  
 
I agree. But this entails a conception of human flourishing and well-being within a 
common life that is Aristotelian to the core, and which can be traced in Thomist, 
Hegelian and Marxist forms. As Gray acknowledges, human freedom is worthwhile 
and meaningful only when set within the frame of common cultural forms. That is 
precisely what the Catholic common good and the Hegelian Sittlichkeit, the system 
of the ethical life, are all about. 
 
We can quote C.S. Lewis again here: ‘As soon as we are fully conscious we 
discover loneliness. We need others physically, emotionally, intellectually; we need 
them if we are to know anything, even ourselves.’ 
 
It is worth giving some thought to that view, because Gray is now arguing that the 
notion of human uniqueness and the self is a delusion and that meaning is made up. 
He is hell bent on reducing humanity to blind and indifferent nature. The point is, 
however, that so long as human beings are conscious beings, they are also social 
beings. As psychologist Anthony Storr argues, we need each other in order to be 
ourselves. Again, this is no more than a restatement of Aristotle’s essentialist view 
that human beings are social beings who need a public life in order to individuate 
themselves. 
 
Gray is prone to advocate positions which are inconsistent and contradictory, or 
underdeveloped. He is most well-known for arguing the meaninglessness of 
existence. But that position is not consistent with his statement of a green 
conservatism based upon the common life. He writes: ‘We are a familial and historical 
species, for whom the past must have authority (that of memory) if we are to have 
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identity, and whose lives are in part self-created narratives, woven from the received 
text of the common life. Where change is incessant or pluralism too insistent, where 
the links between the generations are broken or the shared raiment of the common 
culture is in tatters, human beings will not flourish. They will wither, or else fall into 
anomic violence. In so far as neo-liberalism has been an ideology of radical change, 
whose debts are to liberal individualism rather than to traditional conservatism, it has 
tended to reinforce the disintegrative processes of modernist societies.’ (Gray 1993 
ch 4).  
 
I agree, for all the reasons contained in the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, 
Aquinas, Hegel and Marx. But these are not authorities that Gray can draw upon. 
Further, ‘authority’, ‘memory’, ‘identity’, ‘self-created narratives’, and ‘common 
culture’ all denote an existence that is meaningful, all accent the way that human 
beings create a world that is invested with meaning. Yet, drawing on the Gaia theory 
of James Lovelock, Gray’s critique of humanism and the Enlightenment, religion and 
utopianism is best known for its assertion of the meaningless of existence. (2003). 
Whether that view is right or wrong, it is entirely incompatible with the idea of 
flourishing within a common life which corresponds to the human ontology.  
 
In what follows, I wish to set what Gray presents as a Green conservatism within 
an essentialist metaphysics that is able to identify the forms of the common life 
conducive to the co-existence of human and planetary well-being. And I want to 
unravel Gray’s critique of the delusions of progress so as to focus that critique on its 
proper targets, clearing the way for a genuine progress conceived in terms of the 
realisation and flourishing of essential potentials within the common life.  
For Gray, the belief in meliorism at the core of humanism is inherently utopian 
since it ignores the fact that human beings are limited by their biological natures. 
Meliorism holds that it is possible to alter or improve the human condition in precisely 
the same manner that advances in science and technology have altered or improved 
living standards. (2003).  
 
That may or may not be a valid criticism of meliorism. It certainly applies to plenty 
of the ideas about engineering the future. But the criticism does not apply to 
essentialism. An essence is something essentially and essentially something. 
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‘Progress’ here is not a question of altering or improving that essence, but of realising 
it, of turning potential into actual. Aristotelian flourishing is conceived entirely in these 
terms and so too, I argue, is Thomas Aquinas’ common good and Marx’s 
communism. Gray’s criticism implies a natural law position of Aristotelian derivation.  
 
But whereas the essentialist tradition accents potentiality and its realisation, 
the most salient feature of Gray’s view is how limited and constrained life is by 
nature. Gray argues that history is not progressive, but cyclical. Human nature 
is an inherent obstacle to cumulative ethical or political progress.  
 
Well, this all depends upon teleology and how it is conceived. Gray points to 
how easily progress is reversed in history, citing the US use of torture. There 
are many more examples of regress in the modern world. But Gray’s reasoning 
here betrays his atomist and empiricist approach. Such instances are 
accidental in nature, and such accidents are indeed capable of frustrating 
necessary lines of development. But those lines remain necessary if an 
essence is to be realised and to flourish. Gray, surely, is arguing that torture is 
a bad thing. But he can only make that criticism if there is indeed meaning to 
existence, a meaning based upon a conception of what human beings are 
essentially. 
 
Gray’s loss of nerve here is due entirely to the absence of an essentialist 
understanding. He has had his fingers burned in politics and is now in retreat, 
abandoning the notion of human uniqueness as a religious conceit. Much more 
substantial is the view of John Steinbeck in The Grapes of Wrath: 
 
“The last clear definite function of man—muscles aching to work, minds aching 
to create beyond the single need—this is man....For man, unlike any other thing 
organic or inorganic in the universe, grows beyond his work, walks up the stairs 
of his concepts, emerges ahead of his accomplishments. This you may say of 
man—when theories change and crash, when schools, philosophies, when 
narrow dark alleys of thought, national, religious, economic, grow and 
disintegrate, man reaches, stumbles forward, painfully, mistakenly sometimes. 
Having stepped forward, he may slip back, but only half a step, never the full 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
47 
step back. This you may say and know it and know it. This you may know when 
the bombs plummet out of the black planes on the market place, when 
prisoners are stuck like pigs, when the crushed bodies drain filthily in the dust. 
You may know it in this way. If the step were not being taken, if the stumbling-
forward ache were not alive, the bombs would not fall, the throats would not be 
cut. Fear the time when the bombs stop falling while the bombers live—for 
every bomb is proof that the spirit has not died. And fear the time when the 
strikes stop while the great owners live—for every little beaten strike is proof 
that the step is being taken. And this you can know—fear the time when 
Manself will not suffer and die for a concept, for this one quality is the 
foundation of Manself, and this one quality is man, distinctive in the universe.”  
 
Fear the time when human beings abandon the sense of human 
uniqueness, not in the sense of arrogant superiority over nature and other 
animals, but in the sense of building the new Jerusalem as the new Eden.  
 
Gray is big on pointing to the limits implied by our biological natures, but he 
has failed entirely to assimilate a biological understanding based upon essential 
natures and natural essences. An essence is not just a limit, it is a potential, 
and a potential with a necessary line of development if it is to become an 
actual. That line can be frustrated by accident, and Gray cites plenty of 
accidents which work to subvert the process of realisation, but the realisation of 
potential remains not merely possible, but necessary if completion and 
flourishing is to occur.  
 
None of this argument concerning necessary lines of development implies a false 
teleology. The whole process is rooted in real natures. This point needs to be 
established, since Gray traces the belief in progress to what he describes as an 
erroneous Christian eschatology. Gray has certainly exposed something significant 
here, the extent to which the supposedly secular and liberal pursuit of progress is 
thoroughly religious, but his criticism doesn’t go far enough. His view is simply that 
since Christian eschatology is unwarranted, then the secular conception of progress 
is also invalid.  
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My view is that the problem is much deeper and much more complicated than 
that. I shall argue that a perfectly defensible teleology – in both Judaeo-Christian and 
Aristotelian forms – has come to be appropriated and distorted by a rationalisation 
and a secularisation that is no more than a cover for impersonal forces and alien 
powers which have acquired divine and existential significance.  
The sociologist Max Weber characterised this rationalisation as 'the 
disenchantment of the world' (Entzauberung der Welt). The phrase is a conscious 
borrowing from the poet and philosopher Friedrich Schiller, who wrote of die 
Entgotterung der Nature, the dis-godding of nature (Herman, 1981: 57). But whilst 
the gods have been detached from the natural essences, their purposes have not 
gone away. Thus Weber argued that 'many old gods ascend from their graves; they 
are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces. They strive to gain 
power over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle with one another'. 
(Weber 1970: 149). 
 
The death of God implies the dissolution of the old overarching morality, resulting in 
a polytheism of values, morality as no more than irreducible subjective opinion. There 
is no such thing as moral truth in this disenchanted world, only value judgements, with 
no objective way of deciding between them. These values judgements are of equal 
merit, each is as equally right as the other, and as equally wrong. Power enters into 
this moral vacuum. The old theological and teleological conceptions haven’t gone 
away; instead they have attached themselves to new gods. Weber refers to 
‘impersonal forces’. Marx refers to alien powers. Alienation describes a condition in 
which the creative social power of human beings comes to be invested in the state and 
capital, also money and commodities and bureaucracy and such like. Alienation is a 
condition which takes the human world out of the hands of individuals and beyond their 
common control and comprehension. The human creators become slaves of their 
creators.  
Since this is the case, we stand in need of a disenchantment of the rationalised 
world, exposing the myth of progress as the bogus teleology at the hollow heart of 
secularisation. We need the practical reappropriation of alienated social power, we 
need to put means and ends back in their appropriate places.  
I shall argue that the flourishing within forms of the common life that Gray makes 
an integral part of his Green conservatism requires the underpinning of an 
essentialist metaphysics, at the core of which is a proper understanding of teleology. 
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John Gray seems to be floundering on the twin reefs of immanence and 
transcendence. Rejecting transcendence as the delusion of progress – a progress 
which is busy transgressing planetary boundaries – Gray has retreated at speed to 
the other extreme of immanence, total absorption within nature’s eternal cycles.  
Gray rejects the Judaeo-Christian idea of human beings as morally autonomous 
beings categorically different from other animals as erroneous. Fine. Darwin argued 
that the difference between human beings and other animals is one of degree and 
not one of kind. Except that when rats eat their young, we find the behaviour 
reprehensible but do not consider them to be morally responsible for their actions. 
Should human beings start to behave this way, we would hold them to be 
responsible, and to be immoral to boot. A strictly Darwinian view would undermine 
the entire basis of law. Would civilisation follow? It depends on how human beings 
want to live their lives. And that’s the point, human beings can and do have a view on 
how they shape their existence. That’s ethics and politics, it takes us beyond biology 
into the realm of culture, and it’s not a delusion, however much the various positions 
that human beings take may be manifestly absurd or wrong headed. Gray is good at 
listing the detailing human follies and crimes and stupidities, but even that recognition 
of human error implies a moral standard of the true, the good and the beautiful, 
determined in accordance with what Cicero and the Stoics called right reason. The 
essentialist tradition emphasises the fact that human beings are social and rational 
beings. Gray has cut himself off completely from that tradition and, not surprisingly, 
can make no sense of human life.  
 
“Puts a weight on ya. Goin' out lookin' for somepin you know you ain't gonna 
find.” (John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath). It makes sense to start looking for the 
right things in the right places. 
 
In Straw Dogs (2003), Gray rejects the idea that human beings are self-
determining agents. But it is not just Christianity that Gray has in his sights. He 
exposes the fantasies of all those Darwinists who think that human beings can take 
charge of their own destiny so as to avoid ecological destruction. Gray seems to 
welcome this destruction, much in the same way that Lovelock sees Gaia as fitting 
the human species to itself. There are ways of avoiding destruction, but Gray is right 
to repudiate the follies of the Darwinists here. I call these characters planetary 
engineers. For Gray, for all of their talk of science, they are not naturalists, but 
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apostles of humanism. (2003). Which means they are not true Darwinians either. 
Indeed, when Gray points to natural cycles over against progress, he is much more 
true to Darwin, but that identifies another problem. For Marx, naturalism and 
humanism are not antithetical, but integral, and the fact that Gray should make such 
a distinction implies a missing element in his philosophy.  
Marx calls his standpoint 'consistent naturalism or humanism' and sees it as 
integrating the truths of both idealism and materialism. 
 
Communism is the positive supersession of private property as human self-
estrangement, and hence the true appropriation of the human essence through and 
for man; it is the complete restoration of man to himself as a social, i.e. human, 
being, a restoration which has become conscious and which takes place within 
the entire wealth of previous periods of development. This communism, as fully 
developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully developed humanism 
equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and 
nature, and between man and man, the true resolution of the conflict between 
existence and being, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom 
and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of 
history and knows itself to be the solution.  
 
Marx EW EPM 1975: 348/9 
 
That’s a passage which could have been designed to bring John Gray out in a 
rash. But Marx’s theses are defensible in terms of an essentialist metaphysics. Gray 
may well deny such essentialism, but this begs the question of what he means by the 
limits of biological natures. In essentialism, natures are not just constraints, they are 
potentialities.  
 
In his latest book The Silence of Animals, Gray seems to have become a modern 
day Gulliver, abandoning the war-like, stupid and greedy human beings for the peace 
loving animals, leaving a doomed civilisation to go and live in the stables with the 
horses. It is difficult to look at contemporary business and politics and not want to 
pack up and go and join him. I am a supporter of The Aspinall Foundation and its 
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breeding programme at Port Lympne Wild Animal Park: ‘working together to protect 
endangered animals’. Issue 37 of Wildcry in Spring 2013 headlined ‘Rhinos are doing 
well’. And today I read that the Foundation is threatened by poachers in search of 
rhino horn.  
 
In these circumstances, it is indeed tempting to write off the human species as 
congenitally delusional and seek the deeper wisdom of animals. 
It’s the temptation of the Garden. It’s what Lewis Mumford called a utopia of 
escape. (Mumford 1962). It’s a retreat and an evasion and it brings problems of its 
own. There is no morality in nature, no distinctive identity apart from biological 
imperatives. The species interest prevails. Max Weber wrote that the institutions of 
capitalist modernity proceed ‘without regard for persons’. So too do nature’s cycles of 
birth, life, death and re-birth. It’s a picture of complete immanentism. 
 
Gray’s immanentism view savours more than a little of Callicles in the Gorgias, 
whose amoral naturalism and immoral humanism is contradicted by Socrates’ 
argument that that one could be virtuous even in a totally immoral world and that 
one's soul could never be harmed by the immoral acts of others. Another prejudice, 
Gray would no doubt assert.  
 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb considers Gray to be "prophetic". 
(http://grantabooks.com/page/3012/False+Dawn/1302). He may well be. But there is 
more than a flavour of the self-fulfilling prophecy about Gray’s assertion of the 
meaninglessness of life. In which case, the optimistic belief in and pursuit of a feasibly 
better human life on account of essential potentiality is no more than a delusion than 
Gray’s pessimism and misanthropy, and one much more likely to bring about human 
happiness and well-being. It could misfire, but it’s our responsibility to ensure that it 
doesn’t. The taking of moral responsibility for action and ends is the human condition. 
I read Kant’s regulative ideal in precisely these terms, as an object of willing which 
inspires and orients human behaviour and obligates us within life as a common 
project.  
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‘People need to believe that order can be glimpsed in the chaos of events.’ (John 
Gray, Heresies). That may be true. So what? Human beings are meaning seeking 
animals. Gray is big on the constraints of human nature and accuses utopians of 
ignoring that nature. Yet he ignores some of the most salient characteristic of human 
nature, what Victor Frankl called Man’s Search for Meaning, the sense of 
uniqueness, the belief in free will, the idea of moral responsibility.  
 
Viktor Frankl was a neurologist and a Jew who spent three years in the Nazi 
concentration camps. Persecuted throughout history, the Jews had often been 
confronted with the choice to convert or die. During the Holocaust, they had no such 
choice. Is there anything left to a person once everything there was to lose is about 
to be taken away? Frankl drew the conclusion that there was one freedom that could 
never be taken away: 
 
We who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walked 
through the huts comforting others, giving away their last piece of bread. They 
may have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof that everything can 
be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms - to choose 
one's attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one's own way.  
 
Frankl 1986: 86 
 
This is Socrates’ case for the moral dignity of human beings, that moral capacity 
that is above both mind and body as purely physical, bio-chemical things and 
processes. Even in the most adverse of circumstances, human beings retain freedom 
in the form of the decision of how to respond. John Gray, however, rejects Socrates 
and argues that human life is meaningless. Viktor Frankl knew better and taught 
meaning. The complete absence of hope creates a condition which Frankl called 
‘futurelessness’, a deadening experience that denies life all meaning and all hope. 
Frankl recalls, 'A prisoner marching in a long column to a new camp remarked that 
he felt as if he were walking in a funeral procession behind his own dead body.' 
Human beings need meaning, a hope, a sense of direction towards something bigger 
and better, a feeling of being part of something greater than the individual ego and its 
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concerns. And that, I argue, is greater than simply fitting into an amoral, indifferent 
nature, conceived in terms of cycles and imperatives, leaving us with nothing more 
than species interest in reproduction. Human beings need to do more than survive, 
they need to thrive.  
 
Frankl persuaded two of his fellow prisoners against suicide by convincing each 
that they still had work to do in life. Reduced to self-seeking automata, the lives of 
both prisoners were already over. Without hope survival is not possible. But as part 
of a greater whole, their lives still had unfulfilled purpose and potentiality. Frankl 
convinced both that something remained for them to do in life’s bigger picture, work 
that could be done only by them and no one else. John Gray may dismiss the self as 
a delusion, but both prisoners survived. That is how human beings transcend 
biological necessity to come to lead the good life and flourish. 
Frankl also survived and drew on his experiences to develop a new school of 
psychotherapy, logotherapy, from the Greek logos, meaning 'word' in the broadest 
sense, including the spiritual dimension of human life, that which endows life with a 
sense of purpose. That’s transcendence in the best sense, offering an ideal to inspire 
hope. After the war Frankl wrote the book, Man's Search for Meaning. 
Homo sapiens is the rational species that seeks meaning. The idea that the 
human being is the meaning-seeking animal is an integral part of an understanding of 
our biological nature. To preserve meaning, no matter how adverse the 
circumstances, human beings must be able to do three things.  
 
1. Human beings must refuse to believe that they are victims of fate. Within 
limits, human beings are free, authors of their own lives.  
2. Human beings must understand that there is more than one way of 
interpreting what happens to them. There is more than one way of telling the 
story of life.  
3. Human beings must realise that meaning lies outside them as a call from 
somewhere else. 
 
In the last resort, man should not ask, 'What is the meaning of my life?' but 
should realise that he himself is being questioned. Life is putting its problems to 
him, and it is up to him to respond to these questions by being responsible; he 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
54 
can only answer to life by answering for his life. Life is a task. The religious man 
differs from the apparently irreligious man only by experiencing his existence not 
simply as a task, but as a mission. This means that he is also aware of the 
taskmaster, the source of his mission. For thousands of years that source has 
been called God. (Frankl 1986:13). 
 
Ethics, as a system of moral thought, entails practical suggestions concerning 
how human beings ought to live and, as such, is founded on a view as to what 
human nature is.  
 
This search for meaning is a constant of the human condition. The challenge is to 
ensure its embodiment in terms of a genuine teleology that concerns the realisation 
of the natural human essence. 
 
Reading Gray, I get the impression not of the end of civilisation, but the end of a 
particular civilisation. We have to remember that John Gray was once a free 
marketeering economic liberal who subscribed to all the beliefs of progress he is now 
denouncing as delusions. The falsification of all those promises may well incline Gray 
to believe that progress as such has been exhausted of all its possibilities, but that is 
far from the case. Gray’s god may have failed, but many of us were never believers 
in the first place. Gray clearly bought the promises and now realises that he’s been 
had. The god that has failed Gray was not the true god at all. Yet Gray feels so badly 
let down as to have become a complete non-believer.  
Gray’s position is a cul-de-sac, symptomatic of a certain reaction to capitalist 
crisis, utterly incapable of proposing a solution to it. Denied the world his particular 
belief in progress offered, Gray has become an out and out nihilist with a fine line in 
misanthropy. The danger is that, in embracing a Gaian outlook and in espousing the 
wisdom of animals, his bleak, anti-human position could rebound on the ecological 
vision. 
In fact, Gray’s position is so relentlessly negative that it leaves no room even for 
nihilism. Certainly not nihilism in the sense that Nietzsche conceived it, redeeming 
the meaningless world by a revaluation of values. Gray offers nothing so optimistic. 
Instead, we must simply accept that progress, freedom, and selfhood are just 
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delusions, fancies and fantasies, morality a sickness, and justice a mere custom. Our 
natural condition is illusion. Just add suffering to this list and we are back to the 
professional miserabilist Arthur Schopenhauer. Frankly, it reads like an intellectual 
conceit and indulgence to me, an attempt to evade the difficult questions of ethics 
and politics by dismissing them as illusions. Gray sees no hope. Scientific knowledge 
cannot be used positively, technology cannot be consciously controlled, human 
beings are helpless and hopeless. There seems to be no way of avoiding a future 
global slave state.  
Back in the sixties, Lewis Mumford wrote The Myth of the Machine (1962, 1967), 
the myth being the belief that the Megamachine is all powerful and unbeatable. 
Changing mentalities will change modalities. We can refuse the bribes offered by the 
megamachine, it is possible to reclaim personal responsibility against the bullying of 
the system. That’s what Socratic moral autonomy is all about. But I’m afraid Gray has 
given up the struggle. 
 
In an important sense, Gray seems to be yearning for the Garden of Eden. The 
key argument of Straw Dogs is human existence would be a lot less bloody, violent 
and precarious if men and women really did behave like wild animals. It sounds like 
the ‘back to nature’ argument that Rousseau is always said to have made, but in truth 
didn’t. Rousseau argued for human beings exchanging individual freedom in the 
state of nature for a shared moral freedom in the civil state. Freedom as a collective 
endeavour under law was Rousseau’s message, which Kant developed further in 
terms of the universal moral law. Gray seems to be going in the opposite direction. 
For him, ethics are an animal affair rather than a legalistic affair. And here Gray is an 
optimist, seeing our fleshy, compassionate bodies as the true ground of morality as a 
human practice.  
 
There is plenty to be said for Gray’s view. The origin of the word ethics, after all, 
is ethos, denoting a habit, a practice, a way of life. Gray is also right to want to 
deflate human self-importance. The belief in human uniqueness fosters a sense of 
superiority on the part of human beings with respect to other animals. In exceeding 
its natural reach in pursuit of progress, humanity risks bringing its life and exertions to 
nothing. The ancient Greeks called it hubris, and at the moment overweening human 
knowledge and power is undermining the foundations of life on Earth. But it’s human 
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uniqueness, in the sense of moral autonomy, that allows us to be able to rein in our 
technical powers and recognise our place within a greater whole.  
Rather than re-instate the essentialist categories which alone allow us to 
recover purpose in the world and ground it in concrete reality, Gray abandons 
teleology as such, and with it, foundations, essences, the lot. Gray realises that 
post-modernism is a scarcely reasoned nihilism, but his position has plenty in 
common with it. Including inconsistency and incoherence. You cannot claim 
that human beings live in illusion and that morality is a fiction, and then proceed 
to make a series of criticisms which imply a notion of scientific and moral truth. 
Indeed, Gray’s approach reveals all the dangers of an unalloyed biology in 
politics. Gray stresses the affinities between human beings and other animals, 
denounces the idea of moral autonomy and uniqueness as an erroneous belief 
inherited from Christianity. Then he proceeds to condemn genocide and torture. 
That is not something other animals can do. Gray would respond that that is not 
something other animals would need to do. Organised war is a human 
accomplishment.  
 
As psychologist Rollo May argues in Power and Innocence: 
 
Man creates symbols and bases his culture upon them; the flag and 
patriotism are examples, as are status, religion, and language. The 
capacity to create and deal with symbols, actually a superb achievement, 
also accounts for the fact that we are the cruellest species on the planet. 
We kill not out of necessity but out of allegiance to such symbols as the 
flag and fatherland; we kill on principle.  
 
May 1976: 157 
 
Gray denies human uniqueness and praises of the wisdom of animals in his new 
book, The Silence of Animals. But he misses the double-sided nature of the human 
achievement. Human beings do indeed kill on principle, but they also do plenty more 
on principle than that. As May states, ‘our aggression occurs on a different level from 
that of animals, and not much can be learned from animals about this distinctively 
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human form of aggression.’ (May 1976: 157). That’s the point that Gray fails to 
assimilate, meaning that his whole critique is missing the very thing that is required to 
go beyond the delusions of progress – the human essence as a moral as well as a 
natural essence. 
 
The capacity for murder is also a capacity for morality, and that indicates the 
uniqueness of the human animal. Gray is right to point out that it is humans who 
commit genocide, not animals. It is just that the point is that the moral and technical 
capacities of human beings can be used positively as well as negatively. The human 
record is not as bad or as bleak as Gray’s one-sided narrative implies.  
 
I’m afraid that John Gray has missed the essential features of the human animal 
and has fallen for an unadulterated Gaian holism that sinks humanity back into a 
species essence absorbed within nature’s endless cycles. We should be careful to 
avoid the ecological message disappearing into nature’s immanence at the same 
time. 
 
And this is where we can reinstate the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Human beings 
left the Garden of Eden with the capacity for knowledge and freedom. Whether we 
fall downwards or upwards is entirely our responsibility. That responsibility can be 
used positively and creatively, and should we do so, that would indeed amount to a 
genuine progress. But it can be used destructively. Gray seems to wallow in the 
negativity. That which one cannot have, one must destroy. I get the feeling that we 
are at the end of one civilisation, one which Gray believed in, but which he now 
realises was a fantasy world. So now he wants to see nothing but the end of the 
world. Or the end of the human species which has so badly let him down.  
Gray writes of the limits of biological nature, but says nothing of natural essences 
whose potentials point to an alternative future. It is interesting that James Lovelock 
has referred to human beings as a virus. Lovelock thinks that Gaia is in the process 
of knocking the human species into shape, eliminating all those who are not fit for 
purpose. There are better ways of conceiving purpose, and this is in terms of an 
essentialist metaphysics deriving from Aristotle, which are present in St Thomas 
Aquinas and which take the most developed historical and social form in Hegel and 
Marx. That tradition offers a genuine teleology grounded in real human beings and 
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leading to a genuine progress. Compared to the ugly, misanthropic ecology of a 
Gaian politics, which in turn seems merely a cover for biological necessity, the 
essentialist tradition keeps us sane and sober on the high road leading to progress 
as the realisation of social nature of human beings. Gray is a former Thatcherite who 
once believed in free markets and all the promises made in their favour. We see now 
that the liberal world order is an illiberal disorder, an anarchy of the rich and the 
powerful at the expense of the world’s people. Rather than fight back, Gray has given 
up the ghost. The relentless negativity of his perspective has all the appearance of a 
reaction against the revelation that the freedom he once espoused is a delusion. He 
simply cannot see the light, and so wallows in the darkness of meaninglessness and 
hopelessness. That libertarian freedom Gray once espoused isn’t the only form of 
freedom. It is indeed a delusion. But that’s not the end of freedom at all.  
 
It is difficult to know who or what John Gray’s precise targets are. The old Whig idea 
of history, in which a truly rational world emerged through the progress of reason and 
science and liberty, did not survive the First World War. His criticisms do not apply to 
Judaeo-Christian eschatology or Hegel and Marx properly understood and not distorted. 
So we are left with the bogus teleology of the capital system. Here, Gray is right. But 
that doesn’t justify the abandonment of teleology. Certainly, military expansion and war, 
environmental destruction, economic development, urbanisation etc employ all the tools 
of modernity, of reason, science and technology, to an unprecedented scale — only for its 
promises to explode. Events point to delusion and unreason. 'Henceforth', wrote 
Georges Sorel, "everything is given into disorder; nothing is necessary any longer; no 
predictions are possible.' (Sorel 1969: 210). The fact that Sorel’s book is titled The 
Illusions of Progress should tell us that we are wrestling with a central problem of 
modernity, the loss of meaning through the inversion of means and ends, object and 
subject. 
 
I say that the conclusion is drawn from faulty empiricist and atomist premises and that 
an essentialist metaphysics sees a bigger picture and identifies other trends and 
tendencies. 
 
Progress is not a force beyond human comprehension and control; on the contrary, a 
genuine progress is to be measured by the extent to which human beings attain a self-
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conscious mastery of their powers. Crisis, war and destruction indicates the extent to 
which history remains, in E.P. Thompson’s words, an ‘unmastered practice’. But 
there is no such thing as ‘History’ in abstraction of human beings. Even alienation, in 
which history appears to be independent of human beings, is a praxis. History is the 
story of human beings who, as moral and political beings, choose, within specific 
social relations, to act this way or that. Within those social constraints, human 
beings think, choose, act. 
 
In the chapters that follow I shall unravel the issues and principles adumbrated above. 
I shall look at the dilemmas and delusions of progress, I shall examine immanence and 
transcendence when set to extremes, and then I shall try to draw all the strands together 
by developing an essentialist metaphysics out of the works of Aristotle, Hegel and Marx. 
My argument is that it is possible to reject the illusions and delusions of progress, set 
reason on a rational footing that leads to freedom as human emancipation and self-
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4 CAMILLE PAGLIA ON IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE  
 
Camille Paglia offers a provocative perspective on the relation between immanence 
and transcendence. Her view seems to agree with John Gray’s concerning the 
delusions of progress, with this crucial difference – for Paglia, progress might be an 
illusion, but it is also a necessary illusion if humanity is to avoid being absorbed back 
into the swamp of chthonian nature. Paglia, one appreciates, is not so ready to 
acquiesce in nature’s benevolence as, it seems, John Gray and the Gaians are. It’s 
just that she sees little but delusion whichever way we point. 
 
Paglia describes both the Apollonian (rational, scientific) and Judeo-Christian 
traditions as transcendental in that they both seek to surmount or transcend nature. 
She describes Judaism as the most powerful of protests against nature. ‘The Old 
Testament asserts that a father god made nature and that differentiation into objects 
and gender was after the fact of his maleness. Judeo-Christianity, like Greek worship of 
the Olympian gods, is a sky-cult.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1).  
 
For Paglia, this is an advanced stage in the history of religion, which everywhere 
began as earth-cult, venerating the fruitful nature of the Great Mother figures. Here is 
the world of the natural cycles that Gray opposes to progress. ‘Woman was an idol of 
belly-magic’, argues Paglia. ‘Men, bonding together, invented culture as a defense 
against female nature. Sky-cult was the most sophisticated step in this process, for its 
switch of the creative locus from earth to sky is a shift from belly-magic to head-
magic.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1).  
The transition from earth-cult to sky-cult moves woman into the nether realm of 
immanence and man who knows where in his pursuit of transcendence. It is called 
civilisation. However, from this perspective, it looks more like a surrogate world, giving 
the illusion of power and freedom, not the reality. ‘Man, repelled by his debt to a 
physical mother, created an alternate reality, a heterocosm to give him the illusion of 
freedom.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1). Male civilisation is therefore the product of a defensive 
head-magic, of a transcendence driven by the need to escape the immanence of 
originary, chthonian nature. From this perspective, patriarchy is a male reaction to 
and resentment of woman's power and its connection with chthonian nature. Denying 
the feminist argument that female archetypes are politically motivated falsehoods 
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created by men, Paglia goes much deeper into male-female relations. For Paglia, the 
historical repugnance of man to woman has a rational basis: ‘disgust is reason's 
proper response to the grossness of procreative nature. Reason and logic are thus 
the anxiety-inspired domain of Apollo, premiere god of sky-cult. The Apollonian is harsh 
and phobic, coldly cutting itself off from nature by its superhuman purity.’ 
 
Paglia identifies the male fear and resentment of female origins as lying behind the 
cold, clinical transcendence of masculine Apollonian purity. Apollo's great contrary is 
Dionysus, chthonian nature whose law is procreative femaleness and whose 
‘prototype is the still pond of the womb.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1). According to this line of 
reasoning, the greatest delusion of progress is the denial of the womb-tomb of nature. 
And that denial can proceed so far as to the destruction of nature but also self-
destruction. 
 
Paglia is not, however, valuing female immanence against male transcendence, 
quite the contrary. Eco-feminists like Monica Sjoo and Barbara Mor (1992, 1987) 
condemn patriarchal technology for its destructiveness. Paglia, however, is clear that 
Western science and industry have freed women from the drudgery and danger that 
were the normal conditions of societies that lived close to nature. That is progress. 
Paglia readily admits that most of western culture is a distortion of reality. ‘But reality 
should be distorted’, she argues, that is, ‘imaginatively amended.’ It is an argument for 
transcendence as against absorption in the world of pure immanence, the world of the 
Great Goddess of nature. 
 
The Buddhist acquiescence to nature is neither accurate about nature nor just 
to human potential. The Apollonian has taken us to the stars.  
 
Paglia 2001 ch 1 
 
Which begs the question of where the fanatical, superhuman and potentially fatal 
pursuit of transcendence not only comes from, but ends. We go to the stars in order to 
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deny our natural origins. The danger is that our abstracted technology comes to destroy 
those foundations of life. 
 
It depends on how that flight to the stars is construed. For Paglia, this flight to the 
stars is a male flight from female nature. That, I will argue, rather forecloses the debate. 
There are other options. She argues that ‘mythology's identification of woman with 
nature is correct.’ She acknowledges that most feminist readers will disagree, but insists 
that ‘the identification of woman with nature’ is ‘not myth but reality.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 
1). 
 
It seems as though women are all powerful within Nature as female. Whilst women, 
made in the image of the Goddess, could reproduce themselves, men seemed to have 
no existence beyond their bodies. The envy spurred men to transcend female Nature, 
cheat death and thereby gain immortality. Male projection beyond Nature’s finitude 
lies behind thoughts of transcendence. Machine civilisation thus appears as an 
attempt to evade Nature’s circularity and man’s mortality.  
 
But it’s a cheat, an illusion. The identification of Nature as female does not 
necessarily mean that women have autonomous power and freedom. Paglia is under 
no illusions here. There is a strain of eco-feminism which considers the world of the 
ancient Goddess to be benign (Sjoo and Mor 1987; Neumann 1972; Markale 1999; 
Gimbutas 1982). To Paglia, this would appear to be so much wishful thinking, a 
yearning for the blissful unity of life’s origins. In truth, women are enchained to 
biological necessity more than men. For Paglia, whether woman wishes it or not, 
‘nature yokes her into the brute inflexible rhythm of procreative law.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1). 
That is a rather blunt assertion that biology is destiny. 
 
Seen from this perspective, the world of the Great Mother Goddess is the world of 
blind biological imperatives and natural necessity, a world entirely without free will and 
moral choice. Men have to ascend the levels to the spirit, have to avoid being 
encompassed in the world of the flesh, but the price of such transcendence is an 
unreality in which it is impossible to live. 
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This view leaves us trying to steer a course which avoids coming to grief on the 
twin reefs of the chthonian swamps of (female) immanence and the mad fantasies of 
(male) technological transcendence. More easily said than done, since the rejection of 
one extreme tends us to journey back in the direction of the other.  
 





The name Sisyphus means 'too clever' (Sisyphos). In Greek mythology, 
Sisyphus was the son of Aeolus the wind-lord. He was a cattle-farmer on the Isthmus 
of Corinth. He was also a rogue, rivalling his neighbour Autolycus, son of Hermes, the 
god of tricksters. Sisyphus won his brother Salmoneus’ kingdom of Thessaly by 
treachery. Sisyphus raped Salmoneus' daughter Tyro, and she was so ashamed 
that she killed her sons as soon as they were born. Sisyphus showed the 
Thessalians the bodies and said that they were the result of incest between Salmoneus 
and Tyro. The people banished Salmoneus and made Sisyphus king.  
In Thessaly, Sisyphus revelled in cruelty. He executed enemies by pegging them on 
the ground and build stone-piles on top of them. It is the theme adumbrated above of 
the land being crucified and built upon, but also of human beings being crucified in 
nature, subordinated to natural necessity. Sisyphus went too far when he broke his 
word to Zeus that he would keep the whereabouts of the river-nymph Aegina from her 
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father, the river-god Asopus, in return for the spring called Pirene. Zeus sent Sisyphus 
to the Underworld. The judges of the dead gave Sisyphus a punishment appropriate to 
his trickery and his method of killing people with boulders. They placed a huge boulder 
just above him on a steep hillside. The only way he could prevent it rolling back and 
crushing him was to push it up the hill. Sisyphus was promised that if he could reach 
the top and push the boulder down to the other side his punishment would end. 
With all his effort, time after time, Sisyphus pushed the boulder to the summit, and each 
time, just one more push short of the downward slope, the boulder slipped out of his 
grasp and rolled all the way back down the hill. So Sisyphus was doomed to make 
immense, desperate efforts, only to be cheated, until the end of time.  
 
The tale of Sisyphus serves to elaborate this dialectic of immanence and 
transcendence. Sisyphus crucified people on the earth and piled boulders upon 
them. He was condemned to push that boulder throughout all eternity, lest he himself 
be crushed underneath, falling back into the earth. He was forced to pursue the 
transcendent in order to escape being enclosed within the womb-tomb of the 
immanent world. His fate was to forever be caught within a transcendence that goes 
nowhere and an immanence that absorbs all into nothing.  
 
It’s the illusion that creates and sustains civilisation beyond Nature’s swamp. The 
human race has to keep ascending in order to avoid being absorbed back into the 
primordial slime. But the ascent never actually goes anywhere. Progress is a 
necessary illusion by which we pretend that we have avoided the natural cycle of life 
and death. We have to convince ourselves that our technology will work this time, 
that with one more push we will be free. In the myth, the boulder falls all the way 
back to the bottom, so the ascent has to start again. But what if our ingenuity and 
skill is such that we have become capable of pushing the boulder off the mountain 
entirely? Into space? We have become so clever as to depart the realm of reality 
entirely. Isn’t that a definition of madness? 
 
Those who journeyed into the underworld and survived a period of initiation 
learned the truth that the Goddess of Nature is both womb and tomb, the beginning 
and the end for mortal man. We are talking here of initiation as a spiritual 
matriculation. ‘Etymologically, to matriculate means to enter the realm of womb and 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
66 
mother.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 11). For the Goddess herself there is no end, just an 
endless cycle of life and death, a change of being within an unchanging reality. To 
Goddess Nature, life, death and rebirth are continuous, inseparable parts of the whole, 
not discreet, discontinuous fragments. 
 
Clovis Trouille’s painting My Tomb (c1947) portrays a gloomy view, certainly, but 
exposes the deep psychosexual dimension that many seek to evade.  
 
 
My Tomb c1947 Clovis Trouille 
 
There can be no genuine transcendence based on evasion, that merely 
becomes a flight motivated by fear. 
 
Paglia sets the debate at extremes. Well, as Schopenhauer wrote, extremes 
magnify the truth. Paglia is well aware of the precariousness of the human condition. 
She argues that ‘that all cultural achievement is a projection, a swerve into Apollonian 
transcendence, and that men are anatomically destined to be projectors. But as with 
Oedipus, destiny may be a curse.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1).  
 
Paglia sees men as doomed to return to originary nature. 
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Paglia asks what nature has given man to defend himself against woman? For 
Paglia, Apollonian rationality was invented by western man as ‘a refuge from the 
soggy emotionalism and bristling disorder of woman and nature.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1). 
Paglia thus sets immanence and transcendence at polar opposites. That leaves us 
without much of a choice, only a futile attempt at escape. 
 
Hence Paglia’s rejection of the Eastern acquiescence to nature as ‘neither 
accurate about nature nor just to human potential.’ Paglia claims that everything great 
in western culture has come from the quarrel with nature. Paglia refers to the frightful 
brutality of natural process, describing the heavy blind rolling and milling of matter as 
an ‘insult to mind’. Acquiesce in nature? ‘In loss of self we would find not love or God 
but primeval squalor.’  
 
This revelation has historically fallen upon the western male, who is pulled 
by tidal rhythms back to the oceanic mother. It is to his resentment of this 
daemonic undertow that we owe the grand constructions of our culture. 
Apollonianism, cold and absolute, is the west's sublime refusal. The Apollonian 
is a male line drawn against the dehumanizing magnitude of female nature.  
 
Paglia 2001 ch 1 
 
The upshot of Paglia’s reasoning is that nature is not some benign Goddess but a 
swamp of immanence waiting at society's gates to absorb us back into the chthonian 
depths.  
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Margherita Muller but we will no longer be.. 
 
Organic nature reclaiming abstracted built place? Or nature adapting to fit the 
contours of human creation? 
 
It’s a form of being in time, what Heidegger emphasised as be-ing. But it 
eschews any pretensions at any eternity beyond nature’s endless cycles. It’s 
a vision of pure immanence. But rather than a passive acceptance of our 
finitude with nature’s endless cycles of birth, life, death and rebirth, the picture 
suggests romanticism as a disillusioned idealism. Here one sees the truth of 
Paglia’s claim that without male projection, ‘woman would long ago have 
absorbed all of creation into herself. There would be no culture, no system, no 
pyramiding of one hierarchy upon another. Earth-cult must lose to sky-cult, if 
mind is ever to break free from matter.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1). Women have no 
need of projection beyond the boundaries of the self. In other words, if mind 
does not transcend matter, then sky-cult loses to earth-cult and all is absorbed 
back into chthonian nature. ‘Woman and nature stand ever ready to reduce 
the male to boy and infant.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1). This is an assertion of 
natural necessity so as to deny being not only in eternity, but also in time. 
 
In the finale of The Fall of the House of Usher, Nature returns with a vengeance 
as the mansion is swallowed up by the "black and lurid tarn". This is the return of 
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the built order of man to the swampy, liquid nether world of female nature: ‘There 
was a long tumultuous shouting sound like the voice of a thousand waters.’ This 
deep, dank tarn is the primeval swamp of female generation. Poe looks upon it 
with horror, describing its ‘pestilent and mystic vapor, dull, sluggish,... leaden-
hued.’ It is a good description of the male terror of endless female nature.  
 
Poe’s Fall of the House of Usher oozes an ‘extensive decay.’ (Great Short Works 
of Poe, 217, 219, 238, also 192—93. 158—59, 161, 317, 329.) The extent to which 
Poe’s tales of terror are haunted by absent females has to be significant. In one tale 
after another the ghost of the absent lady of the house haunts the male imagination. 
In Fall of the House of Usher, the house itself sinks into Nature. The man-made 
environment, the buildings erected as proof of male potency, is swallowed whole. In 
Paglia’s terms, this denotes the extent to which civilisation, without transcendence, 
would come to be engulfed whole by chthonian Nature. ‘The cracked house of 
Usher, an Apollonian head fractured by madness, surrenders to the Dionysian, the 
murky womb-world of the primeval abyss.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 22). There is no escape, 
only return to origins, the source that cannot be denied, only repressed, diverted, 
denied, perverted into destructive, death-dealing fantasy. 
 
In The Masque of the Red Death (1842), Prince Prospero attempts to deny 
Nature by shutting it out of the city walls. Here, civilisation, the built world, is a 
defence against nature’s all-engulfing, overarching power. Of course, Nature closes 
in, surrounds and finally suffocates the life out of the city. The tale has affinities 
with Boccaccio's Decameron, where a party of Florentine gentry think they can 
escape the Black Death plaguing the towns by fleeing to the countryside. Poe's 
Red Death is different, though, in that it is the country and not the town which is 
pestilential, it is biological nature itself which is the plague, ‘the redness and the 
horror of blood.’ Camille Paglia draws out the full meaning: ‘The ebony clock of 
Poe's seventh chamber is the ominous heartbeat of the maternal body. Since the 
Red Death is life itself, the clock is the passing bell that tolls for every man.’ (Paglia 
2001 ch 22). 
 
Poe is obsessed with closure, narcolepsy, the fear and reality of being buried 
alive. It’s the central theme running through The Premature Burial, The Cask of 
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Amontillado, Maelstrom, The Pit. But readings of Poe which focus upon the 
alienation of built structures do not go far enough. Alienation refers to the way 
that man-made inventions gaining a life of their own independently of their human 
creators. The failure of the human creators to identify the built world as their own 
creation becomes oppressive in time and drains the life out of the human 
subjects. But Poe is referring to more than the way that the built environment 
gains an existential significance that ultimately sucks the life out of its inhabitants 
and builders. Paglia’s argument makes it clear that the tomb enclosing human 
beings is more than the built environment. ‘Action is the route of escape from 
nature, but all action circles back to origins, the womb-tomb of nature.’ (Paglia 2001 





Poe’s tales are not just about alienated built structures and the need for human 
creative subjects to reappropriate their power as their own. Poe's motivation is 
deeper, darker, more pessimistic. Whatever environment we build, however much 
it expresses our power, however much we identify it as our own power, sooner or 
later the womb-tomb of Mother Nature closes in and swallows it all whole.  
 
In this context, the madness of technological fantasies destroying the planet 
become comprehensible. What one cannot have one must destroy. Transcendence is 
therefore necessary to wake us from the nightmare of nature. The only problem is 
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that we are left dangling between dehumanisation within nature at the level of 
immanence and denaturalisation with technological civilisation at the level of 
transcendence. 
 
Where, one asks, is the balance of the Yin and the Yang? The missing feminine is 
also the missing masculine, since if we lose access to the one, we skew the character 
of the other. Ann Belford Ulanov writes well here in The Wisdom of the Psyche 
(2000). 
 
The down-going feminine way we neglect revenges itself by dragging us down 
into the dark abyss of matter because we neglect what matters. Symbols 
regress into symbolic equations and we are easily overtaken by a massing of 
energy in the unconscious that can at any time explode into neurosis, or into 
the demand for actual weapons with which we can kill others, or even the whole 
planet.  
 
Ulanov 2000: 82/3 
 
The relation between immanence and transcendence needs to be determined so 
that the masculine and the feminine complement each other and thereby complete 
their natures in unity rather than in antagonism. This would be to recognise that there 
is a process of growth within nature’s cycles of birth, life and death, an active way of 
be-ing that is central to a healthy and flourishing life. The philosopher Spinoza 
expresses this idea well in his concept of conatus. In the Ethics, Spinoza writes that 
'Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours (conatus) to persevere in its being’. 
A conatus is a mode's essence (or degree of power); all living things manifest this 
endeavour. The most fundamental desire of human beings is the endeavour 
(conatus) or power to persist in existence, to persevere in our being. Thus conatus is 
therefore the affirmation of essence in a mode's existence.  
 
Spinoza’s reasoning is essentialist, a position which I shall develop in 
greater depth later. The realisation of an essence is what Spinoza 
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understands as the endeavour of a thing, a human being, to persevere in its 
being, to be. Flourishing well is the solution. Shakespeare was right, ‘to be or 
not to be’ really is the question. Human beings will flourish well or they will not 
flourish at all. Striving is being in that the active endeavour to persevere in the 
world is an affective appreciation of reality which brings joy. As Spinoza 
argues, the wise and free person will avoid pain and aim necessarily ‘to act well and 
to rejoice’ (‘bene agere ac laetari’). To act well is to enjoy oneself fully, and to enjoy 
oneself fully is to act well: ‘there cannot be too much joy: it is always good: but 
melancholy is always bad’ (E Pt IV Prop XLII). Historian Barbara Ehrenreich 
argues that the modern wor ld is suffering from ‘an epidemic of melancholy’ 
(Ehrenreich 2008 ch 7). Why? We no longer see health and happiness in 
terms of a personal, qualitative growth in tune with nature but in terms of 
the accumulation of material quantities within the machine we have built 
upon nature and confined ourselves within. Rather than appreciate our 
natural gifts, we turn and blame nature for its finality and indifference. That 
is precisely what we should be blaming the machine for.  
 
In their work, feminist artists Emily Carr, Frida Kahlo, and Georgia O'Keeffe 
reveal how place, nationality, nature, and gender intertwine in art. There is a great 
book on Kahlo, Carr, and O’Keefe called Places of their Own by Sharyn Rohlfsen 
(2000). These painters' inscriptions of self upon their native land became their 
ultimate subject and most radiant achievement, turning physical land into places of 
their own. It is to see the sacred at the heart of nature. 
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Roots 1943 Frida Kahlo 
 
 
Near Abiquiu New Mexico 1930 Georgia O’Keefe 
 
These are pictures of immanence, of being rooted in inescapable nature. 
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Indian Church 1929 Emily Carr 
A vision of transcendence, of realizing a moral purpose out of nature. 
Destined to be absorbed back into organic nature? It depends on whether 
we can live under the aspect of eternity rather than time. 
 
John Gray denies progress as a delusion by reference to nature’s cycles. Paglia 
points out the implications. She sets up the dialectic of immanence and 
transcendence in terms of the opposition between the female contentment in being 
and the male urge to become. Paglia warns us against the siren call of originary 
nature. 
 
Nature's cycles are woman's cycles. Biologic femaleness is a sequence of circular 
returns, beginning and ending at the same point. Woman's centrality gives her a 
stability of identity. She does not have to become but only to be. Her centrality is 
a great obstacle to man, whose quest for identity she blocks. He must transform 
himself into an independent being, that is, a being free of her. If he does not, he 
will simply fall back into her. Reunion with the mother is a siren call haunting our 
imagination. Once there was bliss, and now there is struggle. Dim memories of 
life before the traumatic separation of birth may be the source of Arcadian 
fantasies of a lost golden age. The western idea of history as a propulsive 
movement into the future, a progressive or Providential design climaxing in the 
revelation of a Second Coming, is a male formulation. No woman, I submit, 
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could have coined such an idea, since it is a strategy of evasion of woman's own 
cyclic nature, in which man dreads being caught. Evolutionary or apocalyptic 
history is a male wish list with a happy ending, a phallic peak.  
 
Paglia 2001 ch 1 
 
In this context, science, industry, technology, organised religion, which all involve 
notions of progress and salvation, appear as male fantasies to escape or transcend 
the cycle of nature. Eschatology comes in both religious and secular form. There are 
no such female fantasies. Since woman is that cyclic nature, she has no need to go 
anywhere other than where she is. But that cycle does not denote an autonomous 
power or freedom. ‘The Greek pattern of free will to hybris to tragedy is a male drama, 
since woman has never been deluded (until recently) by the mirage of free will. She 
knows there is no free will, since she is not free. She has no choice but acceptance.’ 
(Paglia 2001 ch 1).  
This position leaves us in a psychic purgatory suspended between the fantasy of 
transcendence and the longing for immanence, with no clear way out. We can neither 
go backwards nor forwards. Reading Paglia, one gets the impression that her 
awareness of the delusions of (male) transcendence are outweighed by her recoil 
from the horrors of (female) immanence. It’s a very fair view, in that it upsets all sides 
equally. Read in this light, the belief in a God that is both immanent and 
transcendent, the God of St Thomas Aquinas, is the best we can ever hope to 
achieve. The big problems come with the death of God in a disenchanted rationalised 
world. The deification of finite human powers which results unleashes the 
transcendent fantasies of the male projectors, bending the finite world in pursuit of 
the infinite. 
 
‘The Apollonian has taken us to the stars’, argues Paglia (2001 ch 1). And that is 
the crucial point. The transcendence entailed by the sky-cult of patriarchal religion, 
science, technology and industry has not only ‘taken us to the stars’, it has distanced 
us from our originary nature and life-sustaining roots. Transcendence has removed 
us from the ground of our being. Or, being more critical, transcendence based on the 
inversion of means and ends, has severed our connections to the natural foundations 
of life.  
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The death of God, however, has not meant the death of theological assumptions. 
On the contrary, the qualities formerly assigned to God have come to be invested in 
means and things, thus encouraging the idea that men have become as gods. It is 
the old fantasy of H.G. Wells. Whereas once, in the theological conception of 
Aquinas, God was both immanent and transcendent, now the new God of science, 
technology and industry is conceived as removed from the world, acting upon it as an 
external force.  
 
Thus we have planetary engineers like Stewart Brand arguing that ‘We are as 
gods and HAVE to get good at it.’ (Stewart Brand, Whole Earth Discipline 2010). 
Brand proceeds to fill his book with large promises concerning nuclear power, 
biotechnology, genetically modified food, geoengineering… God may be dead but the 
old theological assumptions building up to salvation have not gone away; instead, 
they have come to be invested in the new gods of science, technology and industry 
and encouraged the wildest fantasies. Brand may think that he is proposing 
something new. In fact, he is merely the latest in the long line of male projectors. 
With the looming ecological catastrophe, we are surely reaching the end of the line.  
 
In fine, whereas God is in the world (immanent) but not of it (transcendent), ‘men 
as gods’ are of the world but not in it. And this entails a transcendence that threatens 
not merely to take us to the stars but to dissolve and dispose of the nature we leave 
behind. That’s progress as a self-destruction. Paglia writes of ‘a swerve from the 
chthonian’, the shift from earth-cult to sky-cult as a displacement from one area of 
reality to another. Complete transcendence of nature, however, is a radical switch from 
reality to unreality. And that’s madness. Man escapes the claims of immanence only 
through self-destruction: quos deus vult perdere prius dementat (those whom a god 
wishes to destroy he first drives mad).  
 
Stewart Brand writes of ‘men as gods’. Mark Lynas titles his book on planetary 
engineering The God Species. The response to these delusions was written a long 
time ago: 
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‘Tell them this: “These gods, who did not make the heavens and the earth, will 
perish from the earth and from under the heavens”.’ (Jeremiah 10:11). 
 
And they may take the rest of us with them. 
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5 THEOLOGY AND THE SEARCH FOR GOD 
 
I wish to examine some of the concepts by means of which people have 
sought to express their understanding of God. I should caution that finding the 
adequate words is a well-nigh impossible task. Our language is designed to deal 
with the particular things we encounter in everyday life. These things can be 
described literally. Such language will fall short when it comes to any entity, such 
as God, which is said to be eternal and in some way transcendent, outside of 
existence, beyond our language. So there will always be an inevitable paradox 
involved in the language by which we describe God.  
God is ineffable. God is non-existent in that God is neither part of the universe 
nor outside of the universe. If God is infinite, He can neither be inside or outside of 
anything. So we either say nothing, since there is nothing our language can say, 
or we make an inevitably inadequate attempt to describe God through a literal 
language that cannot be inappropriate.  
 
Johannes Scotus Eriugena wrote: ‘We do not know what God is. God 
Himself does not know what He is because He is not anything. Literally God is 
not, because he transcends Being.’ 
 
In transcending Being, God transcends existence and all the tools we have 
developed to explain and describe existence. We should compare this view to the 
Taoist conception of the way. The Tao Te Ching opens: ‘The way that can be spoken 
of is not the constant way; the name that can be named is not the constant name.’ 
There is a need to be clear that much of what passes for a description of God is 
nonsense, the result of having no option but to rely on inappropriately literal 
language. God is indeed non-sensical, an entity beyond sense experience. An 
attempt to give a rational description and account of God gives atheists an easy 
target to hit, but the irony is that they are revealing nothing that isn’t already known 
and understood by theologians. 
 
The view that God is unimaginable and therefore indescribable gained its strength 
from the Christian doctrine of creation from nothing. God is the cause of all reality, 
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the source of everything that has being. God alone is the creator of all that exists 
and requires no help, no building-blocks of pre-existent formless matter, no secondary 
principle, nothing. Before the universe was, there was nothing. The omnipotent God of 
monotheism created the universe out of nothing; "the worlds were prepared by the 
word of God, so that what is seen was made from things that are not visible" 
(Hebrews 11:3). God calls into existence things that did not previously exist, ‘gives life 
to the dead and calls things that are not as though they were’ (Romans 4:17). 
 
This doctrine of creation from nothing separates the Christian view from ancient 
pagan thought. It has no parallel in Greek philosophy. Aristotle, for instance, was an 
eternalist, for whom the world had always existed and would always exist. Against 
the idea of creation, the neo-Platonists argued that world had emanated from the 
One, like rays from the sun. As a result, the world is conceived as some kind of 
extension, or overflowing, of the very being of God. In this sense, the philosophy of 
emanation is connected to the panentheistic conception that sees the universe as part 
of God. Since, in the neo-Platonist view, God and the world are linked together, the 
possibility exists for one to ascend through the world that emanates from the One, to 
the One itself, whether through contemplation or spiritual purification. The metaphor of 
the ladder ascending upwards to God was familiar in the medieval world, picturing 
levels of cognition that we may climb up to God. Since this world flows out from the 
One and is therefore part of God, one may reasonably expect to gain knowledge of 
God in this world in the neo-Platonic conception. 
The Christian doctrine of creation from nothing severs the links between God and 
the universe proposed by the ancient pagan philosophy of emanation. In the Christian 
conception, the universe is a reality that has been caused by God but is not a part of 
God, since it is not an extension of or overflowing from God’s being.  
 
The universe has come into being from precisely nothing at all and is therefore 
separated from God. Since the essence of the universe is not the essence of God, 
reflection upon this world cannot give knowledge of the essence of God. Christians 
therefore understand that their being and God’s being are distinct and that knowledge 
of the universe of things that exist cannot yield knowledge of God. Further, since human 
knowledge is not only shaped and formed by the universe around us, but is also a 
constituent part of the universe itself, Christians understand that they know very little, if 
anything, about God. This recognition that human knowledge is confined to this world 
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and cannot go beyond the beginning of the universe to contemplate the essence of 
God the creator stems from the Christian doctrine that God had created something 
from nothing. As Basil the Great comments, it is because God is the creator of the 
universe that God is unknown: 
 
The superior remoteness of the Father is really inconceivable, in that thought 
and intelligence are wholly impotent to go beyond the generation of the Lord; 
and St John has admirably confined the conception within circumscribed 
boundaries by two words, "In the beginning was the Word." For thought cannot 
travel outside "was," nor imagination beyond "beginning." Let your thought travel 
ever so far backward you cannot get beyond the "was," and however you may 
strain and strive to see what is beyond the Son, you will find it impossible to get 
further than the "beginning."  
 
Basil the Great 1989:8-9 
 
Human thought and intelligence cannot penetrate beyond things within the 
universe and cannot imagine the unimaginable cause of the universe. It is impossible 
to think of nothing. Try it. Whatever quality we imagine when we try to describe 
nothing, a sound, a shape, a colour, it is always something, red, square, loud; and if it 
is ‘something’, then it cannot be ‘nothing’.  
 
Yet this is what one has to do when it comes to attempting to think of what there 
was "before" the universe came into being. One has to think of nothing, a non-
existence that has no colour, no form, no shape, no time. Whatever one imagines, 
however vague, would still be something rather than nothing, some quantity or quality, 
or spatial extension, or duration, or feeling. Any it identified is always something. 
However, when one thinks about whatever caused this universe, it is impossible to 
identify any such it at all, since it would be something. All thought is thought of 
something. Since thought is restricted to the universe, it follows that what lies behind the 
universe is strictly unthinkable. Since God created the universe out of nothing, it follows 
that God is unthinkable and imageless. Since God is not a part of the universe that 
human beings comprehend, it follows that God is incomprehensible. In the Timaeus 
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(28e), Plato argued that it is difficult to conceive of God and impossible to define God. 
Gregory of Nazianzus surpassed Plato in his ignorance of God, teaching that it is 
impossible to define God and even more impossible to conceive of God. (Gregory of 
Nazianzus, "Second Theological Oration." 4, in Hardy (1954:138).  
 
So we cannot imagine the unimaginable cause of the universe. Since God created 
the universe out of nothing, it follows that God is unthinkable and imageless. But that 
hasn’t stopped human beings searching for God and seeking to define and describe 
God.  
 
Why bother? Since the existence or non-existence of God cannot be proven one 
way or the other, those brought up in the school of logical positivism would dismiss the 
whole question as a non-question. Wittgenstein’s conclusion at the end of the Tractatus 
is apposite: ‘What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.' The problem is 
that human beings obviously are bothered. The question doesn’t go away. I think it is a 
question we ask not of some objective world or entity, but a question we ask of 
ourselves as part of what Plato called the examined life. And since it’s all about 
perceptions, how we see ourselves and how we see our reality, I wish to proceed from 
the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant shows how we can speak about God, and why we 
should as a condition of our moral freedom. 
 
The ambiguity or uncertainty of God is no reason for abandoning God or for 
rejecting religion, no more than the uncertainty of our knowledge of the universe 
is a reason for disbelieving the material world or despairing of ever having 
knowledge of it. Human beings are active parts of the world they see around 
them, creative agents who infuse the objective world with their own subjectivity. 
That also applies to God, conceived in terms of what Jonathan Sacks called The 
Great Partnership (2011). There is a role for us to play in the world. There is an 
old Hebrew joke which has Yahweh rebuking Abraham for some transgression or 
other. “What would you be without me”, Yahweh scolds. “Without me”, Abraham 
replies to Yahweh, “you wouldn’t even be known.” A human being is God’s way 
of knowing about God. Life is a co-evolution. In asking questions of God, we are 
asking questions of ourselves, searching for some inner need or potential we 
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need to express in the world. Whatever else that is, it is not a non-question. And 
to be fair to Wittgenstein, he understood this very well:  
 
To believe in God means to understand the question about the meaning of 
life. To believe in God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end 
of the matter. To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning. 
 
Wittgenstein 1979: 74e. 
 
That’s the answer to those who would reduce life to physical events and 
causality, to biological imperatives and natural cycles. That physical universe 
exists, certainly. It’s just that there is a human world which exists in some 
kind of relation to that world.  
 
The uncertainty of God is of a piece with the uncertainty that holds at all levels of 
meaning, in that our experiencing of the world, religiously or naturalistically, depends 
upon our own relation and response to it. Whilst this approach to God and religion 
may seem evasive from a scientific view, the fact is that it is quite consistent with the 
approach taken to epistemology since Kant. Since Kant and the Critique of Pure 
Reason,  epistemology asks not only ‘what do we know?’ but ‘what can we know?’ 
and ‘how do we know it?’ These questions and answers are related, since, for Kant, 
what we can know, and in what form we can know it, depends upon the scope and 
functioning of our own innate cognitive apparatus. (I give extensive treatment of these 
issues in Peter Critchley Kant’s Natural Teleology and Moral Praxis 2012). 
 
For Kant, and for the tradition of critical realism he inspired, our awareness is not 
a simple and direct matter of the material environment imprinting itself as it is 
upon our consciousness. The notion of the environment being passively received by 
the senses in this way is untenable. For Kant, human beings possess a cognitive 
apparatus which in large part infuses the world with human purpose, will, design etc 
and thereby shapes the world presented to the senses. For Kant, the cognitive 
equipment and innate categories within the mind shape what we know and what we 
can know. This principle transcends sense perception and the material world 
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considered as a purely physical world. For Kant, the world is shaped by human 
agency, meaning that what, at the level of senses, appears to be a purely material 
world is actually a human world shot through with consciousness, meaning, purpose 
and morality.  
 
Simply put, Kant demonstrates how the cognitive apparatus of human beings 
shapes the world presented to the senses. But he does more than this, showing how 
we can have both knowledge, as scientific reason, and faith, as moral reason. Kant 
thus resolves the question of the uncertainty or ambiguity of God and the universe by 
making a distinction between phenomena and noumena. Whilst we can know things 
in the world of phenomena, we cannot know things-in-themselves in the world of 
noumena, which is beyond human experience and therefore inaccessible to human 
reason. Kant’s philosophy is therefore a ‘transcendental idealism’, in that it holds that 
the noumenal world can be inferred from reason, but is itself another order of being, 
an intelligible world, a moral order. Human beings are therefore co-creators and co-
legislators of the world of ‘noumena’ as a moral world, and partake of a real world as 
distinct from a merely 'phenomenal' world.  
 
One does not need to understand Kant's entire philosophy in all of its complexity in 
order to understand his basic thesis that far from being a passive receptor of the 
sensuous world, the human mind is continuously active in the perception of that world. 
Advances in cognitive psychology have since confirmed the fundamental truth of Kant’s 
philosophy, revealing the mind to be actively employing its own cognitive apparatus to 
be continuously involved in performing a complex, multi-levelled operation of selecting, 
grouping, extrapolating, excluding, projecting, relating and imposing its own 
interpretive categories. This process is going on at the unconscious level all the 
time, with the conscious level only apprehending the outcomes of the process. 
 
The point is that scientific reason, limited only to the physical world of event and 
causality, the world passively presented to the senses, yields only a limited 
knowledge of the world and forms only a part of the human experience of the 
universe as a whole. Kant’s central insight is that the human mind imposes order 
and meaning upon the sense data it receives. This is true at all levels of 
awareness, not just the physical level studied by natural science, but the moral, 
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aesthetic and religious. These are all layers of meaning, areas which comprise the full 
human experience of the world and which feed human awareness in a holistic sense. 
The ethical and the aesthetic presuppose and are mediated through the physical, 
the religious can presuppose and be mediated through each or all of the others, 
something which does not hold in reverse. My principal focus will be on the religious 
aspect, but it is as well to note that the same epistemological structure runs through 
the many layers of awareness comprising human experience. 
 
Set within this epistemological framework, the uncertainty or ambiguity of God 
ceases to be a problem. The existence or non-existence of God is a pseudo-
problem which fails to acknowledge the involvement of the human mental 
apparatus in shaping the world presented to the senses.  
 
The deeper theological implication is this, God must be deus absconditus – a 
hidden God - in order to make space for human freedom. That is, for human beings to 
exist as autonomous finite persons and morally free beings in God's presence, God 
must not be immediately and compulsorily evident to the senses, but must be hidden, 
yet capable of being found by those who are willing to live in the divine presence. 
Human beings must make the moral commitment to seek God if God is to be found. 
This view is entirely consistent with Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sack’s view of God and 
human beings as existing in a partnership (Sacks 2011). If human beings exist in 
complete direct immediacy with God, as in a 'face to face' relationship, the 
relationship would be passive and automatic and human beings would not have 
moral autonomy and therefore could not achieve moral freedom. A hidden God is 
required for human autonomy, making it possible for human beings to make a free 
response to the Deity and thus exercise the moral autonomy that defines human 
freedom. Only thus do human beings become conscious moral agents of their own 
history, history as their own self-creation. 
 
The same principle, in different forms, can be seen at work in various instances of 
a non-theistic awareness of the ultimate. Thus T.S. Eliot states in 'Burnt Norton', 
'Humankind [in our 'fallen' or pre-enlightened state] cannot bear very much reality'. 
The Buddhist Bardo Thodol claims that it is only at the moment of death that the 
soul confronts the clear light of reality. Only those who are able to embrace, or 
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be embraced by, the light come to be united with that which is ultimately Real (the 
transcendent). Those who are not ready for this, the greater number, have to 
return to the cycle of rebirths (immanence) until they are ready. In Hinduism, life is a 
samsaric cycle of suffering, broken only by moksha or liberation. In general, in both 
Buddhism and Hinduism, enlightenment, liberation, awakening only happen at the 
end of a long process of spiritual growth. There are no short-cuts, the process 
cannot be hastened by force (and certainly not by any hard technology and 
political and monetary power, our modern idols and crutches). The readiness for 
what is ultimately real has to come from within. That is our role in resolving ‘the 
problem’ of the uncertainty or ambiguity of God. 
 
At this point, it is worthwhile briefly defining and discussing five core themes in the 
attempts to comprehend God: 
 
• Theism: The idea that there is a creator God who may be encountered within 
the material world but is not limited to the material world is theism. Theism 
entails a balance of immanence and transcendence. 
• Deism: The idea of God as an external designer who created the world from 
the outside, and is not immanent within it, is deism. It is worth pointing out that 
this is not the 'God' of traditional theism but the God of the scientists. 
Ironically, such natural theology is the most frequent target of those scientific 
materialists and atheists who are concerned to reject all supernatural ideas. 
Ironically, they are marshalling all the tools of rational critique to reject a 
God that is the product of reason in the first place.  
• Pantheism: The identification of God with all that exists in the material 
world is pantheism. God is immanent but not transcendent. Pantheism 
means literally: everything = God. 
• Panentheism: The argument that God is everywhere or within all things, 
but is not the same as everything, is panentheism. God is within everything 
but also beyond everything. 
• Idolatry: The literal identification of God with any individual thing or concept is 
idolatry. Whilst people tend to understand idolatry as applying to a 
physical image, it can also apply to mental concepts or doctrines. There can 
be an idolatry of words. The extent to which people can go to Church and 
subscribe to words, beliefs, and ideas which they do not live up to in 
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their practical lives, indicates the extent to which God can be killed by 
being made an idol, not an idol of stone but of words, phrases, dogma 
and doctrine empty of substance.  
 
In unpacking these ideas in order to form some kind of position on immanence 
and transcendence, I want to focus on pantheism and panentheism. I shall write little 
on Deism. It isn’t the traditional view of God and has become something of a straw 
man for atheist scientists and materialists. It is the God erected by the natural 
scientists which is now being pulled down by the natural scientists, whose self-
congratulation betrays an almost complete ignorance of Deism’s origins. Theism is a 
much more substantial proposition.  
 
Pantheism and deism introduce the two key concepts apropos of God - the 
immanent and the transcendent – in extreme forms.  
 
Pantheism affirms God's presence in the world and in human lives. Pantheism’s 
God is the God within, the immanent God. Deism affirms God’s status above and 
beyond the ephemeral and the transitory. God is immutable and infinite in being 
outside of change and decay. Deism’s God is the God without, the transcendent 
God, the object of awe and worship.  
These aspects of God may be polar opposites, but it can be difficult to avoid going 
from one extreme to another. In rejecting pantheism, it can be difficult to avoid 
embracing Deism, and vice versa, since to resist the one is to tend to the other. What 
is required is a balancing act which avoids swings from one to the other. This is 
precisely what St Thomas Aquinas offers when he explains God's immanence in 
terms of his transcendence.  
In The Idea of the Holy, Rudolf Otto described these aspects as mysterium 
fascinans, the immanent God who draws human beings to Himself, and mysterium 
tremendens, the transcendent God who instils a sense of dread, before whom 
human beings are nothing. 
 
Pantheism seems to be the conception most appropriate to an ecological and 
scientific view of the world. The word pantheism is derived from two Greek words: 
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pan, meaning 'all', and theos, meaning 'God'. God is all and all is God. Pantheism 
therefore affirms that God is everywhere and everything and that everything is God.  
 
Poetry is infused with pantheistic thought. What Shelley wrote with respect to the 
death of Keats offers a clear and unambiguous statement of pantheism: 
 
He is made one with Nature: there is heard  
His voice in all her music, from the moan  
Of thunder, to the song of night's sweet bird. 
 
The philosopher Spinoza expressed the point logically in the formula 'God or 
Nature' (Deus sive Natura), meaning that God and Nature are one and 
interchangeable. 
 
When asked if he believed in God, Einstein replied: 'I believe in Spinoza's God, 
who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who 
concerns himself with fates and actions of human beings'. That’s a complete 
immanence, the absorption of the human species back into vegetable or animal 
nature, all physical eventuality and causality, with no morality beyond reproduction 
and survival. No war and conflict over principles, no symbols and delusions, true; but 
no Bach and Beethoven, no Michelangelo, no art, no music, no poetry, nothing but 
indifferent biological necessity. I’m not sure what remains of humanity in the absence 
of everything that makes us human. 
 
That isn’t exactly what is entailed by pantheism, mind. That’s the scientific 
appropriation of pantheism as a complete naturalism. A pantheistic conception still 
sees God in Nature, and therefore sees Nature as more than just the nature of 
amoral physical causality. In their desire for union with the Divine, Western mystics 
such as Meister Eckhart and Jacob Boehme sought God in Nature and come very 
close to pantheism, without actually stating it explicitly. Whilst they were outside the 
mainstream doctrines of their Christian faith, and were viewed with suspicion, even 
considered heretical, by contemporaries, set in the context of Eastern thought, 
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Eckhart and Boehme can be considered exemplars of those who seek the non-
dualistic experience of total absorption in the Infinite. However, bearing in mind the 
caution issued with respect to the language of God at the beginning of this section, 
this condition is beyond the power of words to describe. Further, total absorption in 
the Infinite is a quite different notion to total immanence with respect to Nature. 
Examples of pantheism are much more visible in Eastern philosophy, both with 
respect to the relationship between the human and the divine, and to the affinity 
between human beings and the natural world. In Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism, 
there is a strong emphasis on God's presence in living things: in human beings, 
animals, birds, fish, insects, trees and plants of all kinds. God is in all things. If God is 
at the same time all things, then this is a pantheistic conception. If God is in all things 
but also more than this, then the conception is panentheistic.  
Panentheism means, literally, everything is within God or all-in-God. According to 
pantheism, the universe is identified with God; according to panentheism, the universe 
is part of God. Stated thus, panentheism seems little different to theism. Here, the 
classic statement is by St Thomas Aquinas, who explains God's immanence in 
terms of his transcendence. According to this conception, God is immanent because 
he is so transcendent. This is the most successful solution to the problem of 
immanence and transcendence since it makes it impossible to focus too much on 
one aspect at the expense of the other. 
 
In this respect, all orthodox Christians are panentheists. The God of theism is 
already seen as immanent within all things. It is the theological equivalent of the 
Biblical idea that 'In him we live and move and have our being.' (Acts 17.28). 
Believing that the universe depends upon God for its initial creation and for its 
continued existence, the conception is a reminder of the need for both immanence 
and transcendence. 
 
My main focus in this piece is upon the Western concept of God. I am arguing 
against extremes of immanence and transcendence and arguing for a balance 
between the two, a balance achieved by a proper sense of divinity. It is, however, 
worth noting, in passing, that the Hindu tradition maintains a similar balance between 
immanence and transcendence, preventing either from going to extremes. A brief 
comment here is in order. 




Margherita Muller Arjuna or 10000 arrows 
 
Prince Arjuna’s dharma requires him to fight, but he has no wish to do so for a 
number of reasons. Instead, Arjuna is keen to behave like a Brahmin, who should 
not pollute himself with the shedding of blood. His charioteer, Krishna, the Supreme 
Deity, rebukes him with the words that it is 'better to do one's own dharma badly 
than another's dharma well'.  
 
My question is where, in this doing one’s dharma, is moral choice and moral 
autonomy? The Latin word 'mores' has different social implications than ethics, with 
morals being the customs of a society in a given time and place. Does dharma vary 
in such a way?  
 
In answering these questions we need to understand how eternity and liberation 
are connected. 
Although the writings of its legendary founder, the Samkhya-karika, only belong 
to the third century CE, samkhya is often referred to as the oldest known 
philosophical system in the world, dating back the Indus Valley civilization which 
came to an end around 1700 BCE. In the Svetasvatara Upanishad it is described as: 
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Eternal among eternals, conscious among the conscious, the One among the 
many, he disposes over desires: he is the cause, he can be comprehended in 
theory (samkhya) as in spiritual exercise (yoga); knowing this God a man is from 
every fetter freed. 
 
It is also described in the Bhagavad Gita, where Krishna tells Arjuna: 
 
This wisdom has been revealed to thee in theory (samkhya); listen now to 
how it should be practised (yoga): if by this wisdom thou art exercised, thou 
wilt put off the bondage inherent in all works. 
 
Hindu philosophical teaching diagnoses the causes of suffering, and then 
prescribes a remedy which leads to its cessation. The Hindu philosopher is a 
doctor of the spirit. The attainment of spiritual liberation described as nirvana, or 
moksha. Samkyha means 'enumeration', probably for the detailed way it analyzes 
human personality. What is of most interest in this discussion of immanence and 
transcendence is the fact that samkyha is a dualistic system that postulates two 
ultimate or eternal realities, purusha (the soul or cosmic spirit) and prakriti (the 
body or matter). The cause of suffering is the result of the fact that purusha is not 
identical with prakriti, so that spirit and matter are ill-balanced. Whilst the purusha 
is essentially free, it is so entangled with matter that it appears to be in bondage 
to it, hence the sense of suffering. The awareness that human beings have of a 
state that transcends the realities of phenomenal experience, and the desire to 
attain that state, is evidence of the existence of purusha. The existence of prakriti 
is self-evident at the sensory level of phenomenal experience.  
Samkhya divides prakriti into 24 parts, the most important of which are the three 
gunas or strands, which are responsible for the tendency to evolution or change, 
sattva, rajas and tamas. Tamas is darkness, the coarse quality which results in 
ignorance. Rajas is activity or passion. It leads to craving and desire. Sattva is potential 
consciousness, goodness, pleasure, pain, bewilderment. Whilst Sattva may be 
described as good in relation to tamas and rajas, it still binds the purusha to things 
like wisdom and joy, thus apparently depriving it of freedom. Sattva, rajas and 
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tamas therefore hold the purusha in bondage like a chain. Spiritual liberation is 
attained by freeing the purusha from the influence of the three gunas.  
 
In terms of the balance of immanence and transcendence, we need to 
understand that the dualism of samkhya is not one of good and evil, or real and 
unreal, but of the unchangeable and the constantly changing. Samkhya is a non-
theistic system and requires no external agency (God or God's grace) to facilitate 
the process of liberation. Any assistance in this process comes from prakriti, 
which, although it causes bondage, also provides the experiences that lead to 
detachment and freedom in the end. 
 
Hindu scriptures express the belief that God is all-powerful, all-knowing and all-
pervading. The Bhagavad-Gita sees a divine spark, aspects or attributes of divinity, 
in every possible aspect of the creation. In Chapter 10, Lord Krishna says to Arjuna 
that 'the best of everything in the world is a part of me'. The creation, maintenance, 
and annihilation of the cosmos is entirely down to the Supreme Will. "I am the origin, the 
end, existence, and the maintainer (of all)" (Gita 10.32). "Of all that is material and all 
that is spiritual in this world, know for certain that I am both its origin and dissolution" 
(Gita 10.8). "By my will it is manifested again and again and by my will it is annihilated at 
the end" (Glta 9.8). 
In the eleventh chapter, Arjuna sees the entire world in Krishna, as the deity 
shows his cosmic form. In fine, Hinduism affirms that God and prakrti (nature) are 
interrelated. Liberation is seeing ourselves as part of the whole, doing none harm. 
 
Seeing God in nature, and human beings in nature, has ecological implications. 
The Hindu belief in the cycle of birth and rebirth holds that a person may come back as an 
animal or a bird. Hindus are called to give other species not only respect, but 
reverence. This reverence finds expression in the doctrine of ahimsa, nonviolence (or 
non-harm or non-injury) against other species and human beings alike. Ahimsa is a 
part of keeping pure. One finds the principle stated in the Mahabharata (written 
between 300 BCE and 300 CE) asserts: “That mode of living which is founded upon 
total harmlessness towards all creatures or (in the case of necessity) upon a minimum 
of such harm, is the highest morality.” 
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The doctrine of ahimsa presupposes the doctrines of karma and rebirth 
(punarjanma). The belief that the soul continues to take birth in different life-forms, 
such as birds, fish, animals, and humans, lies behind the profound opposition in the 
Hindu religion (and in Buddhist and Jain religions) to the institutionalized breeding and 
killing of animals, birds, and fish for human consumption. The abuse and exploitation of 
nature for selfish gain is considered unjust and sacrilegious.  
 
In Hinduism, God and dharma are inseparably linked and combined with 
moksha or liberation from the samsaric cycle of birth and rebirth. Since 
dharma and moksha are social, not individual concepts, there can be no division 
between religion and politics. Gandhi linked this ethical principle of reverence for 
life to the political principle of non-violent resistance. In the Gita Krishna, God is a 
friend (bandhu) who comes to Arjuna in his time of distress. It is in this sense that, 
as Gandhi said, 'Truth is God'. But this is not truth as an impersonal absolute, or as 
a substitute for God, but as a clarification of what God meant by the term. This is 
what Gandhi meant by the word satyagraha, truth force. ‘Its root meaning is holding 
onto truth, hence truth-force. I have also called it love-force or soul-force.’ And that 
is the resolution of Arjuna’s dilemma. 
 
In Hinduism, Brahman is sometimes understood as an impersonal term for God, 
denoting something akin to 'absolute reality'. However, there are two concepts of 
Brahman: Nirguna Brahman, denoting the eternal, self-existent reality of God, and 
Saguna Brahman, denoting the personal aspect of God, seen in his relationship with 
his creation. I want now to link this to the two concepts of God in the Hebrew Bible, 
Elohim (the God of physical Creation) and Hashem (the God of personal Love, 
human relationships). There isn’t, in other words, just the one simple ‘God’ but two 
complementary concepts. 
 
That balance unites the worlds of fact and value, the physical and moral universe, 
so as to create an active role for moral freedom and choice, for personal 
relationships which are at some autonomy from physical necessity. That’s a view 
which favours panentheism over pantheism. Pantheism seems to be the more 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
94 
scientifically defensible proposition, and is precisely the way that Einstein reads 
Spinoza’s God. However, pantheism is problematical for a couple of reasons.  
 
The problem with pantheism is that if God is identified solely and completely with 
Nature, then sooner or later He will cease to be. The immanent God is a finite God, 
who, with all life on this planet, will one day be either frozen or burned into non-
existence. There is no meaning beyond finite nature.  
Maybe we could see panentheism as combining the central affirmations of 
pantheism, deism and theism to create a more sympathetic conception of God. Like 
pantheism, panentheism affirms that God exists throughout the whole of Nature. 
Panentheism offers a way of saving God from this fate suffered by all finite things by 
affirming, along deistic lines, His omnipresence throughout the universe and 
beyond. In other words, God is not limited by what He has created. This adds the 
element of transcendence in order to give meaning and direction to immanent 
nature. Once we add to this the interventionist theology of theism, conceiving God in 
terms of the partnership ethics adumbrated by Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks in The 
Great Partnership (2011), we have established the foundations of the most 
comprehensive relationship possible between God, the universe, human beings and all 
other forms of life. 
 
In denying the distinction between the divine and the non-divine, God and Nature, 
pantheism seems to invite atheism. If God is immanent in Nature and no more, then all 
we are left with is the God of Creation, Elohim, a purely material universe of physical 
fact, event and causality. And this is, indeed, Einstein’s God, the God of the scientists. 
There is little distance at all from the proposition that God is Nature and Nature is God 
to the view that there is no God other than Nature. Spinoza was accused of 
atheism for his formula Deus sive Natura. Strictly speaking, Spinoza was a 
monist, in that he argued that God is the only thing that really exists at all, with 
everything else as a quality of that single divine substance. Which goes to show 
that the pantheist conception is capable of sustaining a belief in God, to the 
extent that we can see Nature as sacred, an enchanted world. It is possible to 
adhere to a pantheism which remains the right side of the line that passes over 
into atheism and the view that Nature is just physical fact and causality and no 
more. The problems come with what Weber called the disenchantment of the world, the 
driving of sacred purpose out of Nature as a result of increasing technological mastery. 
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At this point, Nature becomes no more than amoral and indifferent physical causes and 
effects, and it is human technical powers and products that come to be invested with 
divinity. 
 
If ultimate reality is identified with the material world, then it seems inevitable 
that science should replace religion. Strictly speaking, if we follow Darwin’s view 
that there is only a difference in degree and not a difference in kind between 
human beings and other animals, and if we recognise that the human species is 
but one species of many within Nature’s web, then the notion of human 
uniqueness has to be abandoned as an unwarranted theological assumption. 
Richard Dawkins writes of deflating human self-importance. And it is easy to 
envisage how seeing ‘man’s place in the universe’ (T.H. Huxley) could entail a 
scaling back of human hubris and fantasy and pomposity to bring life back within 
our natural grasp. This is what John Gray has in mind in the series of books he 
has issued on the many delusions attendant upon a belief in progress. 
 
One should bear in mind, though, Pope Benedict XVI’s view that it is only one 
short step from abandoning God to abandoning the human subject as such.  
 
One should also recall philosopher Immanuel Kant’s argument concerning 
God, the immortal soul and freedom. Kant argued that whilst knowledge of the 
existence of our own freedom, as well as God and the immortal soul cannot be 
theoretically demonstrated, these ideas are necessary presuppositions of moral 
conduct — objects of moral belief or faith rather than knowledge. For Kant, the 
practical "ideas" of ‘freedom’, ‘God’, and ‘immortality’ are the necessary supports of 
morality, the conditions that are required for the objectivity of moral experience. Unlike 
the categories of the understanding, the ideas of 'God', 'freedom' and 'immortality' are 
neither abstracted or derived from experience nor applicable within it. For Kant, the 
ideas of pure reason have a legitimate use, and yield a "canon", but in the field of 
morality, not science (A 795—831 /B 823—59). Scientific knowledge of the 
existence of God, of immortality and of the immaterial soul is impossible; these are 
incapable of rational theoretical demonstration. For both rationalists and 
empiricists, this is the end of the matter. Not so, Kant argues, and this is the 
important point to grasp. Knowledge of human freedom is also incapable of 
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scientific demonstration, but this does not imply the end of freedom as a value. On 
the contrary, human beings think and act as though human freedom is real, an 
integral part of Being, implying the existence of an underlying moral truth which is 
beyond rational scientific demonstration but which, in its practical effect, is no less 
real for that. Kant’s solution is to argue that whilst God, immortality and freedom 
cannot be theoretically proven, they do not need to be. They exist in the realm of 
morality, not science; they are objects of moral belief or faith rather than 
knowledge, necessary presuppositions of moral conduct. Hence the meaning of 
Kant’s statement that he found it necessary "to deny knowledge in order to make 
room for faith" (CPuR B xx).  
The ‘death of God’, therefore, through subjecting the realm of morality to 
scientific principles, is also the death of human freedom, of morality as such (I 
argue these points in much greater detail in Peter Critchley Kant’s Natural 
Teleology and Moral Praxis 2012). 
The death of God thus becomes the death of humanity, of human autonomy, 
morality, dignity. This is a dangerous step to take in conditions of economic and 
ecological crisis, when resources are scarce and could well get even more 
scarce. More than ever, we are going to need morality and a moral position that 
embraces each and all and even extends the moral circle so as to encompass all 
animal and plant life.  
 
Moral values are necessary suppositions of a human life that is worth living. 
So when John Gray writes of the delusions of morality, the self and human 
uniqueness, we should be clear that we are in Nietzsche’s world following the 
death of God, a world which for Nietzsche was beyond good and evil. Think about 
it. Without the overarching moral framework attendant upon the belief in God, 
there is nothing that is absolutely good any more. And if nothing can be absolutely 
good, then nothing can be absolutely evil any more. That may sound liberating, 
and Nietzsche was all in favour of the joyful science. But Nietzsche also knew that 
living as gods was an onerous responsibility that human beings may fall far short 
of, with potentially appalling consequences. 
 
It seems impossible to maintain a sense of human uniqueness without a 
conception of God. Fine, those committed to a complete naturalism of existence 
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may say, let us discard human uniqueness. But I wonder how many are truly 
prepared to accept the human species taking its place alongside other animal and 
plant species, in terms of being dissolved back into natural necessity rather than 
raising all life up into the realm of moral freedom. The moral circle should be 
expanded, not dissolved. A total absorption into nature would appear to be a 
genuinely ecological conception, considered purely from the viewpoint of science. 
The only problem is that this doesn’t appear to be how human beings see 
themselves. Maybe that sense of human arrogance is the problem, and maybe 
there is no way of resolving human arrogance other than by developing a moral 
ecology, that is, an ecological conception in which human beings cease waging 
technological war with nature and abandon ambitions of conquest and mastery, 
but assume moral responsibility within Creation.  
 
But the fact that the philosopher Bertrand Russell, who argued endlessly 
against religion, refused to consider the ‘external world’ an object for religious 
devotion, yet continued to believe that human beings were the highest beings, 
and continued to be absorbed in the problems of the human world, indicates 
the extent to which it is easy to repudiate God whilst holding onto God’s 
theological underpinnings. It could be argued that Russell himself experienced 
something akin to 'cosmic emotion' with respect to mathematics and philosophy. 
In The Problems of Philosophy Russell argues that philosophy is to be studied 
'above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy 
contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union 
with the universe which constitutes its highest good'. (Russell (H.U.L. 1912), p. 250; 
Guthrie 2000 ch 4).  
 
This union with the universe is precisely what mystics like Eckhart and Boehme 
were attempting to achieve when they sought God in Nature. I find it impossible to 
distinguish Russell’s mysticism with respect to mathematics and philosophy from 
what R. C. Zaehner called 'nature mysticism'. I think such views, involve, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, the idea of immanence containing a divine presence 
which is more than a merely physical world considered as a system of 
interrelated things. How else is one to make sense of Russell’s lifelong, 
passionate commitment to the political causes of peace, freedom, industrial 
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democracy and social justice despite his recognition that the world is finite, 
meaningless, indifferent to human beings and human ends? 
 
In A Free Man's Worship Russell faces a reality indifferent to humanity square in the 
face. 
 
That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they 
were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and 
his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, 
no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual 
life beyond the grave; that all the labour of the ages, all the devotion, all the 
inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to 
extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple 
of man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a 
universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so 
nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. 
Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of 
unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built.  
 
Those truths provide a scaffolding only for the gallows, they are not firm 
foundations whatsoever. The soul cannot live within the confines of such a world, 
only suffocate and die. Russell’s statement here reveals the greatest problem with 
the immanentist conception, its identification of God, and the infinite spirit and 
immortal soul of human beings, with the finite world. 
And once one recognises this, then the conception of God/Nature tends to 
recover a sense of transcendence. It is simply impossible to make sense of 
Russell’s life as a philosopher, mathematician and political and social activist 
without seeing an element of transcendence at work. And this entails the 
theological sense of human uniqueness, here, expressed in the form of simplicity 
and humility.  
 
Despite accusations of atheism, despite the words of Einstein’s 
recommendation, I do not think that Spinoza's Deus sive Natura affirms a God 
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which is literally identical with the physical world studied by natural science, 
though many may follow Einstein and argue that is. In Spinoza and the Rule of 
Reason (2007), I argue that Spinoza shows how it is possible to realise the ‘higher’ 
ideals of morality without having to de-nature human beings. Spinoza’s ethics are 
realised by realising nature. The greater the adequacy of ideas, the greater the 
power and independence of human beings in relation to the world. 
 
The point I want to establish here is that if God is identified in a literal sense with 
the world of physical fact, even and causality – Elohim – then science will take the 
place of religion, with any number of implications. Hashem, the God of personal 
relationships, sustaining morality and the moral law, will go, along with meaning, 
the sense of human uniqueness, the dignity of the human subject, the view that 
human beings are capable of giving moral ends to themselves. Instead of moral 
choice and agency, there will be description and explanation relating to physical 
cause and effect. And there will be complete immanence in the sense of being 
enchained to amoral and indifferent biological necessity. The species interest will 
be in control of its individual members. 
 
Nietzsche wrote of the death of God. We have killed him, he wrote, with 
reference to the way that scientific advance has revealed the world to be 
meaningless. As my above reference to Kant showed, the advance of science is 
not fatal to God and morality at all. Kant separates morality and science, faith 
and knowledge and so retains moral values as necessary suppositions of human 
freedom. But in the modern world, science is encroaching upon the realm of 
moral values, even though science, dealing with the world of fact, must remain 
silent in the world of value. 
 
Many are inclined to see ‘the death of God’ as such as a liberation, but they 
overlook the profound implications entailed by this development. For Nietzsche, 
the death of God means that we have entered a world beyond good and evil, a  
world beyond morality. Kant referred to moral values, God and freedom, as the 
necessary presuppositions of moral conduct.  
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For Nietszche, the death of God also entails the repudiation of these necessary 
presuppositions. Nietzsche’s response to the death of God involved references to 
idols, falsities, and illusions. Nietzsche saw clearly that whilst many would find it easy 
to abandon the idea of God as the perfect being, they would continue to believe that 
behind the changing world of appearances, a higher or more perfect world of stable 
values would continue to exist, a reality against which the transitory present could be 
judged. Nietzsche’s view was that the death of God called for the revaluation of all 
values. The discarding of all theological assumptions gave human beings the 
onerous moral responsibility of becoming gods. 'Man ought not to know more of a 
thing than he can creatively live up to,' Nietzsche cautioned.  
 
My argument is that what Kant called the necessary suppositions of moral 
conduct do not go away, they are displaced, investing things with moral significance. 
My further point is that whilst the death of God is easily enough accomplished, there 
remains the problem of the continued existence of a whole set of theological 
assumptions, assumptions upon which society and its moral codes have been 
founded. To the extent that these are not discarded in the revaluation of all values, 
then they remain and function as some kind of hidden god. These theological 
assumptions would have to go somewhere. ‘Things’ come to be deified. Nietzsche 
clearly saw the dangers of the new idols of state, war and bureaucracy coming to be 
invested with divine significance. The state and its cult of power has become the 
new religion, the state is the 'new idol’, as Nietzsche put it (Stauth and Turner 
1988:54 56/7 210 216 216/7).  
With the dissolution of morality through the encroachment of science, we come 
to be reduced to Nature as an amoral mechanism devoid of purpose and 
meaning. Nietzsche wrote of a world of power beyond good and evil, but John 
Gray rejection of progress in favour of natural cycles amounts to a reversion to a 
world before good and evil. That may well be implied in Lovelock’s Gaia 
hypothesis, or it may be Gray’s reading of Gaia. But it is a world without morality, 
and it is the great merit of Nietzsche to have spelled out the implications of such a 
world with extreme force, clarity and vigour.  
 
The death of God, which for Nietzsche meant the death of the Christian God, 
implied the death of the Christian morality which had given meaning and order to 
civilisation for millennia. 'When one gives up Christian belief one thereby deprives 
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oneself of the right to Christian morality . . . Christian morality is a command: its origin is 
transcendental ... it possesses truth only if God is truth - it stands or falls with the belief 
in God.' That implies the end of kindness, compassion, forgiveness and everything else 
involved in loving our neighbours as ourselves.  
 
One could, with Nietzsche, see this optimistically, as a world of power being 
expressed ‘joyfully’, that is, creatively and positively. Some such notion can be found 
in Spinoza’s sense of joy (even though Nietzsche seems not to have appreciated 
Spinoza). And that would seem to be how John Gray sees humanity once it 
rediscovers its places within natural cycles. The Aristotelian sense of flourishing, 
which I shall defend later, becomes a kind of healthy functioning within the whole 
natural organism.  
 
I think Nietzsche can entertain such a vision, Spinoza too. I’m not sure that that’s 
available to Gray with his sinking of humanity back into natural cycles. Those cycles 
are morally blind and indifferent. Power here is firmly part of a species interest and 
natural necessity. Later, I shall argue for necessity in the essentialist terms of 
potentials and their realisation. And I also emphasise the creative role that morality 
has to play in an essentialist metaphysics. 
 
For now, I want to follow up the implications of the death of God without the 
necessary revaluation of values. That is, failure to attain the ‘joyful’ universe of 
creative powers pursued by Nietzsche leaves us morally adrift in a world of alien 
powers and/or biological imperatives. This is not a world of freedom and joy, but of 
social and natural necessity. And here, the loss of morality is felt.  
 
To his credit, Nietzsche was clear, in a way that his acolytes have not been, that 
once the belief in objective morality is abandoned, the categorical imperative of justice 
goes too. Without a divine Judge, we can have no reason to expect justice. No God 
means that there is no transcendental 'Thou shalt not'. We are no longer entitled to talk 
of what is just and unjust, since these terms no longer have meaning. If there is no 
justice, neither can there be injustice. There can be no injustice in harm, oppression, 
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exploitation, destruction, since life naturally works that way, that is, Nature harms, 
oppresses, exploits, and destroys as part of its natural cycles. 
 
In rejecting the extreme of transcendence, John Gray is firmly embracing the polar 
extreme of immanence. In taking his stand on nature’s circularity, Gray wants to expose 
progress as a delusion. Fine. But it is the plainest delusion to believe that, under 
pressure of some perceived necessity or imperative written into nature and biology, that 
we can abandon belief in God and leave nothing unchanged. There remains Kant’s 
argument concerning the necessary presuppositions of moral conduct – which Gray 
also abandons, regardless of the consequences for social life – and there remains the 
theological assumptions which accompanied the belief in God. Gray is at least aware 
that it is the plainest insanity to think that our technological powers can substitute for 
real gods. What he fails to appreciate is that there are other ways of constructing and 
pursuing progress than this particular form. 
 
For Nietzsche, we are in a world ‘beyond good and evil’, beyond morality, beyond 
justice. Nietzsche was aware of the encroachment of Darwinism in politics, and he 
rejected the reduction of humanity to biologism. His joyful science seems to imply a 
humanity beyond not only morality but also beyond nature’s limits and constraints. It is 
the purest transcendence, a world beyond the natural and social nature of human 
beings. 
 
I am more interested in what the world ‘beyond good and evil’, which Nietzsche made 
the corollary of scientific nihilism, implies for the social world in which we mere mortals, 
men and women as human beings and not gods, have to live in. John Gray writes of the 
meaningless of existence. This is the scientific view. Kant was clear that God and 
freedom cannot be scientific proven, but nevertheless remain the necessary 
presuppositions of moral conduct. Gray takes the scientific view in which all talk of 
moralities and divinities is merely so much meaningless talk. Without God, there is no 
objective morality, only value judgements, mere subjective opinions, all equally true and 
by the same token all equally false. Moral nihilism seems an inevitable corollary of 
scientific nihilism, if we allow science to encroach upon the world of value, if we dissolve 
the world of moral value into the world of physical fact.  
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Nietzsche’s anti-moralism is not cheap. The atheistic materialists who so 
readily embrace a world without God have missed what to Nietzsche was the 
essential point – that the abandonment of Christian ethics through a scientific 
materialism creates the space for a viciously Darwinian denouement. For 
Nietzsche, the world beyond good and evil is a world of power.  Nietzsche wanted 
that power to be expressed creatively as a condition of human health.  
That may sound ‘joyous’, but we should relate this world of power to 
Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity as a ‘slave morality’ which preserves the 
weak and constrains the strong. In this world without morality, the strong must 
eliminate the weak, might must prevail over right, the rich must prey on the poor. 
The principle of caring for the weak and the needy is condemned as contrary to 
nature and stands in the way of the full working of the logic of power. The Christian 
ideal of the universal love of humanity means, in practice, 'the preference for the 
suffering, underprivileged, degenerate: it has in fact lowered and weakened the 
strength, the responsibility, the lofty duty to sacrifice men'. It must therefore be 
discarded. 
 
Nietzsche writes some chilling words in The Will to Power. 
 
The biblical prohibition 'thou shalt not kill' is a piece of naivete compared with the 
seriousness of the prohibition of life to decadents: 'thou shalt not procreate'. Life 
itself recognizes no solidarity, no 'equal rights', between the healthy and the 
degenerate parts of an organism: one must excise the latter - or the whole will 
perish. - Sympathy for decadents, equal rights for the ill-constituted - that would 
be the profoundest immorality, that would be antinature itself as morality! 
 
We need to bear these words in mind when one reads John Gray denouncing 
progress as a myth, asserting that nature’s eternal cycles are all that exist. 
Whatever condition Nietzsche describes in the passage above, it does not 
denote progress of any kind. It has all the indifference and cruelty of nature 
unleavened by human morality. 
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Civilisation requires deep thought, commitment and confidence, an ongoing 
moral and practical effort at creating and sustaining meaning and purpose and 
order. Without that, we collapse back into the total immanence of natural 
necessity, and the result is seldom pleasant. There is no Eden to retreat back to, 
we are charged with the responsibility of creating the new Eden. Whilst Gray may 
consider such a view a myth inherited from Judaeo-Christian religion, it is also a 
view consistent with Kant’s reference to practical ideas of morality as the 
necessary presuppositions of moral conduct in social life. 
 
Nietzsche was clear that the death of God charged human beings with the 
responsibility to live as gods. The question is whether or not human beings are 
capable of creatively living up to their powers, and this entails much more than 
wielding technological powers over against nature. To live as gods means to live 
up to the objective morality once underwritten by God. To the extent that the 
physical powers of human beings have come to be infused with the theological 
assumptions once invested in God, then progress is indeed a delusion, and a 
dangerous and destructive one at that. But this does not justify some amoral 
embrace of natural cycles. This is merely to exchange one external necessity for 
another, an alienated society for an indifferent nature.  
 
If the death of God is simply interpreted as the end of good and evil, the end 
of morality, then the assertion of power will bring only an illusory freedom that 
proceeds only within the firm constraints of blind natural imperatives. That’s what 
natural cycles are all about, a species interest in control of its individual 
members. Max Weber wrote that the institutions of capitalist modernity proceed 
‘without regard for persons’. So too do natural cycles. In such an amoral 
condition, human beings will become brutal, ruthless, mean and hard; they will 
deny the moral law within and harden their hearts; they will be endlessly 
engaged in seeking to impose their will on others; they will eliminate the weak, 
the poor, the disabled, all those deemed subhuman. And technical power will 
magnify the violence that objective morality has restrained for so long. For, make 
no mistake, if we dissolve our moral values and deny our moral capacity, we shall 
not disinvent our technical know-how. If Gray thinks otherwise, he is plainly 
deluded. The solutions to the dilemmas of progress in the modern world lie not in 
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denying human power, dissolving it back into nature and its cycles, but in 
assuming moral and conscious collective responsibility for it.  
 
Human existence in all its variety, ingenuity and creativity is tied in with 
technology as it always has been. Technology is what defines our time and place 
today and every day, back into the most distant beginnings of humanity. There 
may never have been a time when technology, however humble, was not widely 
used but, as It gets more and more comprehensive In Its effects, It is certain that 
we must make it subservient to the biological health of this planet. We are rooted 
in the earth and it is to the earth that we shall return no matter how sophisticated 
the shields and mirrors that blind us to that ultimate destiny. 
 
Kingdon 1993: 332/3 
 
We must make human power compatible with planetary boundaries, seeing 
human flourishing and planetary flourishing as two aspects of the same thing.  
We have had plenty of reasons since Nietszche to doubt that human beings could 
come to live up to the responsibility of being gods. A progress measured in these 
terms is indeed a delusion. What has happened is that, with the death of God, the 
theological assumptions underpinning the belief in God have not gone away. Instead, 
detached from God as a positive figure giving moral meaning to life and supplying 
ends within an overarching conception of a moral order, these theological 
assumptions have become the underpinnings of a secular religion of ‘progress’. 
Moral ends have been displaced by means invested with divine significance. The 
forces of science, technology and industry have become the new idols of a dis-
godded, disenchanted, rationalised world. And this has upset the whole ratio 
between immanence and transcendence. As a result, human civilisation is being 
stretched beyond its limits, transgressing planetary boundaries and inviting complete 
collapse back within natural confines. 
 
My argument is that in a disenchanted and rationalised world which has been 
robbed of divine significance and moral meaning, we are swinging wildly 
between the extremes of immanence and transcendence and that we need to 
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regain the sense of nature that is an immanence that is in balance with and is 
complemented and completed by transcendence. I think that this balance is 
achieved by an essentialist metaphysics, whether this is theistic, as in the work of 
St Thomas Aquinas, or naturalistic, as in the tradition of Aristotle. 
 
What we have at the moment is the immanence of a material world entirely 
lacking in moral meaning, the physical universe studied by natural science, and 
the transcendence of a machine world pursuing infinity within a world of finite 
resources. The position is unsustainable. 
 
So, my argument is that Nietzsche’s 'death of God' thesis leaves us with two 
alternatives.  
 
Either, we go the whole hog and completely abandon the theological 
assumptions which sustain the belief in God and which entails an abandonment of 
an overarching moral framework. This would be the revaluation of all values 
demanded by Nietzsche. As a complete moral autonomy from nature, or a 
complete absorption into natural necessity, the position is untenable. Nietzsche 
rejected Darwinian biological necessity but went mad trying to live up to his 
nihilism. As finite beings, human beings cannot be purely self -creating beings; only 
gods can be that. 
 
Or, we recognise the inextinguishable yearning of the human spirit to a 
transcendent reality. In which case, we have to resolve the inversion of means 
and ends which characterises the modern world, and seek a re-enchantment 
which once more places human ends over technical, instrumental means. What 
we have at the moment is a halfway house that, predictably, is misfiring. The 
world of means has been invested with divine significance. The theological 
assumptions going spare given the absence of God in the dis-godded world have 
come to be attached to ‘things’ and are supporting a secular myth of progress as 
salvation. We are caught between the immanence of a material world that is all 
physical causality and no more, and the complete transcendence of that world via 
our technical powers. Predictably, as with the swing from pantheism to Deism and 
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back again, the inability to connect immanence and transcendence is sending the 
world to extremes. No wonder that H.G. Wells went from writing Men as Gods in 
1922s to Mind at the End of its Tether in 1945. Simple identifications of science, 
technology and industry with progress could not survive depression, mass 
unemployment, fascism, Stalinism, world war and the atom bomb. 
So we are left searching for God. This in itself is not a problem. We are 
supposed to search for God. It’s part of living the examined life. If God was 
immediately present face-to-face, we would never play our role in the partnership, 
would never exercise our moral freedom to bring about the divine in the world.  
And therein lies the problem with immanentism. The immanent God is the finite 
God. The human yearning for transcendence stems from that need for meaning 
by contact with the infinite. Remove God from the picture, and the vertical 
projection beyond the immanent world comes to be horizontalised within the 
material world. Failing to exercise our moral capacity to search for and find God, 
we come to deify and venerate our technical powers. The result is the pursuit of 
infinity within a finite world. The result of seeing ourselves, through our technical 
powers, as gods, and of coming to use these powers to live as gods is the 
dissipation of the earthly ground of our being. 
What we need is a conception of an ultimate reality that transcends the world 
as it is conceived by physical science. This can be done by recognition of the 
capacity of human beings as moral beings to supply ends to themselves. This can 
also be linked to an understanding of natural essences. Through a genuine 
recognition of manifestations of potentiality and actuality, human beings gain an 
awareness of the ultimate ground of all finite existence, a reality which transcends 
immediate experience and which human beings are morally free to choose or reject. 
This philosophy is firmly grounded in the human experience in transcending the 
sphere of physical nature, the immanent world studied by natural science, to tend 
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6 PLATO, ART AND ETERNITY 
 
According to the philosophy of Spinoza, this would be to see the world ‘under 
the aspect of eternity’ (sub specie aeternitatis) and not just ‘under the aspect of time’ 
(sub specie durationis). Spinoza sees the intellectual recognition of facts, 
impassively, without the intrusion of subjective fears and hopes. To attain objectivity 
in face of rationally ascertained truth is to achieve eternal life through the intellectual 
love of God/Nature: ‘he who understands himself and his emotions loves God, and 
the more so the more he understands himself and his emotions’ (E 5, 15). Arising 
necessarily from the pursuit of knowledge, this delineates an intellectual love of 
God/Nature (amor intellectualis Dei) through activity of mind. Such a mind rejoices 
constantly in the object of its contemplation. 
 
We are in that eternal realm that connects all the transcendental idealists - Plato, 
Plotinus, Dante, Berkeley, Blake, Kant. Plato asks: ‘how can he who has 
magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of 
human life?’ But being a spectator of the objective world is not simply contemplative 
or passive, but entails the idea of participating in a higher realm. This becomes clear 
in Plato’s conception of art and the role of the artist in relating us to eternity and 
Being. 
 
In Plato's hierarchy of values, the desire for the human body ranks lowest on the 
scale. The body is of time; there is nothing permanent to it, it soon passes and 
decays. Highest on Plato’s scale of values is the desire to produce 'eternity', the 
ideals of truth, goodness and beauty. Accordingly, Plato expresses a love for eternity 
which is a higher form of love than the 'human' desire for the body, which is merely 
transient. Plato's extraordinary love is transcendent in being beyond sense 
experience, and relates us to eternal life and to Being itself. This love transcends the 
life of the here and now, the transitory affairs of human beings absorbed in the 
reproduction of everyday life. Plato’s conception is an ode to art and to the artist. So 
much so that Max Schoen writes this paean to art: 
 
An Art work cannot be anything but wholesome in its influence. ... It raises the 
self to a realm of experience cleansed of the dross and dirt, the strife and 
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struggle, the back-biting and back-sliding, which often ... are the substance of 
day-to-day existence.... No one can leave... a great performance of a great play or 
symphony without feeling that he has been in touch with perfection; that for a 
moment which was also an eternity, God was truly in His Heaven. This is good at 
its highest because it is life at its best. 
 
Schoen 1944: 20 
 
In truth, that overstates Plato’s view. Plato does not justify all art, art as such, 
in these terms. This is art its highest when life is at its best and the true, the good 
and the beautiful are attained in unity. The idea that ‘art with a clear and 
independent ethical purpose is preferable to the concept of “art for art’s sake”’ and 
a ‘pure’ aestheticism … which negates any involvement with ethics’ (Margherita 
Muller Under what stars to plough the earth? The aesthetics and ethics of three 
Scottish gardens 2012) has a clear Platonic resonance (and also Aristotelian, in 
the reference to ‘purpose’, telos, of which I shall write more later). Independence in 
the Platonic sense would refer to the way that art takes us beyond transitory 
temporal concerns and relates us to eternal life and Being itself. Thus, artists 
realize, not merely their personal dream, but also the ideal plan for humanity 
designed from eternity by God. The thinking is clearly teleological, in that there is a 
purpose at work. (Republic. 395c ff., Laws 903b ff. 817b f).  
The question, then, is whether, upon entering the realm of eternity, time and 
space cease to exist. To understand Plato’s point concerning art, we need to 
understand how Plato’s community is organised according to eternal principles 
and purposes. 
In creating objective works of art, the artist believes that s/he is fulfilling his or her 
function as an artist, producing a painting, a poem, a statue, a piece of music. The 
artist detaches his/her personality from such works, going on to create other art-
works, also similarly detachable. So detached, Plato points out, the creative vitality 
seems to leave the artist, or the work, left to itself. (Ion 535d f. Protagoras. 347b f , 
Phaedrus 275d f, Theaetetus 165e f, 171c f, Sophistes 243a f.) But such an artist 
has no further conception of his/her function beyond creation. The artist is completing 
a technical job to order, marketing a product precisely the same way as a carpenter, 
weaver, or potter does.  
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This is not Plato’s artist at all. Plato’s artist is a creative being and does not 
produce detachable objects to be exposed for sale, handed around, maybe criticized 
unfairly and rejected. For Plato, the artists’ creativity is an integral part of the 
community life. In contributing to that life, the artist demonstrates an active citizenship 
and produces art which is never detachable. The community is a living and growing 
thing, developing as part of a plan designed from eternity in accordance with the 
principles of the true, the good and the beautiful. The artist participates in that life 
and that growth, interpenetrating with others and with the community as a whole, in 
the process coming to unfold eternal principles. The artist thus copies, produces, and 
identifies with the spirit of citizenship in his/her full personality. The Platonic artist is 
never detached from community life, and that life is never detached from the artist. It 
lives in his life and in the life of his fellows. (Republic 395 ff; The Laws 664e ff., 817b f). 
The artist is therefore the creative individual who gives birth to eternal forms, 
to truth, beauty, and goodness. Plato has been accused of being anti-woman in this 
respect, creating a transcendent male realm of creation to replace the natural female 
realm in which women give birth to life. (In Spite of Plato: A Feminist Rewriting of 
Ancient Philosophy A Cavarero 1995 Polity). Such a reading misses Plato’s central 
point spectacularly (and contradicts the familiar feminist anti-essentialist piety that 
‘biology is not destiny’). Plato is affirming an ethical position that is beyond biological 
nature and which raises both men and women to the eternal realm which is highest 
on the scale of values.  
 
There is no denying that transcendence has often functioned as a male fantasy in 
denial of live-giving female nature, and that is certainly how it is functioning today 
with the massive military and technological armament of a machine world 
increasingly detached from Nature. But Plato’s transcendentalism is of an altogether 
different kind. Platonic love is both sexless and timeless, it is beyond biology and 
history and mechanical materialism and reveals the higher, rational humanity in all 
of us, male and female. Further, Plato’s transcendental idealism (as expressed in 
the Phaedo and Georgias) is balanced and buttressed by the ‘mixed life’ of The 
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7 THE FINITE IN PURSUIT OF THE INFINITE 
 
 
Margherita Muller Hope 
 
As I ebb'd with the ocean of life (Walt Whitman) 
 
Dawn and dusk. As the end of night is the beginning of day. “'Tis always 
morning somewhere in the world.” (R.H. Horne). 
 
The sun descends to calm the turbulent seas, as if seeking the perfect unity 
of immanence and transcendence. The seas remain turbulent, though. The human 
race has ever looked upwards to the sun, and at some point the sky god 
overthrew the ancient earth goddess, human beings projecting their power over, 
above and even against nature. It’s time to stop deifying the means by which we 
transcend our earthly existence and come back down to Earth to seek peace 
and tranquillity through the reconciliation of transcendence and immanence in 
the ground of our being. The blissful reunion of sky and sea/land when day is 
done and life has run its course. There can be no more than that, and there 
doesn’t need to be. That cycle is complete and self-contained. But, if the seas 
remain turbulent, can we do this? Are we seeking reconciliation with nature’s 
endless cycles? Or escape from them? Where does power reside? 
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So, what are we looking at here? Drawing down the sun; All things flow away; 
The destiny of all things; The origin and end of all things; as it began, so shall it end. 
 
Not underground but in the growths of the upper air 
And they feel the sun and rain, 
And the energy again 
That made them what they were! 
(Thomas Hardy – Transformations) 
 
Are we geocentric beings or heliocentric beings? Can we live under the aspect 
of eternity? Or are we destined to see the defeat of all our hopes as beings 
absorbed in time? 
 
The price of participation in the sublime is as much storm and stress as any 
mortal can withstand. Nature is indifferent, so is said. As Kenneth Clark pointed out, 
no great artist has ever observed these violent, hostile moods of nature as closely 
as Turner; and Turner was without hope. (Clark 1969: 309). 'Hope, hope, fallacious 
hope,' Turner wrote, 'where is thy market now?' 
 
Well, not in nature it seems. Modern science, it seems, declares in favour of 
hopelessness and meaninglessness. 
 
Francis Crick writes (his emphasis), 'Chance is the only true source of novelty'. (Crick 
1982: 58.) In similar terms, Nobel-prize winning biologist Jacques Monod 
uncompromisingly puts human beings in their insignificant place within nature: 
 
The ancient covenant is in pieces; man at last knows that he is alone in the 
unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which he emerged only by 
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chance. Neither his destiny nor his duty have been written down. The 
kingdom above or the darkness below: it is for him to choose. 
 
Monod1972: 167  
 
Chance deprives us of even a fate or a destiny which, however unalterable, would 
entail some meaning, some standard by which to make sense of our lives as we live 
them.  
 
This may (or may not) be scientifically accurate, but it isn’t remotely humanly 
accurate.  
 
This condition of meaninglessness and hopelessness is what Rebecca Goldstein 
calls ‘the sad sight of human life untouched by transcendence. (Goldstein 2010: 
308.) Without a sense of the transcendent, there is nothing but indifferent physical 
fact. We need a sense of the sun radiating joy to give hope in a world that could 
quickly engulf the spirit within its physical confines. 
 
The poet Wallace Stevens writes of the 'The Plain Sense of Things' 
 
It is as if 
We had come to an end of the imagination, 
Inanimate in an inert savoir. 
 
Stevens 1997: 428 
 
As the great and scandalously overlooked philosopher Giambattista Vico argued 
in the New Science: 
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If people lose their religion, nothing remains to keep them living in a society. 
They have no shield for their defence, no basis for their decisions, no 
foundation for their stability, and no form by which they exist in the world.  
 
Vico 1999: 490 
 
It’s no wonder that light has forever been considered the way to truth. The sun is 
the source of our power and energy, it radiates joy and gives hope.  
 
The heliocentric, or 'sun-centred' theory of the cosmos, which posits that the Earth 
circles around the sun, is considered to be the watershed moment when science and 
religion parted company. But it all depends on how one understands science and 
religion. For Marsilio Ficino, the sun is the embodiment of God. Indeed, it is worth 
recalling that the Hermetic tradition located the seat of the anima mundi in the sun. 
Described as the Visible god' and a 'second god', the sun relays God's creative and 
sustaining power.. (Asclepius  p. 85).  
 
It is in light of this that we should consider this remarkable statement from 
Copernicus: ‘Accordingly [considering the sun's central position], it is not foolish that it 
has been called the lamp of the universe, or its mind, or its ruler. [It is] Trismegistus' 
visible God’. Copernicus’ understanding of the sun's physical place in the solar 
system is transcendental: Trismegistus' visible God' is the sun as the universe's 'mind' 
or the seat of the power that rules all creation. 
Copernicus’ debt to Hermeticism is demonstrated by the fact that his three 
revolutionary ideas - the Earth's motion in space, its rotation on its own axis and the 
orbiting of the Earth and other planets around the sun – all appeared in the Hermetica. 
 
As Frances Yates argues: 
 
One can say, either that the intense emphasis on the sun in this new worldview 
was the emotional driving force which induced Copernicus to undertake his 
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mathematical calculations on the hypothesis that the sun is indeed at the centre of 
the planetary system; or that he wished to make his discovery acceptable by 
presenting it within the framework of this new attitude. Perhaps both explanations 
would be true, or some of each. 
At any rate, Copernicus' discovery came out with the blessing of Hermes 
Trismegistus upon its head, with a quotation from that famous work in which 
Hermes describes the sun-worship of the Egyptians in their magical religion. 
 
Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, pp. 154-5 
 
Writers in the Hermetic tradition took the Earth's journey around the sun for 
granted. Copernicus’ reference to Hermes Trismegistus in explaining his conception 
of the heliocentric system is significant. 
 
One gets the impression that Copernicus is saying: the truth of the matter was 
already there, but went unseen because we judged things from an earthly 
perspective. But Hermes, at the beginning of science, he saw it.  
 
Churton 2002: 59 
 
The truth of the matter was already there, it has been there all along – there is 
nothing new under the sun. The book of Ecclesiastes in the Bible makes precisely 
this point. Because we judge things from a transitory, earthly perspective we cannot 
find meaning and hope in what we have, only diminish what we have by a false and 
futile comparison with what we can never have. Instead of accepting the truth and 
appreciating the now-ness of life, we grasp at an eternity we cannot have, and so fall 
back disillusioned and in despair.  
We are geocentric beings, not heliocentric beings, meaning that we are 
constantly tempted into seeking infinity by finite means. It cannot be done; it’s a 
delusion. But rather than abandon delusion to pursue a possible happiness in the 
here and now, we despair. If we cannot find eternity in the temporal, we turn and 
abandon it, calling life as a whole meaningless and hopeless. 
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The author of Ecclesiastes is a man who has everything - palaces, vineyards, 
gardens, parks, pools, servants. He finds that all the wealth and success in the world 
mean nothing:  
 
2"Meaningless! Meaningless!" 
says the Teacher. "Utterly meaningless! Everything is meaningless." 
3What does man gain from all his labour at which he toils under the sun?  
4Generations come and generations go, but the earth remains for ever.  
5The sun rises and the sun sets, and hurries back to where it rises. 6The 
wind blows to the south and turns to the north; round and round it goes, ever 
returning on its course.  
7All streams flow into the sea, yet the sea is never full. To the place the 
streams come from, there they return again.  
8All things are wearisome, more than one can say. The eye never has 
enough of seeing, nor the ear its fill of hearing.  
9What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; 
there is nothing new under the sun.  
10Is there anything of which one can say, "Look! This is something new"? It 
was here already, long ago; it was here before our time.  
11There is no remembrance of men of old, and even those who are yet to 
come will not be remembered by those who follow. (Ecclesiastes 1:2-11) 
 
And on it goes. Pleasure, wisdom, folly, toil, riches, advancement, everything is 
meaningless. The key word of Ecclesiastes – used thirty-eight times - is hevel. This is 
usually translated as 'vain', 'pointless' or 'meaningless'. Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, 
however, points out that the word means 'a breath'. ‘As in many other ancient 
languages, the Hebrew words for soul or life are all forms of respiration. Nefesh, 'life', 
comes from the verb meaning 'to breathe deeply'. Neshamah, 'soul', means 'to 
inhale'. Ruach, 'spirit', also means 'wind'. Hevel is a part of this family of words. It 
means specifically 'a shallow breath'. (Sacks 2011: 189).  
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The point of Ecclesiastes, then, is not that life is meaningless and human beings 
without hope, quite the contrary. The point is that seeking meaning in wealth and 
possessions, even in books and wisdom, is futile, since life is just a fleeting breath. 
And because life is a fleeting breath, it is precious and should be appreciated when 
we have it. Ecclesiastes does not encourage despair in the meaninglessness of life 
at all but calls upon us to contemplate the vulnerability of life and thus come to 
appreciate the life we are privileged to have while we have it.  
 
Sacks writes of hevel in a way that recalls Shakespeare’s King Lear as he holds 
dead Cordelia in his arms and says, 'Why should a dog, a horse, a rat, have life / And 
thou no breath at all?' Life is breath and breath is life. ‘Hevel, a shallow breath, is all 
that separates the living from the dead. We live, we die, and it is as if we had never 
been. We build, and others occupy. We accumulate possessions, but others enjoy 
them. The good we do is soon forgotten. The wisdom we acquire is useless, for it 
merely brings us back to a recognition of our mortality. To seek happiness in objects 
that endure is a kind of self-deception: they last, we do not.’ (Sacks 2011: 189). 
 
Ecclesiastes declares ‘a common destiny for all’. ‘All share a common destiny—the 
righteous and the wicked, the good and the bad,  the clean and the unclean, those 
who offer sacrifices and those who do not.’ ‘The same destiny overtakes all.’ (Ecc 9: 
2-3). ‘Man's fate is like that of the animals; the same fate awaits them both. As one 
dies, so dies the other. All have the same breath; man has no advantage over 
animal. Everything is but a fleeting breath. All go to the same place; all come from 
dust, and to dust all return.’ (Ecclesiastes). 
 
Life is but a fleeting breath – appreciate it while you have it. The argument 
savours a great deal of Spinoza, who writes ‘A free man thinks of nothing less 
than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation not on death but on life’ (Ethics 
Pt IV Prop LXXII Dem). Through the serene contemplation of God or Nature 
as a whole, the individual achieves a blessedness in existence, bound in 
community with others of like mind, by ‘the love which acknowledges as its 
cause freedom of mind’ (E 4, Appendix). 
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As Ecclesiastes makes the point, ‘Anyone who is among the living has hope — 
even a live dog is better off than a dead lion! For the living know that they will die, but 
the dead know nothing; they have no further reward, and even the memory of them is 
forgotten. Their love, their hate and their jealousy have long since vanished; never 
again will they have a part in anything that happens under the sun.’ (Ecc 9: 4-6).  
 
In other words, live life and enjoy life while you have it, rather than lament the fact 
that one day you will not.  
 
7Go, eat your food with gladness, and drink your wine with a joyful heart, for it is now 
that God favours what you do… 9Enjoy life with your wife, whom you love, all the days 
of this meaningless life that God has given you under the sun—all your meaningless 
days. For this is your lot in life and in your toilsome labour under the sun. 10Whatever 
your hand finds to do, do it with all your might, for in the grave, where you are going, 
there is neither working nor planning nor knowledge nor wisdom. (Ecc 9: 7-10). 
 
The most remarkable thing about the book of Ecclesiastes is that it justifies life in 
its living in there here and now, not in terms of an afterlife. The stark fact of mortality 
is faced rather than evaded and there is no moralisation of fate. The important thing 
is to act, even though ‘you do not know the path of the wind’: ‘Cast your bread upon 
the waters, for after many days you will find it again.’ (Ecc 11: 1). 
 
Sow your seed in the morning, and at evening let not your hands be idle, 
for you do not know which will succeed, whether this or that, or whether both will 
do equally well. (Ecc 11: 6). 
 
Once we recognise that only God is eternal and that we have only a brief span of 
time in which to live, we are able to seek and find human happiness in the now-ness 
of time. Ecclesiastes refuses to let despair have the final word:  
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A man can do nothing better than to eat and drink and find satisfaction in his 
work. This too, I see, is from the hand of God, for without him, who can eat or 
find enjoyment? To the man who pleases him, God gives wisdom, knowledge 
and happiness, but to the sinner he gives the task of gathering and storing up 
wealth to hand it over to the one who pleases God. This too is meaningless, a 
chasing after the wind. (Ecc 2: 24-26). 
 
The challenge is to live in the eternal now. ‘then man goes to his eternal home’ 
(Ecc 12: 5).  
 
9What does the worker gain from his toil? 10I have seen the burden God has laid on men. 
11He has made everything beautiful in its time. He has also set eternity in the hearts of 
men; yet they cannot fathom what God has done from beginning to end. 12I know that 
there is nothing better for men than to be happy and do good while they live. 13That 
everyone may eat and drink, and find satisfaction in all his toil—this is the gift of God. 
14I know that everything God does will endure for ever; nothing can be added to it and 
nothing taken from it. God does it so that men will revere him. (Ecc 3: 9-14). 
 
‘The sleep of a labourer is sweet, whether he eats little or much, but the 
abundance of a rich man permits him no sleep.’ (Ecc 5: 12).  
‘Remember Your Creator While Young’ means remember to live life whilst you 
have it, and know that it does not last forever. ‘Remember your Creator in the days of 
your youth, before the days of trouble come and the years approach when you will 
say, "I find no pleasure in them"— before the sun and the light and the moon and the 
stars grow dark.’ (Ecc 12: 1-2).  
We return to the living of life in the light of the sun.  
 
7Light is sweet, and it pleases the eyes to see the sun.  
8However many years a man may live, let him enjoy them all. But let him 
remember the days of darkness, for they will be many. 
Everything to come is meaningless. 
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9Be happy, young man, while you are young, and let your heart give you joy in 
the days of your youth. Follow the ways of your heart and whatever your eyes 
see.. (Ecc 11: 7-9). 
 
Ecclesiastes enjoins us to find meaning in the life we have been given, not to 
despair in the meaninglessness of a godless universe. Whatever the uncertainties 
concerning the future, the world to come, the afterlife, we can have no doubt that, in 
the present now-ness of things, we are alive, and since we are blessed with life, we 
ought to live it. I live, therefore I am. The author of Ecclesiastes is a man of great 
material riches and learning, but he finds meaning in the simple things of life, love 
and work, eating and drinking, friendship, doing good. He knows that ‘there is a 
time for everything and a season for every activity under heaven.’ (Ecc 3: 1). To 
acknowledge the eternity of God and accept the limits of the human life span 
diverts us from futile activities that waste our time and make us none the happier. 
Rather than set off in pursuit of an illusory permanence we should focus us upon a 
possible happiness, the one that is within our natural grasp. This is to achieve a 
genuine transcendence, to be touched by the divine within one’s life. 
 
But there is another kind of transcendence, the attempt to storm the heavens 
and create an eternity and an immortality by limited, temporal means. This is 
indeed futile, meaningless, but it is precisely what the doctrine of industrial and 
technological progress rests upon. 
 
The price of transcendence of our Earthly dwelling is now being exacted. We 
have been burning up the Earth for some time now. Through our industrial 
activity and the burning of ancient wastes that Mother Earth, in her wisdom, has 
kept buried beneath her skin, we have inflicted a sun of our own making on the 
planet. "Vocatus atque non vocatus deus aderit". “Invoked or not invoked, God will 
be present.” (Carl Gustav Jung). But global heating is human-made, not God 
inflicted. The crisis in the climate crisis is a call to the human species to invoke 
its own moral and rational powers and divert them from destructive to 
constructive ends. Through the burning of fossil fuels, we have achieved a 
power that transgresses planetary boundaries. In religion, transcendence is a 
spiritual endeavour that seeks the eternal beyond the temporal and transitory. In 
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industry, transcendence is instrumental, an inflation of technical and mechanical 
means to cheat mortality and manufacture immortality. This is not a genuine 
transcendence, but an idolatrous power that transgresses planetary boundaries. 
And it achieves not a genuine progress, a progress defined in terms of the 
realisation of a natural purpose, but a vain attempt to storm the heavens. The 
transcendent ideal has been brought down to Earth and brought within the reach 
of human technical power. In claiming the power of gods, we are in the grip of a 
delusional progress, the finite in pursuit of the infinite. 
 
“Every action of our lives touches a chord that vibrates in Eternity” (Edwin 
Hubbel Chapin). Maybe, but the quality and beneficence of those actions 
depends upon what, precisely, we understand by Eternity. Are we talking about 
a claim to immortality through megalomaniacal deeds and triumphs? Shelley 
dealt with the ruination of all such claims in Ozymandias. Immortality through 
buildings and machines is a delusion.  
 
Eternity, understood within the sense experience of biology, is nature’s 
endless cycles, and the best any species can do is flourish within those cycles. 
To flourish is to achieve health and well-being as a natural essence, and that’s 
more than enough. But what distinguishes the human species, naturally, is the 
ability to live by moral reason and to create a world of meaning out of physical 
immediacy. The danger is that that capacity leads us to unbalance the ratio 
between nature and culture, and that does indeed lead to the delusions of 
transcendence. 
 
"Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death. If we take 
eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then 
eternal life belongs to those who live in the present." (Ludwig Wittgenstein). 
 
This savours a little of what theologian Paul Tillich described as ‘the eternal now’. 
We live in the present in light of eternity. That is transcendence in the purest sense, 
beyond sense experience, and hence beyond empirical evidence and reason.  
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Which begs the question of life, life after death and eternity. The 
problems come when we attempt to force the finite realm to infinity. There 
are turbulent times ahead on planet Earth as a consequence of 
immanence and transcendence parting company. We have horizontalised 
the vertical. Where once infinity pointed upwards to the transcendental 
sphere, we have brought it down to Earth and stretched it across a planet 
of finite resources. We have been so seduced by the promise of unlimited 
material power and progress by means of our technics that we have 
become detached from the natural cycles which nurture and sustain life. 
We thus come to seek immortality in the mortal realm, eternity in the 
temporal realm, infinity in the finite realm. The endless expansion of 
material power is not a genuine transcendence at all, but is a neurotic 
attempt to escape reality and evade finality. And it involves an assault 
upon nature, our own nature within as well as nature without. 
 
Through its technological capacity, the human species has spread 
itself horizontally to cover the planet with evidence of ‘progress’. The 
worship of material ‘progress’ commits us to the extension of the infinite 
across the horizontal ocean and land. As a consequence of 
horizontalising the vertical, we have come to locate and pursue the infinite 
within the finite world. The problem is that infinity can go only so far within 
a planet of limited resources. We therefore come to transgress planetary 
boundaries. It is nature’s cycle of birth, life, death and rebirth that is truly 
eternal, not the instruments and products of progress. The pursuit of 
immortality through machines transgresses planetary limits and upsets 
the ecological balance of life on earth. It is a delusive, destructive attempt 
to escape nature’s eternal cycle of birth, life, death and rebirth. According 
to particle physics, the atoms of matter that comprise our mortal bodies 
are more or less indestructible. All matter, our own included, is 
redistributed throughout the universe by Mother Nature to some useful 
purpose of her own for eternity. We need to remember that we are part of 
a great whole. For Darwin, evolution is a descent with modification from a 
common source, meaning that we are related to all things and that all 
living things are our brothers and sisters. 
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Transcendence and immanence, the sun and the sea/land, the vertical 
and the horizontal. We need to achieve a relational and holistic 
perspective that releases us from the constraints of a worldview in which 
'up' and 'down', ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ are seen as antithetical. Enlightenment 
doesn’t just come from above, the land is not covered with darkness. The 
distinction between ‘up’ and ‘down’ loses its meaning.  
 
With the pursuit of material progress, we think we are achieving 
Heaven on Earth. But it’s an illusion. A worldview in which Heaven is 
sought ‘up there’ beyond the skies and Hell is seen as ‘down here’ on the 
benighted land is unsustainable. I would put the point this way. With the 
split between transcendence and immanence, we see Heaven as 
something up there beyond the clouds. And we think that we can reach 
Heaven by means of our skill and ingenuity and intellect. These are the 
means of material progress. It’s a secular myth, a false religion. We are 
neither reaching Heaven nor building Heaven. Imagine using our technics 
to build a tower that allows us to reach into the skies, and beyond. All the 
resources of the planet are utilised in the process, all the iron, the copper, 
all the minerals, all the energy, everything. The whole of the planet’s 
surface is covered in concrete in order to build a strong enough foundation for 
the tower to be able to reach the moon. All the materials of the planet are 
used to build the tower. And what do we find when we ascend the tower 
all the way to the top? I can’t see God up here, astronaut Yuri Gagarin is 
reputed to have said when reporting back from outer space. Try looking 
down. All the life we need is around us here on Earth. Yet we have used 
up and wasted all our natural resources in order to achieve divinity and 
immortality. It is the finite in pursuit of the infinite, and it is to waste the 
gift of life in an attempt to cheat death. I don’t believe that Gagarin made 
this remark. I suspect it was the politicians, serving their own idols, who 
put the words into the astronauts’ mouth. All of the natural resources 
making for Heaven on Earth are being used to achieve the false eternity 
and immortality of material progress. This secular myth of progress 
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delivers not the salvation promised, only endless human sacrifice to the 
new idols of state, capital, money, commodities, bureaucracy. 
As a transcendent ideal, God is a vision of something better, 
something beyond biological imperatives and natural necessities, 
something that gives us hope and inspires our moral effort and willing and 
gives us a shared ethic, a universal. We need a moral conception that 
enables us to see beyond the world of factual matter. Without the moral 
intelligence that the transcendent offers, we either fall back into 
purposeless, meaningless matter or seek to escape it by an endless 
material progress pursued by mechanical and instrumental means. We 




Psychologically, we are still coming to terms with the discovery that the 
world is round rather than flat. Until the sixteenth century, the great civilisations 
and empires of the world were flat regimes in that they existed within a 
cosmology which conceived the Earth as flat. The land was a great island, 
surrounded horizontally by the oceans and linked vertically to infinity by the sky 
above. All the kingdoms and empires were bounded flatlands having to look 
upwards to the skies or outwards to the sea for a sense of infinity. The 
transcendent was located in the vertical pointing upwards. 
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All the maps of the world before the discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries exhibit that flat concept of the land, with human civilization centred around 
the Mediterranean Sea, a name which means ‘Sea in the Middle of the Earth’. Rome 
was known as caput mundi, the ‘capital of the world’. That notion implies a political 
hierarchy. Dante uses the phrase to refer to Rome as the world capital in De 
Monarchia. (De Monarchia (II, ix, 17). In Italian/Latin ‘capo’ means ‘head’, and 
therefore implies something ‘higher’ or ‘on top’. Rome may be the city built on seven 
hills, but my argument concerns a psychological height, rather than a physical height. 
That perception stems from the perception of the Mediterranean as being the middle 
of the Earth, the idea that Earth is a flatland with a centre, an end, a height. 
 
It’s the psychological aspect, the way we see the world and see ourselves 
accordingly, that matters more than the physical aspects. The world we 
perceive in hierarchical fashion is not the world revealed by the new physics 
of the twentieth century; it’s not even the world revealed by the geographical 
discoveries of the sixteenth century and after. Our mindscapes are still 
adjusted to a way of seeing the world that no longer fits the way we know the 
world as landscape is. But that returns to the notion of ‘topographical location’ 
which I introduced at the beginning of this book. Our minds have to ascend 
the levels of cognition so as to access true reality. We have to ascend 
philosophically if we are to find our true place within the world. Instead, we 
seem hell-bent on a technological ascent in order to escape natural 
boundaries, considered as constraints upon freedom. They are not 
constraints, they are our moorings, keeping us sane and sustaining life. 
 
The Earth is not flat and there is no division between the immanent and the 
transcendent. There is no horizontal on planet Earth, and since there is no horizontal, 
there is no longer any need for the old conception of the vertical. There is no need to 
project the transcendent upwards. There is no ‘up’ and no ‘down’, no ‘top’ and no 
‘bottom’. The world neither rises nor comes down.  
 
Yet just as we come to realise that the world and its potentialities are within our 
grasp, we have become prisoners of a techno-urban industrial mechanism that 
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continuously removes the world from our hands and extends it horizontally to infinity. 
The problem is that secular modernity has repudiated theology at the superstructural 
level but has absorbed theological assumptions within its substructure. We therefore 
get a secular myth of progress in which salvation is achieved through the endless 
accumulation of material quantity. Whereas once we looked upwards for spiritual 
meaning, with industrial and technological progress we have secularised the 
end of salvation and relocated its satisfaction within the material world. In 
horizontalising the infinite, we have reconceived the end of salvation as an 
endless, infinite industrial and technical progress on a planet of finite resources. 
This secular myth of progress delivers not the human happiness and freedom 
promised but a spiritual and physical dissolution. And the reason for this is 
because it is focused upon delivering quantities rather than satisfying the 
qualities of being and place. Materialism is a false philosophy, its notions of a 
purely secular progress having all the character of a surrogate religion.  
 
We now have a Pope in Rome, Pope Francis, who, upon his election, said 
this to the crowds in St Peter’s Square: It seems my brother cardinals went 
almost to the end of the world (to choose a Pope). 
 
When a cardinal, Pope Francis declared: ‘The unjust distribution  of goods 
persists, creating a situation of social sin that cries out to Heaven and limits the 
possibilities of a fuller life for so many of our brothers’.  
 
Social and environmental justice go hand in hand. 
 
We need to recover a proper sense of ends or it really will be the end of the 
world. Kaput also means ‘gone, dead, finished’. By horizontalising the vertical and 
pursuing the infinite in a world of finite resources, kaput mundi may well come to 
mean the end of the human world as in ‘gone, dead, finished’.  
 
I owe these meanings of caput mundi and capo to literary linguist Margherita 
Muller. Her MLitt thesis contains a theme which is highly pertinent to this discussion: 
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Under what stars to plough the earth? The aesthetics and ethics of three Scottish 
gardens (2012), (available at http://independent.academia.edu).  
I shall return later to the question ‘under what stars to plough the earth?’ It’s the 
key question. 
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8 THE VISIONARY MATERIALISM OF WILLIAM BLAKE 
Beyond Urizen 
 
(all textual references, unless otherwise indicated, are to The Complete Writings of 
William Blake, edited by Geoffrey Keynes 1958). 
 
And all the Arts of Life they changd into the Arts of Death in Albion. 
The hour-glass contemnd because its simple workmanship 
Was like the workmanship of the plowman, & the water-wheel, 
That raises water into cisterns: broken & burnd with fire: 
Because its workmanship was like the workmanship of the shepherd. 
And in their stead, intricate wheels invented, wheel without wheel: 
To perplex youth in their outgoings, & to bind to labours in Albion 
Of day & night the myriads of eternity that they may grind 
And polish brass & iron hour after hour laborious task! 
Kept ignorant of its use, that they might spend the days of wisdom 
In sorrowful drudgery, to obtain a scanty pittance of bread: 
In ignorance to view a small portion & think that All. 
—William Blake, Jerusalem 
 
Against the dominant paradigm of mechanistic materialism, there were a number 
of writers and artists who expressed a different attitude to nature. One could mention 
here figures from the world of art such as Caspar David Friedrich, Goya and Samuel 
Palmer. The Romantic poets Wordsworth and Coleridge are another two. I would offer 
William Blake (1757-1827) as a visionary materialist in a category of his own. 
There are good reasons for including a piece on the visionary poet and artist 
William Blake in this collection of essays and articles concerning our need to re-
think immanence and transcendence in light of the looming ecological 
catastrophe. Blake wrote at the height of the first industrial revolution in the early 
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nineteenth century and saw more clearly than anyone the moral and intellectual 
implications of the new world that was in the process of emerging. I conceive 
Blake's visionary materialism in terms of the moral necessity of imagining 
alternatives to the mechanical system that installed itself on top of the common 
ground of our Being. Blake’s concern was not to return to some pre-capitalist idyll, 
but to realise the eternal ideal. In this, Blake exposed the emerging industrial 
capitalism as a false universal, a partial ‘All’, a totalitarian ‘only’, a singular vision. 
The "intricate wheels" of the dark Satanic mills against which Blake fulminated 
savour so clearly of industrial capitalism, binding workers to the labours of ever-
repeated cycles of time and work discipline, that it is easy to read Blake simply as a 
critic of economic exploitation and dehumanisation. In truth, this forms one part 
of Blake’s critique, with industrialism being a consequence of a larger 
mechanical materialism that comes to shape whole mentalities and modalities. 
Blake is concerned to expose the whole, apparently irresistible, totality that 
works to suppress alternate possibilities within itself. In his day, ‘mad Blake’ 
was considered a crank and an oddity, even a lunatic. Yet Blake had shown 
that to conform to the "necessities" and "realities" imposed by the mechanical 
system entails nothing less than madness. Blake struggled against this 
mechanical system that he struggled, not in pursuit of another system, but to 
put an end to all systems. "Striving with Systems to deliver Individuals from 
those Systems" This emancipation is the unchaining of human potential from 
the realm of necessity, bringing about the creative fulfilment of all human 
creative energies and desires. 
With this unchaining, human beings would for the first time – but "once 
again," in Blake’s terminology, - to see the myriads of an eternity and an 
infinity. These possibilities are currently closed off to us by the single vision of a 
mechanical system that reduces everything to finite, uniform and measurable 
quantities. The easiest thing to write here is that Blake is a critic of industrial 
capitalism and the commodification and exploitation of the world. He may well 
be, but his vision is much larger than that, taking in the whole mechanical 
universe.  
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Newton c 1795 Blake 
 
We live in a world which conceives Nature to be a machine. Industrial 
capitalism is one part of that universe. "The hours of folly are measur'd by the 
clock: but of wisdom, no clock can measure," Blake writes (the Proverbs of Hell 
in The Marriage of Heaven & Hell). We measure the hours of the working-day 
within the machine, whereas Blake wants us to imagine the presently 
unimaginable. Changing mentalities brings about changing modalities, meaning 
that to get out of the mechanistic universe we need vision. 
 
Blake's visionary materialism contains the imperative to transcend the narrow 
confinements of a mechanical reality conceived according to the single vision. 
Blake sought to unleash the human energy against the structures and rules of 
the machine system of his day. That system remains in place. It is our world. 
Blake calls the ideologues of the mechanical order the Angels of the 
rationalizing system, meaning all those who would present the rules and 
regulations, principles and laws, objectives and imperatives, necessities and 
restraints of the system as natural, inducing us to conform in spirit as much 
as in body. Those people exist today also. Blake’s visionary materialism is 
timely in giving us the capacity to see through and break through these 
constraints.  
 
It is with some trepidation that I enter the world of William Blake. Blake has all 
the brilliance, insight, contradiction and obscurity of the self-taught genius. He has 
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the esoteric quality of the true visionary. I get the impression that just one slight 
error in reading Blake can leave you heading for one almighty fall. I doubt that 
Blake would sympathise. He knew that the truly great works did not present their 
meanings immediately, on the surface, to be casually perused and picked up. So it 
is easy to see why so many could be misled by surface level investigation. Blake 
was determined not to have his message identified with surface appearances. 
Blake is not the most quotable of poets; even apparently simple words have a 
peculiar flavour in Blake. And Blake knew exactly what he was doing. Blake wholly 
concurred with Thomas Taylor's view that the Ancients concealed the Divine 
Mysteries behind symbols. "What is Grand is necessarily obscure to Weak men. 
That which can be made Explicit to the Idiot is not worth my care. The wisest of the 
Ancients consider'd what is not too Explicit as the fittest for Instruction because it 
rouzes the faculties to act. I name Moses, Solomon, Esop, Homer, Plato" (To 
Trusler, 23 Aug 1799). Now that could leave Blake struggling for an audience. 
Personally, I’ve always strove to be understood, to invite individuals out of the 
idiocy of private concerns (the Greek idiotes refers to those who are interested only 
in private affairs). I address people as polites, thinking, rational, social beings. But 
Blake knew what he was doing. He saw his great task as "to open the immortal 
Eyes of Man inwards, into the Worlds of Thought" (J 5:18). Blake was trying to get 
human beings to see with their mind’s eye, penetrate the world of the senses and 
see the ultimate reality. And such work is not for the idiotes. 
 
We all have that inner vision. Blake is challenging us to use it. It follows that 
Blake is not altogether impenetrable. He is addressing us at the level of an innate 
mental capacity, something we all have. Further, for all of his alleged mysticism, 
Blake is not an obscurantist. And he repays the effort. Blake’s message is timely. 
But then again, given Blake’s belief in an eternal realm, it is bound to be. 
 
I shall start with a concise definition of Urizen. 
Urizen is the southern Zoa, who symbolizes Reason. But he is much more 
than what we commonly understand by "reason": he is the limiter of Energy, the 
lawmaker, and the avenging conscience. He is a plowman, a builder, and driver 
of the sun-chariot. His art is architecture, his sense is Sight, his metal is Gold, his 
element is Air. His Emanation is Ahania (pleasure); his Contrary, in the north, is 
Urthona  (the Imagination). His name has been translated as "Your Reason," a 
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derivation quite characteristic of Blake, who  continually used semi-conscious 
puns; but Kathleen Raine and others prefer to derive it from the Greek … "to 
limit", which is the root of the English "horizon."  
Man, the image of God, is fourfold; God therefore must also be fourfold. As 
the Trinity is reflected in the other three Zoas (Tharmas, the Father; Luvah, the 
Son; and Urthona, the Holy Ghost), Urizen must be … that aspect of deity which, 
when fallen, becomes Satan (FZ v: 217). All things, even the Devil, are of the 
divine substance.  
(Foster Damon 1979) 
 
To give some idea of the complexity of the idea of Urizen, the entry in Foster 
Damon’s Dictionary contains more than five thousand words. 
When I write of Blake’s vision as going ‘beyond Urizen’, I shall take this to mean 
Urizen in both senses of ‘your reason’ and ‘horizon’. Blake’s vision goes beyond the 
way that alienated rationality narrows the horizon of the Human Imagination. 
 
As Theodore Roszak comments in Where the Wasteland Ends (1972), Urizen is 
Blake's most compelling image, from the Greek to limit, bound, restrict; also "Your 
Reason." ‘Urizen is single vision: functional logicality, that which divides up, limits, 
draws lines—the dominant Zoa of scientized culture, the Zoa that rules modern 
society. His sign is "the Starry Wheels": law, logic, inexorable order: the world-
machine.’ Urizen expresses Blake's horror of the mechanistic universe revealed by 
the natural scientists, which Blake describes as a "soul-shudd'ring vacuum" 
fashioned conceptually by a demon intelligence: 
 
Lo, a shadow of horror is risen In Eternity! Unknown, unprolific, Self-enclos'd, 
all-repelling: what Demon Hath form'd this abominable void, This soul-shudd'ring 
vacuum? Some said "It is Urizen." 
 
But Urizen is "Your Reason.” We need to reclaim this alienated rationality via 
the Human Imagination.  
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The contrary of Urizen is Urthona, “earth owner", the creative Imagination of 
the Individual. Urthona’s element is Earth (FZ i: 18). Urthona is a blacksmith 
(FZ i: 519; J 95:17), constantly occupied with creating forms. He makes the 
"spades & coulters" of peace (FZ i: 520) and "the golden armour of science for 
intellectual War" (FZ ix. 853). His forge is in the deep dens or caves of the 
subconscious (MHH 26; FZ v: 189; vii b: 133; ix: 840). His Sense is the Ear (J 
12: 6o; FZ i: 17); his Art is Poetry, which, in its degeneration, becomes Religion 
(Mil 27:60). Urthona is "keeper of the gates of heaven" (FZ iv.42; 78a:8i). 
 
The discussion which follows is organised around this dialectic of struggle 
and divergence between Urizen and Urthona, reason and imagination. Jesus 
is the universal Imagination. 
 
It is interesting that Urthona is rendered as ‘Earth owner’. There has been an 
attempt to claim Blake for the ecological movement and its attempts to secure 
some kind of Green Peace on Earth. The anarchist Peter Marshall argues that Blake 
‘is an ecological poet par excellence, a vibrating source of earth wisdom. He not only 
challenged the mechanistic and rational premises of Western civilization but posed an 
alternative vision which looks back to the millenarian sects of the Middle Ages and 
anticipates the modern green movement.’ (Marshall 1992 ch 20). 
That’s fine as far as it goes. But it all depends on what we mean by ecology, 
Earth wisdom and the modern green movement. Blake’s view is quite distinct from 
any simple veneration of nature. Blake was well known for his antipathy to the 
countryside. He was a city man through and through. But the issue is much bigger 
than lifestyle. Blake’s life, his work and above all his vision together resonate with 
their connection with ultimate reality. But this ultimate reality is not quite the same 
thing that a deep ecologist like Arne Naess would recognise as the Earth. Blake’s 
ultimate reality is not physical nature, whether that is the nature of the deep ecologist 
or the natural scientist. For Blake, the physical materialism of modern science merely 
yields the appearance of a vegetable nature, not true reality. Green movement? It 
depends who and what is meant. I doubt that Blake would be enamoured of wind 
farms. To him, they would be power stations in beauty spots, more Satanic Mills 
evidencing the power of Urizen, technical reason alienated from the one and true 
reality. 
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Marshall uses this phrase ‘Earth wisdom’ quite a lot. He refers to the ‘ecosophy or 
earth wisdom’ of the Americans John Muir and Aldo Leopold and the German Albert 
Schweitzer. He writes this of Leopold: ‘he concluded that the earth was alive, a living 
being, which deserved respect. To transcend his earlier anthropocentric position was 
for him, as the title of a 1944 essay put it, Thinking like a Mountain'. (Marshall 1992: 
25) 
 
Blake also felt that the earth was alive, a living organism. This was part of his 
repudiation of mechanical materialism and scientific rationalism. But any ‘Earth 
wisdom’ in Blake did not entail transcending an anthropocentric position in order to 
think like a mountain. Indeed, Blake so thoroughly rejected an immanentist position 
with respect to nature that he went to the other extreme of transcendence. The world 
and everything in it is eternal in the Human Imagination. To Blake, vegetable nature 
was precisely the unreal world of appearance that the methods of mechanistic science 
revealed, not the true reality. To access that ultimate reality required a deeper vision, 
an inner eye.  
 
Marshall writes of the deep ecology of the Norwegian philosopher Arne 
Naess, whose 'ecosophy', which seeks to deepen our understanding of ourselves 
and our place in nature, derives from the Greek sophia, 'wisdom', and eco, 'earth'. 
Ecosophy, Marshall writes, ‘concerns itself with “earth wisdom”’. 
 
Marshall is insufficiently alive to what distinguishes Blake from these other views 
expressing an ‘Earth wisdom’. This comes out clearly when Marshall expresses his 
inability to understand how AN Whitehead could reconcile his Platonic philosophy of 
ideal forms with his organic philosophy of process and desire. Marshall cannot see 
‘how the world of eternal objects or forms is organized and how it is connected to this 
world’ in Whitehead’s conception. (My own view is similar to Whitehead’s in being an 
attempt to combine a transcendental idealism in the tradition of Plato and Kant with an 
essentialism in the tradition of Aristotle, Hegel and Marx. Arguably, the finest 
statement of such a position is given by St Thomas Aquinas, if one can accept the 
existence of a supernatural God. Despite Aquinas’ best efforts, it can’t be proven one 
way or the other. It’s a matter of faith). 
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Marshall’s view of Whitehead remains favourable. ‘Nevertheless, with all the 
complex and subtle understanding of modern physics, logic and mathematics, he 
elaborated a philosophy which is profoundly in tune with ancient 'earth wisdom' and 
can inspire the best in modern green thinking.’ (Marshall 1992: 26). 
 
Again, as with Blake, that rather general conclusion with respect to Earth wisdom 
and green thought and action rather fudges the fine philosophical points and 
distinctions. And, with respect to a figure such as Blake, that generalisation cannot but 
distort the complexities of the man’s thought. In another book, Marshall writes of Blake 
as a ‘visionary anarchist’. (Marshall 2008). He may well be. In Blake A Man Without a 
Mask, Jacob Bronowski writes that energy is ‘the core of Blake's religious thought’. 
Bronowski writes of ‘evil and energy exploding society for its good. This anarchism 
remains masterful in Blake's prophetic books.’ (Bronowski 1944: 65). 
It rather depends on what one means by an anarchist. If Blake is an anarchist, 
then so too is Jesus Christ. The spiritual revolution is at the core of Blake’s 
philosophy. I would argue that Blake is a visionary materialist who, with a belief in 
innate ideas, is able to penetrate the vegetable world of the senses and access a 
true reality, an eternal realm of Human Imagination. And this gives Blake a true 
conception of reality beyond the mechanistic materialism which focused on the senses 
and the unreality of physical event and causality. That is a transcendental perspective. If 
Blake rejected mechanical materialism, he also rejected the idea that vegetable nature 
was a true picture of reality. His ‘Earth wisdom’ was to this extent Platonic or 
Neoplatonic. And it also distinguishes Blake from an ecosophy or deep ecology that 
equates Nature as such with God. Blake presents a visionary materialism so radical that 
it escapes the finiteness of immanence by embracing the infinity of complete mental 
transcendence. It is a strange kind of ecology that leaves the finite world of the senses 
behind in order to enter the realm of the eternal mind. Unravelling this riddle is the 
subject of this paper.  
Arguing for a reality that lies somewhere between the extremes of immanence 
and transcendence begs the question of what we mean by reality? Reality is one 
those terms that make us yearn for a fresh vocabulary, since the word conveys so 
many different meanings. Those various meanings are less important here than the 
fact that Blake was in no doubt what reality meant. For Blake, reality is the universal 
soul of man. That is the one and true reality. Everything else is the "emanation" of 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
138 
that universal soul. Blake conceived reality as eternal form; temporal appearance is 
unreality.  
 
This view brought Blake into collision with modern science. Blake demonized the 
unholy trinity of Francis Bacon, John Locke and Isaac Newton, whose thinking 
jointly reduced 'that which is Soul & Life into a Mill or Machine': 
 
I turn my eyes to the Schools & Universities of Europe 
And there behold the Loom of Locke, whose Woof rages dire, 
Wash'd by the Water-wheels of Newton: black the cloth 
In heavy wreathes folds over every Nation: cruel Works 
Of many Wheels I view, wheel without wheel, with cogs tyrannic 
Moving by compulsion each other, not as those in Eden, which, 
Wheel within Wheel, in freedom revolve in harmony & peace. 
 
Advancing a philosophy which reads Nature as mechanistic and the mind as 
passive, the unholy trinity of Bacon, Locke and Newton had replaced the soul with 
the five material senses, which were mere windows through which Nature 
impressed itself upon the senses. Locke viewed the mind as a tabula rasa, blank at 
birth, then inscribed by the outer world. In contrast, Blake believed in the reality of 
innate ideas. (And, as with Chomsky’s innate conception of linguistic capacity, 
Kant’s innate conceptual apparatus, the idea of an innate moral grammar, this 
could certainly be integrated within an essentialist position, the idea that there 
are natural essences rather than blank sheets for culture to write upon). 
 
Blake’s visionary materialism represents an inversion of the common sense 
view of the world. Blake’s belief in innate ideas locates him in the Platonic 
tradition. These innate ideas transcend the world of immediacy and give access 
to the ultimate reality beyond the senses. When the man or woman of common 
sense refer to the "reality" of a thing, they mean its material substance. 
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However, for Blake, that material substance is precisely what denotes the 
unreality or shadow of a thing. So Blake would condemn a position of complete 
immanence not on account of it being realistic, but on account of it not being 
realistic enough, or realistic at all. The corporeal form, the very physical fact 
which is the stuff of single vision science, is, for Blake, mere vegetative nature. 
What mechanistic science presents as a true representation of material reality 
is, for Blake, the partial or sensory impressions that appearance makes on eyes 
that are mere glasses of reflection rather than being dynamic organs of sight. 
Whatever appears on those glasses of reflection is not true reality but mere 
unreality. Thus Blake emphasised the inner vision, what Plato in The 
Symposium calls the eye of the mind. True perception has sight of the eternal 
form. Blake thus argues that the doors of perception be opened. To Aldous 
Huxley, cleansing the ‘doors of perception’ entailed experimentation with drugs. 
Blake had no need of such artificial intoxication. The Imagination was enough. 
To Blake, artificial stimulants would have been stupefaction. Human beings 
have sufficient innate powers, which Blake sought to waken from their 
slumbers. 
For Blake, the way to access the true reality beyond the senses was to liberate the 
sensuous imagination and allow it to reveal forms inherent and embryonic within the 
existing order of things. These forms are immanent within this order, yes, but also 
burgeoning, emergent, pointing beyond the shell of the prevailing world of the senses. 
If this is an immanence, then it is an immanence that is always pointing beyond itself, 
rather drawing things back into itself. Blake’s vision is expansive, an unfolding of 
worlds within worlds. For Blake, the imagination is both the progenitor and midwife of 
such forms, bringing about a world that vision has in some way created. One could 
therefore argue that Blake has a transcendent vision of the future, a future which is 
based on the transformation of a reality which is conceived as a field of materialist 
immanence. The future held in the mind’s eye is realised by freeing the sensuous 
imagination to play upon reality as a field of potentialities: 
 
. . . the whole creation will be consumed and appear infinite and holy, whereas it 
now appears finite & corrupt. 
This will come to pass by an improvement of sensual enjoyment. But first the 
notion that man has a body distinct from his soul is to be expunged; this I shall do 
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by printing in the infernal method, by corrosives, which in Hell are salutary and 
medicinal, melting apparent surfaces away, and displaying the infinite which was 
hid. 
If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, 
infinite. 
For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his 
cavern. (The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, p. 187). 
 
The ‘infinite which was hid’ is a crucial phrase. Blake is writing of the ultimate 
reality which the methods of modern mechanistic science cannot access. This idea of 
unveiling reality crops up in quantum physics, as in the work of Heisenberg. For 
Blake, this infinity hidden in the finite world ultimately points beyond sensuous reality 
to the eternal realm.  
 
The question is whether, as a result, Blake abandons the immanence of nature 
for a complete transcendence that exists nowhere except in the eternal realm of 
mind. If this is Earth wisdom, then it is Earth wisdom that involves much more than 
respecting and following the patterns of Nature as immediately given to the senses. 
Blake is arguing for much more than merely fitting ourselves passively to the 
contours of Nature or simply reading off lessons from Nature. Rousseau is commonly 
understood to have argued ‘back to nature’, conceiving nature to be benign and 
good. The Marquis de Sade agreed that we should go ‘back to nature’, except that 
Sade knew that part of nature which is cruel and violent and morally indifferent. One 
sees here that any notion of ‘Earth wisdom’ entails a moral view which is in some 
way independent of sensuous nature. The natural law is not the laws of physical 
nature but nature as seen through the eyes of reason, through Plato’s eye of the 
mind.  
 
Blake is arguing for no such thing as de Sade’s back to nature. His Earth wisdom 
is quite distinct from that of naturalist scientists, philosophers and ecologists. By 
proposing that the doors of perception be cleansed, Blake is advocating a praxis that 
is reflective, indeed, that is self-reflective in Plato’s sense; and he is arguing for an 
imaginative transformation of reality. 
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And it is a mutual transformation. Blake’s criticism of mechanistic science and 
technological rationalism does not entail a rejection of science and technology. Blake 
offers himself as an example here, referring to his craft as printer and engraver, a craft 
in which Blake made a number of practical and technical advances beyond his 
contemporaries. Blake made no superficial distinction between theory and practice. 
Blake is far from being a mad visionary and impotent dreamer. On the contrary, 
Blake stated explicitly that theory and practice go together. 
 
Good thoughts are little better than good dreams.  
Thought is act. Christ's acts were nothing to Caesar's if this is not so.  
 
Blake Annotations to ‘Bacon’s Essays’. Written about 1798 
 
Blake’s conception of praxis is capable of generalisation to cover the whole socially 
organized sphere of work and life, including the making of language and poetry, as 
well as science and technology. Indeed, since ‘Thought is Act’, there could be no 
separation between mind and body, intellect and will, for Blake. 
 
For Blake, revolutionary transformation towards the free society began in the 
here and now. There was no need to adopt a passive posture waiting for the 
cataclysmic upheaval at some vague point in the distant future. The conception of the 
unity of theory and practice implies that everyone has a role to play in changing 
society by acting so as to change their own lives. And that change as self-change 
always begins in the present. And it involves the individual in taking stands against 
error wherever it may reside in existing social institutions: 
 
All Life consists of these Two, Throwing off Error & Knaves from our 
company continually & Recieving Truth or Wise Men into our Company 
continually.  
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He who is out of the Church & opposes it is no less an Agent of Religion 
than he who is in it; to be an Error & to be Cast out is a part of God's design.  
No man can Embrace True Art till he has Explor'd & cast out False Art 
(such is the Nature of Mortal Things), or he will be himself Cast out by those 
who have Already Embraced True Art.  
Thus My Picture is a History of Art & Science, the Foundation of Society, 
Which is Humanity itself. What are all the Gifts of the Spirit but Mental Gifts? 
Whenever any Individual Rejects Error & Embraces Truth, a Last Judgment 
passes upon that Individual. 
 
Blake: Complete Writings, with Variant Readings, ed. Geoffrey Keynes, Oxford 
Standard Authors (London, 1966); new impression with corrections, Oxford 
Paperbacks, 1971 p 613  
 
This is to place some exacting demands upon the individual. Human beings 
are social beings. Only the very strongest can resist the social pressures to 
conform, even to accept error. But Blake is clear in his rejection of hypocrisy, even 
and maybe even especially that hypocrisy born of a concern for the social peace 
and social position. For Blake, the hypocrite is a wrongdoer who knows his wrong, 
and this makes him the silent witness to the knowledge of right. Blake condemns 
the hypocrite from the perspective of one who is aware of the responsibility of 
moral responsibility and who is happy in having chosen right over error. That is a 
choice which everyone can make in their everyday life and which, for Blake, 
everyone must make. 
For Blake, the personal is political and vice versa. Individual rebellion in the 
everyday life world forms an integral part of the necessarily collective enterprise of 
working towards the fundamental transformation of society. Blake was a rebel as a 
person but was also a revolutionary with respect to his vision of society. Bronowski 
writes of Blake as someone who had ‘a harsh understanding of the world in which he 
was forced to live: in which he knew himself to be a rebel, and in which he felt 
himself a prisoner.’ (Bronowski 1944 ch 2). 
Blake felt himself to be an outsider, a man living in internal exile, in prison. 
Blake saw himself as living in a State of "Empire or Tax" (OSAB 777) in which 
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visionaries such as himself were considered madmen. Blake wanted to escape that 
prison and he knew that this was not just a question of personal rebellion but of 
social revolution. Blake knew that the madness was in the mechanistic rationality of 
the world being erected around him. 'May God keep us,' Blake exclaimed, 'From 
Single vision & Newton's sleep!'  
In this mythology, Blake associates Newton with the authoritarian tyrant 
Urizen, 'your reason', which narrows the 'horizon' to imagination and cuts us off 
from true reality, from the infinite. Urizen is the Zoa of physical power, the physical 
power that rules the flatland, the world conceived in terms of mechanical 
materialism. Urizen is the builder of the "dark Satanic mills," the architect of vast 
geometric structures and imperial cities, the master of the "Mundane Shell."  
 
Blake connects the mechanistic conception of the material world and 
mechanical models of the mind with the mechanisation that characterised the 
Industrial Revolution and which brought with it new oppressions. Urizen is the 
genius of the machines: "the Loom of Locke . . .  the Waterwheels of Newton . . . 
cruel Works of many Wheels, wheel without wheel, with cogs tyrannic . . ." 
 
Urizen is ‘your reason’, human reason taking alien form, bringing vast technical 
and physical power but delivering not liberation but oppression and tyranny. Urizen-
Satan's alienated reason extends mechanical, instrumental rationality over the 
whole world, mind and matter: "To Mortals thy Mills seem everything." 
 
As Materialism is completed under Newton and Locke, humankind becomes more 
and more spiritually debased. In America and Europe, revolution breaks out; The 
Song of Los ("Asia") ends with the general resurrection. 
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'Europe supported by Africa & America', 
engraving for J.G. Stedman, Narrative (1796) 
 
But the revolution that Blake demands is not merely political. Blake is concerned 
with more than an external liberty within the machine world. He demands inner 
spiritual liberty. 
 
It is worth spending some time on the question of Blake’s politics, given the extent 
to which both the left and right, both socialists and conservatives, have laid some 
claim to Blake’s memory and message. 
Blake’s political radicalism is a well-documented fact. Many ‘patriots’, 
whose worship of war and the imperial state is in direct contradistinction to 
Blake’s views, cite Blake’s authority and celebrate ‘England’ as though the 
New Jerusalem has already been built. As though Blake’s concern is with 
England alone. Blake’s support for social, racial and sexual equality is 
anathema to such people. In Blake Prophet Against Empire, David Erdman 
(1977) shows just how expansive Blake’s vision is.  
 
There is an attempt to evade Blake’s radical politics by erecting a socialist 
straw man. As though pointing out, contrary to Labour Party sentiment, that 
Blake was not a socialist somehow diminishes his clear support for radical 
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social and political causes. There is an awful lot of anachronism going on 
here, with Blake being pulled left and right between political traditions with 
which he would have had little sympathy. It should be clear that to say that 
Blake is not a Labourite socialist does not mean he is a Tory. Indeed, those 
who sing the hymn Jerusalem and get all misty eyed about the sacrifice of 
those who have fallen in the many wars between the imperial states have 
even less right to claim the name of Blake. Blake loathed all such wars.  
Blake distinguishes between mental wars fought in Eternity and physical 
wars fought on Earth.  
In Eternity, war is "intellectual" (Zix:854). "As the breath of the Almighty, 
such are the words of man to man in the great Wars of Eternity, in fury of 
Poetic Inspiration, to build the Universe stupendous, Mental forms Creating" 
(Mil 30:18). Wars such as these are fundamentally humane: "Our wars are 
wars of life, & wounds of love with intellectual spears & long winged arrows of 
thought" (738:14). 
War on earth is a dreadful debasement of this instinct, "War & Hunting, the Two 
Fountains of the River of Life, are become Fountains of bitter Death & of corroding 
Hell, till Brotherhood is chang'd into a Curse" (Mil 35:2; 743:31). "For the Soldier who 
fights for Truth calls the enemy his brother: they fight & contend for life & not for 
eternal death; but here the Soldier strikes, & a dead corse falls at his feet" (7 
43:41). 
War on earth is "energy Enslav'd" (FZ ix: 152). It is "the fever of the 
human soul" '(738:9). 
 
Yet Jerusalem is sung on state occasions, ostensibly in commemoration 
of all those who have fallen in earthly wars between imperial states. This is a 
complete travesty of Blake’s views. 
 
Those reactionaries in politics and religion – staunch defenders of Church and 
State – who condemn the idea of Blake the socialist, simply don’t understand just 
how radical Blake’s position is. I am not aware of any marxist who has argued that 
Blake is a Marxist before Marx, and I would be surprised if there is one. Marx thought 
capitalism and industrialism had redeeming qualities, Blake thought they had none. 
To Marx, alienation is a progressive force that was capable of redemption. To Blake, 
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alienated reason was the work of Urizen-Satan. This makes Blake a much more 
uncompromising figure given that the forces of materialism and instrumental 
rationalism have now gone global. It doesn’t make Blake right against Marx. It just 
makes him a figure who can never be seduced by or bought off with the material 
progress offered by the machine world.  
 
The fact remains that Blake was a political and social radical, even if he was 
much more than even this. Blake’s radical sentiments are well known. He was a 
French sympathiser charged with sedition. One book remains of the poem in support 
of the French Revolution, which Blake began in 1789.  
 
Blake called himself a ‘Liberty Boy’, although he was canny enough to keep his 
mouth closed in public. Nevertheless, Blake had some interesting friends who 
certainly kept him in touch with revolutionary politics. Johnson. The radical Unitarian 
William Frend. Through William Sharp, Blake would have known of the activities of 
the Society for Constitutional Reform, which promoted Paine’s Rights of Man. Then 
there was Hayley, with whom Blake shared radical opinions as regards the tyrannical 
government of England. 
 
Blake’s support for social, racial and sexual equality is well-documented. Blake 
opposed slavery and supported the rights of man and woman, he opposed all 
hierarchies in Church and State – in other words, he espoused radical political views 
which exposed him to great personal danger at a time of political repression. 
 
So imagine how it feels to read Blake being enlisted in the cause of Church and 
State, the very Satanic forces which his message opposed, against who he waged 
his ceaseless mental fight.  
 
Blake sympathised with the political reformers in their struggle against the 
oppression of the poor, the subordination of women and the institution of 
slavery. Blake’s sympathy with these causes was as genuine as the 
reformers. Blake differed from the reformers in that he believed that an 
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exclusive concern with the trappings of external liberty would reinforce the 
tyranny of reason which is destructive of inner spiritual liberty. Blake was not 
content to be a political revolutionary but developed a subversive 
metaphysical doctrine which was concerned to realise that inner spiritual 
liberty. Blake’s mysticism was not, however, an obscurantism.  
 
To argue that external liberty forms only one part of Blake’s vision does not imply 
that it is a disposable part. The implication that Blake’s political sympathies are 
insignificant when set within Blake’s metaphysical vision is an obvious non sequitur. 
 
I would distinguish between Blake and Marx in these terms: Blake believed in 
renewal whereas Marx believed in change. Blake believed in an ultimate reality that 
was eternal, whereas Marx believed in the realisation of immanent lines of 
development through the historical process. Blake could be described as a 
conservative revolutionary for whom capitalism and communism represent two sides 
of the same materialist coin. Ultimately, Blake believed in (spiritual) renewal rather 
than (political) change.  
 
Blake’s vision drew upon sources older than the Enlightenment and deeper than 
reason. The benevolent rationalists and perfectionists of the late eighteenth century 
ended their days disillusioned beings, disappointed by a human nature which, they 
felt, had proved resistant to reason and had let down the cause of enlightenment. 
Blake, as EP Thompson argues, was immune to such disenchantment.  
 
His vision had been not into the rational government of man but into the 
liberation of an unrealised potential, an alternative nature, within man: a nature 
masked by circumstance, repressed by the Moral Law, concealed by Mystery 
and self-defeated by the other nature of 'self-love'. It was the intensity of this 
vision, which derived from sources far older than the Enlightenment, which made 
it impossible for Blake to fall into the courses of apostasy. 
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Rather than succumb to despair, Blake chose to hand 'The Everlasting Gospel' 
on to the initiates. Thompson concludes that there is ‘obscurity’ and even ‘oddity’ in 
Blake: 
 
But there is never the least sign of submission to 'Satan's Kingdom'. Never, on 




Blake believed that there is a supersensible realm beyond the transitory divisions 
of time and place. However, that does not mean that Blake’s support for radical 
political causes is unimportant, ephemeral. Such a view would make a mockery of 
the stances that Blake took throughout his life. As the old radicals who had not died 
lost their way, one by one, Blake remained a radical to the end. And Blake’s position 
is cogent. There was no debilitating division between matter and spirit in Blake. 
External liberty in the political and material world and inner spiritual liberty go hand in 
hand in Blake. By guaranteeing equal external freedom for each individual, political 
justice fosters a climate which is favourable to moral autonomy and which is 
preparatory for the final end of Creation, the moral community in which external 
commands are internalised as the product of moral motives rather than by prospects 
of private gain and power. Ultimately, internal discipline replaces external discipline.  
 
The validity of these innate and inalienable rights, which are the necessary 
property of humankind, is confirmed and enhanced by the principle that human 
beings may have lawful relations, even with higher beings. For the individual may 
consider himself/herself to be the citizen of a transcendental world, in which the 
same principles would apply. 
 
Blake was a staunch, lifelong supporter of social, sexual and racial equality and 
his hatred of hierarchies in religion, politics and society comes out clearly in his 
writings. It’s just that there is a need to avoid conflating the external trappings of 
liberty with the internal experience. With Blake, there is an ascent to complete inner 
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spiritual liberty through, not against, the material world. Blake’s political and social 
radicalism and his spiritual concern with the ‘Tree of Life’ are not only compatible, 
they are integral. 
 
Blake’s fourfold vision cannot be reduced to the external liberty promised by the 
single vision of scientific, political and economic rationalism and materialism. But it is 
an error to set the one against the other. With Blake there are levels of freedom and 
consciousness which build upon each other to completion. It also needs to be 
pointed out that the danger of mistaking the trappings of external liberty for complete 
inner liberty applies to all who settle for the merely political expression of Blake’s 
vision, and to all who reduce the spiritual dimension to the material terrain. External 
liberation is preparatory for inner spiritual liberation, not a substitute for it.  
 
The point applies most incisively to those who would reduce Blake’s patriotism to 
political-institutional expression. That is, it applies to those political conservatives 
who, in seeking to claim Blake from the socialists, enlist him to the cause of Church 
and State, war and empire. At least the socialist cause, for all of its supposed political 
materialism, is consistent with the conditions of external liberty. The same cannot be 
said for that conservatism which serves the material power of Urizen-Satan, the idols 
of Church and State. 
 
The point is that, for Blake, there is a deeper truth beyond political and 
national divisions. Words are a blunt instrument. Art, understood in the 
expansive sense that Blake used the word, as a mode of life, is much more 
effective in accessing ultimate reality.  
 
So what lies behind the conservative appropriation of Blake’s message and the 
concomitant denial of Blake’s political and social radicalism? The appropriation lies in 
the fact that Blake believes in an ultimate reality, an eternal realm of ideal forms 
which are outside of time and space, and it is this that taps into idealised visions of a 
country, it is this that supports a certain view of patriotism. Blake was a patriot, 
something very distinct from being a nationalist. How many of those who see 
Jerusalem as a celebration of England see the distinction can be questioned, 
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especially given the extent to which the hymn is sung on state occasions and in 
memorial services. But the fact remains that, above and beyond the external 
trappings of liberty, Blake’s “England” encapsulates a culture, a spirit of a place, a 
moral disposition, an ethos as a way of life. And it is eternal, hence my view that 
Blake believed in renewal rather than change. The Jerusalem to be built already 
exists in the ideal realm of the ultimate reality.  
 
Blake’s “England” is a protest against a world that is quantified, measured, and 
reduced. And this protest is a protest against technocrats without a soul, rationalists 
without a spirit and materialists without a body. Blake is protesting against the 
materialism and instrumentalism of the machine world. For him, art accesses a truth 
that is beyond the instrumentalism of mechanical reason. 
 
The social philosopher Max Weber describes rationalisation as ‘the 
disenchantment of the world’. characterises this shift as a ‘dis-godding’ of 
Nature - die Entgotterung der Nature - a dedivinization in which Nature 
becomes simply matter, available for technological appropriation, to be 
exploited according to human desires and projects. Blake believed Nature to 
be alive. Mechanistic science disagrees. Blake criticised this science as the 
‘Tree of Death’. Blake saw how mechanisation in thought and action would 
engulf the whole world.  
 
Blake was an inveterate opponent of rationalisation, mechanisation and 
industrialisation – forces which have now gone global. These are the forces which 
are abstracting places from persons, stripping the world of moral meaning, and 
despoiling the green and pleasant lands of people all over the world.  
 
Blake’s “England” encapsulates a culture, a moral sense of place, a spirit, an 
ethos, a mode of life, elusive qualities that can be neither objectified nor quantified, 
only grasped by vision and imagination. Blake’s Jerusalem is a protest against a 
world that is measured, reduced and commercialised. Marx believed that the 
capitalist economy and the forces of industry and technology showed the extent and 
potentiality of human power in alien form. Alienation denoted the potential for 
progress. Blake felt such Urizen to be Satanic to the core. We are discovering that 
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the death of God has not led to the death of divinity. Instead, in the cause of 
progress, we have come to deify our powers as they have taken alien form. And the 
result has been the fevered employment of our technical installations of physical 
power to unleash Hell on Earth. Progress? At what point does a dehumanised 
humanity come to identify and reclaim its alienated power and use it creatively? 
Blake was never persuaded; he identified the mills as the work of Satan from the 
start. 
 
Blake rejects the dualism of mind and matter, of spirit and body which is the 
accompaniment of mechanical materialism. Instead, he calls for a revolution led 
by the imagination: 
 
The Negation is the Spectre, the Reasoning Power in Man: This is a false Body, 
an Incrustation over my Immortal Spirit, a Selfhood which must be put off and 
annihilated alway. To cleanse the Face of my Spirit by self-examination, To bathe in 
the waters of Life, to wash off the Not Human, I come in Self-annihilation and the 
grandeur of Inspiration; To cast off Rational Demonstration by Faith in the Saviour, 
To cast off the rotten rags of Memory by Inspiration, To cast off Bacon, Locke, and 
Newton from Albion's covering, To take off his filthy garments and clothe him with 
Imagination; To cast aside from Poetry all that is not Inspiration, To cast off the 
idiot Questioner, who is always questioning, But never capable of answering; who 
sits with a sly grin Silent plotting when to question, like a thief in a cave; Who 
published Doubt and calls it Knowledge; whose Science is Despair, Whose pretence 
to knowledge is Envy, whose whole Science is To destroy the wisdom of ages, to 
gratify ravenous Envy That rages round him like a Wolf, day and night, without rest 
He smiles with condescension; he talks of Benevolence and Virtue, And those who 
act with Benevolence and Virtue they murder time on time.  
 
These are the destroyers of Jerusalem! these are the murderers Of Jesus! who 
deny the Faith and mock at Eternal Life, Who pretend to Poetry that they may 
destroy Imagination By imitation of Nature's Images drawn from Remembrance. 
(Harris 1969 ch 8). (533) (f.42, 1.34.) 
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This passage encapsulates the message that William Blake sought to deliver. In 
the Preface he calls upon the poets, painters, sculptors and architects to throw off the 
domination of styles drawn from the past and find and express their own inspiration. 
'We do not want either Greek or Roman models if we are just and true to our own 
Imaginations, those Worlds of Eternity in which we shall live for ever, in Jesus our 
Lord.'  
Blake is a Platonist. He believes in innate ideas, the unchanging realm of ideal forms 
and in an ultimate reality, he believes in the kind of vision that Plato in The Symposium 
called ‘the eye of the mind’. 
 
Vision or Imagination is a Representation of what Eternally Exists Really 
and Unchangeably. 
 
Imagination is the human essence for Blake. In a manner that anticipates Kant, 
Blake argued for the active connection between the perceiving mind and the 
perceived world. 'Some See Nature all Ridicule & Deformity ... & Some Scarce 
see Nature at all. But to the Eyes of the Man of Imagination, Nature is 
Imagination itself. As a man is, So he Sees.' (Blake, Complete Writings, p793). 
Or as a man sees, so he is.  
As the expression of the Imagination, Los is the creator of all that we see. "All 
Things Exist in the Human Imagination" (J 69:25). This line forms the fundamental 
grounding of Blake's whole philosophy. For all of the references to Blake’s mysticism, 
his philosophy of vision and imagination was not suspended in some ethereal realm, 
as those struggling to deal with its complexities might be inclined to believe. Amid the 
myriad deviations, incoherencies, and exaggerations, this principle that "All Things 
Exist in the Human Imagination" is the bedrock, the beginning and the end-point of 
Blake’s philosophy. This principle holds that the conceptions of the mind are the 
realities of realities, give access to the ultimate reality, that the eternal world and the 
Human Imagination are, in some elemental sense, one and the same. Blake saw his 
task along the lines of the transcendent symbolism of Hermeticism. 
 
I rest not from my great task! 
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To open the Eternal Worlds, to open the immortal Eyes Of man inwards into the 





This passage, and many others like it, make it clear that, for Blake, the 
true exercise of the imagination involved an actual and comprehensive 
rejection of the world as it is revealed to us by our senses, and the 
replacement of images passively received by other images perceived by the 
active and unaided mind.  
It should come as no surprise to discover that Bishop George Berkeley, who 
authored the phrase 'to be is to be perceived', made it onto the list of Blake's 
favourite philosophers. Berkeley argued the radical thesis that all that exists are 
minds and the ideas in them. With his bold and fearless imagination, Blake the poet 
and artist appropriated the metaphysician's philosophical conception of Idealism and 
transformed it into a grand, poetic Cosmos.  
All of which makes Blake a very radical figure in these disenchanted, ‘dis-
godded’ times.  
But beware. There is a danger lurking in Blake’s spiritual revolution. ‘What are all 
the Gifts of the Spirit but Mental Gifts?’, Blake asks. All the gifts of the spirit are 
mental gifts. There is a danger here of complete transcendence of the material world 
in order to enter the eternal world of the imagination as the true reality, the reality of 
all realities. Thus Los gives "a body to Falshood that it may be cast off for ever" (J 
12:13). Only thus can an error be limited, recognized, and annihilated. But is it 
falsehood alone that is cast off, or the body as such? The most fundamental of 
Blake’s instincts was the instinct of the mystic. Premised upon the search and the 
discovery of the infinite in all things, Blake’s vision is prone to end with repudiation of 
the finite, for the reason that the infinite is not contained in it.  
 
"O Satan, my youngest born, art thou not Prince of the Starry Hosts.  
 
“And of the Wheels of Heaven, to turn the Mills day & night?  
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"Art thou not Newton's Pantocrator, weaving the Woof of Locke? 
"To Mortals thy Mills seem every thing, & the Harrow of Shaddai  
“A Scheme of Human conduct invisible & incomprehensible.  
"Get to thy Labours at the Mills & leave me to my wrath."  
 
Satan was going to reply, but Los roll'd his loud thunders.  
 
"Anger me not! thou canst not drive the Harrow in pity's paths :  
"Thy work is Eternal Death with Mills & Ovens & Cauldrons.  
'Trouble me no more ; thou canst not have Eternal Life."  
 
So Los spoke. Satan trembling obey'd, weeping along the way.  
Mark well my words! they are of your eternal Salvation.  
(Milton). 
 
This is Blake speaking in the guise of Los. Los directly inspires Blake himself (Mil 
22:4; 36:21). The figure of Los ties up all the central themes of Blake’s message. 
Los resembles Jesus in being both the creator and the great champion of Man (J 
96:22). Jesus constantly supports him. Blake declared to Crabb Robinson that 
Jesus is the only God. 'And so am I and so are you'. As the poet, Los is "the Prophet 
of Eternity" (Mil 7:38). "His vigorous voice was prophecy" (FZ i: 239). "He is the 
Spirit of Prophecy, the ever apparent Elias" (Mil 24:71). It is Los who reveals the 
basic truths. Los creates the line of poet-prophets who destroy the kings (J 73:40). 
Los is the spiritual revolutionist, whose son Ore is outward revolution. External and 
inner spiritual liberty go together. Los creates Golgonooza, the city of art (FZ v.76, 
etc.); he creates Jerusalem, the idea of liberty (FZ viii: 190); he creates Erin, the 
belief that all living things, especially the body and its impulses, are holy (J 11:8). 
 
Blake proceeded to call for a building of a new Jerusalem, even 'Among these dark 
Satanic Mills'. Blake was not merely referring to the new cotton factories that had 
sprung up over England. Blake’s 'Mills of Satan' referred to the intellectual and moral 
darkness that had engulfed the world, of which industrialisation was but one 
expression.  
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Blake’s new Jerusalem was not just a world of social justice and equality but a world 
of spiritual freedom which embodied the triumph of the imagination: 
 
'I will not cease from mental fight, Nor shall my sword sleep in my hand, 
Till we have built Jerusalem In England's green and pleasant land.' 
 
Jerusalem, The Emanation of the Giant Albion (1804-20) portrays the building of 
the new land presided over by the arts and the imagination (Harris 1969 ch 8).  
 
Jerusalem represents the culmination of Blake’s lifelong attempt to state his 
vision. In the new land, the oppressive shell of Church and State is cast off as 
humanity comes to realise its divine potential and live in peace and love: 
 
In Great Eternity every particular Form gives forth or Emanates Its own 
peculiar Light, & the Form is the Divine Vision And the Light is his Garment. 
This is Jerusalem in every Man, A Tent & Tabernacle of Mutual 
Forgiveness, Male & Female. 
 
As a result, the moral law, imposed as a curse, ceases to be valid. There is no 
more division between the sexes as the Eternal Man bearing the stamp of the 
Divine Image walks the land. (Daughters of Albion.) So Los declares: 
 
Sexes must vanish & cease 
To be when Albion arises from his dread repose . . . 
 
Jerusalem, Blake exists, is within each and every person. ‘And Jerusalem is 
called Liberty among the Children of Albion.’ (OSAB 684). To Crabb Robinson, Blake 
had declared that Jesus is the only God, 'And so am I and so are you'. God could be 
identified with Jesus only if spiritual error had been cast out. That would seem to 
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imply that, for Blake, human beings, with spiritual liberation and true fulfilment, are to 
become gods. I shall return to this aspect of Blake’s thought later. 
 
With all the old radicals of his day either dead or giving up the struggle, Blake 
increasingly felt alone. In 1827, he wrote to a friend, "since the French Revolution 
Englishmen are all Intermeasurable One by Another, Certainly a happy state of 
Agreement to which I for One do not Agree" (878). But Blake for one never gave 
up. That same year, in his annotations to Thornton's New Translation of the Lord's 
Prayer, Blake offered his own liturgy. For all of the complexity of his imaginative 
world and for all of his isolation from the social world, Blake never descended into 
mysticism as an obscurantism. He continued to argue for social justice and freedom 
here on earth. Blake prayed for an end to capitalist exploitation (Price), for an end to 
repressive morality (Satan), and for an end to political authority (Caesar). Praying to 
Jesus, not God, he declares:  
 
Give us This Eternal Day our own right Bread by taking away Money or debtor 
Tax & value or Price, as we have all Things Common among us. Every thing 
has as much right to Eternal Life as God, who is the Servant of Man. His 
Judgment shall be Forgiveness that he may be consum'd in his own Shame. 
Leave us not in Parsimony, Satan's Kingdom; liberate us from the Natural man 
& [words illegible] Kingdom. 
For thine is the Kingdom & the Power & the Glory & not Caesar's or Satan's 
Amen. (788) 
 
One sees here the fundamental accuracy of Jacob Bronowski’s view that Blake 
‘was and he remained robust, matter-of-fact, and a rebel. He is as downright a rebel 
in the later religious writings as in his earlier Radical ones.’ 
 
Blake's form of Christianity was heretical, for it identified Christ the Son with 
all spiritual goodness and made God the Father, a symbol of terror and 
tyranny. And this, the Manichaean heresy, is not merely a technical nicety 
among sects: it is a crux in Blake's mind. God to Blake personified 
absolute authority, and Christ personified the human character; and 
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Blake was on the side of man against authority, at the end of his life 
when he called the authority Church and God, as much as at the 
beginning when he called it State and King.  
 
Bronowski, Introduction 1958 
 
This can all be read in the unfinished drafts of The Everlasting Gospel and in 
Blake’s response to Dr Thornton's version of the Lord's Prayer. For Blake, all 
virtue is human virtue:  
 
The Worship of God is honouring his gifts  
In other men & loving the greatest men best, each according To his Genius 
which is the Holy Ghost in Man; there is no other God than that God who is 
the intellectual fountain of Humanity.  
 
Here we see the fundamental unity between the early Blake the Radical and 
the late Blake the heretic, they are one and the same man from first to last. 
 
Blake castigates the kind of science which only sees nature as a 
machine as the 'Tree of Death'.  
 
Blake recorded his credo concisely round his engraving of the Laocoon:  
 
If Morality was Christianity, Socrates was the Saviour. 
A Poet, a Painter, a Musician, an Architect: the Man Or Woman who is not one 
of these is not a Christian. 
Art can never exist without Naked Beauty displayed.  
For every Pleasure Money Is Useless. 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
158 
Without Unceasing Practise nothing can be done. Practise is Art. If you leave off 
you are Lost. 
Where any view of Money exists, Art cannot be carried on, but War only, by 
pretences to the two impossibilities, Chastity and Abstinence, Gods of the 
Heathen. 
The Old and New Testaments are the great code of Art.  
Art is the Tree of Life. Science is the Tree of Death.  
The whole business of man is the Arts and All things in common.  
No secrecy is Art. 
 
"Art is the Tree of Life. Science is the Tree of Death" (Laoc, K 777). Whilst such 
science may kill us, art is our salvation. However, Blake was referring to "Art" in the 
most expansive sense, the whole mode of life, the life of the imagination. And Blake 
identifies art in this sense with Jesus. "Jesus & his Apostles & Disciples were all 
Artists. The Whole Business of Man Is The Arts" (Laoc, K 777). The aesthetic 
approach should shape all acts, even the least. Each Zoa, Blake argues, has its Art 
(Mil 27:55). "A Poet, a Painter, a Musician, an Architect: the Man Or Woman who is 
not one of these is not a Christian" (Laoc, 776). Anyone who does not develop one 
of these aspects is failing to live in accordance with the divine plan. "Prayer is the 
Study of Art. Praise is the Practise of Art. Fasting &c., all relate to Art" (Laoc, K 776). 
Blake overcomes the inversion of means and ends that characterises commercial 
society. "Christianity is Art & not Money. Money is its Curse" (Laoc, K 777). The 
obsession with money and money-making blocks the aesthetic mode of life that 
Blake identified as the true end of human existence. "Where any view of Money 
exists, Art cannot be carried on" (Laoc, K 776). "Works of Art can only be produc'd in 
Perfection where the Man is either in Affluence or is Above the Care of it. ...  Tho' Art 
is Above Either, the Argument is better for Affluence than Poverty" (LJ,K612). 
 
Art is essentially the precise telling of truth. "Art can never exist without Naked 
Beauty displayed" (Laoc, K 776; cf. J 36: 49). 
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These sentences taken together reveal that Blake identifies the artistic 
spirit as a resolution of the problems of life, going beyond the divisions and 
conflicts of the material world – the injustices and iniquities associated with 
wealth and poverty – to attain the level of the pure mind.  
 
Blake affirms the Tree of Life over against the Tree of Death. In castigating 
science as the Tree of Death, Blake is thinking specifically of mechanistic 
science and its negative effect in reducing the natural world to a blind and 
dead materialism. In this instance, Blake denounces science as the Tree of 
Death. However, in a condition of purity, art and science may be classed 
together as spiritual activities. As a spiritual activity, Blake calls science 
Christianity. It’s all part of the life of imagination. As Blake argues, if we 
recognize that 'Nature is Imagination itself, its study can become a 'sweet 
Science'.  
 
In his holistic approach to nature, Blake comes close to the positions of 
contemporary ecologists and the emphasis upon the interdependence and 
interconnection of all things, unity in diversity and organic growth. More than this, Blake 
offers a perspective on the re-enchantment of the world. If we can go beyond our five 
senses and cleanse the doors of perception, then we will see that 'every thing that lives 
is Holy'. (Blake, Complete Writings, pp pp.777, 379,149,160). 
Human beings are an integral part of Nature, not separate from it. Blake 
repudiates the dualism of subject and object. Nature is not some objective datum 
external to human beings. However, the single vision of mechanistic science has 
reduced Nature to dead matter, making it available to the utilitarian and exploitative 
interests of a humanity that, in turn, comes to conceive itself a subject apart from 
Nature. The result is that human beings stray from the beneficial course of nature. 
"The Bible says that God formed Nature perfect," Blake wrote, "but that Man 
perverted the order of Nature, since which time the Elements are fill'd with the 
Prince of Evil" (OSAB 388). In its fallen condition, humanity comes to introduce a 
rapacious self-interest and wanton cruelty into an originally pure and benevolent 
natural order.  
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Blake abhors war and violence in human society but he goes further than this 
and condemns the callous treatment of other species at the hands of human beings. 
Human liberation, the liberation of art and the imagination, applies also to the animals. 
 
A Robin Red breast in a Cage 
Puts all Heaven in a Rage. 
A dove house fill'd with doves & Pigeons 
Shudders Hell thro' all its regions. 
A dog starv'd at his Master's Gate 
Predicts the ruin of the State. 
A Horse misus'd upon the Road 
Calls to Heaven for Human blood. 
Each outcry of the hunted Hare 
A fibre from the Brain does tear. 
A Skylark wounded in the wing, 
A Cherubim does cease to sing. 
The Game Cock clip'd & arm'd for fight 
Does the Rising Sun affright. 
Every Wolf's & Lion's howl 
Raises from Hell a Human Soul. 
The wild deer, wand'ring here & there, 
Keeps the Human Soul from Care. 
The Lamb misus'd breeds Public strife 
And yet forgives the Butcher's Knife. 
(431) 
Further along Nature’s interconnected and seamless web of life, Blake sees the 
spiritual and aesthetic qualities of plants and objects. Blake’s poems allow clods of 
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mud and pebbles to speak and flowers to feel. Blake's ecological sensibility here 
stands in complete contrast to those who lack the vision to see any horizon beyond 
this fallen world of callous cash payment, those who can see only with the eyes of 
the miser, for whom "a Guinea is more beautiful than the Sun, & a bag worn with the 
use of Money has more beautiful proportions than a Vine filled with Grapes. The tree 
which moves some to tears of joy is in the Eyes of others only a Green thing that 
stands in the way" (793).  
 
Blake’s ideas resonate within the contemporary ecological perspective which 
holds that nature is more than a stock of resources but forms an ecosystem which 
nurtures life and nourishes the spirit. Above all, though, it is Blake’s holism which 
impresses. Blake is celebrating not just life, but the life of imagination. To the Zoas of 
Reason and Energy, Blake adds the Zoa of Prophesy, which is "the true man." And 
when Prophesy achieves masculine-feminine wholeness, the quality of perception 
alters, "Creating Space, Creating Time, according to the wonders Divine of Human 
Imagination . . ." 
Blake takes us beyond the conception of nature as an ecosystem and nothing 
more. Instead, Blake’s life of imagination denotes a new reality where it is the 
meanings of things which predominate. We are beyond a concern with price and 
monetary value but instead see the transcendent correspondences which shine 
through nature. Like the alchemists, Blake is in search of spiritual gold. The inverted 
world which has placed mere means in the place of ends is turned inside out by 
visionary power to reveal a bright new green and gold world of symbolic presences.  
 
Mental Things are alone Real; what is call'd Corporeal, Nobody knows of its 
Dwelling Place: it is in Fallacy, & its Existence an Imposture. . . .  I assert 
for My Self that I do not behold the outward Creation & that to me it is 
hindrance & not Action; it is as the Dirt upon my feet, No part of Me. 
"What," it will be Question'd, "When the Sun rises, do you not see a 
round disk of fire somewhat like a Guinea?" O no, no, I see an Innumerable 
company of the Heavenly host crying "Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord God 
Almighty." I question not my Corporeal or Vegetative Eye any more than I 
would Question a Window concerning a Sight. I look thro' it & not with it.  
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The figure of Los, which is surely Blake, is "the magician of perception" 
(Kathleen Raine).  
As above, so below. 
 
To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower, 
Hold Infinity in the palm, of your hand 
And Eternity in an hour. (431) 
 
Blake transcends what is immediately presented to the passive senses and 
opens the 'doors of perception', emphasising the power of vision and the 
imagination to see through and break through the domination of the alienating 
abstractions of tyrannic power so as to realise the creative attributes of humankind. 
 
We continue to live in Urizen-Satan’s world, with the rivalries and wars of 
imperial cities and states threatening to consume the whole world in a universal 
conflagration. Alienated reason, detached from the soul and blinded to vision 
and imagination, deliberately and clinically plans the annihilation of humanity 
and the destruction of the earth. The agents of instrumentalisation are still at work, 
doing their worst in the name of ‘progress’. From the military to the market, the 
machine continues to dominate human beings who are divided from each other, 
from nature, from their true selves. Mechanisation is a denaturalisation and a 
dehumanisation. The humanisation of our technics is also naturalisation of 
human beings.  
 
It is Blake’s awareness of this knowledge and power on the part of alienated 
reason that fires his anger and indignation, and gives both him and us the strength to 
fight the mental war 'with intellectual spears, & long wing'd arrows of thought', in pursuit 
of a vision of man as he is to be, a vision of man as a fulfilled being. 
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Against the alienated authority of Church and State, the Satanic Mills of the 
machine world, Blake presents a vision of the free community of fully realised 
individuals who act spontaneously and creatively in accordance with their true 
natures, free individuals who are artists, even kings and priests in their own right. 
Blake told Crabb Robinson that Jesus is the only God, 'And so am I and so are you'. 
The idea that men are gods is an ancient dream and delusion. In recent times H.G. 
Wells in the 1920s to the current crop of planetary engineers have asserted ‘We are 
as gods and HAVE to get good at it.’ (Brand 2010). The problem with the scientists and 
engineers is that they make the obvious mistake of investing divinity in ‘things’, in the 
machines. It is the strength of William Blake’s position that he saw through this delusion 
all along, identifying Urizen’s technical and physical power as Satanic. Blake never 
made such crass errors as our planetary engineers intoxicated with scientific knowledge 
and technical power. Blake saw such science as the ‘Tree of Death’.  
"Art", in the most expansive sense, as the whole mode of life, is the ‘Tree of Life’. 
And this is the life of the imagination. And Blake identifies art in this sense with 
Jesus. "Jesus & his Apostles & Disciples were all Artists. 'We do not want either 
Greek or Roman models if we are just and true to our own Imaginations, those 
Worlds of Eternity in which we shall live for ever, in Jesus our Lord.' 
The question remains, in becoming artists in this sense do we become as 
gods? For Blake, God could become identified with Jesus once spiritual error 
had been cast out. And casting out spiritual error is precisely what Blake has 
in mind. And once this condition of purity has been attained, art and science 
may be reunited as spiritual activities. It’s all part of living in the artistic mode 
of imagination. Once we recognize that 'Nature is Imagination itself’, the “its 
study can become a 'sweet Science'”.  
Isolated in his own day, his memory appropriated war-mongers and imperialists, 
his message distorted by posterity, Blake's sun of spiritual gold is beginning to rise 
in the approach of the age of ecology. That promise is increasingly felt as the 
innate yearning to access ultimate reality grows stronger through its denial by the 
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9 THE PARTICIPATORY UNIVERSE 
 
There is a failure to appreciate the extent to which the various problems we face 
are interrelated. There is also a failure to recognize the extent to which so-called 
‘solutions’, based on an outmoded technocratic, techno-fixing approach, will have a 
deleterious impact on future generations.  
 
Our mentalities and modalities are still in the flatlands. William Blake opposed his 
‘fourfold vision’ against the ‘single vision’ of mechanistic science.  
 
Blake’s visionary materialism integrates the psychological and the physical. This 
integral perspective focuses upon the whole person in terms of the Four Zoas: 
body (Tharmas), reason (Urizen), emotion (Luvah), and spirit (Urthona). None can 
exist, creatively and healthily, without the others. Love, for instance, involves 
physical, intellectual and emotional states, but in true sexuality the spiritual perfects 
the physical. Blake’s "fourfold vision" describes a full visionary awareness which 
integrates energy, reason, emotion and spirit.  
 
Now I a fourfold vision see, And a fourfold vision is given to me; 'Tis fourfold in 
my supreme delight And threefold in soft Beaulah's night And twofold Always. 
May God us keep From Single vision & Newton's sleep!  
 
The reference to Beaulah comes from Bunyan’s Pilgrims Progress, describing 
the country in which the pilgrims can see the city they are searching for.  
 
Single Vision is the state we suffer when the soul  sleeps and appearances form 
themselves on the mind's eye like images on a photographic plate. This is the first 
level of consciousness, a flatland of mechanical materialism where mechanistic 
reason holds sway in darkness, which Blake describes as Heaven. The second level 
of consciousness is the realm of energy, which Blake calls Hell. The threefold 
vision is the third level of consciousness which unites the first two through The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell to achieve a state of light. The fourfold vision is the 
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inspired state of full light which integrates all the levels of consciousness. "Four-fold 
vision" is "naked beauty displayed", every living thing as it is in its itself, in its full 
flourishing, together. 
It is worth pointing out that the god whom Blake destroys in his prophetic 
books, Urizen, is the Bible Jehovah. He is a god of reason, a god of the material 
world reduces to physical fact and cause and effect, not a personal god moved to 
evil by will but a god moved to evil by compulsion. Urizen is the god of the scientists 
and the philosophers, the god of those who remove soul and moral meaning from 
the world and reduce reality to the single vision of physical fact and causality. 
Blake, in the character of Los, is "the magician of perception" (Kathleen 
Raine). Despite the best efforts of Blake, the single vision has worked its way deep 
into the marrow of modern civilisation. This is how mentalities shape modalities, 
how the figure of Urizen brings out the Satanic Mills.  
 
But all is not lost. Far from it. Science is now moving in Blake’s direction, leaving 
the flatland of single vision behind and revealing such things as the designer 
universe, life as a cosmic imperative, the directionality of evolution, the 
participatory universe. The old mechanistic science is being eclipsed. In the 
work of theoretical physicist John Wheeler, we are beyond the old dualisms of 
subject/object and knower/known have entered the ‘participatory universe’ in which 
everything is the observer and everything is the observed. What counts in this 
universe is not the objectivity of reality but its intelligibility and potentiality. These 
are terms which owe more to the essentialist metaphysics of Aristotle and 
Aquinas, of which much more will be said later.  
 
But Werner Heisenberg clearly invokes the Aristotelian concept of potentia when 
he writes: “In experiments about atomic events we have to do with things that are 
facts, with phenomena that are just as real as any phenomena in daily life. But the 
atoms or elementary particles are not as real; they form a world of potentialities or 
possibilities rather than of things or facts.”  
 
As Polkinghorne comments: ‘An electron therefore does not all the time 
possess a definite position or a definite momentum, but rather it possesses the 
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potentiality for exhibiting one or other of these if a measurement turns the 
potentiality into an actuality.’ (Polkinghorne 2002). Heisenberg may be struggling to 
express this view when writing that this makes an electron 'not as real' as a table or 
a chair. Not so. It’s about potentiality becoming actuality, different stages and kinds 
of reality as it unfolds in a way appropriate to inherent nature. The idea is 
thoroughly Aristotelian. ‘What each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature’ 
(Aristotle). Each stage from potentiality to actuality is real, it’s just that we only 
know the nature of a thing when it is fully developed. As Polkinghorne comments, 
to know things as they are, we must know them as they actually are, on their own 
terms.  
 
Despite the comment ‘not as real’, Heisenberg’s thinking is perfectly consistent 
with this Aristotelian conception. Heisenberg refers to ‘the veiled reality that is the 
essence of the nature of electrons’ and describes the ‘rather wraithlike 
wavefunction’ as ‘an appropriate vehicle to be the carrier of the veiled potentiality of 
quantum reality.’ 
 
Potentiality and intelligibility are crucial to this quantum reality. There is no 
objective reality, no material flatland that is merely physical fact and causality. 
Quantum physics shows that we cannot determine in advance whether electrons 
should be particles or waves. This is the observer’s choice, deciding which side of 
the black hole the photons would pass, even though it happened many millions of 
years ago.  
 
As Wheeler explains: 
 
Since we make our decision whether to measure the interference of the two 
paths or to determine which path was followed a billion or so years after the 
photon started its journey, we must conclude that our very act of 
measurement not only revealed the nature of the photon's history on its way 
to us, but in some sense determined that history. The past history of the 
universe has no more validity than is assigned by the measurements we 
make - now!  
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Wheeler and Ford 1998: 337 
 
The implications of Wheeler’s arguments are profound and entail the complete 
transformation of the way that human beings perceive the universe, relate to it 
and place themselves within it. This way of reasoning totally transforms the 
understanding of time and space. If anything, we seem to have our feet planted in 
mid-air. It is the intelligibility of reality that matters, and that accents the mind 
rather than matter. The general idea that observers influence what they observe 
barely scratches the surface of the revolutionary implications of this reasoning. 
John Wheeler emphasises the active role of the mind in the universe in proposing 
that we should think not merely in terms of observers but of participants. Human 
beings are actively involved in producing the world we see around us as we come 
to seek knowledge of it. For Wheeler, the difference between observation and 
participation might be 'the most important clue we have to the genesis of the 
universe': 
 
The phenomena called into being by these decisions reach backward in time 
in their consequences ... back even to the earliest days of the universe .... 
Useful as it is under everyday circumstances to say that the world exists 'out 
there' independent of us, that view can no longer be upheld. There is a 
strange sense in which this is a 'participatory universe'.  
 
Wheeler in Wheeler and Zurek 1983: 194 
 
Wheeler takes this idea to its logical conclusion in arguing that 'we are 
participators in bringing into being not only the near and here but the far away 
and long ago.’  
At this point, we reach a thoroughly transformed conception of time and 
space. We reach a cosmic perspective in which see ourselves as parts of a 
greater whole. Plato asked: ‘how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the 
spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human life?’ The idea that 
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one is a participant embracing all time and all existence, and not merely a 
spectator, would seem to buttress a cosmic optimism. It is easy to think a great 
deal of human life, of life as such, when one is a part of everything one sees.  
 
The question then is what becomes of place? As Paul Davies and John Gribbin 
comment: 'the quantum nature of reality involves non-local effects that could in 
principle reach right across the Universe and stretch back across time.' (Davies 
and Gribbin 1991: 208). 
 
Such a perspective alters the whole notion of time and space. The old notions 
of ‘up’ and ‘down’, ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ have lost their meanings and bearings, 
however much we still live as best we can in accordance with them. The ‘top and 
bottom’ and ‘up and down’ of what? The flatland of the objective world has 
dissolved. 
 
For David Fideler, science is moving ever more in a Neoplatonic direction (it 
should be pointed out here that a Neoplatonic influence has been detected in 
Blake, who most certainly did believe in innate ideas): 
 
Over the last century the mechanistic view of the universe has started to 
completely break down. Because the implications of quantum mechanics, 
chaos theory, and the realization that we inhabit an evolutionary, self -
organizing universe are starting to work themselves out, it is no 
exaggeration to say that we are truly living in the midst of a new 
Cosmological Revolution that will ultimately overthrow the Scientific 
Revolution of the Renaissance. And if the mechanistic world view left us 
stranded in Flatland - a two dimensional world of dead, atomistic matter in 
motion - the emerging Cosmological picture is far more complex, 
multidimensional, and resonant with the traditional Neoplatonic metaphor of 
the living universe.  
 
Fideler in Harris (ed.), vol. I, p. 104 
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Such views make it clear that the living, participatory universe is much more 
than a metaphor and instead denotes the quantum reality. Yet, in terms of its 
mentalities and modalities, humankind remains stranded in the 'Flatland' of a 
material world reduced to physical causality and mechanical rationality, caught 
between an all-encompassing immanence that absorbs the soul and puts the 
mind to sleep and a transcendence that ultimately severs all connections with 
reality and goes mad. We are cut off from the radiance of Blake’s fourfold vision 
and all the immense rewards it bestows. This, however, is not humanity's end, 
merely its beginning. We can - and must – move up the levels of consciousness 
and leave the flat landscape of mechanical materialism behind.  
 
Fideler emphasises the holistic nature of existence. He notes how particles of light 
from a common source 'continue to act in concert with one another' no matter 
how far apart they are. Fideler comments on the implications of this phenomenon, 
known as 'quantum nonlocality': 
 
The tantalizing implication of quantum nonlocality is that the entire universe, 
which is thought to have blazed forth from the first light of the big bang, is at its 
deepest level a seamless holistic system in which every 'particle' is in 
'communication' with every other 'particle', even though separated by millions 
of light years. In this sense, experimental science seems to be on the verge of 
validating the perception of all mystics - Plotinus included - that there is an 
underlying unity to the cosmos which transcends the boundaries of space 
and time. 
 
Fideler in Harris (ed.), vol. I,  2002: 106 
 
The breakdown of the paradigm of mechanistic materialism requires a new 
type of science, and Fideler proposes a fusion of the philosophy of Plotinus and 
John Wheeler's concept of the participatory universe. I would also refer to Plato’s 
innate ideas, Aristotle and potentiality, Aquinas and intelligibility, Kant and the way 
that the innate cognitive apparatus of the human mind shapes the world presented to 
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the senses. I have referred to the fourfold vision of William Blake. Capra draws the 
connections between the new physics and Eastern religions. The world is in flux. The 
upshot of this is that: 
 
... the focus of life will become more multidimensional, contemplative, and 
celebratory as we as individuals come to see ourselves as living 
embodiments of the-universe-in-search-of-its-own-Being, and as active 
participants in the ongoing creation of the world. 
 
Fideler in Harris (ed.), vol. I,  2002: 117 
 
In The Tao of Physics, Fritjof Capra refers to ‘the emergence of a new vision of 
reality that will require a fundamental change in our thoughts, perceptions and 
values.’ The systems view of life which Capra develops in that work represents a new 
way of thinking about life, involving a new language, new perceptions, and new 
concepts. This new vision explores the implications of the new scientific 
understanding of life at all levels of living systems—organisms, social systems, and 
ecosystems. This new vision integrates psychological and physical aspects of reality 
so as to transform not only science, religion and philosophy – the three perennials 
concerning how human beings relate to the world and to each other - but the 
fundamental aspects of the everyday lifeworld - business, politics, social living and 
interaction, health care, education, and culture. We are dealing with nothing less than 
a new perception of reality leading to the emergence of a new conception of life. 
Capra writes of the ‘crisis of perception’ in the modern world. He is thinking 
primarily of the environmental concerns that have become of paramount 
importance. ‘We are faced with a whole series of global problems that are 
harming the biosphere and human life in alarming ways that may soon become 
irreversible.’ Scientists have been documenting the extent and significance of the 
ecological crisis for a long time now. The evidence is overwhelming. The point is, 
however, is that the crisis in the climate system is not just a scientific question but needs 
to be set in the bigger context of how we perceive reality. Without a fundamental 
change in perceptions, we will keep resorting to outdated modes of thought, action and 
organisation. This will merely intensify the crisis. (Capra 1982). 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
172 
 
As Capra argues: ‘There are solutions to the major problems of our time, some of 
them even simple. But they require a radical shift in our perceptions, our thinking, our 
values. And, indeed, we are now at the beginning of such a fundamental change of 
worldview in science and society, a change of paradigms as radical as the 
Copernican revolution. But this realization has not yet dawned on most of our political 
leaders. The recognition that a profound change of perception and thinking is needed 
if we are to survive has not yet reached most of our corporate leaders, either, or the 
administrators and professors of our large universities.’ 
 
From the perspective of living systems, the only genuine solutions are those that 
are "sustainable." The concept of sustainability is central to the ecology movement. 
Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute gives a clear and concise definition of 
sustainability: "A sustainable society is one that satisfies its needs without 
diminishing the prospects of future generations." (Brown 1981). The great challenge 
of our time is to create sustainable communities, ‘social and cultural environments in 
which we can satisfy our needs and aspirations without diminishing the chances of 
future generations.’ (Capra 1996: ch 1). 
 
Capra argues that the major problems of our time — the threat of nuclear war, the 
devastation of our natural environment, poverty, hunger — are all ‘different facets of 
one single crisis, which is essentially a crisis of perception.’  
 
It derives from the fact that most of us—and especially our large social institutions—
subscribe to the concepts and values of an outdated worldview, to a paradigm 
that is inadequate for dealing with  the  problems  of our overpopulated,  
globally interconnected world. At the same time, researchers at the leading 
edge of science, various social movements, and numerous alternative networks 
are developing a new vision of reality that will form the basis of our future 
technologies, economic systems, and social institutions.  
 
Capra 1982 Afterword 
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What we are seeing is the emergence not only of a new scientific paradigm but a new 
social paradigm. Capra refers to "a constellation of concepts, values, perceptions, and 
practices shared by a community, which forms a particular vision of reality that is the 
basis of the way the community organizes itself." (Capra 1986: 3). 
 
The paradigm that has dominated for the past few centuries consists of a 
number of key ideas and values which have come to be embodied within political 
and social structures and practices. The universe is conceived as a mechanical 
system made up of elementary building blocks. The mechanical perception of nature 
has in turn shaped the perception of human life and society. The human body, the 
state, the economy, society itself all come to be conceived as a machine. In the 
process, the distinctive human values of creativity, spontaneity and autonomy come to 
be subordinated to mechanical regularity. Human purpose comes to be replaced by 
technical function. It’s the world of the natural scientist, a flatland of mechanical 
materialism, a world reduced to physical causality, a world without human value and 
meaning. In 1748, the natural scientist Julian La Mettrie wrote the book L'Homme 
machine, ‘Man the Machine’. La Mettrie describes all mental attributes as mere 
properties and functions of matter, the human will being mechanically determined by the 
body's response to pleasure and pain as a result of its internal constitution or external 
environment.  
 
This paradigm of mechanical materialism dominated for hundreds of years. If, as La 
Mettrie argues, man is a machine’, then it follows that politics in he ancient sense of 
creative self-realisation comes to be displaced by engineering.  
 
In the organic world-view of the ancient past, all life forms — animal, vegetable, 
mineral— exude innate purpose and therefore radiate meaning as intelligible beings. 
However, the machine image objectivizes all it apprehends by emphasizing its 
inertial otherness as distinct from inherent natural purpose, capacity and growth. The 
scientific ideal of reality becomes internalised to form a subjective reality. This ‘single 
vision’ can be found in any number of thinkers, in Holbach and his Systeme de la 
nature, in Helvetius. Newton turns the universe into a machine; Descartes turns 
animals into machines; Hobbes turns society into a machine; Locke turns 
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government into a machine; Smith turns the economy into a machine. Everywhere 
we look we see mechanism.  
 
It should come as no surprise, then, that as science advances, scientists 
should reveal the human body to be a machine. We end up with Francis Crick 
declaring that ‘You’re nothing but a pack of neurons’. Crick, Watson, Dawkins, 
Harris, Pavlov, socio-biology, neuroscience … in all of this human behaviour is 
presented as machine-like, society as atomistic, life as a gene competition, the 
economy as a market mechanism. Slowly but surely there is a congealing of spirit, 
a militarization of the natural world, a petrification of the soul. As the mechanistic 
surface hardens without, the organic world withers and dies within. The 
Neoplatonism of Ficino, which saw the world as alive, inspired Michelangelo, 
Raphael, Botticelli and such like, inspires. I see no inspiration at all in mechanical 
materialism. 
 
Further, the hierarchical conception of the physical landscape is implicated in 
the hierarchical ordering of society. From the mechanical conception of the material 
world there follows the idea that life is a competitive struggle for survival; there 
follows the belief in progress as unlimited material expansion to be achieved 
through economic growth and technological advance; there follows the belief that 
a functioning society rests upon relations of domination and subordination, the 
rule of some over others, whether organised in terms of class, sex, race, nation. 
As Capra argues: ‘The old hierarchical way of seeing the world fits easily into a 
society that is stratified by notions of class and status.’ 
 
All of these assumptions are now in the process of being challenged and 
subverted by the emergence of a new paradigm of scientific and social thought. 
 
The emerging paradigm is based upon a holistic and an ecological worldview, 
viewing the world as an integrated whole rather than an aggregation of unrelated, 
atomistic parts. As Capra points out, an ecological awareness recognizes ‘the 
fundamental interdependence of all phenomena and the embeddedness of individuals 
and societies in the cyclical processes of nature.’ (Capra 1982 Afterword). 
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Capra offers a way of steering a path beyond the twin reefs of immanence and 
transcendence. To recognise the embeddedness of individuals and societies in the cyclical 
processes of nature does not necessarily imply the subsumption of human life into the 
natural world. Such a view is more akin to the single vision which reduces life and all 
values and ideas to the material flatland. We can retain the sense of the transcendent by 
recovering a spiritual sense of the material world. 
 
The ecological paradigm is supported by modern science, but it is rooted in a 
perception of reality that goes beyond the scientific framework to an awareness of 
the oneness of all life, the interdependence of its multiple manifestations, and its 
cycles of change and transformation. Ultimately, such deep ecological awareness 
is spiritual awareness. When the concept of the human spirit is understood as the 
mode of consciousness in which the individual feels connected to the cosmos as a 
whole, it becomes clear that ecological awareness is spiritual in its deepest essence, 
and it is then not surprising that the new vision of reality is in harmony with the 
visions of spiritual traditions.  
 
Capra 1982 Afterword 
 
Thus, for Capra, the new worldview that is now emerging in all the sciences and in 
society is a holistic and ecological worldview that is grounded, ultimately, in spiritual 
awareness. It is for this reason that Capra, in The Tao of Physics, has no trouble in 
showing and in drawing out the connections between the new paradigm, as it emerges 
in physics and in the other sciences, and certain key ideas in spiritual traditions, 
particularly in the religions of the East.  
 
Capra’s view of interdependence overcomes the dualism that sends human 
beings to the extremes of high and low, up and down, top and bottom. Just as there 
is no ‘top’ and ‘down’ in the physical world, so there is no ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ in the 
social world. The division between body and soul, flesh and spirit, matter and mind 
dissolves and with it so too do all the distinctions between human beings organised 
around artificial constructs and stratifications of class and status. As science shows 
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that we live in a participatory universe, in which everything is the observer and 
everything is the observed and we are a part of everything we see, so a society 
based upon participatory structures becomes possible. Beyond the dualism of 
subject and object, it is intelligibility that matters in the new participatory reality.  
 
‘The culture we create and sustain with our networks of communications includes 
not only our values, beliefs and rules of conduct, but also our very perception of 
reality. As cognitive scientists have explained, human beings exist in language. By 
continually, we co-ordinate our behaviour and together bring forth our world.’ 
 
Jesuit priest and palaeontologist Teilhard de Chardin writes well here:  
 
Every person, in the course of his life, must build—starting with the 
natural territory of his own self—a work, an opus, into which something 
enters from all the elements of the earth. He makes his own soul 
throughout all his earthly days; and at the same time he collaborates in 
another work, in another opus, which infinitely transcends, while at the 
same time it narrowly determines, the perspectives of his individual 
achievement: the completing of the world. For in presenting the Christian 
doctrine of salvation, it must not be forgotten that the world, taken as a 
whole, that is to say in so far as it consists in a hierarchy of souls—which 
appear only successively, develop only collectively and will be completed 
only in union—the world, too, undergoes a sort of vast 'ontogenesis' (a 
vast becoming what it is) in which the development of each soul, 
assisted by the perceptible realities on which it depends, is but a 
diminished harmonic. Beneath our efforts to put spiritual form into our 
own lives, the world slowly accumulates, starting with the whole of 
matter, that which will make of it the Heavenly Jerusalem or the New 
Earth. 
 
Teilhard de Chardin 1978: 61/2 
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Plato divided the world between the realm of Becoming and the realm of 
Being. Later, I shall argue this ‘vast becoming what it is’ in terms of an 
essentialist metaphysics which sees reality as a field of materialist 
immanence in the process of becoming a complete form. 
 
Long before the World Wide Web and the Internet, Teilhard proposed the 
idea of the noosphere, an intellectual film which surrounds the world and 
functions as some kind of Universal Mind in which we may all participate. The 
noosphere serves to integrate the technosphere, the world of means, and the 
biosphere, the nurturing, sustaining basis of life on earth, to form a complete 
humanised and naturalised whole. If this Universal Mind is a God we have 
created, then we become not so much gods as sparks of the divine.  
 
American physicist Frank Tipler goes further: 'People talk of God as the 
creator of life. But maybe the purpose of life is to create God.' Tipler argues 
that the stated aim of physics to describe the Universe in its entirety is a 
search for a Supreme Being. 'If it is to succeed in this task, clearly it [physics] 
must also describe any Supreme Being living in the Universe. It therefore 
follows that theology must eventually be shown to be a branch of physics.' 
Fine, but that doesn’t make us gods, just part of the divine milieu, which is 
more than enough. Knowing our place in the universe doesn’t entail becoming 
masters of the universe, still less becoming that universe. We need to 
remember the words of Jacob Bronowski as he stood in the death camp of 
Auschwitz: ‘this is what happens when men aspire to the knowledge of gods’. 
We need to ground our visionary materialism in natural essences and remain 
on the level of real potentials and their realisation, resisting fantasies of being 
as gods. 
 
But there is a transcendental aspect to this visionary materialism. And 
here we develop an Aristotelian essentialism in terms of Plato’s idealism. In a 
Platonic sense, the creative individual who gives birth to eternal forms, to 
truth, beauty, and goodness. 
 




“There are two equal and eternal ways of looking at this twilight world of ours; we 
may see it as the twilight of evening or the twilight of morning; we may think of 
anything, down to a fallen acorn, as a descendant or as an ancestor. There are 
times when we are almost crushed, not so much with the load of the evil as with 
the load of the goodness of humanity, when we feel that we are nothing but the 
inheritors of a humiliating splendour. But there are other times when everything 
seems primitive, when the ancient stars are only sparks blown from a boy's 
bonfire, when the whole earth seems so young and experimental that even the 
white hair of the aged, in the fine biblical phrase, is like almond-trees that 
blossom, like the white hawthorn grown in May. That it is good for a man to 
realize that he is ' the heir of all the ages' is pretty commonly admitted; it is a less 
popular but equally important point that it is good for him sometimes to realize 
that he is not only an ancestor, but an ancestor of primal antiquity; it is good for 
him to wonder whether he is not a hero, and to experience ennobling doubts as 
to whether he is not a solar myth. (G.K. Chesterton A Defence of Nonsense) 
 
Religion has for centuries been trying to make men exult in the 'wonders' 
of creation, but it has forgotten that a thing cannot be completely wonderful 
so long as it remains sensible. So long as we regard a tree as an obvious 
thing, naturally and reasonably created for a giraffe to eat, we cannot 
properly wonder at it. It is when we consider it as a prodigious wave of the 
living soil sprawling up to the skies for no reason in particular that we take 
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off our hats, to the astonishment of the park-keeper. Everything has in fact 
another side to it like the moon, the patroness of nonsense… 
This is the side of things which tends most truly to spiritual wonder. It is 
significant that in the greatest religious poem existent, the Book of Job, the 
argument which convinces the infidel is not (as has been represented by 
the merely rational religionism of the eighteenth century) a picture of the 
ordered beneficence of the Creation; but, on the contrary, a picture of the 
huge and undecipherable unreason of it. 'Hast Thou sent the rain upon the 
desert where no man is?' This simple sense of wonder at the shape of 
things, and at their exuberant independence of our intellectual standards 
and our trivial definitions, is the basis of spirituality as it is the basis of 
nonsense. Nonsense and faith (strange as the conjunction may seem) are 
the two supreme symbolic assertions of the truth that to draw out the soul 
of things with a syllogism is as impossible as to draw out Leviathan with a 
hook. The well-meaning person who, by merely studying the logical side of 
things, has decided that 'faith is nonsense', does not know how truly he 
speaks; later it may come back to him in the form that nonsense is faith. 
(Chesterton A Defence of Nonsense) 
 
I think Chesterton is right with respect to a natural science that sees the 
physical universe as ‘dead matter’, mere physical imperatives of cause and 
effect. With the perception of the ultimate reality, we are beyond the world of 
senses. But the older conception of the Earth as a living organism is back. 
This is an animated world alive with purpose. Nonsense, shout the 
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10 UNDER WHAT STARS TO PLOUGH THE EARTH? 
 
Under what stars to plough the earth?  
Let’s first know the winds,  
and the varying mood of the sky,  
and note our native fields,  
and the qualities of the place,  
and what region grows and what it rejects.  
(Virgil, Georgics Bk I lines 2; 52-54). 
 
Place, life, reproduction, regeneration. Virgil is an important character in that 
whilst he is the origin of the idea of Arcadia, his poems identify a creative role 
for human agency in realising the good life. Rather than just passively living off 
Nature, human beings are actively involved in realising nature’s purposes. 
Georgics means ‘On working the Earth’. Virgil’s words on farming and rural life 
take us a stage beyond immanence, but not beyond nature and natural cycles 
and life-support systems. ‘Under what stars to plough the earth?’ It’s a good 
question. It’s a question concerning how we relate transcendence and 
immanence. It’s a question of how we relate our technics to the Earth as our life 
support system. 
Steinbeck describes the modern application of technology to nature as 
monstrous. He describes the tractors coming over into the fields. ‘That man 
sitting in the iron seat did not look like a man; gloved, goggled, rubber dust 
mask over nose and mouth, he was a part of the monster, a robot in the seat … 
The driver could not control it …. He could not see the land as it was, he could 
not smell the land as it smelled; his feet did not stamp the clods or feel the 
warmth and power of the earth… He loved the land no more than the bank loved 
the land. He could admire the tractor – its machined surfaces, its surge of 
power, the roar of its detonating cylinders; but it was not his tractor. Behind the 
tractor rolled the shining disks, cutting the earth with blades – not plowing but 
surgery … The driver sat in his iron seat and he was proud of the straight lines 
he did not will, proud of the tractor he did not own or love, proud of the power he 
could not control.’ (John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath). 
We need a whole new approach to the land. We still stand in need of what the 
American naturalist and forester Aldo Leopold called a 'land ethic'. The land ethic 
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overcomes the damaging separation of human beings from the land, recognises the 
necessity for intellectual as well as emotional defences of the environmentalist 
position, and rejects the tendency to judge the value of the environment solely in 
economic terms. 
Margherita Muller argues that ‘as societies ecological concerns rise proportionally 
to their destructive economic model, a demand for radical gardening is also ever 
growing and represents … an alternative ethic’ (Under what stars to plough the 
earth? The aesthetics and ethics of three Scottish gardens 2012). 
But beware the eco-engineering approach of Stewart Brand. Chapter 8 of his 
Whole Earth Discipline is titled ‘It’s all gardening’. In truth, there is precious little 
gardening in what Brand proposes. The chapter should be re-titled ‘It’s all 
engineering’, as Brand waxes lyrical about market solutions allied to technology. ‘To 
protect a wilderness permanently … it has to be treated not just as a garden, but as a 
commercial garden. The wildland must pay its way or perish.’ (Brand 2009: ch 8). 
And he means it. Organic nature must ‘pay its way’, or perish.  
 
I get the distinct impression that the planetary engineers take the same merciless, 
mercenary approach to people. The engineering view betrays arrogance towards and 
ignorance of Nature, the greatest engineer of all. In The Little Book of Garden Heroes 
(2004), Allan Shepherd writes: “The phrase ‘garden heroes’ seems to suggest that 
those plants and animals that benefit us are somehow consciously helping us out. Of 
course, this isn’t true… It is a curiosity of nature that they happen to do the jobs we 
need doing and do them extremely well.” To which the planetary engineers working 
for business would ask, ‘do they pay?’ Pathetic. This quotation encapsulates the 
organic alternative to an imploding, decreative commercial civilisation. The book 
Garden Heroes is a product of the Centre for Alternative Technology community in 
Machynlleth, Mid Wales. The book celebrates the ‘little’ heroes of the world, plants 
and animals that act as composters, pollinators and predators, identifying ‘top 
trumps’ species such as the ladybird and comfrey. Designing a garden around the 
true heroes of the plant and animal world enables a low-intensity gardening and 
vegetable growing that is more productive, more satisfying, more in tune with nature 
within and without, more enriching in soil and soul. 
Margherita Muller goes on to note the overwhelming recognition in town 
planning strategies that access to gardens creates happiness and favour well-
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being. These are sound concepts which are firmly grounded in an Aristotelian 
essentialist metaphysics. I shall return to essentialism later. At the moment, I 
am more interested in this question of how we guide our interchange with 
nature by. It’s a question not merely the plough and the plowing, but of 
the stars. By what morality do we guide the use of our tools? The 
balancing of immanence and transcendence requires the integration of 
our moral and technical capacities. To achieve harmony, we need to put 
the world of fact and the world of value together. 
 
We are back to Blake here, and his conception of a Satanic reason. "O 
Satan, my youngest born, art thou not Prince of the Starry Hosts.” This is 
Urizen, the limiter of Energy, the lawmaker, and the avenging conscience. For 
Blake, Urizen is single vision, the functional logicality which divides up, limits, 
draws lines. Urizen is a plowman, a builder, and driver of the sun-chariot. His 
sign is "the Starry Wheels" and he is the dominant Zoa of a scientized 
culture characterised by law, logic, inexorable order: ‘the world-machine.’  
 
Urizen is the plowman (FZ ii:119; J 95. 16). In the Last Judgment, after the Son of 
Man, the Human Truth, is revealed, Urizen drives the Plow of Ages over the entire 
universe in preparation for the New Age (FZ ix: 311). Urizen then sows the human 
seed (FZ ix:321), returning to his true vocation (FZ ix: 344-53). Urizen and his sons 
reap the human crop and store it in the barns (FZ ix:579). On the Fourth Day, he 
flails out the chaff, threshing the Nations and the Stars (FZ ix: 650), for Urthona's 
use in making the Bread of Life (FZ ix:86). Urthona, “earth owner", (FZ i: 18), 
"keeper of the gates of heaven" (FZ iv.42; J 82:81), takes over from Urizen. 
 
In Jerusalem, it is Albion who operates the Plow. In Milton, it is Los rather 
than Urizen who operates "the Plow ... to pass over the Nations" (6:13; 7:5; 
8:20) in preparation for the New Age. The historical logic is the same, with 
the poem ending with the preparation for "the Great Harvest & Vintage" (Mil 
43:1). 
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Blake is seeking the well-balanced man in Eternity, Imagination and 
Reason as cooperating contraries. Los is "the Prophet of Eternity," who 
reveals the basic truths (J 44:30; Mil 22:4; 36:21), the expression of the 
Imagination, the creator of all that we see (J 69:25), and creates the line of 
poet-prophets who destroy the kings (J 73:40).  
 
Blake's idea is the unifying of the universe, which had been divided by the 
Elohim in the six days of creation, the separation of the sexes, the separation of 
good from evil, of body and soul in the sentence of death, and man from man in 
the confusion of tongues at Babel, ending in the dreadful and irreconcilable 
dichotomy of Heaven and Hell. Blake reunited man and God, who are 
inseparable; man and man in the Brotherhood which is the Divine Family; man 
and nature, which is his projection; man and woman, who together constitute the 
Individual; soul and body; good and evil; life and death. The basic, ultimate reality 
is the union of God and man in the mystical ecstasy. (Foster Damon 1979: 418).  
 
We are drawing down the stars. We are in the Neoplatonic tradition. 
 
In his translations and commentaries, Italian philosopher Marsilio Ficino 
revived interest in Plato and Plotinus and, with the Corpus Hermeticum, was an 
integral part in the formulation of an alternative to Aristotelian Scholasticism. Ficino 
was also concerned with the practical impact of philosophy, something which involved 
him in astral magic, seeking to draw the influence of the planets and stars into our life 
by conscious means - through use of images, music, scents, types of food and drink, 
and such like. But Ficino’s purposes are psychological rather than astrological. As he 
writes in The Book of Life: ‘The important thing is to hold on correctly to whatever spirit, 
whatever force, or whatever powerful thing it is that these planets signify.' In other 
words, Ficino has grasped the extent to which we are involved in creating the world 
around us. In integrating disparate psychological, philosophical, moral and spiritual 
strands into a unified and coherent system, Ficino created nothing less than a living 
Platonism for an organic view of the world. 
 
To Giordano Bruno, however, contemplation of the stars that govern our lives 
leads to a complete rejection of geocentrism and anthropocentrism.  
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If in the eyes of God there is but one starry globe, if the sun and 
moon and all creation are made for the good of the earth and for the 
welfare of man, humanity may be exalted, but is not the Godhead 
debased?. . .  the earth is but a planet, the rank she holds among the 
stars is but by usurpation; it is time to dethrone her '  
 
Bruno, On the Infinite Universe and Worlds 
 
This passage makes clear the extent to which Bruno did much more than 
embrace the heliocentric view that the Earth orbits the Sun. Bruno not only argued 
against geocentrism (the idea that the Earth is the centre of the universe), but 
dethroned the human species from the centre of the universe.  
 
Bruno’s view is not as bleak as it may seem. He argued for a form of hylozoism, 
the idea that all physical matter is imbued with life. The world is alive and human 
beings are an aspect of that living universe. For Bruno, to see ourselves and our place 
within a living whole is a liberation; for the first time we would come to appreciate the 
true wonder of creation. Everything in the universe is alive – not just the animals and 
the plants, but the stars and planets possessed a form of conscious life. A divine 
spirit pervades the universe, unifying all things into one being. Bruno calls upon us to 
abandon the belief in our privileged position as an illusion. But far from being the 
diminution of the human species, this would be a 'promotion', in that human beings 
would come to share in the totality of everything - every blade of grass, every planet 
and supernova: 'Dwellers in a star, are we not comprehended within the celestial 
plains, and established within the very precincts of heaven?' 
 
It’s an inspiring vision. And Bruno’s conception of the world as alive is certainly 
valuable, distinguishing him from the mechanistic materialists who dominated for 
centuries after. Bruno’s day may yet come. But his vision begs the same old 
questions. The human species has not been an unconscious part of Nature’s 
seamless web since being cast out of Eden. By nature, human beings are endowed 
with reason and morality; by nature human beings strive to develop and grow out of 
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immediate confines. Human beings are guided by their own stars; they are active in 
bringing about the world around them.  
And by nature, human beings are geocentric beings. Bruno’s view is that of the 
scientist, in that it seeks a factual truth in abstraction from the human psyche and 
human morality. Most people are not scientists. For most people, the sun rises and 
the sun sets. The practical human vision is earth-bound, geocentric in flat 
contradiction of the heliocentric view.  
The crucial question remains: how we can put the scientific view and the moral 
view together, how can we unite the world of fact and the world of value. This was 
the philosopher Kant’s great achievement. 
 
“Two things fill the mind with ever-increasing wonder and awe .. the starry 
heavens above me and the moral law within me.” (Kant CPR 1949:258). 
 
The problem is that we can no longer see the starry heavens above on 
account of the light pollution emitted by our techno-urban industrial system, the 
very system of monetary values that has also blinded us to the moral law that 
nature has planted within. And, as Camille Paglia, argues, ‘the Apollonian has 
taken us to the stars.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1). It has also abstracted us so far from nature, 
our own nature within as well as nature without, that the species is self-destructing. 
Surely, with Ficino, we should be drawing down the stars, achieving some kind of 
psychic balance with the Earth. 
How do we identify the end that realises the telos at the heart of all living 
organisms? How do we relate the qualities of place to the qualities of being? 
What is the role of creative human agency in realising nature’s immanent 
purpose? How do we play our part realising our purposes within the whole 
without succumbing to the delusion that, through our powers, we have become 
as gods in forming the whole totality of things?  
 
How do we balance immanence and transcendence? 
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Steinbeck shows how Being and Place are integral to each other when he exposes 
the limitations of a possessive individualism.  
 
“Sure, cried the tenant men, but it’s our land.. We measured it and broke it up. 
We were born on it, and we got killed on it, died on it. Even if it's no good, it's still 
ours. That's what makes it ours - being born on it, working it, dying on it. That 




Starry Night 1889 Vincent Van Gogh 
 
It’s time to see the world by the light of nature. 
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Green Nature – sparkling with fine lights. 
 
When Jesus spoke again to the people, he said, “I am the light of the world. 
Whoever follows me will never again walk in darkness, but will have the light of life.” 
(John 8: 12). 
 
With the claims made for industrialisation and in the pursuit of endless economic 
growth, we see the extent to which secularisation is itself based upon a myth of 
progress, a teleology in which history is forever moving in the direction of some end. 
This material progress has nothing to do with salvation but is a secular myth. Marx 
wrote that under capitalist modernity all that is holy is profaned. Max Weber pointed to 
rationalisation as a disenchantment which stripped the world of meaning and purpose. 
For Friedrich Schiller, this was a ‘dis-godding’ of nature, die Entgotterung der Nature, 
a ‘dedivinization’ (Herman, 1981: 57).  
 
As a result, we lose the old transcendental ideal of salvation but also the 
ancient idea of nature as alive and filled with purpose. We have lost telos and, 
as teleological beings searching for meaning, we are coming to terms with this 
loss. It should come as no surprise that in this meaningless universe, human 
beings should come to invest ‘things’ not just with an existential significance but 
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also a moral meaning. The idea that secularisation is atheistic is untenable.  
Instead, the old religious concern with salvation has been secularised. Where 
once salvation was something achieved in Heaven, now it is located on Earth.  
Where once the concern was with the immortal soul, now the concern is with 
material goods pandering to the physical self. Modernity worships new gods in 
the form of industry, technology, the state, capital, money, commodities.  It’s an 
idolatry. The problem with such gross materialism is not that it is materialistic, 
but that it isn’t materialistic enough; the problem is not that it is irreligious but 
that it is all too religious. Materialism is a new religion, a disguised religion. The 
whole notion of secular progress is thoroughly infused with a hidden theology.  
 
The apostles of secular progress are forever promising us ‘the end of 
history’. Francis Fukuyama in the 1990s was merely resurrecting an old claim 
that can be dated back to Francis Bacon or Robert Boyle’s ‘empire of man’, to 
Hegel and to Marx.  
 
Nietzsche is often quoted as the prophet of the new atheistic age.  Nietzsche 
announced the death of God as a result of scientific advance, the stripping away 
of the world of objective morality and meaning through the encroachment of 
knowledge into areas formerly the province of traditional morality.  But 
Nietzsche’s perspective is nuanced rather than simple.  Nietzsche would accuse 
the militant atheists of the contemporary world of missing precisely what is at 
issue in the debate over atheism. He is less easily satisfied than the likes of 
Grayling, Dawkins and Harris, who peddle a rather crude version of eighteenth 
century materialism that has nothing in common with Nietzsche’s argument.  
Nietzsche was clear that with the death of God, human beings are being called 
upon to fill the gap and assume moral responsibility.  He seemed to doubt 
whether human beings were up to the challenge, that they were even aware of 
the challenge before them. To repudiate God is a simple enough thing to do. 
The problem with many atheists is not that they are radical in repudiating God, 
but that they are not radical enough. In so far as they are apostles of modern 
progress through science and technology, there is a hidden God at work in their 
arguments. This was Nietzsche’s point when he announced the death of God.  It 
is so much easier to renounce theology than it is to escape its influence. Plenty 
that is presented under the rubric of atheism leaves a whole set of theological 
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assumptions firmly in place. The problem is worse than this, however. A genuine 
religion is a way of addressing and resolving some perennial issues in the 
human condition. Religion is a kind of psychic therapy which allows human 
beings to confront, express and control certain deep seated needs and fears 
and hopes that are buried in the human psyche. The danger is that with a 
disguised religion, that these assumptions are buried and go unrecognised and 
thus unchallenged and uncontrolled. The problem with a half-baked religion is 
that these psychic impulses go underground and can reappear in untamed, 
unrestrained perilous forms. Where we once thought that God was dead, we now get 
lots of deities ascending from their graves, doing battle in all manner of impersonal 
forms.  
 
'Many old gods arise from their graves, disenchanted and in the form of 
impersonal forces; they strive to gain power over our lives and resume 
again their eternal struggle with one another’. 
 
Weber 1991: 147/8 
 
'Which of the warring gods should we serve?', Weber asks in Science as a 
Vocation. As though we have a choice in a world which proceeds, in Weber’s apposite 
phrase, ‘without regard for persons’. Weber realises our predicament. In place of God 
as an overarching morality, there is an irreducible subjectivism of value orders, with no 
way of deciding between them: 'over these gods and their struggles it is fate, and 
certainly not any ‘science’ that holds sway'. (Weber 1:246-47 quoted by McCarthy 
Introduction to Habermas 1991:xix/xx). 
 
In this context, the idea of progress through industrialisation, economic growth, the 
advance of scientific knowledge and the technological mastery of nature appears as a 
secular myth which is shaped by the Judaeo-Christian presumption about the direction 
of history. One could also throw the Aristotelian notion of telos, purpose, in here to 
make the point that the idea of a beginning, a middle and an end is not necessarily a 
myth nor intrinsically a bad thing. All living organisms have essences and 
potentialities which are to be realised and exercised as integral to their flourishing. 
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The case against the secular myth of progress is that it supplants this organic sense 
of purpose with impersonal targets, drives and objectives. In this utilitarian world, 
human beings come to serve ends which are external to them, not the purposes 
which are intrinsic to their being. As function replaces purpose, progress fails to 
deliver the salvation promised. Instead of Heaven on Earth, our technical instruments 
deliver Hell. 
 
These huge institutions of the modern world are fundamentally flawed in the way 
they go about things. As they get bigger and as more and more political power 
and technological hardware get concentrated within these oligarchic structures, 
the more their directors and executives threaten to become new sorcerer's 
apprentices for the twenty-first century.  
 
Kingdon 1993: 330/1 
 
The control and use of this power takes different forms within society's many 
institutions, from the state and the armed forces to industry and trade. Kingdon sees 
the dangers of technology falling into the wrong hands. He proposes an ‘Earth Council’ 
setting guidelines and putting limits upon the innumerable and often dangerous side 
effects of technology. ‘Access to technology, techniques and processes needs to be 
kept open to all, yet responsibly controlled in the interests of the world's life processes 
of which we are a mere part.’ (Kingdon 1993: 330/1). 
 
I think the problem goes much deeper than the control and the use of technology 
and pertains to the extent to which technical powers in the service of the mastery of the 
Earth have been invested with a divine significance. This deification is both a 
dehumanisation and a denaturalisation. To overcome this condition, we need to 
recover a genuine sense of purpose, one rooted in real essences and their realisation.  
A teleological conception sees the idea of progress as inherent in the unfolding of 
the historical process. History possesses an overarching meaning and morality, 
giving us some sense that all our thoughts and actions are part of some grand 
scheme building up to some great conclusion. The arrow of time is forever pointing in 
the direction of a better future, with human action conceived as being in fulfilment of 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
192 
history's promise. One can see this in the Whig interpretation of history, the idea that 
history is the inexorable march of reason and liberty, culminating in liberal 
democracy. One can find the same mode of reasoning in Hegel. So when the Berlin 
Wall fell in 1989, Francis Fukuyama could be found declaring the end of history. Of 
course, history hadn't ended. To be fair to Fukuyama, and to Hegel before him, the 
point is that freedom and reason are the culmination of history, their realisation being 
the full and complete realisation of human potentialities. This is a view which gives 
history and human life meaning. Such a claim is independent of the particular forms of 
their incarnation in time and place. And that, surely, is the case for teleological 
thinking, the idea that living organisms possess an essential purpose that ought to be 
expressed and incarnated in the world rather than repressed.  
 
My argument is not against teleology as such but against that form of teleology 
which abstracts from natural essences and in the place of genuine purposes imposes 
inexorable and impersonal imperatives. Instead of ends entailing fulfilment, we are 
given objectives, instead of purposes, we are given functions. As a result, salvation, 
which hitherto concerned the human soul or psyche, becomes no more than the 
endless accumulation of material quantity and physical knowledge. 
 
My target is the secular myth of progress, a disenchantment and dis-godding 
that is shaped by buried and unacknowledged theological assumptions and which 
results in modern forces and powers taking idolatrous form. In other worlds, God is 
not dead at all, but has taken other, not necessarily benign, forms.  
 
The ultimate measure of the awesome power, and the fundamental violence, of 
unfettered abstraction is to be found in the millions upon millions of nameless 
corpses which this most vicious of centuries has left as its memorial, human 
sacrifices to one or another of Weber's renascent modern gods. War itself is not 
new, modernity's contribution is to have waged it, with characteristic efficiency, 
under the sign of various totalizing abstractions which name and claim the lives 
of all. 
 
Sayer 1987: 154/5 
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From this perspective, the endless progress sought by capitalist modernity is 
anything but a gross or atheistic materialism, it is something much more startling – it 
is a secularised theology. Modern progress via the new idols of industry and 
technology is not just a secular myth, it is a form of eschatology. Once, history was 
considered the expression of God's purpose for humanity, leading from the fall to 
the salvation of the human race. History has a final end. In this view, history is seen 
as working towards a final end. One can trace the idea of teleology to Aristotle. The 
secular myth, though, reads more like an inverted and gutted version of Christian 
theology, denoting a rationalisation in which means have become so enlarged as to 
displace ends. But this is not an abolition of teleology, only a bad teleology in which 
means have been exalted to the status of ends. That is an inversion of Christian 
theology and is a complete misreading of the way that telos operates in the work of 
Aristotle. In exposing the misfiring modern conception of ‘progress’ as a disguised 
theology, one should be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. 
Teleological conceptions which work well in Aristotle, in the Judaeo-Christian 
eschatology and in Hegel and Marx become something else entirely when pressed 
into the service of the new gods of money and power. One sees this clearly in the 
modern world. Instead of the promised Heaven on Earth, we get the endless 
expansion of a socially unjust and environmentally damaging economy, we get 
military expansion and total war, we get the enlargement of state power and the 
bureaucratisation of the world. Such ‘progress’ may not amount to an end of history, 
but it may certainly put an end to human history.  
We should be clear that the problem here is not the idea of purpose as such, but 
the inversion of means and ends which replaces purpose with function. Marx is 
pertinent here, describing this condition of alienation in terms of the inversion of 
subject and object, human creators becoming appendages of their creations, as 
‘things’ come to be invested with existential significance. Marx is clear on this 
question:  
 
History does nothing, it does not possess immense riches, it does not fight 
battles. It is men, real, living men, who do all this, who possess things and 
fight battles. It is not 'history' which uses men as a means of achieving - as 
if it were an individual person - its own ends. History is nothing but the 
activity of men in pursuit of their ends. 
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Marx, The Holy Family (1845), MECW, 4, p.93. 
 
Marx did not, therefore, see history as evidence for the hand of God guiding us 
inexorably towards some inevitable end. But he did possess a teleological view (he 
explicitly renounces the supra-natural conception when praising Darwin). As Scott 
Meikle convincingly argued in Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx (1985), the 
idea of essences containing potentialities and immanent lines of development is 
central to Marx. But Marx cannot be convicted of the bad teleology of hidden 
designs and purposes that proceed independently of human agency. Marx explicitly 
repudiates the idea that history is about the inexorable unfolding of God’s purpose. 
Marx did not see history as evidence for the hand of God guiding us inexorably 
towards some inevitable end and criticised the way that Hegel employed the figure 
of Reason in this manner, (a criticism which is unfair to Hegel, who clearly 
emphasises the role of human agency in the progress of reason to consciousness of 
freedom.) It is human purpose that matters, and this is where we reinstate Aristotle’s 
conception of essences and potentialities which need to be actualised and exercised 
for fulfilment. This realisation is necessary for a flourishing life, but is not inevitable. 
It depends upon human agency for its realisation. Necessary lines of development 
can be frustrated. To which I will just add that, as Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks 
makes clear, in the Jewish conception, history is a co-evolution between human 
beings and God. The emphasis remains firmly on human agency. The real error 
here is not the idea of salvation based upon teleology as such but the secularisation 
of this idea to create a false religion of progress based on the veneration of 
industrial and technical powers as the new deities. The error is the idea of salvation 
based upon technological and industrial powers regardless of ends supplied by 
human moral agency. 
 
Differentiating between and evaluating these competing versions of teleology 
requires an ability to take philosophy and theology seriously. If philosophy is a 
difficult terrain for modern pragmatic, results-driven, money obsessed men and 
women to explore, the challenge to think theologically seems to be utterly beyond 
them. In claiming divine power through our technology, we have fallen far short of 
the knowledge and wisdom of God. Stripping the world down to physical fact and 
causality has greatly diminished the human mental and moral equipment. This has 
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left us psychologically exposed and vulnerable. The same life forces that have 
shaped human beings throughout history are still at work in the human psyche. The 
problem is, in the aftermath of rationalisation as disenchantment/dis-godding, 
modern man and woman possess an impoverished religious/theological apparatus 
which leaves us powerless when confronted by these underlying processes. We 
cannot control the forces we have unleashed upon the world. This is an integral part 
of the paradox that the increasing rationalisation of the world, far from issuing in 
progress, is accompanied by increasingly irrational behaviour. That is the only way 
to explain the $1.7 trillion global arms budget, a figure so large that it would take six 
times recorded history to count at the rate of a dollar per second.  
We need to recognise the extent to which our secular idea of progress is infused 
with a hidden teleological assumption which derives from theology. The political 
philosopher Leo Strauss argued that "what presents itself as the 'secularisation' of 
theological concepts will have to be understood, in the last analysis, as an 
adaptation of traditional theology to the intellectual climate produced by modern 
philosophy or science both natural and political." (Strauss Natural Right, ch 6). 
 
This radical change is not primarily a change within theology, but a change in 
modern philosophy and science. And I would argue further that the change goes 
deeper than that and is rooted in the inversion of means and ends within capitalist 
modernity, the extent to which instrumental means have become so enlarged as to 
replace ends.  
 
By citing Nietzsche, my point is not to demand that secularisation be the 
thoroughgoing process he demanded, extinguishing not merely God but all the 
theological assumptions attendant upon the belief in God. Instead, I would argue 
that we should recognise certain ineliminable aspects of the human condition, 
particularly the search for meaning, and address those psychic realities with greater 
honesty and courage. This would amount not to the abolition of teleological 
assumptions but to the reintroduction of telos in a form which is appropriate to the 
end of human flourishing in our day. And this implies an ability on our part to 
understand and give thought to such ideas, something we are poorly equipped to do 
in an increasingly irreligious age. The death of God and the denigration is our loss if 
we fail to live up to the moral and creative imperative that comes with it – to become 
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as gods. I would argue that such divinity is beyond human beings. As Kant 
reasoned, out of nothing so crooked can something entirely straight be made. 
 
‘Man ought not to know more of a thing than he can creatively live up to', argued 
Nietzsche. That’s the challenge that comes with the death of God, can human 
beings creatively live up to the knowledge and power that is now in their hands? In 
rejecting God whilst retaining a whole range of theological assumptions, human 
beings have come to venerate their power as a new idolatry. Human beings have 
come to think and act as gods, with predictably disastrous results. Such power 
becomes a destructive and dangerous force rather than the creative, joyful force 
Nietzsche affirmed. If human beings do not use power creatively according to ends 
they have set themselves, ‘power’ would impose its own external, impersonal ends 
destructively. Against the assertiveness of the militant atheists of the contemporary 
age, Nietzsche, who knew what was at stake, considered the death of God to be a 
tragedy. The death of God has charged human beings with the responsibility to the 
live as gods. Nietzsche suspected from the first that human beings might well not be 
up to meeting the challenge. In this, Nietzsche’s pessimism has proven all too true. 
Nietzsche thought the issue took us beyond good and evil. The problem is that the 
secular myth of progress has neither sought nor achieved the transvaluation of all 
values. On the contrary, the old values have gone underground as a set of 
theological assumptions which invest material powers with divine significance. On a 
superficial level, we are beyond God, but at a deeper level, we have deified our 
technical powers and material things. The new gods are the impersonal forces 
which govern the lives of all within modernity and which demand – and receive - 
daily human sacrifice. 
 
We badly need to recover a sense of purpose and start to give ends to ourselves 
as moral beings. The notion of telos is central to the philosophy of Aristotle. 
Aristotle’s teleological assumptions are embedded in a philosophical anthropology 
which sees human beings as social beings (zoon politikons) requiring a public life 
(politikon bion) in order to realise and exercise their potentialities and thereby 
flourish. Aristotle argued that the purpose of life is not just to live but to live well. And 
his holistic approach involves an examination of the social conditions for human 
flourishing. Clark summarises Aristotle's view in these terms: 'Man's being lies in 
community, in the unity of man with man’ (Clark 1975:107/8). In the modern world, 
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one sees this perspective in the work of communitarian philosophers such as 
Sandel, Raz, Finnis, and Galston.  
 
Jurgen Habermas also offers a variant of this thesis. For Habermas, freedom, 
even personal freedom, is conceivable only in 'internal connection with a network of 
interpersonal relationships', in the context of the communicative structures of a 
community, so that 'the freedom of some is not achieved at the cost of the freedom 
of others'. Identifying the 'potential for Social-Darwinist menace' inherent in 
individualist conceptions of freedom, Habermas argues that there is a need to 
‘analyse the conditions of collective freedom'. 'The individual cannot be free unless 
all are free, and all cannot be free unless all are free in community. It is this last 
proposition which one misses in the empiricist and individualist traditions' 
(Habermas 1992:146). 
We should be clear that the repudiation of purpose and meaning could come at 
a very big price. There is a case for arguing that deflating the sense of human self-
importance, encouraging human beings to see themselves as parts of nature’s 
interconnected web of life, has the potential for a species more at peace with itself 
and with its world. Some such notion would seem to be what Nietzsche was 
presenting as the joyful or gay science. This would be to abandon the idea that we 
are going to some better, improved future via science, technology and industry as a 
delusion. Economic growth, technological expansion, urbanisation, military power 
and conquest etc are all evidence of a rationalistic fallacy and false mythology at 
work, not progress. But I would still distinguish this secularisation of purpose and 
salvation from the Aristotelian conception of flourishing and all those traditions which 
are based upon it, whether we refer to Christianity, Hegel or Marx. Any progress 
within this conception is a natural process of growth, development and flourishing. 
The growth, realisation and exercise of potentiality is healthy for a living organism. 
Such a notion does not denote a myth of progress at all but, instead, defines the 
vital functioning and flourishing of all living things. And this is where I would 
distinguish this Aristotelian view from Nietzsche’s criticisms. Nietzsche, I would 
suggest, was not sufficiently alive to the potential for Social Darwinist menace in 
individualist conceptions of freedom. He failed to recognise the force of Aristotle’s 
argument that human beings are essentially social beings, that human beings are 
not just individuals but are individuals who require each other in order to be 
themselves. As Aristotle argued in the Politics, “He who is unable to live in society, or 
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who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god.” 
The way that our deification of technical power has unmoored us from our moral and 
social foundations points to a danger. If we cannot become as gods, then it seems that 
we must become as beasts. 
It is surely of some significance that Nietzsche, with his elitist conception of 
freedom and morality, referring to the mass of humanity as the ‘bungled and the 
botched’, was unable to live in society and consequently went mad. Nietzsche 
personifies a whole modern civilisation that has lost its moral compass and has 
loosened its social cement.  
 
There is a case for saying that an immanentist perspective which sees nothing 
but the circularity of nature deflates the human ego, dissolves the idea of a unique 
self as a delusion, and exposes the free will as a myth. If human beings can finally 
abandon their mad enterprises to conquer the planet and build the ‘empire of man’, 
accept that we are going nowhere on this planet, and simply learn to live out our 
natural span in peace with each other and the environment, then that would indeed 
be a happy outcome. But I would still argue that this would be a form of progress 
which represents the realisation of a telos, human beings finally learning how to live 
well. As Gandhi put it, we can fly like a bird in the skies and swim like a fish in the 
seas, but we have yet to learn to walk on the Earth like a human being. I say that 
living the human life amounts to the realisation of the telos of the human being. That 
is the only progress we can achieve on Earth. That is how I would interpret Plato’s 
statement that ‘virtue is its own reward’. 
 
If immanence means the rejection of the purpose and end associated with the 
transcendent ideal, I see not the joy that Nietzsche forecast but egoism and 
madness. Repudiating the individualist approach to freedom and morality, the 
teleological conception deriving from Aristotle holds that freedom represents a 
certain quality of life for all the individuals composing a community. Freedom, if it is 
to be anything more than a delusion associated with free will and the egoistic self, can 
only be conceived as a fundamental component in a communal modus vivendi which is 
committed to the flourishing of all. This implies a conception of the good life, which in 
turn requires a teleological underpinning.  
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And this implies a transcendent ideal. In realising a human purpose, human 
beings have no alternative but to hold in the eye of the mind (Plato, Symposium) some 
design for life which pertains to human character, conduct and interaction in the 
community, and proceeding to pursue a plan of action as tends to bring about that 
design. And this implies a conception of the good life for human beings, a teleology 
which identifies a form of communal life that enhances rather than inhibits human 
flourishing.  
 
And that means recovering and reclaiming theological assumptions from their 
appropriation and misrepresentation by secularised modernity. We need a re-
enchantment, not in the sense of investing modern idols with theological 
significance, but in the sense of reordering the arrangement of means and ends. We 
need to recover the ‘end of the world’ in the sense of fitting our lives to an overall 
pattern or design for life which corresponds to the human ontology and its 
flourishing. The problem with the secular myth of progress is that it exalts the 
instrumental means to the status of ends and as a result contradicts the human 
ontology. That’s the kind of progress we can do without. That’s the kind of progress 
which is a delusion. Instead of human ends relating to flourishing, we have the 
pursuit of objectives associated with economic growth, the endless racking up of 
material quantities, the infinite pursuit of capital accumulation on a planet of finite 
resources. That kind of progress will indeed bring about the ‘end of the world’, 
interpreted as ‘dead, finished, gone’. We need to pursuing a genuine end, one 
related to genuine teleological assumptions concerning the human ontology. 
We have lost this ability to identify a genuine teleology concerning purpose from 
a bogus teleology concerned with instrumental rationality and function. The danger 
is that in repudiating the latter we fail to recover the former. We need to recover the 
genuine sense of ends as a condition of our flourishing. We need to re-enchant a 
culture that currently stresses egoism within society and independence from nature, 
a view which sees human individuals as being in the world but not of it, charged with 
the task of bending reality to egoistic will. That is not a genuine teleology in that it 
realises an end which is external to the human ontology. Instead of the realisation of 
human potentiality, it is the contribution an individual makes to the expansion of the 
GNP that counts. That is progress as a secular myth. That delusion does not mean 
that progress in terms of the end of salvation is also a myth. A genuine sense of 
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purpose and ends implies a more holistic approach to life, submerging the ego in 
relations to others and to nature.  
Modern man’s success in separating himself from others and from nature 
represents a massive anthropological failure, a triumph in the name of material 
progress which has led to growing dis-ease and unhappiness. Free will and the ego 
are false constructs which delude human beings into accepting the diremption that 
characterises the modern condition as normal and inevitable. We misread 
transcendence as separateness from others and from nature. In truth, human beings 
are part of the world, not apart from it. Transcendence and immanence are united 
when we come to recognise that we are joined to all organic and inorganic things by 
a unifying and universal spirit. Any self that we have is a cosmic self. We see 
ourselves as parts of a greater whole. Teilhard de Chardin wrote well of the Cosmic 
Christ. 
Ultimately, the separateness of egoism estranges us from our own natures. In 
describing the condition of alienation, Marx writes of ‘the self-estrangement of man 
from himself and from nature.’ (Marx EW OJQ 1975). This is ‘human self-
estrangement.’ (Marx EW OJQ 1975). Marx makes it clear that the problem is not 
progress as such and not purpose as such, but the particular forms these take within 
alienative and exploitative social relations:  
 
Money is the universal and self-constituted value of all things. It has therefore 
deprived the entire world - both the world of man and of nature - of its specific 
value. Money is the estranged essence of man's work and existence; this alien 
essence dominates him and he worships it.  
 
Marx EW OJQ 1975 
 
The problem is the inversion of subject and object, ends and means, and the 
resulting loss of human purpose and human ends. This denotes a condition of 
alienation: 
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So much does the appropriation of the object appear as estrangement that the 
more objects the worker produces the fewer can he possess and the more he 
falls under the domination of his product, of capital.  
 
Marx EW EPM 1975: 324/5 
 
Marx identified the new god of the secularised theology of the modern world all 
along – capital. ‘Accumulate, accumulate, that is Moses and all the prophets!’ Marx 
wrote. Where once Moses was the lawgiver dispensing ethics pertaining to human 
ends, now the imperatives of capital accumulation give the orders. And that’s the 
point, the accumulative dynamic of capital is endless, it is never a completed purpose, 
just accumulation for the sake of accumulation. Capital must expand its values or 
collapse. The process can never end, only expand endlessly. Capital accumulation 
is the endless pursuit of mere means to infinity on a planet of finite resources. The 
only end here is the exhaustion of nature’s life support systems. Again, that is the 
end of the world, certainly of the ecological conditions supporting civilised human 
life. 
 
Rather than unmask the theological assumptions of the secular myth of 
progress, Marx put the accent on unmasking self-estrangement in its secular forms, 
a much more radical enterprise and one which presupposes human purpose, ends 
and fulfilment. Marx presents his own form of the end of history argument in 
precisely these terms: 
 
It is the immediate task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, to 
unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms once the holy form of human self-
estrangement has been unmasked. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the 
criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law and the criticism 
of theology into the criticism of politics. 
 
Marx Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction   EW 1975: 245 
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And that is the task that remains before us if we are to achieve the social 
conditions which correspond to the human ontology and enable human – and 
planetary – flourishing. The qualities of Being and Place interpenetrate, meaning that 
the end we set ourselves is concerned with the realisation of essential purposes.  
 
In fine, I would relate transcendence and immanence in this way. The 
transcendent ideal sets ends which are concerned with the realisation of human 
purpose, indeed of the telos of all living organisms. The ends are those which human 
beings, as moral and teleological beings, set themselves in pursuit of the fulfilled and 
flourishing life. Conceiving reality as a field of materialist immanence, the 
transcendent ideal is a vision of the immanent society which exists as a current 
potentiality to be actualised. I would come back here to Virgil and his idea of ‘working 
the earth’, gaining knowledge of natural processes not so as to be able to exploit them 
in pursuit of ends abstracted from nature, but to learn our connections to nature so as 
to be able to define ends which enable a creative self-realisation of our telos. This is 
to see place as the ground of our being, a field of materialist immanence that contains 
potentialities for the flourishing society, an immanent ideal which we are able to 
conceive morally by our sense of the transcendent. In the material realm, this 
transcendent ideal becomes, in the words of Kant, the 'real object of our willing' (Kant 
CPrR 1956:121f). In other words, the transcendent is an end that human beings as 
moral agents set themselves and which, as purposive, creative agents, they set 
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11 BEYOND HEROIC MATERIALISM 
The Echoing Green by William Blake 
The Sun does arise, 
And make happy the skies; 
“Such, such were the joys 
When we all, girls & boys, 
In our youth time were seen 
On the Echoing Green.'' 
Till the little ones, weary, 
No more can be merry; 
The sun does descend, 
And our sports have on end. 
Round the laps of their mothers 
Many sisters and brothers, 
Like birds in their nest, 
Are ready for rest, 
And sports no more seen 
On the darkening Green. 
 
In Civilisation, Kenneth Clark said this of New York: ‘it’s godless, it's brutal, 
it's violent — but one can't laugh it off, because in the energy, strength of will 
and mental grasp that have gone to make New York, materialism has 
transcended itself.’ ‘New York was built to the glory of mammon - money, 
gain, the new god of the nineteenth century.’ But it is not a celestial city. 
‘Come closer and it's not so good. Lots of squalor, and, in the luxury, 
something parasitical. One sees why heroic materialism is still linked with an 
uneasy conscience.’ Clark goes on to write of ‘the heroic self-confidence of 
men for whom nothing was impossible, the men who forced the first railways 
over England.’ The men who imposed industrialisation upon nature. Clark 
exposes the hollowness at the heart of the city of mammon and concludes on 
a troubled note: ‘The moral and intellectual failure of Marxism has left us with 
no alternative to heroic materialism, and that isn't enough. One may be 
optimistic, but one can't exactly be joyful at the prospect before us.’ (Clark 
1969: 347). 
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Margherita Muller Blessed are the people who need no heroes 
 
I believe the phrase comes from Berthold Brecht. The people who need no 
heroes are indeed truly blessed, in that they at peace with the ‘garden heroes’ 
on and in the land. It all depends upon what we meaning by heroism. In 
ancient mythology, the hero sets an example, inducing us to draw out the 
heroic capacities we all have within. The hero stands intermediate between 
men and gods. Strange that the hero-cult was apparently unknown to the 
Mycenaeans,  a civilisation often considered to be matriarchal, living 
peacefully within the contours of the land.  
 
Even more interesting is the fact that Hero was a woman, priestess of 
Aphrodite at Sestus on one side of the Hellespont. Her mythological lover, 
Leander lived on the other side at Abydos. Leander saw Hero at a festival, fell 
in love with her, and used to swim the Hellespont at night to see her. He was 
drowned when a storm put out the light by which Hero guided him, and Hero 
leapt from her seaside tower onto his corpse.  
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Hero and Leander c 1605 Rubens 
 
Musaeus’s  poem (5th/6th cent. AD) accentuates the motifs of light and darkness in 
this myth to good effect, with Hero's lamp equated with the life of her lover in a myriad 
ways. (Virgil, Georgics 258-63; Ovid, Heroines 18-19, see also Marlowe's Hero and 
Leander). Light and dark, sun and sea, the transcendent and the immanent – is perfect 
peace and union possible? 
 
Where Leander would swim the Hellespont, Greek heroes would take to 
their boats. Where now we have the infinity of space, in the flat worlds of the 
past, it was the sea that represented infinity. Where now we have rockets 
going upwards into space, in the past heroism was proven in the infinity of the 
sea. The sea was the testing ground of heroism. So we had the heroes setting 
out in their boats in an attempt to master the seas. And I mean ‘master’ in the 
sense of men pitting their technical wits and tools against the oceanic as the 
unconquerable female. Or is it men differentiating themselves from their 
origins in order to return as independent beings for reunion at a higher level? 
Attempts at mastery are doomed to fail, no matter how big the ships 
become, no matter whether they go round the world or leave it entirely. The 
Earth is never conquered. If unity without differentiation is an unconscious 
world of complete immanence, then differentiation without unity is a madness 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
208 
of rootless transcendence. Yet, somehow, these adventures are always read 
as triumphs for the heroic spirit.  
 
The Odyssey may be read in terms of a separation from the land, a 
journey, a triumph over alien nature, the return as conquering hero. This could 
be the way we differentiate ourselves from our natural origins, achieve a 
moral autonomy and distinctive identity as human beings, and return to live a 
self-conscious existence in relation to circumstances. 
 
Maybe. But that’s not how they read. The price paid and the independence 
asserted precludes any genuine reunion. Odysseus, king of Ithaca, is the son of 
Sisyphus (a name meaning ‘too clever’). When Odysseus returned from the wars in 
Troy as a hero, he hanged a dozen slave-girls in his household on one rope. He 
suspected them of ‘misbehaviour’ during his long ten year absence. The hanging 
involved no morality. Like the nature to be heroically mastered, the girls were 
property, his property, the disposal of which was a matter of expediency and utility, 
not of right and wrong. In other words, the heroism of Odysseus did not involve an 
ethical relationship to nature, only possession, expediency and utility. We still lack 
that planetary ethic. Instead, like Odysseus' slave-girls, the land, the sea, the sky and 
all the animals and plants which fill the earth are just property of merely utilitarian 
significance. 
 
Read from this perspective, the Odyssey is a tale of the deliberate rupturing of 
our ancient, originary ties with nature and celebrates the triumph of technics over 
nature. To equate this triumph with ‘progress’ and ‘civilisation’ is a lie, a masculine 
fantasy that takes heroism away from the tale of Hero and Leander. The people who 
have no need of heroes have achieved their peace with the land and see no reason 
to engage in its mastery. 
The Odyssey exposes the fearful void that weighs on the heart and soul of the 
heroic ideal. In the Odyssey, death is a black transcendence. Not even the heroes 
can make sense of it. Death is ineffable and inconceivable. (Vernant 1996: 58-60). 
Visiting the underworld, Odysseus is horrified by the obscene spectacle of the 
swarming crowds of the dead, stripped of all humanity. However, Odysseus begs 
Achilles not to grieve: "No man has ever been more blest than you in days past, or 
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will be in days to come. For before you died, we Achaeans honoured you like a 
god, and now in this place, you lord it among the dead." But to Achilles, the words 
are hollow; he knows the truth. "Don't gloss over death to me in order to console 
me. I would rather be above ground still and labouring for some poor peasant man 
than be the lord over the lifeless dead." (Odyssey 11:500, in Shewring 1980). Here 
is a clear answer to Virgil’s question: Under what stars to plough the Earth? 
Achilles’ words thoroughly subvert the aristocratic ethos of the warrior as hero. 
 
Is that void at the heart of nature or at the heart of ‘heroic’ man divorced from 
nature, at war with nature, with others, with himself?  
 
The Werner Herzog film 'Heart of Glass' ends with the inhabitants on some barren 
rock looking out to the sea for an escape from their confinement. Nature’s 
immanence is a confinement, it can suffocate and swallow up – there is a human 
yearning to push out beyond such confines and develop an independent personality. 
Such is heroism. Herzog’s Heart of Glass seems to offer no hope either way. 
Whether we stay or go, there is nothing but the blind indifference of nature. The 
camera pans to the sky above and focuses on the birds circling round in the air. To 
those tied to the land, birds are symbols of freedom, as under the feudal system 
during the Middle Ages. Those bound by the immanence of the land yearn for the 
transcendence symbolised by birds. The camera looks upwards and outwards. Then 
the narrator ends the film: "Then the men set out, pathetic and senseless. In a boat 
that is far too small. It may have seemed like a sign of hope that the birds followed 
them out into the vastness of the sea."  
And there the film ends, with the sea and sky swallowing them all up. There is no 
infinity in the horizontal plane, and more fool those who horizontalize the vertical in a 
finite world. It’s an escape, an illusion, an attempt to deny finitude and mortality rather 
than come to terms with them. We are already on a tiny little boat within the vastness 
of nature. Earth is a fragile planet. But, rather than see nature as bleak and hostile, 
something to escape or conquer by our technologies, we need to appreciate the 
potentialities for flourishing contained within nature, nature without and nature within.  
 
"The religion of the future will be a cosmic religion. It should transcend 
personal God and avoid dogma and theology. Covering both the natural and 
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spiritual, it should be based on a religious sense arising from the experience of 
all things natural as a meaningful unity. Buddhism answers this description.... If 
there is any religion that could cope with modern scientific needs it would be 
Buddhism." (Albert Einstein). 
 
That sounds reasonable in the age of science. But what, then, becomes of 
morality? When asked if he believed in God, Einstein replied that he believed in the 
God of Spinoza, a God/Nature that is concerned with the harmony of all that exists in 
complete indifference to human thought and action. That’s Elohim, the God of 
Creation, as against the personal God, Hashem. The problem is that the personal 
God is the God of human relationships, the God of love, of morality, of human 
meaning. It’s hard to see how we can transcend the personal God and retain a sense 
of human dignity. Human beings need to find the moral law within themselves and 
share it in relation to others – it is this that gives reality to Hashem as the personal 
God and delivers moral meaning to the world of natural processes. There is a need 
for transcendence in this sense. The human spirit needs to see and experience 
meaning in the harmonious unfolding of natural processes within the web of life. We 
can re-write Einstein’s credo. Elohim and Hashem go together to join the material 
and the spiritual, fact and value, and thus generate a religious sense from the 
experience and understanding of all things natural as a meaningful unity. 
 
Free your body and soul 
Unfold your powerful wings 
Climb up the highest mountains 
Kick your feet up in the air 
You may now live forever 
Or return to this earth 
Unless you feel good where you are! 
(John Laird McCaffery) 
 




‘Progress’ has come to be measured by the extent to which our heroes 
have transcended all ties with the land and sought infinity through their 
machines and rockets and space ships. That’s the promise by which we are 
socialised, and to question its veracity is to provoke an existential crisis. But 
material progress is illusory, since there is no escaping nature’s circularity. "All 
flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again unto dust." (Job 34:15). 
It’s all dust to dust. But what we do in between is our choice. That’s the moral 
autonomy we have from nature and its blind imperatives. The question is 
whether it is better to accumulate material quantity in pursuit of progress or to 
realise and exercise the natural potentialities we are born with? The former 
leads nowhere, since the world of things is ephemeral and transitory and 
comes to an end; the latter is to make the most of the gift of life while we have 
it. 
Science tells us that the sun doesn’t rise and doesn’t set. The earth goes round 
the sun, not vice versa. Yet we see the sun going round our earth and not vice versa. 
We are geocentric beings, not heliocentric beings. Our feet stand on the ground, 
even if our heads are in the clouds. We need to see the sun paying his homage to 
oceanic nature, the blue planet, Gaia. We need to find a peace on nature’s terms, 
going beyond heroes and the pursuit of ‘progress’ to achieve a genuine unity of 
immanence and transcendence. At this point, we see the sky god abandoning 
attempts at transcendence and instead achieving reconciliation with permanent 
nature, achieving a genuine eternal life that recognises the circularity of nature.  
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But that’s the problem: a self-contained world soon becomes a prison of the spirit. 
The human being years to move, get out, explore, and then, maybe, return a 
differentiated, self-conscious being. Circularity, for all its merits, is the enemy of 
independent movement. It is a nature worship that diminishes human moral stature. 
And that is what transcendence feeds - spiritual hunger. Civilisation is the record of 
human beings reaching for something beyond their grasp. That’s the paradox of the 
human condition, always seeking home, never at home, until day is done and the sun 
goes down. Human beings must escape the finite world of naked materialism and 
instead go to face and find themselves in the infinite. To be human is to undertake a 
long, often tempestuous voyage ahead, with no way of saying where it will end, 
because it is never over until it is over.  
 
I have used the sun and the sea as metaphors for journey’s beginning and 
journey’s end, because human life is all about movement, escape, deed and return. 
We may return in triumph or in failure, but we return nonetheless. 
 
Once more upon the waters! yet once more! And the waves bound beneath 
me as a steed That knows his rider. Welcome to their roar! Swift be their 
guidance, wheresoe'er it lead! 
 
‘Wheresoe’er it lead!’ We go where it leads, otherwise we fall back into Nature’s 
swamp. Does Nature’s circularity point to the fallacy of human ambition and the 
futility of human machinations? Nature and her endless cycles and rhythms are 
eternal, human actions temporal. We are the finite sparks in pursuit of the infinite. 
William Blake stated the point with typical vigour: 'The roaring of lions, the howling 
of wolves, the raging of the stormy sea and the destructive sword are portions of 
eternity too great for the eye of man!'  
‘Too great for the eye of man!’ It bears repetition in an age when men yet again 
are thinking of themselves as gods and once more pursuing the fantasy of 
immortality by mechanical means. But Nature, what Einstein calls the God of 
Spinoza, is indifferent to human affairs, and the journey into the infinite soon 
becomes tiring. So we return and accept our finitude. Or we carry on to self-
destruction, either as a person or as a civilisation. Eternity is too great for unaided 
human capacities. But we can live under the species of eternity without having to 
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capture, control or defeat it by technical means. Fulfilment requires recognition of 
natural limits. Fulfilment requires our recognition of our dependence on nature and 
upon others. The rich person knows sufficiency, the poor person never does – 
stupidity is the finite in endless pursuit of the infinite.  
 
But such stupidity is deeply rooted in a part of the human psyche that resents 
originary nature and seeks to dominate and destroy it.  
 
I shall come later to discuss George Monbiot’s lazy denigration of Plato and Marx 
as totalitarian thinkers in The Guardian. The anger was fully justified. At a time when 
we need to develop a rational thinking capacity that secures the long term common 
good over against short term individualist thinking, Monbiot caricatures the arguments 
of two of the thinkers who did most to take us in that direction. 
 
It isn’t just the philosophical shallowness of Monbiot’s reasoning that grates, but the 
evidence of an underlying political naivety, a naivety which has ever characterised 
liberal reformism and incrementalism. Monbiot writes in outraged tones as to how Marx 
could dismiss lumpen elements as ‘social scum’ and ‘bribed tools of reaction’. Monbiot 
has evidently never heard of the King and Country mobs, and clearly has no class 
awareness of who the supporters and enemies of dictatorial regimes from Bonapartism 
to Fascism/Nazism have been. That is not just historically ignorant, it is politically 
dangerous. It is a typical liberal blindspot. I would refer here to the German Freikorps, 
the murderers of Karl Leibnecht and Rosa Luxemburg. These are the lumpen elements 
that Marx was rightly wary of, and history has proven Marx right here. But I want to 
look at this question at a deeper level than this clash between revolutionary and 
reactionary politics. I want to look at domination in terms of a reaction not just against 
political enemies, but against life and nature. 
 
Klaus Theweleit has written an extensively researched, detailed and disturbing study 
of the attitudes toward women and sexuality among German soldiers between the 
world wars. (Klaus Theweleit, (1987 [1977]) Male Fantasies,   Volume 1:  Women, 
Floods, Bodies, History. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Klaus 
Theweleit (1989   [1978])  Male  Fantasies,   Volume  2:   Male  Bodies: 
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Psychoanalyzing  the   White  Terror.  Minneapolis:  University  of Minnesota 
Press.) 
 
Theweleit’s The study exposes the dark side to the domination of nature and merits 
comment.  
 
Theweleit's main focus is upon the German Freikorps. This was an army unit 
formed at the end of the First World War with the express purpose of fighting 
'Bolsheviks', socialists and trade unionists along Germany's eastern border. However, 
despite the ending of the official mandate, many continued to fight as a vigilante force, 
in time joining the SA and SS, some becoming commandants in the concentration 
camps. 
 
Theweleit describes this group as a dissociated, contingent body forming itself into 
a warrior body with the express intention of dominating others. Theweleit thus details 
the construction of the dominating body as warrior: 'The soldier male is forced to turn 
the periphery of his body into a cage for the beast within.  In so doing, he deprives it of 
its function as a surface for social contact. His contact surface becomes an insulated 
shield, and he loses the capacity to perceive the social corpus within which his 
insulated body moves. ... A man [so] structured craves war, because only war allows 
him to achieve identity with his alien, "primitive," "bestial"   interior,   while   at   the   
same   time   avoiding   being devoured by it' (1989: 22). In the process, domination 
becomes medium and outcome of the warrior body: 'What seems to hold the 
masculine-soldierly body together is his compulsion to oppress the body of another (or 
bodies, or the body in his own body). His relation to the bodies he subordinates is one 
of violence and, in extreme cases, of murder' (1989: 87).  
 
Theweleit’s key thesis is that ultimately, the male soldier's hatred is not just directed 
against this group or that group, but against life itself, as productive and contingent. 
Subordination, violence and murder is directed against life as such. 'The 
monumentality of fascism would seem to be a safety mechanism against the 
bewildering multiplicity of the living. The more lifeless, regimented, and monumental 
reality appears to be, the more secure the men feel. The danger is being alive itself.' 
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Theweleit (1987: 218). And those who make the best soldiers are those who most fear 
being alive. 
 
Theweleit is concerned to identify what lies behind the lack which motivates 
domination. He rejects classical psychoanalytic explanations for a social explanation, 
influenced by Deleuze and Guattari (1983). Theweleit explains the distinction between 
the two perspectives thus: 'And so, the story doesn't go; because he couldn't take 
possession of the mother, he subjugated the Earth to himself (Freud). It goes: because 
he wasn't allowed to use the Earth and produce, he went back to his mother. In this 
scheme of things, "incestuous desire" is not primary desire at all, but a form that Desire 
assumes because of the repression to which it is subject in society' (Theweleit 1987: 
213). Through domination, society institutes within the body the disturbing psychic 
forces indicated above. Theweleit re-reads the biblical story of Adam and Eve as 'a 
failed revolution [told] from the victor's standpoint. For attempting to put into practice 
their slogan "Our bodies belong to us," the rebels were sentenced to a life of forced 
labor in the sweat of their brows. "Your bodies belong to your ruler!" was the response.' 
The 'prerequisite . . . for ideological assault' is to install a condition of lack in bodies. 
'Installing dark territories, sources of terror and anxiety, in and on people's own bodies 
and the bodies of those they desired' creates the 'fear and uncertainty, of people's 
feeling that there were many places within themselves that no one could enter - neither 
they themselves, nor anyone else. Those were the territories occupied by the gods, the 
police, laws, Medusas, and other monsters' (1987: 414, 415).  
There are monsters aplenty in the world of the megamachine. Each and all are 
being appropriated in mind, body and soul, enlisted in a cause designed to dominate 
and, ultimately, destroy life on Earth. The last word may well belong to one of the 
Freikorps members who, writing his own epigram and epitaph, could have been 
writing for all of us: 'Only now do we recognize how little at home we are within 
ourselves' (quoted by Theweleit 1987: 243). 
 




Bluebell, any plant of the genus Endymion.  
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12 DANTE: THE WAY OF TRUTH AND LIFE 
 
[I have written more extensively on Dante in Peter Critchley, 2013 Dante – The Living 
Hope; and Peter Critchley, 2013 Dante’s Enamoured Mind. I refer those who want a more 
in depth view of Dante to those works. I believe that Dante offers the finest, most sublime, 
most existentially satisfying resolution of the dualism between immanence and 
transcendence. I establish my case in detail in the above works. Here, I can do no more 
than give a taster.] 
 
Philosophy... is the ascent of the mind from the lower regions to the highest, and 
from darkness to light. Its origin is an impulse of the divine mind; its middle steps 
are the faculties and the disciplines which are described; and its end is the 
possession of the highest good. Finally, its fruit is the right government of men. 
(Marsilio Ficino 1433-1499 Letters) 
 
I start with a quote from Marsilio Ficino for a reason. Later on I shall develop as 
essentialist metaphysics based on the philosophy of Aristotle. Aristotle is an obvious 
starting point in defending teleological thinking on the basis of the existence of 
natural essences possessing inherent potentialities and purposes. But there is 
another tradition in this quest for realisation, one which highlights the transcendental 
ideal. This is the tradition of Plato. After centuries of domination of Aristotelian 
Scholasticism, there was a Platonic revival, in which Ficino played a central part. as 
the first translator of Plato's complete works into Latin.  
In truth, Platonism had been dominant in Christian civilisation until the early 
thirteenth century. The medieval world considered appearances to be symbols of 
the ideal order, the one and true reality. From the time of St Thomas Aquinas, 
Aristotle became the dominant influence. 
 
Dante was as interested in humanity and Earth as any Aristotelian naturalist, 
but his philosophic power, moral depth and grasp of abstract ideas gave him a 
transcendent sense of heavenly light. I wish to pursue the metaphor of light with 
respect to Dante. ‘The way of truth and life’ is a quote from Dante’s Divine 
Comedy, a poem whose central theme is the ascent into the light. 
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The Aristotelian world is the world of earthly realities, a world of unfolding 
purposes within the material plane. Dante can also see an unfolding of purposes, 
but in such a way as to ascend the levels from the lower to the higher being. 
The great achievement of Dante is to have modelled an ideal unity, relating the 
parts together and structuring life according to ascending levels of purpose so as to 
form a greater whole. If, as seems to be the case, human beings are meaning 
seeking, symbol making creatures, then Dante is the master. The argument of The 
Divine Comedy is beautifully structured, almost mathematical, possessing a 
relatedness that draws the inner person out of the ego and into to the outer world. I 
like that idea of ascending purposes, each of us finding a place that allows us to 
contribute to the greater whole, a symbiosis of the parts that creates synergy. It is a 
view that appealed to R.H. Tawney. I find it significant that Tawney concluded The 
Acquisitive Society with an exposition of Dante’s practical philosophy. 
 
The famous lines in which Piccarda explains to Dante the order of Paradise are 
a description of a complex and multiform society which is united by 
overmastering devotion to a common end. By that end all stations are assigned 
and all activities are valued. The parts derive their quality from their place in the 
system, and are so permeated by the unity which they express that they 
themselves are glad to be forgotten, as the ribs of an arch carry the eye from 
the floor from which they spring to the vault in which they meet and interlace.  
 
Tawney 1982 ch 11 
 
That’s the democracy of place, purpose and person that I argue in favour of 
over against the democracy of subjective opinion and self -interest. The 
attainment of Being comes through the realisation of purpose. 
 
Such a combination of unity and diversity is possible only to a society which 
subordinates its activities to the principle of purpose. For  what  that 
principle  offers  is  not  merely  a standard for determining the relations of 
different classes and groups of producers, but a scale of moral values. 
(Tawney 1982 ch 11). 
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The economic problem is, in origin, a moral problem arising from the inversion 
of means and ends. Tawney proceeds to argue that economic activity should be 
assigned to its proper place as the servant, and not the master, of society. The 
problem of modern civilization is not merely the maldistribution of wealth, but 
that economics has come to hold a position of exclusive predominance among 
human life, a position which ‘no single interest, and least of all the provision of 
the material means of existence, is fit to occupy.’ 
From first to last, this is Dante, for whom the greatest sin of all is avarice, 
since from this sin all the others follow. We have built a social system organised 
around avarice and the results are plain to see. ‘Like a hypochondriac who is so 
absorbed in the processes of his own digestion that he goes to his grave before 
he has begun to live, industrialized communities neglect the very objects for 
which it is worth while to acquire riches in their feverish preoccupation with the 
means by which riches can be acquired.’ (Tawney 1982 ch 11).  
 
Tawney concludes by arguing that this obsession by economic issues is as 
local and transitory as it is repulsive and disturbing.  
 
To future generations it will appear as pitiable as the obsession of the 
seventeenth century by religious quarrels appears to-day; indeed, it is less 
rational, since the object with which it is concerned is less important. And it is a 
poison which inflames every wound and turns every trivial scratch into a 
malignant ulcer. Society will not solve the particular problems of industry which 
afflict it until that poison is expelled, and it has learned to see industry itself in 
the right perspective. If it is to do that, it must rearrange its scale of values. It 
must regard economic interests as one element in l i fe, not as the whole 
of  l i fe. I t must persuade its members to renounce the opportunity of gains 
which accrue without any corresponding service, because the struggle for 
them keeps the whole community in a fever. It must so organize its industry 
that the instrumental character of economic activity is emphasized by its 
subordination to the social purpose for which it is carried on.  
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Tawney 1982 ch 11 
 
The end of The Divine Comedy is Commedia, felicity, giving us a happy ending. 
It’s a happiness achieved by our coming to subordinate our egoistic selves to moral 
and social purpose. 
 
I rate Dante highly. Dante makes the idea of philosophy as ascent not only 
comprehensible but sublime. As George Steiner writes: Dante 'organizes, makes 
irreducibly vital, the reciprocities of religious, metaphysical and aesthetic codes in 
respect of being and of generation. Dante's apprehension of theology is schooled 
and profound. No faith is more innervated by thought. He engages with philosophical 
issues at the highest level of general perception and technicality (Dante was a 
logician of the intuitive). There is - banality - no greater poet, none in whom the 
summa of knowledge, of imagining, of formal construction is made to reveal itself in 
language more commensurate to its purpose.' (Steiner 2001 ch 2). Dante is a 
towering figure in the history of philosophic theology. And he's a political philosopher 
of the first rank. Here, Dante’s principal concern was to establish the foundations of 
unity and peace between the fractious city-states of northern Italy. But his attempt to 
discern the common good in a context of particularism is of much wider significance 
in time and space. Ultimately, Dante’s end was universal peace in a world state. In 
his new book, Al Gore argues for a universal planetary ethic in order to deal with 
social and environmental issues. I agree. But here, the world is catching up with 
Dante’s attempts in De Monarchia to form the fragmentation and atomisation of the 
existing political world into a consistent and united whole. De Monarchia was written 
in 1310-13, that is, exactly eight hundred years ago. Ask yourself this question, how 
many of today’s thinkers will be so lauded in the thirtieth century? 
 
With Shakespeare, as with Montaigne, scepticism is liberating. And maybe the 
point to grasp is that the human condition is to keep asking questions rather than 
resolving them. But, ultimately, I prefer those thinkers who embark on the ascent 
because they think that there really is something ‘up there’, wherever that ultimate 
reality is located. If you believe that there is such a thing as scientific truth and moral 
truth, then you have to have a conception of the true, the good and the beautiful as 
something that inheres in an ultimate reality, a reality which is intelligible if we ascend 
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the levels of cognition from lower regions of empirical necessity to the higher ground. 
Dante gives us that sense of the ultimate reality and sets us on our way, out of the 
darkness and into the light. 
 
"Unask'd of you, yet freely I confess, 
This is a human body which ye see. 
That the sun's light is broken on the ground, 
Marvel not: but believe, that not without 
Virtue deriv'd from Heaven, we to climb 
Over this wall aspire." 
 
Under what stars to plough the Earth? asks Virgil. Dante makes Virgil his 
guide through purgatory. It’s a tale of going from darkness to light, going from the 
forests at the beginning of the poem to the threshold of Paradise. At this 
threshold, Virgil, the epitome of human knowledge, leaves, as if it is here that we 
meet the limits of human knowledge. After that, we are in the deeper realms of 
moral value and faith. 
 
Dante's Inferno portrays a terrible world, a world of hatred, greed, cruelty and 
suffering. But Dante’s vision reached beyond the sins of humanity to the 
goodness in nature - to flowers, animals and birds. From the middle of the 
Purgatorio, Dante achieves moments of disembodied bliss which are transcendent. 
We move from the lower regions to the higher regions, from darkness to light. For 
Dante, light is the symbol of the spiritual life, and The Divine Comedy contain 
beautiful, poetic descriptions of the transcendent effects of light. 
 
Numberless lights, the which in kind and size 
May be remark'd of different aspects; 
If rare or dense of that were cause alone, 
One single virtue then would be in all, 
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Alike distributed, or more, or less. 
Different virtues needs must be the fruits 
Of formal principles, and these, save one, 
Will by thy reasoning be destroy'd.  Beside, 
If rarity were of that dusk the cause, 
Which thou inquirest, either in some part 
That planet must throughout be void, nor fed 
With its own matter; or, as bodies share 
Their fat and leanness, in like manner this 
Must in its volume change the leaves.  The first, 
If it were true, had through the sun's eclipse 
Been manifested, by transparency 
Of light, as through aught rare beside effus'd. 
But this is not.  Therefore remains to see 
The other cause: and if the other fall, 
Erroneous so must prove what seem'd to thee. 
If not from side to side this rarity 
Pass through, there needs must be a limit, whence 
Its contrary no further lets it pass. 
And hence the beam, that from without proceeds, 
Must be pour'd back, as colour comes, through glass 
Reflected, which behind it lead conceals. 
Now wilt thou say, that there of murkier hue 
Than in the other part the ray is shown, 
By being thence refracted farther back. 
From this perplexity will free thee soon 
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Experience, if thereof thou trial make. 
 
The Divine Comedy makes countless references to light. ‘How in thine intellect 
already shines, The light eternal.’ ‘But light transparent--did I summon up, Genius, 
art, practice--I might not so speak.’ ‘Now, if thy mind's eye pass from light to light’. 
Dante writes of ‘eternal light’, ‘And radiance, light with light accordant.’  
 
The Supreme Good; light, ministering aid, 
The better disclose his glory: whence 
The vision needs increasing, much increase 
The fervour, which it kindles; and that too 
The ray, that comes from it. 
 
Dante writes of  the light of dawn, light on the sea, the light on leaves in spring. 
These poetic descriptions are the part of Dante which resonate most with people. 
They are, however, metaphors, an attempt to make a vision of divine order and 
heavenly beauty comprehensible to our earth-bound senses.  
 
He, whose transcendent wisdom passes all, 
The heavens creating, gave them ruling powers 
To guide them, so that each part shines to each, 
Their light in equal distribution pour'd. 
By similar appointment he ordain'd 
Over the world's bright images to rule. 
Superintendence of a guiding hand 
 
Dante’s vision is transcendent in the purest sense. That is, the transcendental 
as something outside of sense experience: ‘The light, outshining far our earthly 
beam.’ There comes a point when words fail us and we can only proceed by way of 
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analogy. Here, we part company with empiricists, existentialists and pragmatists. 
They don’t know what they are missing. 
 
Into the heav'n, that is unbodied light, 
Light intellectual replete with love, 
Love of true happiness replete with joy, 
Joy, that transcends all sweetness of delight. 
Here shalt thou look on either mighty host 
Of Paradise; and one in that array, 
Which in the final judgment thou shalt see." 
 
Dante takes us as far as words and images can take us. After that, the journey is 
our own. 
 
In his latest book, The Silence of Animals, philosopher John Gray returns to his 
dominant theme of 'progress' as a delusion. He makes many good points, but his 
argument is premised on the meaningless of existence, something which he says is 
liberatory. Giordano Bruno also argued for the dethronement of human beings from 
the centre of Creation. This conception is liberatory, Bruno argues, to the extent that 
we saw the whole universe as alive, and saw ourselves as an aspect of that living 
whole.  
Such views are worth contemplating, particularly given all the signs of senility and 
self-destruction that a self-important modern civilisation is showing. A $1.7 trillion 
global arms budget at a time of ecological crisis is hardly evidence of the progress of 
reason. I have a lot of sympathy with Bruno’s position. But I’m not sure that it is true 
to human nature. Accepting a humble place within the confines of natural cycles is 
not enough to sustain a human society, since it is a perspective that exists solely 
within the confines of the present. Such a view implies a small static existence that 
never looks outside or beyond its own narrow parameters. We know from historical 
experience that such societies are inert and become petrified. The human spirit 
yearns to break the confines of such narrow vision, it requires change and 
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development beyond endless, repetitive cycles; it requires ideas and inspiration that 
transcend immediacy and develop human potentialities in a richer, more expansive 
way as levels of cognition are ascended. 
 
Whenever we have had societies that lacked a transcendental sense of hope, a 
sense of meaning, a sense of the future as something worth striving towards, they 
have tended to be bleak, bounded and oppressive. They soon close in on 
themselves. They confine the human soul and the human spirit. We need the sense 
of hope for the future that the transcendent gives. And that's what Dante delivers, the 
‘light transcendent’. That is the best that humanity can achieve.  
 
It’s an anthropomorphic view, admittedly. One can easily imagine the Earth as a 
Paradise teeming with life without the human species. Bruno’s view exposes our 
notions of progress as a convulsive self-importance. It could be that the human 
species is congenitally incapable of appreciating the gift of life on Earth. In which 
case we are dealing with a problem that lacks resolution, so we have to believe in 
progress. It may be a myth but, like God, it’s a necessary myth to stop us going mad. 
I’m sympathetic to the view. That’s the reason I spent a chapter on John Gray. His 
argument is worth consideration. But here we are. And since we are here, it is better 
to try to make the best of anthropomorphism rather than pretend that if we ignore it, it 
will go away. It’s possible to look at the empirical evidence – the war, the violence, 
the greed, the stupidity – and walk away, abandoning the human species as a 
botched job. My arguments are an attempt to present the human species at its best, 
to show the best that human beings can be.  
 
It’s interesting that Boccaccio, who always wrote in praise of sensual delights, of 
love and women, started to feel religious scruples later in life. In the 19th-century 
Francesco De Sanctis described the Decameron as a “Human Comedy”, a successor 
to Dante's Divine Comedy. So I’m holding onto the Aristotelian distinction between 
human beings as they are and human beings as they could be. Aristotle 
distinguishes between existence and life. The purpose of human life is not just to live, 
but to live well. And to live well we need a sense of the transcendent, of hope 
grounded in the human spirit. 
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And that’s why I like Dante. Despite a profound awareness of the depth of human 
sin and suffering, Dante answers the question as to whether happiness is possible in 
the affirmative. It's about finding your place in the wider scheme of things. And to do 
that we have to believe that we are part of a greater whole. We have to believe that 
the world and our lives have meaning. And at that point, we come out of the chains of 
the ego and subordinate the self to a greater moral and social purpose. We see 
ourselves in others. 
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13 BIOLOGY AND NATURAL SELF-ORGANISATION 
 
Instead of the totally self-contained world implied by immanence, and instead of the 
supernatural God implied by transcendence (and I include the false gods of science, 
industry and technology in this category, given the way that they transgress finite 
natural limits), the biological conception of self-organisation in nature shows a way of 
connecting immanence and transcendence in a fashion that realises essential natures. 
 
If one follows the line of reasoning which conceives the relation between God and 
human beings to be a partnership ethics (Sacks 2011), then evolution is a co-evolution. 
God is not merely Nature as physical cause and effect, but Nature conceived as a field 
of materialist immanence, involving human moral agency, always pointing in some 
necessary way beyond the present. If this indicates the presence of God, then it is God 
not as an intelligent designer outside of creation but as an immanent potentiality 
forever transcending the immediately given reality. 
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To the old dualism of nature and nurture (reason, culture, morality), then, I would add 
self-organisation, indicating a materialist immanence which exists as a field of 
potentialities in the process of becoming actualities. Such a view combines immanence 
and transcendence within time and space, not beyond it. This is not the Theistic 
conception. It is a naturalist conception which does not require a supra-natural 
dimension. Infinity ceases to be out there in the spiritual realm but instead becomes a 
part of evolution. Eternity once more becomes something like the ancient Goddess, an 
eternal force in control of the natural cycles of birth, life, death and rebirth. But it is a 
natural cycle that transcends natural necessity in that it includes the moral capacity for 
human beings to read nature with the eyes of reason and thus come to supply natural 
moral ends to themselves. 
 
This moral essentialism would be compatible with 'Darwinism'. Indeed, the real 
issue separating evolutionists and proponents of Intelligent Design, even 
Creationists, is whether life has evolved over a very extended time-frame through 
purely self-organising natural processes. (Fuller 2008 conc). Evolutionists say it has, 
ID theorists point to evidence of design, conscious purpose, hence God as an 
Intelligent Designer. 
 
Vague talk about nature's wonder and divine consolation may be inspiring and 
may be reassuring, and may well be what is required in most instances in life. There 
is a strong case for arguing that religion is an ethos, a way of life, something that 
human beings do rather than think and say. But as meaningful disciplines, science 
and theology require more than  a vague and broad consistency. Intelligent Design 
theorists need to show how the intelligent designer implicit in Creation is the 
Abrahamic God. And they also need to accentuate the idea of moral autonomy 
alongside the immanent processes of nature. Without this, Intelligent Design is 
empty of content and becomes little more than evolution in another form. And 
evolution has no need of God. A true theology requires specificity with respect to the 
intelligent designer. That is, theology is a ‘science of God’ or it is not theology at 
all.  
 
Which begs the question of the value of theology. Theology plays a 
cognitive role in theorising the nature and power of God. It is a rational 
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discipline that shapes our view of reality. But bear in mind the remarks I 
made earlier concerning the extent to which God is unknowable and 
indescribable. And bear in mind the Taoist view that the Tao is unnameable. 
Here is Karen Armstrong writing about ancient religions: 
 
The ultimate reality was not a personalised god, therefore, but a transcendent 
mystery that could never be plumbed. The Chinese called it the Dao, the 
fundamental 'Way' of the cosmos. Because it comprised the whole of reality, 
the Dao had no qualities, no form; it could be experienced but never seen; it 
was not a god; it pre-dated Heaven and Earth, and was beyond divinity. You 
could not say anything about the Dao, because it transcended ordinary 
categories: it was more ancient than antiquity and yet it was not old; because 
it went far beyond any form of 'existence' known to humans, it was neither 
being nor non-being. It contained all the myriad patterns, forms and 
potential that made the world the way it was and guided the endless flux of 
change and becoming that we see all around us. It existed at a point where all 
the distinctions that characterise our normal modes of thought became 
irrelevant.  
 
Armstrong 2009 ch 1  
 
Such a view would put a big question mark against the whole notion of theology. 
Theology is nothing if it is not a ‘science of God’. But if God is unknowable, 
indescribable and unnameable, then such an entity is beyond the methods of science. 
In her History of God, Karen Armstrong states explicitly that she is not offering ‘a history 
of the ineffable reality of God itself, which is beyond time and change, but a history of the 
way men and women have perceived him from Abraham to the present day.’ The 
reason we cannot have a history of God is the very same reason why we cannot 
have a science of God – God is an ineffable reality beyond time and space. 
 
So what can we have? Theology is a rational, cognitive discipline that tries 
to render the incomprehensible comprehensible, making some sense of the 
ultimate reality that human beings feel themselves a part of. It isn’t science, 
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strictly speaking, in that such a study must necessarily go beyond physical 
matter. We can have religion as an ethos, a practice, something that people 
do. And we can have metaphysics, dealing with a transcendental realm 
beyond immediate sense experience. And we can have a history of how we 
have been co-authors in the understanding of God. 
The yearning of the human spirit for a transcendent reality derives from a need 
for meaning through contact with the infinite. Theology, for all of its necessary 
shortcomings, has played a significant role in that quest for meaning. And it’s an 
ongoing quest. One would have thought that the first principles concerning God 
would be fixed throughout all eternity. They may well be. But if they are, human 
beings work at the limits of their own knowledge and must forever engage in the 
attempt to describe the ineffable. And this is the way of science. Our knowledge 
of the external world is our knowledge, and not the external world as such. God 
as the ultimate reality will always be greater than our theology. 
So moral essentialism would also be compatible with theology, in that 
theology, as the ‘science of God’, means that what theology writes of God is what 
our science tells us at any particular time. That science changes with the times. If 
God has a history in relation to human actors, as a partnership ethics holds, then 
this is a history which is bound up with human experience.  
 
The human idea of God has a history, since it has always meant something 
slightly different to each group of people who have used it at various points 
of time. The idea of God formed in one generation by one set of human 
beings could be meaningless in another. Indeed, the statement 'I believe in 
God' has no objective meaning, as such, but like any other statement it only 
means something in context, when proclaimed by a particular community. 
Consequently there is not one unchanging idea contained in the word 'God' 
but the word contains a whole spectrum of meanings, some of which are 
contradictory or even mutually exclusive.  
 
Armstrong 2009: ch 1 
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If God and human beings are involved in a partnership, it follows that the idea 
of God possesses a flexibility and even a history. This implies that any particular 
conception of God has meaning and relevance according to time and place, and 
is modified as human beings come to express their yearning for the transcendent 
differently throughout history.  
 
The result may well represent a new theology. But a new theology implies a new 
God only in the fundamentalist sense that people today experience God in exactly the 
same way as Abraham, Moses and all the prophets did all those years ago. That view is 
anti-historical and can make no sense of the idea of human moral agency in 
partnership with God.  
 
In fine, as Karen Armstrong argues, ‘there is no objective view of 'God': each 
generation has to create the image of God that works for them.’ Armstrong adds, 
pointedly, that ‘the same is true of atheism.’ The atheists are engaged in the 
search for God and moral meaning and freedom, just as much as the theists are.  
The controversy between biology and theology revolves around the claim that 
the evidence of intelligent design in the universe implies the existence of an 
intelligent designer. The existence of a watch implies the existence of a 
watchmaker. This is Paley’s natural theology, the Deist view of a God that creates 
the universe and then stands apart from it. This is the God that Dawkins has 
targeted his most telling criticisms against. But it is not the God that most 
Christians have accepted throughout history. It is the scientists’ God, the God 
which was defined in the aftermath of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth 
century, and as such is somewhat easy for scientists to criticise.  
 
Nature is not a machine, and God is not a mechanic. The question is begged, 
then: what if Nature is an organism instead of a machine? I shall answer this 
question by reference to the principle of self-organisation in biology. 
The watchmaker argument is appropriate to an age of mechanistic science, an 
age which reduced Nature to ‘dead matter’. An older biology, rooted in Aristotle, saw 
Nature as alive, as a living organism, and this view goes against both the idea of 
God as the watchmaker and of Nature as the watch. Instead, in the Aristotelian 
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conception, Nature is a field of essences and purposes unfolding according to their 
own potentialities. Once we conceive matter organically, rather than mechanically, 
we are able to see nature’s ability to organise itself from within. Organisation, in 
other words, is self-organisation, and this does not require an external organiser in 
the sense of an intelligent designer. Rather than a watch, a better analogy would be 
a whirlpool or a tornado, a structure that comes into being and organises from 
within, without the need for conscious intervention. Self-organisation is an 
immanentist view that conceives matter organically as a field of unfolding 
potentiality, that is, as a reality that is always in the process of realising itself beyond 
an immediate and given state. Here, transcendence lies in immanent potentiality 
becoming actual. 
The idea of self-organisation seems counter-intuitive. The existence of 
organisation seems clearly to imply the existence of an organiser. The world evinces 
evidence of design, so we think that the idea of a designer is plausible. But if the world 
is self-organising, if that design is internal and evolving, then we, who are ourselves 
on the inside of the living organism, would not experience such behaviour directly and 
explicitly. In our everyday lives, we have to plan, design, prepare, order and work 
hard in order to produce organisation in our world. We see the results of our efforts, 
and understand our roles as organisers. We are much less inclined to see that we 
are made from and surrounded by matter that is highly organised, and it must have 
attained this level of organisation in some way. The easiest thing to do is to draw the 
analogy with ourselves and claim that the organisation we see is evidence of an 
organisation-maker.  
The idea of organisation as implying an organisation-maker is well known 
to philosophers and theologians. Its plausibility stems from its comprehensibility. The 
existence of organisation indicates the existence of an organiser. However, at a deeper 
level than simple intuition, the idea merely begs the same questions: who or what 
organised the organiser? Who or what is the organiser? Where is the organiser? The 
idea of the organisation-maker hasn’t answered the key questions concerning 
organisation at all but remains a deduction from the existence of organisation. The 
organisation-maker is an assumption. This may be fine at the level of faith. One may or 
may not believe it. But if we want to pursue this question further than intuition and 
guesswork, which are prone to mislead, then, surely, we need an approach that is able 
to understand nature, not merely postulate it. One can be content with the view that the 
existence of organisation implies the existence of an organiser. It’s just there is just no 
compelling, cogent reason to accept that proposition. 
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So we come to the alternative proposition that organisation is a living organism 
which has organised itself. In this perspective, there is no organiser in the sense of a 
conscious organisation maker who intervenes from the outside. 
The great merit of the 'self-organisation' hypothesis is that it goes beyond 
postulating nature to understanding it. Whereas the notion of the organisation-maker 
fails to answer the key questions, the self-organisation hypothesis is capable of 
resolving the issue by explaining how and why organic matter self-organises. There is 
nothing inherently self-contradictory in the idea that organic matter engages in self-
organised behaviour which is without conscious design, organisation and 
intervention. The fact that science is still unsure as to how self-organisation operates 
does not alter the fact that we know that organic life is self-organising. This raises 
some deep theological questions concerning how much we, as parts of the whole, 
not the whole itself, need to know in order to play our own role in the self-organising 
universe. Perhaps the self-organising universe is special in being like that; that is, if 
God is the whole living matter, then we are parts of that whole aiding the self-
organisation of the whole, not gods who are the whole. In which case, not only do we 
not know, we will never know, we are incapable of knowing. In which case we re-state 
the ineffable nature of God/Nature. 
It’s the concept of the universal soul that John Steinbeck in The Grapes of Wrath 
put in the mouth of Tom Joad, when speaking of the radical preacher Casy:  
 
“Says one time he went out in the wilderness to find his own soul, an’ he foun’ 
he didn’t have no soul that was his’n. Says he foun’ he jus’ got a little piece of a 
great big soul. Says a wilderness ain’t no good, ’cause his little piece of a soul 
wasn’t no good ’less it was with the rest, an’ was whole.” 
Well, Tom concludes, maybe it's like Casy says. “A fellow ain't got a soul of 
his own, just little piece of a big soul, the one big soul that belongs to everybody, 
then...” 
 
Then, we put all those little pieces together to form one big whole that’s more 
than the sum of its parts – that’s the only transcendence we can achieve, and it’s 
more than enough. It’s still a soul. 
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The self-organising ability of life is clear. There is solid evidence that matter can 
spontaneously self-organise. As Rupert Sheldrake argues, ‘a lthough the self-
organisation of living organisms as a whole is more complex than that of ribosomes 
or viruses, and produces a far greater internal heterogeneity, there is sufficient 
similarity to suggest that here again is a difference of degree.’ Sheldrake believes that 
the evidence concerning the generation of life supports the organismic theory over 
the mechanistic theory of life (Sheldrake 1981 ch 2). There is a creative role for 
human reason, morality and culture in this view, and it is natural rather than 
supernatural. Immanence and transcendence join together as a mutual growth and 
completion. 
We need to go beyond the theory of evolution through variation under natural 
selection to consider the properties of dynamic self-organisation of developmental 
systems. And this requires a new approach to evolution, ‘one that sets out to explore 
not the variation and selection of intergenerationally transmitted attributes, but the self-
organising dynamics and form-generating potentials of relational fields.’ (Ingold in 
Rose ed 2000: 242/3). 
 
Steven Rose views cells as marvellously complex versions of string quartets or 
jazz groups, ‘whose harmonies arise in a self-organised way through mutual 
interactions.’ This is why the answer to the chicken and egg question in the origin of 
life is not that life began with DNA and RNA, but that it must have begun with primitive 
cells which provided the environment within which nucleic acids could be synthesised 
and serve as copying templates. (Rose in Rose ed. 2000). 
So maybe this is the answer to the dilemma of freedom and determinism, the 
resolution of the riddle that freedom is the appreciation of necessity. One finds that 
view in a range of philosophies, in Spinoza, Hegel and Marx, and in a lot of Eastern 
religions. The Existentialists sought to resolve the dilemma with the view: 'We are 
condemned to be free.' In truth, human beings need to overcome egoism and see 
themselves as parts of a greater reality. Overcoming egoism is shedding the self 
through a greater union. It is to participate in a greater whole. Is this what Bruno 
meant when conceiving human beings taking their place within a living universe as 
a liberation? It depends on whether that dissolution of egoism is an absorption into 
unthinking matter or a transcendence that takes us into an ultimate ideal realm. 
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The Catholic tradition is based upon what is called the natural moral law. In this 
tradition, the natural law is not the law of nature considered in the sense of physical 
science, but nature as seen through the eyes of moral reason. In this tradition, reason 
is a natural endowment which human beings can and ought to use in order to 
realise moral freedom as a rational natural end. There is a long line of 
development in pre-modern civilisation which connects Aristotle to Aquinas 
through notions of human flourishing, the good life and the common good. The rise 
of capitalist modernity fractured this picture of an overarching moral order, 
atomised nature and society, and gave us the paradox of individual freedom as a 
collective unfreedom.  
 
I want to look here at the philosophies of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
Immanuel Kant as attempts to recover the sense of a universal order of which 
individuals are a part. (Hegel would be another philosopher who sought 
universality and commonality to resolve the diremptive conditions of the modern 
world). 
Rousseau wrote of individuals being ‘forced to be free’, the law as a moral and 
educative purpose that puts egoistic individuals in touch with their true, general 
interest. This is not to abolish freedom so much as to repudiate free will and the 
notion of an independent self as egoistic delusions. But it begs the question of how 
autonomous is moral autonomy. The idea of moral choice independent of natural 
necessity and biological imperatives does not necessarily imply a moral agency which 
is apart from nature as such. The philosopher Immanuel Kant writes of the ‘common 
moral reason’ and the moral law which is implanted within each and all. The 
realisation of the realm of ends, for Kant, is part of the realisation of the rational end of 
nature. In other words, nature guides human inclinations over time to the rational end 
of the 'just civil constitution', which is the final condition for the self-development of the 
natural faculties of human beings (Kant UH 1996:45). And such a just civil constitution 
would be based upon law in the sense affirmed by Rousseau, as the embodiment of 
the general interest of human beings, the interest that individuals should serve in 
order to realise a greater, richer freedom. 
 
The point I want to establish is that, in the title of Roger Trigg’s book, Morality 
Matters (2005). Morality is not just a method of social repression, restraint and 
control, but provides meaning and coherence to individual existence. Moral values 
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provide a significance and direction to human lives beyond that which is provided 
by the ego. As social beings, human beings seek reasons which are more or other 
than mere epiphenomena of individual wants, impulse and desires. Morality 
provides standards which enable us to evaluate which of our inclinations to 
cultivate and which of our goals to pursue. Morality also yields the satisfaction that 
comes with living together as one ought with others in a shared culture of a 
common life, something which brings a richer and more fulfilling freedom than that 
of merely doing what one wants as an individuals. And my point is that this moral 
freedom is a freedom not over and above and against nature, but is an integral 
part of rational nature. To simply absorb humanity back into natural cycles or a 
living universe merely begs the same old questions. At some point, the human 
species will eat of the forbidden fruit, seek and gain knowledge and exit 
unthinking, unconscious nature.  
 
Here, I would cite Kant’s argument that the moral good which human beings 
ought to pursue and realise in the realm of ends is immanent in rational nature 
itself. It exists as a potentiality which is to be realised and as a moral capacity 
which is to be used. 
 
If then there is to be a supreme practical principle and—so far as the human 
will is concerned—a categorical imperative, it must be such that from the 
idea of something which is necessarily an end for every one because it is an 
end in itself it forms an objective principle of the will and consequently can 
serve as a practical law. The ground of this principle is: Rational nature 
exists as an end in itself. 
 
Kant GMM 1991:90 
 
I want to establish the point that such ‘rational natural’ freedom can emerge from 
within self-organising living organisms. Here, the self-organising system is considered 
to contain a realm of moral autonomy, creative human agency, art, culture, 
intelligence, individual expression, all those things which biologist Steven Rose calls 
'lifelines' (Rose 1997). Rose’s rigorous and systematic shredding of biological 
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determinism and genetic reductionism in all their forms shows how, from what he 
describes as his ‘strongly materialist perspective’, we can recover a sense of 
human moral agency whilst recognising that human action and self-realisation 
proceeds within natural constraints and limits.  
 
The question is whether this is an immanentist perspective? It is certainly a 
materialist perspective, in that it does not rely on or support any supernatural 
entity or entities. My point is that it is possible to have a sense of the 
transcendental within material reality with respect to  
 
a) the Platonic and Kantian transcendental conception of a moral ideal 
which we may identify and pursue as the 'real object of our willing’ (Kant 
1956:121f); 
b) the Aristotelian conception of an essence as possessing potentials in 
the process of becoming actual. 
 
And this viewpoint is entirely compatible with the conception of biology based on 
notions of lifelines and self-organisation.  
In this conception, reality is understood to be in the process of becoming, moving 
from an unrealised to a realised state, something which makes future reality 
something other than it is in the present. If this is a materialist immanence, then it is 
an immanence that is expansive in always moving beyond itself rather than closing in 
on itself. To the Aristotelian distinction between reality-as-it-is and reality-as-it-could-
be – an essence as potential in the process of becoming actual – I would add the 
Kantian conception of human moral agency – the ability of human beings to supply 
ends to define an ideal which exists the real object of our willing, motivating and 
inspiring human beings to bring about a morally desirable future society. Neither view 
relies on supernatural agency or intervention. The conception is materialist. But it is a 
materialism which contains a transcendent element, in precisely the sense in which 
Steve Jones retains a sense of the transcendent in his ‘strongly materialist 
perspective’.  
Jones claims that his perspective on biology ‘transcends genetic reductionism 
by placing the organism, rather than the gene, at the centre of life - this is the 
perspective that I call homeodynamic.’ Jones refers to those traditions in biology 
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‘which have refused to be swept along by the ultra-Darwinist tide into accepting that 
living processes can be reduced to mere assemblages of molecules driven by the 
selfish urges of the genes to make copies of themselves.’  
 
These traditions argue instead the need for a more holistic, integrative biology, 
one which understands and enjoys complexity and recognizes the need for 
epistemological diversity in our explorations of the nature and meaning of life. 
Their voices can still be heard above the ultra-Darwinist din.  
 
Rose 1997 Preface 
 
I want to follow up Jones’ emphasis on the organism as a whole. I want to return 
to the idea of self-organisation in nature. I want to argue for this self-organisation in 
the essentialist terms of potentiality in the process of becoming actuality. This places 
the accent on human society as well as on nature as a living organism, both of which 
we are a part. We are an active part of both society and nature, as creative, 
conscious, moral beings. We create a social world out of the natural world. But this 
world is an organism and not a machine. Only in conditions of alienation does the 
world we create take on megamechanical characteristics. The alienated world as a 
machine world is not organic: it has functions instead of purposes; it has objectives 
instead of ends; and it has cogs instead of persons.  
 
 
In Lifelines, biologist Steven Rose writes that the metabolic web has an 
advantage over one made of mere fabric. ‘Unlike living systems, human artefacts 
such as fabric cannot compensate for the loss of any individual thread. The cellular 
web, however, has a degree of flexibility which permits it to reorganize itself in 
response to injury or damage. Self-organization and self-repair are its essential 
autopoietic properties.’ (Rose 1997: 164). 
 
To see society as a living organism instead of a machine is to conceive social 
metabolic order of flourishing beings. I want to argue that the idea of self-organisation 
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drawn from biology can be conceived in terms of an essentialist metaphysics, seeing 
development and flourishing in terms of the realisation of potentiality. 
 
It is possible to see self-organisation as implying a self-regulating organising that 
thrives according to its internal connection and complexity, 
 
It is like this with the metabolic web within every cell: once it reaches a sufficient 
degree of complexity, it becomes strong, stable and capable of resisting change; 
the stability no longer resides in the individual components, the enzymes, their 
substrates and products, but in the web itself. The more interconnections, the 
greater the stability and the less the dependence on any one individual 
component. 
 
Rose 1997: 164 
 
Stuart Kauffman describes the properties of stability and self-organization as 
'order for free'. They can certainly be presented as implying a social metabolic order 
that is free in the sense of the flourishing of the parts. Kauffman’s book has the 
suggestive title Stuart Kauffman, At Home in the Universe (1995). Metabolic 
organization is not merely the sum of the parts, it forms a greater whole. In 
organisation theory that is called synergy. It is also transcendence. The knowledge 
of, indeed the flourishing of, the parts, has to be set within the functioning of the 
entire ensemble. 
 
In terms of an essentialist metaphysics, this entire ensemble is dynamic, 
comprising potentiality in the process of becoming actuality. Jones writes that 
stability and self-organization explain why the equilibrium achieved by the cell is 
indeed a dynamic and not a static one. ‘The essence of the stability of the whole is 
that the individual components are in constant flux. Freeze them in reductionist 
immobility, and, like a skater on thin ice who needs to keep moving to avoid falling 
through, the cellular edifice would collapse into those individual components that we 
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biochemists have for so long lovingly studied in dissected and impoverished isolation.’ 




Lifelines, then, are not embedded in genes: their existence implies 
homeodynamics. Their four dimensions are autopoietically constructed 
through the interplay of physical forces, the intrinsic chemistry of lipids and 
proteins, the self-organizing and stabilizing properties of complex metabolic 
webs, and the specificity of genes which permit the plasticity of ontogeny. The 
organism is both the weaver and the pattern it weaves, the choreographer 
and the dance that is danced.  
 
Jones 1997: 171 
 
Jones considers this to be the fundamental message of the biology he 
develops in Lifelines. Set within an essentialist metaphysics, homeodynamics 
provides the foundation and framework for an organismic perspective which sees the 
realisation and flourishing of the parts in terms of the realisation and flourishing of the 
whole.   
 
To see society as a living organism instead of a machine is to conceive a social 
metabolic order of flourishing beings. I want to argue that the idea of self-organisation 
drawn from biology can be conceived in terms of an essentialist metaphysics, seeing 
development and flourishing in terms of the realisation of potentiality. 
In fine, the approach I am seeking to develop repudiates an immanentism 
defined narrowly in the sense of biological and ecological determinism, sees 
evolution in the sense of the continuous realisation of potentialities, affirms the 
active role of human moral agency in establishing transcendental ends in a field of 
materialist immanence, and therefore argues that human beings create a personal 
history within the constraints of biology, ecology, society and everything else, 
including what theology reveals about the nature of God. 
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Since Darwin and the domination of Darwinism, essentialism, organicism, 
teleology have come to be edited out of biology, replaced by reductionism and 
atomism that can explain the parts but passes in silence on whole organisms as 
living entities. Darwin has been portrayed as an empiricist, carefully amassing his 
accidental facts, paying no attention to overall meaning. And, of course, Marx praised 
Darwin for putting the final nail in the coffin of teleology. Was Marx thinking of 
eschatology and the idea of history as the product of Providential design? James 
Lovelock presents Darwin as a simple empiricist for whom theory was merely a 
secondary consideration: “Charles Darwin did not travel the Earth to prove a 
theory. He was a supreme observer and naturalist: the theory was developed later, 
some of it after he had died.” (Lovelock 2009 ch 2). This is an old-fashioned view, 
reflecting the domination of atomist metaphysics. The biologist Stephen Jay Gould 
has done good work to correct this view (Gould 1980: 11, 19-26). 
 
In the work of maverick biologists such as Rupert Sheldrake, essentialist and 
organicism is returning. In biology as in history and the social sciences, the stock 
of atomism is falling rapidly as its inflated promises are increasingly revealed to 
be false. 
 
Marx's conception of historical development is teleological, and, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, that is its strength, not its weakness. For any adequate 
account of nature, society, history, the human being, any organism has to be. Even 
biologists, intimidated by the dominant mechanical materialism, have had to smuggle 
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14 TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND NATURALISM 
 
Metaphysics properly means omne, quod trans physicam est (everything that is 
beyond physics). An essentialist metaphysics combines both immanence and 
transcendence, both Plato’s realism of the Ideal forms and Aristotle’s unfolding of 
natural essences. In a Platonic sense, the oppositum of physics is concerned with 
truths that are founded on principia a priori, or supersensible principles. Immanuel 
Kant developed this supersensible Idea in terms of right and duty. In Kant’s 
transcendental idealism it is understood that while, in concreto, we can attach these 
truths to the corresponding objects in experience, we nevertheless develop such 
truths purely in abstracto, and thereby vault up into the boundless, so far as the 
limits of reason permit (Kant 2001: 251). 
 
The great achievement of Kant’s philosophy is to have reconciled the claims of both 
empiricism and rationalism. Kant, I argue, offers the most intellectually sophisticated 
and philosophically cogent attempt to mediate between sensible and supersensible 
realms.  
 
In the constructive theory of The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1965) demonstrates 
that all knowledge requires both input from the senses and organization by 
concepts. Kant does not oppose the mental apparatus to empirical nature in 
any simple sense. Kant is not an idealist in the sense of arguing for the non-
reality of the real world apart from mind. Kant argues that both sensory inputs 
and organizing concepts have pure forms that are capable of being known a priori, 
and which are therefore universally and necessarily valid. The pure forms of 
ordinary sensory inputs - empirical intuition - are the structures of space and 
time studied by mathematics; the pure forms of ordinary empirical concepts are 
the pure concepts of the understanding - the categories – and these are what 
makes it possible to apply the various aspects and forms of judgment studied by 
logic to objects of experience. Mathematics contains synthetic a priori judgments that 
are universally and necessarily true of all appearances; these must be derived from 
the construction of mathematical objects in pure intuition rather than from the 
analysis of concepts. The categories yield synthetic a priori principles when applied 
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to experience with its necessarily spatio-temporal structure - the principles of the 
conservation of substance and of the universality of causation for instance.  
 
Kant’s crucial argument is that the various features of experience, including 
space, time, causality and substance, are not in themselves features of the 
external world, but are things which the human mind imposes on experience in 
order to make sense of the external world. With this argument, Kant transformed 
epistemology and metaphysics, giving us a whole new way of looking at the world.  
 
To take one example, when we see a sequence of events, one following another, 
we say that time is passing. We find this easy to understand, since we can easily 
grasp the sequence of things. Things get more difficult, however, when we ask 
where this time is. Time is not something that exists 'out there' which we are able to 
see. Rather, time is part of our mental apparatus. This, for Kant, is an example of 
the ways in which the mind organizes its experiences. 
 
For Kant, the physics of Newton and the modern natural sciences in general are 
necessarily true on account of the categories. To argue that the truths of physics are 
a priori truths, Kant means that physics does not merely describe experience and 
that Newton's laws cannot be derived from the content of our perception. The 
same reasoning applies to geometry and arithmetic. For Kant, the human mind 
constructs the categories of space and time, cause and substance, in such a way as 
to shape experience. The world of experience presented to the senses is shaped 
by the way that forms, or categories, are imposed upon them. Our knowledge of 
physical objects is the result of being shaped by the way we impose forms, or 
categories, upon them. This does not mean that the phenomenal world is merely a 
mental construction ‘made up’ by each individual human subject, a pure subjectivism 
to which philosophical idealism is prone. Phenomenal forms — the categories of time 
and space, causality and substance — are the constructs of the perceiving human 
mind, certainly, but they are a collective creation common to all human beings, not 
a subjective creation. The world in which we live is common to all human beings, 
not individual subjects alone in isolation, but all perceiving subjects together. 
Whilst objects can exist independently of the perceiving subjects, the idea of an 
appearance presupposes that there is something beyond the appearance, even 
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though we cannot know anything of those things ‘in themselves’. Since we cannot 
see independently of the subjective conditions of experience, we cannot know 
anything of things 'in themselves', other than that they are not the same as their 
appearances. 
 
Human beings, then, do not see the world as it is, but as it appears. Certain aspects 
of reality are internal rather than external in that they are present in the innate cognitive 
or conceptual apparatus of the human mind rather than existing in the world outside. A 
chair appears to be a particular shape or colour on account of the particular constitution 
of the human visual apparatus. The visual apparatus of a different species, one that 
could, for instance, process a wider range of light waves (infrared, ultraviolet), would 
show this chair differently.  
 
And what applies to the visual apparatus applies to the cognitive equipment of the 
human mind in general as it apprehends other aspects of reality. For Kant, the 
‘categories’ of experience, such as space and time, cause and effect, are a part of the 
conceptual apparatus which is innate to human beings and which determine how 
human beings experience the world. In other words, the phenomenal world that 
human beings experience is a human world constituted by the innate categories. 
Without these categories, the world of sense experience would be an inchoate 
jumble. It would make no sense. The human mind therefore makes sense of sense 
experience, that is, imposes a meaningful order upon the external world, thereby 
giving an objective, natural datum a human shape. 
 
Kant’s philosophy contains a wealth of reality making implications with respect 
to affirming the creative, constitutive power of human agency. Kant, however, is 
careful to emphasise limits and check any flight into subjective fantasy. In The 
Critique of Pure Reason, he argues that ‘It is precisely in knowing its limits that 
philosophy exists.’ This knowledge of limits is important. The emancipatory potential of 
reason can be realised only through a knowledge of what reason cannot do. Kant, 
therefore, sought to describe exactly what can be said by reason and what cannot. 
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The innate categories impose order on chaos but also impose limits on 
experience. These limits determine what human beings can know. Human beings 
can seek causal explanations regarding everyday experience - who put that table 
there? what made that noise? These are the simplest questions to answer, and 
form the stuff of empiricism. However, Kant is aware that there are questions to 
which causal explanations cannot be given - human free will, the origin of the 
universe, and so on. Answers to such questions can often result in antinomy, that is, 
equally rational and plausible possibilities which are nevertheless mutually exclusive. 
A large part of the freedom and determinism debate in philosophy has this character. 
In the history of philosophy, we can find equally rational and plausible arguments on 
either side of this debate. One argument may claim that human beings possess 
freedom and that every human act is the product of free moral choice; another 
argument may claim that human beings are unfree and that every human act has a 
determined cause. Similarly, it is possible to present equally rational and plausible 
arguments that the universe at one time didn't exist and was created out of nothing or 
that it has always existed and always will exist (Aristotle’s eternalism). Such 
arguments appear equally plausible, or equally implausible. 
 
For Kant, these antinomies indicate that there are limits to reason, and make 
clear the extent to which human beings can never fully understand certain things.  
 
For Kant, all scientific and moral judgements are imposed by the mind on the 
world outside. Human beings are only able to apprehend the things of the world 
through the use of our conceptual apparatus and the imposition of the innate 
categories upon the world. Kant is not denying that things exist independently of the 
mind. Kant’s point is that these things in themselves cannot be known since they are 
beyond mind. Kant therefore distinguishes between the world of phenomena, the 
apparent world, and the world of noumena, the unknown and unknowable world of 
the thing in itself. Kant’s philosophy is therefore a transcendental idealism. This 
means that whilst human beings can only ever experience their own perceptions 
through categories of experience (idealism), there is a reality that exists beyond 
(transcends) these categories. Whilst the noumenal world can be inferred from 
reason, it is in itself another order of being. 
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In the Preface to the second edition of the Critique, Kant informs us that the 
Critique is an essential preparation for a proper grounding of morality (Bxxv). In a 
section entitled ‘The Canon of Pure Reason’, contained in the Transcendental 
Doctrine of Method, Kant resolves the problem of metaphysics by demonstrating that 
Critical philosophy is able to bring harmony to reason and thus validate the moral 
order through its vindication of the metaphysics of experience and criticism of 
transcendent metaphysics. 
Kant presents the concepts of hope and faith as the central theme of the 
doctrine of the postulates. He states that the doctrine of postulates is concerned 
with the question, "What may I hope for?" (C1, A 805/B 833). Kant seeks to 
ground hope in faith, but faith of a certain kind. On first impression, Kant’s view 
that he found it necessary ‘to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith’ 
(C1, B xxx) sets hope and faith in opposition. In truth, they are complementary 
and constitute a single matter. The faith Kant refers to is a special type of 
knowledge, common (in principle) to all human beings as rational beings. Hope is 
grounded hope and is the affective response that faith arouses in each individual. 
Faith and hope are therefore two interrelated aspects of the same awareness. 
The relation is one-way, from faith to hope, faith being prior to hope both logically 
and temporally (Yovel 1980 ch 2).  
 
The critical theory of Kant’s Critique holds that we can use the pure concepts of the 
understanding to conceive of objects that lie beyond the limits of our sensible 
intuition through our power of inferential reason. We can, for instance, imagine a 
spatio-temporal universe that has a kind of completeness that our indefinitely 
extendable actual intuitions can never have. And we can imagine objects that 
cannot be represented in sensory experience at all, such as God or an immaterial 
soul. Kant is clear that, contrary to traditional metaphysics, these conceptions do 
not amount to knowledge. But Kant goes much further than exposing past errors. 
Kant’s positive argument is that these powers have a proper use, so long as we 
understand them correctly (G, 4:395). Working in the tradition of Plato (see CPuR, 
A312-20/B369-77), Kant argues that the ideas of pure reason have a legitimate 
use, or yield a "canon" (A 795—831 /B 823—59), but in morality rather than science. 
Kant denies the possibility of knowledge of the existence of God, of immortality and 
of the immaterial soul as a result of theoretical reason. Such notions are incapable 
of rational theoretical demonstration. For empiricists, this would seem to be the end 
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of the matter. Not so, says Kant. For knowledge of human freedom is also 
incapable of theoretical demonstration. A strict adherence to theoretical reason 
would also entail the end of freedom as a value. Yet human beings continue to 
think and act as though human freedom is real. Such freedom, and such belief in 
freedom, is an integral part of human Being. So, Kant reasons, whilst God, 
immortality and freedom cannot be theoretically proven, they do not require such 
proof. They are not objects of knowledge. They are objects of moral belief or faith, 
what Kant calls necessary presuppositions of moral conduct. Theoretic reason 
has nothing relevant to say in the realm of faith and belief. Hence Kant’s statement 
that he found it necessary "to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" (B 
xx). Faith can neither be supported nor destroyed by means of knowledge.  
 
Kant therefore exposed the inadequacy of the rational proofs for the existence of 
God. Ultimately, Kant took the unknown and unknowable noumenal world to be 
evidence for the existence of God - because it is unknown and unknowable. One is 
tempted to refer here to the Tao as the unnameable. This begs the question of just 
what comprises ‘the One’ and whether or not human beings are a part of it and what 
role we play. If the human mind plays no active role in the noumenal world of things 
in themselves, then in what way does human agency relate to divinity? 
 
Reason does more than interpret experience. What Kant offers, in addition to 
speculative reason, is ‘practical reason’, with its own a priori principles. These 
principles are normative and bring human beings, with their ‘common moral 
reason’, into the moral world.  
 
The concept of freedom, insofar as its reality is proved by an apodictic law 
of practical reason, is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system 
of pure reason and even of speculative reason. All other concepts (those of 
God and immortality) which, as mere ideas, are unsupported by anything in 
speculative reason, now attach themselves to the concept of freedom and 
gain with it and through it, stability and objective reality.  
 
Critique of Practical Reason. 
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‘Practical reason’ is central to Kant’s architectonic. The world of 'practical 
reason' or morality is radically different from the phenomenal world. Human beings 
are co-creators and co-legislators of this moral world, the world of ‘noumena’, and 
partake of a real world as distinct from a merely 'phenomenal' world. The moral law 
is crucial to this world. 
 
The categorical imperative is at the very core of Kant’s ethical system . The 
categorical imperative requires us to act only on "maxims" or principles of action 
that can be ‘universalized’ in the sense that they can be accepted and acted on by 
all who would be affected by individual actions. Further, principles must be 
universalizable since every person, ourselves as well as all others, must always be 
treated as ends and never merely as means. This is the Formula of the End in Itself: 
‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.’ 
The principle of universalizability affirms that this ethic of ends applies to each and all 
equally.  
 
The Formula of Universal Law holds: 'Act only on that maxim through which you 
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law'. Human beings are 
therefore enjoined to act in such a way that they bring about the universal interest of 
each and all. This achieves a greater freedom than purely individualistic actions. Thus 
The Formula of Autonomy holds: ‘So act that your will can regard itself at the same 
time as making universal law through its maxim.’ 
 
If everyone respected the principle of universalizability and acted on the 
categorical imperative in accordance with the principle, the result would be a "realm 
of ends," a "whole of all ends in systematic connection (a whole both of rational 
beings as ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that each may set 
himself") (4:433). The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends therefore enjoins individuals 
to: ‘So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of 
ends.’ In the realm of ends, each person is intrinsically valuable and is treated as 
such, not as a mere means to the ends of others. This is a realm in which the 
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particular ends set by each person are promoted by all persons to the extent that 
this can consistently be done.  
 
The categorical imperative has three components. The first concerns its form, 
the second its content, the third linking these together: 
 
(1) Act as if you were legislating for everyone. 
(2) Act so as to treat human beings always as ends and never merely as a 
means. 
(3) Act as if you were a member of a realm of ends. 
 
Formulation (3) connects (1) and (2) together.  
Kant’s fundamental idea is that individuals should act as a community of 
persons, each and all making moral decisions together. This implies that each 
member treats all other members as moral beings, allows freedom of decision to 
all, and recognizes that each should and can decide as though legislating for all.  
 
The ethics of the categorical imperative has political implications insofar as 
the realm of ends can be understood as a politically organised society. 
Certainly, Kantian ethics is a democratic ethics in affirming that every person is 
competent to make universally legislative decisions. (Raphael 1981:57). 
 
 
I would argue that this step from morality to politics needs to be taken in order 
to realise the principles of Kant’s practical philosophy.  
 
It is important to keep both aspects of Kant’s transcendental idealism in mind so 
as to ensure that the question of knowing ‘why’ is set alongside the question of 
knowing ‘how’. Detached from moral purpose, reason as ‘know how’ can degenerate 
into a technics which turns the emancipatory possibilities of reason into a repressive 
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reality. This shows the danger of failing to bridge the gap between reason and 
nature. Since culture is constituted in the sphere of reason apart from the empirical 
world, reason is transcendentally constituted and legislates to the empirical world 
from the outside (Rundell 1987:14). The realisation of Kant's ideal of a noumenal 
community therefore depends upon the synthesis of morality and politics. 
 
Kant therefore argues for rightful (external) freedom in politics and the rule of law 
as preparatory for the final end of creation, the moral community in which the 
command of law is internalised as the product of moral motives rather than of 
self-interest and coercion, gain and power. Internal discipline replaces external 
discipline. Rightful freedom in politics fosters a climate favourable to moral 
autonomy. 
 
Rightful (i.e. external) freedom cannot, as is usually thought, be defined as a 
warrant to do whatever one wishes unless it means doing injustice to others. 
For what is meant by a warrant ? It means a possibility of acting in a certain 
way so long as this action does not do any injustice to others. Thus the 
definition would run as follows: freedom is the possibility of acting in ways 
which do no injustice to others. That is, we do no injustice to others (no matter 
what we may actually do) if we do no injustice to others. Thus the definition is 
an empty tautology. In fact, my external and rightful freedom should be 
defined as a warrant to obey no external laws except those to which I have 
been able to give my own consent. Similarly, external and rightful equality 
within a state is that relationship among the citizens whereby no-one can put 
anyone else under a legal obligation without submitting simultaneously to a law 
which requires that he can himself be put under the same kind of obligation by 
the other person. (And we do not need to define the principle of legal 
dependence, since it is always implied in the concept of a political 
constitution.) The validity of these innate and inalienable rights, the necessary 
property of mankind, is confirmed and enhanced by the principle that man may 
have lawful relations even with higher beings (if he believes in the latter). For 
he may consider himself as a citizen of a transcendental world, to which the 
same principles apply. And as regards my freedom, I am not under any 
obligation even to divine laws (which I can recognise by reason alone), except 
in so far as I have been able to give my own consent to them; for I can form a 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
251 
conception of the divine will only in terms of the law of freedom of my own 
reason.  
 
Kant PP 1996:99 
 
The principal aim of Kant's political philosophy is to establish 'the way to peace', 
converting chaos, difference and diversity into order, identity and unity (Saner 1973:3 
4). This political peace is freely and spontaneously affirmed by human agents 
as morally autonomous beings to create a community of ends. In this community, 
individual agents do not leave each other free to pursue private ends but come actively 
to promote each other's ends (Van Der Linden 1985:188). 
 
Kant's political philosophy identifies the goal of human history as the empirical 
political fulfilment of the idea of 'rational freedom', a freedom which is universal and 
applies to each and all as rational beings (Cassirer 1981:407). Kant affirms that the 
'sovereignty of the good principle is attainable, as far as men can work toward it, only 
through the establishment and spread of a society in accordance with and for the 
sake of the laws of virtue, a society whose task and duty it is rationally to impress 
these laws in all their scope upon the entire human race' (Kant R 1949:404). Kant’s 
reasoning is teleological and identifies a social and historical goal on account of the 
rational moral nature of human beings. It follows from this that ‘the species of rational 
beings is objectively, through the idea of reason, destined for a social goal, namely, 
the promotion of the highest good as a social good’ (Kant R 1949:407). 
 
The continued and full development of human capacities requires a social order 
with the greatest possible freedom. Kant identifies this social order as the perfectly just 
constitution in which the mutual antagonism gives way to a mutual intercourse that is 
consistent with freedom and justice.  
 
Kant therefore conceives the moral laws, a priori laws based on the Ideas of pure reason 
(A806/B834), in a political framework. The function of moral law is to harmonize the 
freedom of each individual with the freedom of all other individuals. Kant offers the Idea of a 
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republican constitution, which allows 'the greatest possible human freedom in accordance 
with laws by which the freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others' 
(A316/B373). 
 
These laws are initially proposed as maxims, the subjective rules of behaviour. But 
when these subjective rules are in accord with the Ideas of pure reason, they can be 
accepted by all as the objective laws of a community. Kant's conception of morality, 
therefore, entails a realm of ends which reconciles the life of each individual with that of 
the community of all individuals. Such a civic constitution establishes a commonwealth.  
 
Kant identifies this constitution, embodying rational freedom as a universal law, as the 
end of rational nature. Hence The Formula of the Law of Nature: ‘'Act as if the maxim of 
your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.' And this gives a 
new version of the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: ‘'All maxims as proceeding from our 
own making of laws ought to harmonise with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of 
nature.’ 
 
This shows the danger of failing to bridge the gap between reason and nature. 
Since culture is constituted in the sphere of reason apart from the empirical world, 
reason is transcendentally constituted and legislates to the empirical world from the 
outside (Rundell 1987:14). The realisation of Kant's ideal of a noumenal community 
therefore depends upon the synthesis of morality and politics. 
In other words, Kant has a way of bridging the gap between reason and nature. 
For Kant, reason is transcendentally constituted and legislates to the empirical world 
from the outside. Culture is therefore constituted in the sphere of reason 
independently of the empirical world. But Kant is thinking here of natural inclination, 
desire and impulse, that is, those things which chain individuals to the world of 
natural necessity. This is not Nature as a whole. The ‘common moral reason’ of 
human beings is a natural endowment which human beings can use to achieve a 
moral freedom independent of the world of empirical immediacy and necessity. Kant 
identifies the realisation reason as the natural end of human beings. 
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If then there is to be a supreme practical principle and—so far as the human 
will is concerned—a categorical imperative, it must be such that from the 
idea of something which is necessarily an end for every one because it is an 
end in itself it forms an objective principle of the will and consequently can 
serve as a practical law. The ground of this principle is: Rational nature 
exists as an end in itself.  
 
Kant GMM 1991:90 
 
Rational nature as an end in itself is nature with a moral component, nature that 
is more than inclination, impulse and desire. Thus, Kant identifies the ultimate 
purpose of Nature as leading humanity from the state of egoistic rivalry at the level of 
empirical immediacy – an individualist freedom which inhibits the freedom of each 
and all - to the state of universal harmony – a rational moral freedom which enhances 
the freedom of each and all. A civil society established by the force of reason will 
eventually spread and rule the whole world. And this, for Kant, is the realisation of the 
final purpose of creation (C3 435). 
 
I want to finish here by tying up these arguments in terms of innate moral and 
intellectual reason as a rational natural endowment. That is, I want to identify 
rational freedom as an end of nature, something human beings realise in coming to 
fulfil their nature as rational, moral and social beings. And I want to establish Kant’s 
transcendental idealism as a transcendental naturalism. Kant is commonly thought 
of separating reason over and against nature. My point is that Kant’s moral reason 
is a natural endowment which human beings use in order to transcend the necessity 
of empirical inclinations, impulses and desires and thereby achieve a genuine moral 
freedom, a freedom that applies to each and all.  
 
I come now to Kant’s aesthetic philosophy, showing how reflective judgement 
mediates between the worlds of phenomena and noumena. Kant’s The Critique of 
Judgement (1790) is much less well read than the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) 
and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). Which is a shame, since in this work 
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Kant does some good work on beauty and purpose, clarifying and tidying up a good 
number of complicated issues arising from the earlier critiques.  
In his aesthetic philosophy, Kant bridges the gap by way of a two-way transition: 
an upward transition from phenomena to noumena, which concerns the recognition 
of moral law; and the downward transition from noumena to phenomena, which 
concerns the realization of moral law.  
In considering how judgement makes these two transitions, we need to recognise 
that Kant has two aesthetic theories, aesthetic formalism and aesthetic Platonism.  
With respect to aesthetic formalism, reflective judgements are made by the 
subjective feeling that the free interplay of imagination and understanding provoke. 
Since this free interplay involves no supersensible world, there is no need for 
mediation.  
In Kant’s aesthetic Platonism, mediation is required since the ultimate foundation 
of all aesthetic judgements is the Idea of Beauty, and this belongs to the noumenal 
world. The Idea of Beauty is transcendent and abstract and is not therefore readily 
applicable to the phenomenal world. This leaves a gap between phenomena and 
noumena. Bridging this gap requires aesthetic Ideas constructed by imagination and 
understanding in order to articulate the transcendent Idea of Beauty in terms of 
sensible imagery. This is what artistic genius and its inspiration does. In Platonic 
terms, this represents the descent of Ideas from the Ideal realm to the natural world. 
In Kantian terms, this represents a mediatory transition made by both human beings 
and nature to bring phenomena and noumena together. In other words, natural 
beauty is the expression of aesthetic Ideas immanent in both human beings and 
nature. 
 
I wish to argue this two-way mediation in teleological judgements as a end of 
rational nature. In doing so, my intention is to argue for an essentialist 
metaphysics based upon Plato’s Idealism and which proceeds within Kant’s 
transcendental idealism.  
 
For Kant, natural purpose is a supersensible Idea that cannot be found in the 
blind mechanism of nature (C3 377). There is therefore need for a two-way 
mediation. Human beings make the upward transition for recognizing the Idea in 
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the Ideal realm and the downward transition for realizing the Idea in the natural 
world.  
The point to emphasise is that this mediation bringing natural purpose to bear 
is made by both human beings and natural teleology. On the highest level, there 
may be only one Idea of natural purpose. As Plato argues, there is only one Idea 
of Life (Timaeus (39e). However, every species has its own Idea of natural 
purpose and is governed in accordance with it. On this level, the multiplicity of 
teleological Ideas corresponds to the multiplicity of aesthetic Ideas. However, the 
various particular Ideas of natural purpose are generated by the articulation and 
specification of the one transcendent Idea of Life. In naming the objects of natural 
beauty, Kant refers to living beings such as flowers, birds, and crustaceans, thus 
implying that the power of life includes the power of beauty. In this way, Nature 
conjoins the Ideas of Life and the Ideas of Beauty and brings them from the 
supersensible to the sensible world. This descent of Ideas is engineered by the 
technique of Nature. For Kant, this is Nature working like an artist (C3 390).  
 
Kant explains Nature’s two-way mediation between phenomena and noumema 
thus: Nature creates living beings in the phenomenal world by bringing down the 
supersensible Ideas, and one species amongst those living beings has the 
intelligence to apprehend the noumenal world. The moral and aesthetic life of 
human beings is therefore a link in the creative cycle of natural teleology, which 
Kant conceives as the Providence of Mother Nature in his Idea of a Universal 
History. 
 
For Kant, Newton was the master of natural world (the starry skies above) and 
Rousseau was the master of the moral world (the moral law within). But neither 
could bridge the vast chasm between phenomena and noumena. There remained a 
division between fact and value, between scientific knowledge and morality. This, for 
Kant, is the key problem in human affairs. Kant locates the solution to this problem 
in Nature, in rational nature as purpose and end. Nature is the original matrix for 
realizing the supersensible Ideas in the sensible world; the moral and political 
development of humanity is shaped under the auspices of Nature’s eternal 
providence. Kant’s earlier acceptance of the mechanistic conception of nature had 
prevented him from grasping this cosmic truth, hence Kant’s separation of reason 
over against (empirical) nature. But Kant came to appreciate that there was more 
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to nature than the necessity of immediate impulses, desires and inclinations. 
Nature has a rational end. In coming to acknowledge Nature as the living force, 
Kant resolves his ultimate philosophical problem and bridges the chasm 
between the starry skies above and the moral law within, between the world of 
phenomena and the world of noumena.  
 
Kant’s resolution of the split between fact and value, science and  morality, 
savours a great deal of the conception of the natural world which Plato presents in 
the Timaeus, where the Demiurge, the spirit of the natural world (the World-Soul), 
creates all things in accordance with the eternal Ideas. 
 
Moral and political philosophy began with Socrates and the stand he took 
against the overweening claims to knowledge on the part of natural philosophers. 
The natural philosophers Thales, Anaximander etc were scientists concerned with 
physical fact; they studied nature without regard to human beings. For Socrates, 
the most important question in philosophy concerns how human beings ought to 
live. As Cicero put it: 'Socrates was the first to call philosophy down from the 
heavens and compel it to ask questions about life and morality.'  
 
Plato continued Socrates’ concern with the examined life, ident ifying the 
philosophical quest with the fight against the amoral forces of nature and the fight 
against the immoral forces of human beings. For Socrates, amorality in nature and 
immorality in society were linked. In the Gorgias, Callicles is the avowed champion 
of both amoral naturalism and immoral humanism. Socrates confronts Callicles 
with the argument that that one could be virtuous even in a totally immoral world 
and that one's soul could never be harmed by the immoral acts of others. As Plato 
put it: virtue is its own reward. In the Phaedo and in the Symposium, Plato finds a 
safe haven for the virtuous soul in the intelligible world of Ideas. In this world, the 
soul was safe from the immorality of the phenomenal world. The problem is that the 
safe haven of the intelligible world cannot provide a living community for moral 
individuals. Appreciating the difficulty of realising a just society in an amoral and 
irrational world, Plato laid out his conception of a rational and orderly universe in 
the Timaeus. This conception forms the cosmological foundation for the ideal state 
of the Republic and for the city of Magnesia proposed in the Laws. In these 
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works, Plato set out the principles of the political community as a moral community 
which provides for the moral life of individuals. 
Kant is working entirely in this tradition of Plato. Kant develops Plato's idea of 
the perfect city in terms of the free civil constitution: 
 
A constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with 
laws which ensure that the freedom of each can co-exist with the freedom of all 
others.  
 
Kant 1965 B.373-374 
 
This is a concise statement of the principle of rational freedom in the political 
realm, embodying the idea that the freedom of each individual is conditional upon 
and compatible with the freedom of all individuals. 
 
Kant thus continues Plato's quest for a suitable natural order for the realization of 
eternal ideals. In his Ideological conception of natural order, Kant reaffirms the 
Platonic conception of the rational order of Nature, the idea of Nature as the Mother 
of all creation. Whilst Kant’s conception of the categorical imperative and the 
noumenal realm derive from the Christian religion, the conception of Mother 
Nature taps into ancient nature religion with a view to looking forward to the attempts 
to locate the place of human beings within Nature. The idea inspired the supernatural 
naturalism of Romantic philosophers and poets. Certainly, the conception was a key 
figure in Goethe’s Faust, where Nature manifests her inexhaustible creative power 
as the Earth Spirit, the Eternal Mothers, and the Eternal Feminine. (see Peter 
Critchley The Eternal Womanly 2013). Read in conjunction with the conception of 
immanent Ideas, this natural teleology is one of Kant's most enduring 
achievements and offers a perspective of rational nature that is likely to 
become ever more pertinent as ecological crisis gives human beings the task of 
making their peace with Nature. 
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The descent of transcendent Ideas from the Platonic Ideal realm to the natural 
world fundamentally alters Kant's original conception of Nature. In the first Critique, 
in Religion and in the Groundwork, Kant had conceived Nature as a chaotic world of 
subjective impressions and natural inclinations, a world so unruly that Kant claimed 
that it was the ultimate source of all radical evil in human nature (Kant R 1960: 19). 
This is a world of egoism and desire and impulse, a chaotic world that could obtain 
rational order only through the a priori natural laws that human understanding 
comes to impose on empirical impressions. For Kant, the world of natural 
inclinations and impulses could only be controlled through the imposition of 
moral laws. 
 
In the Groundwork, Kant turned morality and Nature against each other. The 
categorical imperative is conceived as a stern command for the triumph of morality 
over the forces of natural inclination. (Kant GMM 1991: 394). The natural world is at 
best coldly indifferent and at worst cruelly hostile to the world of supersensible moral 
ideals. Material forces are governed by mechanical laws and are therefore blind 
and indifferent to moral values. In constituting human nature, they produce natural 
inclinations that have the perpetual propensity to flout moral laws. The natural world 
thus works to prevent human beings realizing their transcendent aspirations. The 
fact that human beings have such aspirations makes the human species a misfit 
pitted against nature. Kant contemplated this troubled condition of humanity in the 
natural world in terms of the gap between the sensible and the supersensible 
worlds. This was a gap between fact and value that Kant sought to close. 
Since the possibility of morality depends upon abstraction from the empirical 
world, the noumenal realm beyond the phenomenal world 'is certainly only an 
ideal'. Individuals enter this noumenal realm only to the extent to which they 
abstract from their empirical situation. The categorical imperative can enjoin that 
individuals act as though they are legislating members of a 'kingdom of ends' only 
'if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also 
from all the content of their private ends' (Kant GMM 1991:95).  
 
Kant's morality of self-denial, instituting the obedience of the 'lower', i.e. empirical, 
to the 'higher', i.e. rational self,  is  based  upon  the  categorical distinction  
between  reason  and  nature. The workings of the Categorical Imperative enables 
individuals to discover 'right' and 'wrong' independently of their inclinations, impulses 
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and desires. It follows that to realise their higher nature, individuals must learn to 
identify happiness with the subordination of their lower nature to the moral law. 
 
Kant’s point is that freedom will only be achieved through the realisation of the 
human capacity for autonomy and independence as given by rational and moral 
will. The capacity of the market economy to manacle individuals to necessity in 
their empirical existence by manipulating their ‘sensuous desires’ is one of the 
most striking features of the modern world. It is this shackling of human beings by 
their own natural inclinations that Kant’s morality seeks to overcome.  
 
The descent of transcendent Ideas from the Platonic Ideal realm to the natural 
world enable Kant to mediate between sensible and supersensible realms and thus 
develop a much more expansive conception of Nature. Nature is more than a realm 
of empirical necessity but contains a rational teleology leading to moral freedom. 
The descent of transcendent Ideas from the Platonic world of Being releases 
Nature from the shackles of humanly imposed moral and natural laws. Nature is 
now able to operate with the power of its own immanent Ideas. This opens up a 
conception of Mother Nature as the Eternal Feminine who has the inexhaustible 
power to procreate and sustain her countless children. Kant further argues that 
human beings, as Nature’s children, are equipped with natural endowments that 
enable them to transcend their natural condition and create their cultural world as 
a world of moral freedom. The attainment of this world is the realisation of 
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15 ESSENTIALISM AND ATOMISM 
 
The secular myth of progress may have the appearance of Christian salvation, but 
it has none of the reality. In exposing the teleological assumptions behind the 
delusions of progress, one is not attacking teleology as such, but the form of teleology 
employed in the modern world. To bracket Plato’s Ideal Forms, Kant’s transcendental 
idealism, Aristotle’s realisation of potentials, the Christian belief in salvation, the 
secular promises of economic growth and technological innovation, the operation of 
Hegel’s Reason in history, and Marx’s ‘truly human society’ together when writing of 
the delusions of progress clearly won’t do. That’s far too big a target, fails to 
differentiate between various purposes and goals, reveals absolutely nothing and 
therefore fails to identify the real cause of delusion. The problem lies with the specific 
form of teleology at work. We need to ask, precisely, which gods are failing? Why is 
progress backfiring so spectacularly? Asking deeper questions such demands a 
definition of teleology. Teleology is often conceived as a theory that concerns the 
fulfilment of a purpose in the world. The world is seen as the artefact of a Deity, 
with purpose unfolding in a specific way through the operation of a higher 
Intelligence. This is certainly how critics of the teleological assumptions at work in 
secular notions of progress see teleology. This is not the conception of teleology 
within an essentialist metaphysics.  
We should, however, bear in mind what Freud said: ‘The idea of life having a 
purpose stands and falls with the religious system.’ (Freud and Strachey 2005: 76.) 
Freud also thought that religion was an illusion. Freud did not escape the 
mechanicism of his day. He could not appreciate purpose as a materialist 
essence. I propose teleology as an integral part of an essentialist metaphysics. It 
is based upon the view that there are natural essences, things that are essentially 
something and something essentially, essences that have purposes with 
necessary lines of development. As Moses Maimonides writes: “In the realm of 
Nature there is nothing purposeless, trivial, or unnecessary.” (Maimonides, The 
Guide for the Perplexed). 
 
I wish to show how immanence and transcendence relate in an essentialist 
metaphysics. An important point to establish is that essentialism is not a 
determinism; change is central to essentialist metaphysics. A nature is not 
preserved through history, it is developed through successive forms. This makes 
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all existing reality a field of immanent potential in the process of becoming actual. 
This is a field of materialist immanence in the process of transcending itself, 
realising its potential as actual.  
 
In being elevated into the universal, a species transcends its former state.  
This view is also firmly grounded upon Aristotle’s conception that ‘what each 
thing is when fully developed, we call its nature’ (Aristotle). For a thing to be fully 
developed, completed, in accordance with its nature, is a necessary development. 
A thing is an organism which has a telos, a purpose, which is to be fully developed 
in order to realise its nature.  
 
Hegel and Marx developed this Aristotelian essentialism in terms of a unity of the 
‘is’ and the ‘ought-to-be’. That is, the ‘is’ of existing material reality is conceived to 
be the ‘ought-to-be’ in the process of becoming. Existing reality is therefore a field of 
immanent potential in the process of transcending itself in becoming a fully developed 
actual.  
 
In The Moral Landscape (2011), Sam Harris, as part of his project of promoting 
atheistic humanism, challenges philosopher David Hume’s distinction between the ‘is’ 
and the ‘ought-to-be’. Harris argues that there is such a thing as moral truth and that 
this can be derived from a knowledge of biological nature. The possibility of this 
project is defended by Daniel Dennett: 
 
If "ought" cannot be derived from "is," just what can it be derived from?.. . ethics 
must be somehow based on an appreciation of human nature—on a sense of 
what a human being is or might be, and on what a human being might want to 
have or want to be. If that is naturalism, then naturalism is no fallacy (Dennett, p. 
468). 
 
My point is that the entire essentialist tradition in philosophy has always argued 
this case, and has ever been concerned to develop the practical, political implications 
in terms of what Aristotle called a politikon bion, a public life of flourishing human 
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beings. Essentialism, however, is not a naturalism and is quite distinct from the 
reduction of moral values to biological facts. Dennett is selling his philosophical 
birthright for a mess of scientistic pottage, reducing the ‘ought-to-be’ to the ‘is’ instead 
of, as with essentialism, seeking to realise the ‘ought-to-be’ out of the ‘is’. The 
biological approach is the denial of morality as integral to the human ontology; the 
essentialist approach is the realisation of this morality. 
 
Within an essentialist framework, teleology is a theory about how the real 
nature or essence of an entity is to be identified and how its development from 
potential to actual form is to be explained. A whole entity can be anything from the 
smallest thing to the social organism. Telos may be defined as the form, state or 
condition towards which an entity develops as it realises its nature. This line of 
development is necessary, in that this is what is required if a thing is to complete 
itself, attain its final form. But this development is not inevitable, it can be 
frustrated by external accident. All that a teleological argument states is that the 
telos is the final form an entity achieves through its process of development. 
 
Set within the frame of an essentialist metaphysics, it soon becomes apparent that 
the problem with progress is not teleology as such, or even teleology at all, but a false 
necessity which has taken the form of a surrogate teleology within specific social 
relations. With the inversion of subject and object through the alienated form of social 
labour under capitalist relations of production, ‘things’ have come to acquire existential 
significance. Human subjects have become mere puppets of the vast impersonal 
forces which they themselves have initiated in their actions, and which they 
themselves sustain in their practices. In Manuscript Found in Accra, Paulo Coelho 
writes: “The great wisdom of life is that we can be masters of the things that try to 
enslave us.” That could have been Marx’s response to Weber’s claim that we are 
destined to remain confined within the ‘iron cage’ of rationalised modernity. The things 
that try to enslave us are our own alienated powers; they have no will of their own, 
only imperatives which, in failing to recognise our subjectivity in the world we have 
created, we blindly obey. How do we become masters of these alien powers? “By 
taking responsibility”, says Coelho. “Today people aren’t encouraged to take 
responsibility. It’s easy to obey because you can blame a wrong decision on the 
person who told you to do this or that. From the moment you accept that you’re the 
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master of your own destiny you have to accept responsibility for every single action of 
yours.”  
 
Coelho is on the right lines, but assuming moral responsibility is a collective 
project, and not just an individual one. Our alien powers are supra-individual powers, 
powers which escape the comprehension and control of individuals.  
 
John Steinbeck expresses the idea well in The Grapes of Wrath: 
 
"We’re sorry. It’s not us. It’s the monster. The bank isn’t like a man." 
"Yes, but the bank is only made of men." 
"No, you’re wrong there—quite wrong there. The bank is something else than men. 
It happens that every man in a bank hates what the bank does, and yet the bank 
does it. The bank is something more than men, I tell you. It’s the monster. Men 
made it, but they can’t control it.”  
 
“The bank - the monster has to have profits all the time. It can't wait. It'll die. No, 
taxes go on. When the monster stops growing, it dies. It can't stay one size.”  
 
This points to alienation as a supra-individual force which require collective 
mechanisms of control. Society is a social organism, and mastery in the sense of 
moral responsibility is only possible in the context of social control of associated 
individuals. (Meszaros, The Necessity of Social Control in Beyond Capital 1995). 
Since Aristotle, history has swung continuously between atomism and 
essentialism, with forms of essentialism being dominant throughout the middle 
ages, and atomism becoming dominant in the context of the mechanistic 
materialism of the scientific and industrial revolutions. Hobbes, Locke, Hume, 
Descartes are exemplary figures here. Essentialism returned with Hegel and the 
idealism that followed in his wake, including later Oxford idealists like TH Green, 
McTaggart, Bradley, as well as Santayana. Marx is also part of this development. 
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The atomist view, going back to Democritus and Epicurus, holds that reality 
is composed of discrete entities and events, with no overall significance. Against 
this, Aristotle’s view is that an account of the persisting natures of things, species 
and genera is possible only by acknowledging a category of form or essence. In 
the essentialist view, it is impossible to explain what a thing is in terms of its 
constituent matter (atoms), since the entity retains its nature and identity even as 
its constituent matter changes over time. A thing changes but stays the same in 
terms of its essence. It completes itself. The development is necessary. 
Essentialists argue that there are organic wholes with real natures and hence 
laws, forms and necessities. Essentialists may also be called organicists. 
Atomists deny the existence of essences, or, at least, essences which are 
knowable. Atomists may also be called empiricists (but not always, for example, 
Descartes). Rather than discern a meaning and purpose in the movement of 
history, atomists see only discrete events and accidental relations at the level of 
appearances. There is no meaning in history, no pattern, no progress. This 
would appear to be the dominant intellectual and philosophical view of the 
modern world. History is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury and 
signifying nothing. 
That view is superficial. Apart from anything else, it can make no sense of 
why, throughout history, human beings have so readily believed that they and 
their societies are on the road to somewhere. One could, with John Gray, simply 
refer to the delusion of progress. But if progress is a delusion, it has always 
been a powerful one. And a necessary one. It clearly resonates with something 
deep in the natures of human beings. Human beings are meaning seeking 
creatures who invest their lives with a sense of worth and significance. To 
simply dismiss this as a delusion will do nothing to stop human beings seeking 
meaning. That yearning is a permanent feature of the human condition and has 
to form part of any viable worldview. 
 
Those who are sceptical of any and all meaning in history are soon lost in 
the thickets of accident. To them applies what Marx wrote of Gustav Hugo: 'He 
is a sceptic as regards the necessary essence of things, so as to be a courtier 
as regards their accidental appearance.’ (Marx MECW I 1975  204). 
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It was for this reason that Jurgen Habermas characterised the 
poststructuralists as ‘young conservatives’. If you deny a vision of a meaningful 
alternative then, whether by default or design, you end up as a supporter of the 
status quo. And the status quo at the moment is the secular religion of 
‘progress’ based on a false eschatology of endless expansion of physical power. 
It is a nihilism. I don’t see how John Gray, on his own premises, can escape the 
world he condemns as deluded. And the same applies to all those who see 
meaninglessness in the modern world and conclude that there is no such thing 
as purpose. They are atomists and empiricists, whose vision is confined to 
surface level events, and who are incapable of penetrating to the underlying 
structures. 
 
It is in light of this that I would like to spend some time challenging the 
criticisms that the ecologist George Monbiot has made of Plato and Marx.  
 
 
Read this from George Monbiot. 
 
A century and more ago the idea was communism. Even in the form in which 
Marx and Engels presented it, its problems are evident: the simplistic binary 
system into which they tried to force society; their brutal dismissal of anyone 
who did not fit this dialectic ("social scum", "bribed tool[s] of reactionary 
intrigue"); their reinvention of Plato's guardian-philosophers, who would 
"represent and take care of the future" of the proletariat; the unprecedented 
power over human life they granted to the state; the millenarian myth of a final 
resolution to the struggle for power. But their promise of another world 
electrified people who had, until then, believed that there was no alternative. 
 
George Monbiot Communism, welfare state – what’s the next big idea? The 
Guardian 2 April 2013 
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This is so wrong on every count that it merits extensive discussion. It’s not the 
specific charges that are important – they are easily countered – it’s the mode of 
reasoning that is revealing.  
 
I read all of this kind of ‘criticism’ back in the 1990s, the rejection of the 
‘privileging’ of the proletariat and the embrace of identity politics, the endless 
assertion that ‘there is no necessary relation’ between class position and political 
views. I’m afraid that was the liberal left in the process of mental, moral and political 
implosion and, sure enough, the inevitable has happened. The likes of Monbiot are 
up a creek without a paddle. Monbiot is desperately asking what the next big idea is. 
Given the way that he caricatures Plato and Marx here, it is evident that Monbiot 
lacks the philosophical depth to deal with big ideas, old or new. And that 
philosophical deficiency is worthy of comment. It is a deficiency of atomist and 
empirical thinking which sees only a world of surface level accidents and discrete 
events. This is a world incapable of the joined up, holistic thinking we need in an era 
of global economic and ecological crisis. That is my case for a rational and organic 
essentialism, drawing upon both Plato and Kant, and which I shall develop 
throughout this book. Such a philosophy avoids the loose, overly-hasty reliance 
upon sensory experience, as though discrete events and accidental facts provides 
us with sufficient verification. 
 
But I’ll give Monbiot a brief response. Brutal dismissal of anyone who didn’t fit the 
dialectic? There is no doubting that Marx was intellectually intolerant. But was he 
wrong against Stirner’s individualism, Bakunin’s political violence? Was Proudhon’s 
small scale production likely to bring about the transformation of social relations? 
Marx was trying to reveal immanent potentialities, not entertain limitless social 
alternatives. In politics, at the International, Marx worked with all sections of the 
organised working class, even right wing trade union leaders, precisely because it 
was the movement of the class that was important. He also rejected the political 
indifferentism and abstentionism advocated by the anarchists. Marx urged working 
class involvement in politics, including parliamentary politics. Where on earth did 
Marx argue forcing society into a simple binary system? Marx’s writings on French 
politics make it crystal clear that he understood that there were a number of classes 
and gradations within classes. Monbiot refers to ‘dialectic’, by which he seems to 
mean some external reason at work in history, according which everything must be 
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fitted. What is missing here, of course, is the whole supporting infrastructure. Marx 
wrote three volumes of Capital to reveal these innermost potentialities and purposes 
at work, so that human beings would gain self-understanding and work with realities 
rather than illusions. That was why Marx revealed – or thought he had revealed – 
what lay behind the value form, the money form, the commodity form. Rather than 
wade through such close reasoning, it is of course easy to write ‘dialectic’ and imply 
some extraneous reason at work in an anonymous history.  
 
Marx also argued against using force to bring about the new society, that is 
precisely what his analysis of social forms and stages of history is about. That’s why 
Marx took pains to ground the historical process in what he called ‘concrete reality’. 
That human beings in business and politics find it easy to detach themselves from 
that essential reality and project fantasies in political programmes is not Marx’s fault. 
Marx’s philosophy is full of organic metaphors. He speaks of the new society 
embryonic in and emerging out of the womb of the old. Thus the working class 'have 
no ideals to realise, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old 
collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant' (Marx CWF FI 1974: 214). Of course, it 
is teleological and essentialist, but that’s the kind of reasoning that Monbiot 
condemns as millenarian.  
As for "social scum" and "bribed tool[s] of reactionary intrigue", is Monbiot denying that 
such lumpen elements did line up behind tyrants and dictators? Is he denying that the 
lumpenproletariat turned up in the massed ranks of the Fascist squadre, the Freikorps? 
The empirical evidence is that the organised working class resisted the Fascist and Nazi 
temptation, and Marx’s argument here will show why. Those who lack social identity 
within the class structure very easily fall in behind a strong ruler in support of an 
authoritarian politics. What matters to Marx is the structural capacity to act and social 
futurity, and that is what Marx identified in the working class as the value creating class. 
To postmodernists this amounted to ‘privileging’ the proletariat. They proceeded to ditch 
the working class for a myriad of social groups and identities, with the result that they 
lack a social agency to back any vision that they may have. Which is no doubt why 
George Monbiot is now asking for the new big idea. Whatever ‘big idea’ Monbiot ever 
has, on these premises he would lack social relevance.  
 
As for Marx reinventing Plato's guardian-philosophers, this is just plain rot. Marx’s 
position is distinguished by the way he subverted the Weitling-Buonarroti view that the 
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masses are too 'corrupt', too determined by circumstances, to emancipate themselves. 
That is precisely what revolutionary-critical praxis and the principle of the self-
emancipation of the proletariat is about. Self-transformation and social transformation are 
one and the same process. Marx is not to be held responsible for the fact that the 
socialism that came after failed to act on the principle. In the Circular Letter Marx 
condemns those who call for the leadership of 'educated and propertied' bourgeois on 
account of the working class being incapable of liberating itself by its own efforts. Marx 
couldn’t be clearer.  
 
One has, therefore, to insist upon Marx's conception that the emancipation of the 
working class must be the work of the working class itself. 
 
We cannot, therefore, cooperate with people who openly state that the, workers 
are too uneducated to emancipate themselves and must first be freed from above 
by philanthropic bourgeois and petty bourgeois. 
 
Marx and Engels to Bebel, Liebknecht and Bracke and others, 17 September 1879 
in FI 1974. 
 
Marx thus criticised those concerned with engineering revolution in abstraction from 
a revolutionary process as 'alchemists of revolution'. It was in this mind that Marx 
referred to revolutionaries as 'alchemists’ and critics who criticised him for confining 
himself 'merely to the critical analysis of the actual facts, instead of writing recipes .. for 
the kitchens of the future’ (Capital I 99). 
 
Monbiot writes of ‘the unprecedented power over human life they [Marx and Engels] 
granted to the state.’ At which point I ask, has Monbiot even read Marx, or merely read 
what an anti-Marxist has written of Marx. ‘Unprecedented power’ if you please. From first 
to last, Marx criticises the state power as a parasitic growth upon society. In The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte Marx draws attention to the fact that it is 
the liberal bourgeoisie who are statist to the core. 
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the material interest of the French bourgeoisie is most intimately imbricated 
precisely with the maintenance of that extensive and highly ramified state 
machine. It is that machine which provides its surplus population with jobs, and 
makes up through state salaries for what it cannot pocket in the form of profits, 
interest, rent and fees. Its political interest equally compelled it daily to increase 
the repression, and therefore to increase the resources and the personnel of 
the state power; it had simultaneously to wage an incessant war against public 
opinion and mistrustfully mutilate and cripple society's independent organs of 
movement where it did not succeed in entirely amputating them. 
 
Marx SE The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 1977:187 
 
And this parasitic state power has grown ever since. Of course it has. The state and 
capital are in symbiotic relation. They rose together and they will fall together. 
In The Civil War in France, Marx calls for ‘the destruction of the state power’ as ‘a 
parasitic excrescence.’ ‘While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental 
power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an 
authority usurping preeminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible 
agents of society.’ (Marx CWF FI 1974:210/1).  
 
Criticising Bolshevism, George Lichtheim describes the use of the state 
power to 'build socialism' as 'the most un-Marxian notion ever excogitated by 
professed Marxists' (Lichtheim 1961:370). 'The fact remains that Marx stood 
out among the early German socialists just because he did not share the 
traditional idealist veneration of the state' (Lichtheim 1970:94). Marx thus 
rejects the Gotha Programme of the German SPD for its commitment to the 
‘free state’. It forms no part of Marx’s communism to make the state free: 
'freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed on 
society into one thoroughly subordinate to it' (Marx CGP FI 1974:354). 
Of course, what Monbiot could cite in his defence is Marx’s tactical use of political 
power in conditions of social revolution. If Monbiot thinks that those with a vested 
interest in an existing order are going to see reason and walk away without a word 
of protest, then he is a political naïf. He himself has seen how organised and how 
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vociferous the fossil fuel lobby is with respect to climate change denial. In the book 
Political Materialism, Robert Meister shows how Marx broke with left wing radicals 
who lacked political realism and whose radicalism was merely an endless rehearsal 
of the defeats to come. It’s a politics of permanent protest. At some point, you have 
to embody your alternative, and that requires political organisation. 
 
It took me about ten minutes to eviscerate Monbiot’s charges. The important 
point, however, is not the defence of Marx. What I find most significant is that 
Monbiot has misunderstood Marx so profoundly that we have to question the 
philosophical foundations behind this misreading. The looming ecological 
catastrophe demands that we all up our philosophical game, cease dealing in 
clichéd thinking and start demonstrating intellectual and moral courage. We need 
real philosophical and moral depth in order to deal with the crisis of civilisation we 
are facing. A rehash of totalitarian pieties betrays an appalling philosophical 
deficiency on Monbiot’s part that is bound to impair his reasoning in other areas. It is 
pointless calling for new ideas if that is what we make of the old ideas. Monbiot 
dismisses Plato with a one line reference to the ‘guardian-philosophers’. What he 
fails to appreciate is Plato’s point concerning the organisation of human affairs in 
terms of a distribution of competences and expertise for the good of the whole. 
Monbiot should understand the nature of the problem that Plato is addressing here, 
how to secure the long term common good out of particular interests and opinions. It 
should ring a bell. How to get governments constrained by short term electoral 
cycles to act on the evidence for human made global heating and secure the long 
term good. Rather than deal with the question of how we relate knowledge and 
opinion, general and particular, long term and short term, Monbiot delivers a knee-
jerk liberalism that presumes Plato is a totalitarian. If that is the best that a leading 
environmental thinker can make of Plato and Marx, then we are in trouble. After all, 
in arguing for action to tackle climate change, in arguing for a general interest to 
prevail over myriad particular interests, ecologists like Monbiot have been accused 
of being eco-fascists. 
 
We need not so much new ideas as the ability to think deeply about serious 
issues. Establishing philosophical foundations is precisely what this book is about.  
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The case I develop in this book reveals such criticism to be lacking in 
philosophical depth. It’s no wonder that George Monbiot is casting around for the 
next big idea if that is how he deals with Plato and Marx, a few quotes taken out of 
context, without the supporting edifice of definition and argumentation, to prove a 
totalitarian implication. My deeper point is that this crude rehash of Popper betrays 
all the shallowness of the empiricist and atomist method. I shall discuss this point at 
length in later chapters when developing an essentialist metaphysics against 
atomism and empiricism.  
Monbiot writes of ‘the millenarian myth of a final resolution to the struggle for 
power’ and ‘promise of another world’. And this, for me, is the key to Monbiot’s 
deficiencies. For it betrays the total inability to understand a teleological and 
essentialist mode of thought as anything but mythological and delusional, 
possessing inherent totalitarian implications. This view is currently being expressed 
by John Gray, whom I shall discuss at length in a later chapter. The argument boils 
down to whether we can see purpose at work in history. The essentialist sees 
history as the progressive realisation of immanent purposes through inherent 
potentialities becoming actualities. Marx’s argument is organised around the 
essentialist categories of law, form, substance, necessary lines of development. And 
his analysis of various social forms was an attempt to ground this essentialism in 
realities, not mythologies. It is this analysis of what Marx called ‘concrete reality’ that 
gave his vision of an ‘another world’ a reality as against utopian though. Marx’s 
notion of socialist revolution has been compared to Judaeo-Christian eschatology 
many times before. In truth, the comparison reveals more about an author’s inability 
to understand the philosophical and theological points in anything other than very 
broad brush strokes. In simple terms, this teleological tradition believes that there is 
meaning in history, that history has a direction and that the end point concerns the 
realisation of the potentials of something essentially and essentially something. The 
atomist and empiricist tradition has been in the ascendant for so long now, that 
there is a complete incomprehension when it comes to essentialist modes of 
thought. Rather than engage with the arguments, there is a simple straight reading 
of totalitarianism. Those brought up to see no meaning in history beyond discrete 
and accidental events can make no sense of those philosophical and theological 
traditions that make necessary connections within the whole. To them, history is 
meaningless, aimless and endless. Those who identify purpose at work and seek 
realisation are guilty of millenarianism.  
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Beyond the philosophical line connecting Plato and Aristotle to Kant, Hegel, Marx, 
the criticism also takes in the major religions Judaism, Christianity and Islam, for 
whom history has a purpose and leads to an end point. It is that end point that 
invests actions with moral meaning, raises hope, inspires effort, and obligates 
individuals in pursuit of an end. It is worth emphasising this point because Monbiot, 
as an environmentalist, certainly believes in changing the existing world in order to 
achieve ‘another world’ in the shape of the ecological society. Monbiot is surely 
aware of the extent to which environmentalists have been accused of being ‘eco-
fascists’ and ‘eco-zealots’ practising a ‘new religion of climate alarmism’. That’s the 
same accusation of millenarianism that Monbiot levels at Marx, with about as much 
substance - little.  
 
The charges of millenarianism betray the inability to see meaning in history, and 
that is derives from the absence of essence and purpose. That’s fine for those bent 
on digging up the planet in order to make money. It makes perfect commercial 
sense to reduce Nature to a dis-godded machine devoid of intrinsic purpose, to be 
used whichever way money and power deems meaningful. But Monbiot is 
attempting to promote the environmentalist message against such commercial 
exploitation. My argument is that without an essentialist foundation, there is no 
environmentalist message as such, just another value position. And in such a 
meaningless world devoid of purpose, it is money and power that counts, as 
Monbiot has surely, by now, found out. His writing details the machinations of 
business in the world of politics and public policy. All the scientific evidence on 
climate change in the world hasn’t budged the world of business and politics. The 
only defence that environmentalism has is the bedrock reality of Nature, and that 
requires an essentialist mode of thought. All that Monbiot has is empiricism and 
atomism that makes nonsense of the idea of purpose and no sense of history. 
History becomes meaningless, aimless and endless. And that’s precisely what 
money and power want, a blank sheet upon which they can write their dreams and 
fantasies of expropriation and exploitation. 
 
So my point here is that beneath Monbiot’s specific against Plato and Marx lies a 
mode of reasoning that is typical of an atomist and empiricist methodology, a mode 
which we need to discard. What Monbiot argues against Plato and Marx would 
apply to all those who would seek to oppose the “ought to be” against what “is”, 
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another future world that is feasibly better than the present, since such distinction 
necessarily implies that some – an elite! – see a reality that others – the mass! – 
don’t. To penetrate to the underlying, essential reality beneath the surface is to set 
up a division between appearance and reality. It is to argue that those on the 
surface are living in Plato’s cave, chained to illusion. To those of nervous liberal 
sensibilities, this implies that some can see through the illusion and hence can claim 
privileged access to knowledge and, no doubt, power. So the distinction is rejected 
and we remain enclosed within the cave of shadows. 
 
The point is worth labouring given that Monbiot is an environmental campaigner 
who has frequently crossed swords with climate change deniers. The distinction 
between appearance and reality is intrinsic to science. Without it, as Marx argued, 
there could be no science. Empirical observation at the level of the senses tells us 
that the world is flat. Science tells us that the world is round. Science is counter-
intuitive. To argue this is not to justify a scientific dictatorship in which an elite of 
knowledgeable experts govern the deluded, ignorant masses. Yet this crude 
caricature is the only sense that Monbiot can make of Plato and Marx for their 
distinction between appearance and reality.  
The point is worth pursuing. The way that Monbiot criticises collapses the 
distinction between knowledge and opinion, a distinction which he, as an 
environmentalist who promotes the idea of human made climate change, is well 
aware of. It is climate change deniers who remove that distinction, in an attempt to 
reduce science to politics. 
 
The serious point is that the failure to ground the ecological standpoint on natural 
essences leaves us adrift of reality. And it leaves us ill-equipped intellectually, 
morally and politically to challenge those in business and politics who are asserting 
their right to distort reality whichever way they like. Take climate change denier 
Brendan O’Neill who condemns 'the ugly elitism and end-of-days mania of the 
environmentalist movement'. (Brendan O'Neill,  'Stupid,  feckless,  greedy:  that's 
you,  that is', Spiked, 16 March 2009.) It is the likes of Monbiot, as someone who 
argues for action to deal with climate change, who is on the receiving end of these 
charges of elitism and ‘end-of-days mania’. Monbiot would defend himself by 
pointing to the climate science. And the criticism will come back that Monbiot is an 
elitist claiming privileged access to knowledge. These charges directed against 
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environmentalists like Monbiot are the charges that Monbiot directs against Plato 
and Marx. And it’s philosophically loose. 
The point is that human reason is capable of penetrating beyond the illusion of 
the empirical world presented to the senses and give us access to true reality. 
Without that capacity, we are condemned to remain enchained to empirical 
immediacy and necessity. 
Monbiot’s rehash of hoary old claims of totalitarianism betrays the lack of a viable 
philosophical standpoint. But it reveals more. It reveals a lack of intellectual courage. 
'Have the courage to use your own reason!' wrote Kant. We need the courage to 
depart from the immediate and the given in the world of appearance and embark on 
the journey to what is most real. This was a familiar idea in past civilisations, but the 
brave soldiers of the modern empiricism seem to lack the appetite to make a move. 
The future is no more than the present enlarged and they see no direction, no 
necessary relations or lines of development beyond the accident of discrete events. 
They lack hope, they lack courage, they are beaten, and the evidence of their defeat 
is all around us.  
 
We have been here before. Back in the 1980s, postmodernism and 
postructuralism was all the rage, marxism, the working class and class politics were 
out. The likes of Monbiot had their way, and we are now where we are, in the brave 
new world of call centres, casual, short-term contracts and climate crisis. Realising 
that they are up a creek without a paddle, they issue the call for new ideas. Well, as 
Aristotle wrote, there is nothing new, only a lot of things we’ve forgotten. It’s time to 
remember. 
 
I can do no better than to quote Norman Geras, who saw off this nonsense when it 
first reared its head in the 1970s and 1980s. In Discourses of Extremity, Geras 
concludes the final chapter entitled Ex-Marxism without Substance with these 
pertinent words: 
 
But socialist thought presently also confronts, on the other hand, a singularly 
hostile political and intellectual environment. It is pressed in from all directions by 
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those ready to write it off, deride it, belittle both its hopes and its achievements as 
illusion or dross. 
So besieged, socialist thought - in all its currents and varieties - has an even 
heavier responsibility than it should generally own to anyway, to conduct its 
discussions in a spirit of sobriety and just proportion and with a sense of the 
complex paths that truth and error alike persist in tracing across all 
straightforward maps of the historical intellect. Argument by caricature and 
simplification; by easy reduction and intellectual short-cut; by light-minded use of 
such hackneyed vulgarizations as have already been answered many times 
over (and as will be seen today for vulgarizations not only by Marxists but by a 
substantial number of fair-minded, non-Marxist students of Marxism) - this is a 
dual dereliction. It obstructs fruitful socialist debate. And it reinforces the currently 
difficult external environment of that debate. It is no fit style for the kind of 
socialist pluralism we need. In any case, enough is now more than enough. 
 
Geras 1990: 165 
 
Scepticism with respect to essences sapped the life out of socialism. Today we 
face a civilisation-threatening crisis in the climate system. To confront that problem 
we are going to need thinking of real perception, philosophical depth, intellectual 
courage and moral weight. If what Monbiot writes is typical of environmentalists, then 
we are indeed writing the Requiem for a Species (Clive Hamilton 2010). 
 
I shall argue against such pessimism. It is precisely because of the reality of 
essences that a future creative self-realisation, beyond the vagaries and accidents of 
sensory experience, is always possible. Indeed, in the essentialist terms I shall 
develop, this development is necessary. Not in the sense of being inevitable, since 
lines of development are frustratable. It depends upon human agency, the way in 
which, or whether at all, human beings act. The development is necessary if human 
beings – and other organisms – are to become what they essentially are, that is, 
what they have the potential to be. 
I shall argue that we can pursue the “ought to be” without disappearing into the 
fantasy world of subjective wishes and delusions. Anglophone philosophy since 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
277 
David Hume has insisted that one cannot derive an ‘ought to be’ from an ‘is’. And this 
distinction became a philosophical convention. Finally, Daniel Dennett has had the 
nerve to ask that if one cannot derive an “ought to be” from an “is”, from what can we 
derive it from? It seems we must have to make it up, and thus enter the world of 
delusion. Not so. The essentialist tradition going back to Aristotle has always 
deduced the “ought to be” from the “is”. And that is to conceive the “is” as composed 
of natural essences. Thus Hegel and Marx are able to locate the ideal within the real, 
conceiving the future as an immanent society in the process of becoming actual.  
Those who allege elitism, privileged access to knowledge and totalitarianism are 
simply wrong, badly wrong. The reverse is true. It is because of the possession of 
innate capacities and natural essences that human beings are protected from total 
manipulation and management on the part of external agencies.  
It is only because of this connection at the level of essence that it is possible for 
philosophy to lead every thinking person from the world of the “is” to what “ought to 
be.” We need the courage to hold our nerve and not retreat before this ascent. No-
one and nothing else can take that journey for us. That’s why Kant called upon us to 
have the courage to use our reason. To retreat from the ascent is to fall back into the 
world of empirical inclination, impulse and desire. To ascend to the “ought to be” of 
the moral law, Kant needed the fact of conscience as something that existed within 
the realm of the “is”. 
 
And that implies innateness and essentialism, human beings as something 
essentially and as essentially something, something more substantial than cultural – 
even worse, political – creations. This essentialist conception has been lost in 
modern times. Take Richard Evans’ review of Eric Hobsbawm’s Fractured Times. 
(The International Man by Richard J Evans, Review Saturday Guardian 
23.03.13). In two large introductory columns Evans argues the case for 
Hobsbawm as the ‘most celebrated historian of the 20th century, not just in 
Britain but all over the world.’ His major works remain in print, he has honorary 
degrees and awards and prizes from all over the world. ‘There are many 
reasons why Hobsbawm managed to achieve such worldwide eminence and 
popularity’, claims Evans. ‘Clearly Hobsbawm owed much of this to his lifelong 
adherence to Marxism, which in his hands was a subtle and flexible tool for 
organising and interpreting historical material.’ It was from Marxism that 
Hobsbawm learned to ses the connections between the discrete events of 
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history and set them in a wider context. ‘His ability to see the big picture and 
devise a framing concept to sort out the diverse and unruly detail of history was 
breathtaking,’ writes Evans. He is right. Except, in the very next passage, Evans 
sounds the retreat. ‘Marxism did, it is true, lend much of his work a teleological 
flavour that is no longer to our taste in the post-Marxist world.’ So what if 
teleology is no longer in fashion? That inability to engage in teleological thinking 
is precisely the reason why, with a wealth of information and knowledge before 
us, our thinkers and intellectuals can only write of meaninglessness and 
delusion. They remain on the surface level of discrete events and therefore 
cannot find any interlinking purpose, any direction, any overall meaning. They 
are sceptics of the structures who have become the sycophants of the surface.  
 
The same copy of The Guardian carried an interview with Noam Chomsky (A 
Life of Protest, The Saturday Interview, Aida Edemariam, The Guardian 23 
March 2013). Chomsky is worth discussing at length, since his work in 
linguistics proceeds from a very distinct philosophical viewpoint, the rationalist 
tradition that I am defending in this book. This rationalism is today considered 
controversial, but it possesses a long and distinguished heritage and, in 
Chomsky, possesses one of its greatest exponents.  
 
Chomsky’s breakthrough as a linguist came with the argument that, 
contrary to the prevailing idea that children learned language by copying 
and by reinforcement (i.e. behaviourism), basic grammatical 
arrangements are already present at birth. Published in 1957, Chomsky’s 
Syntactic Structures defined linguistics for the rest of the century. 
Chomsky's concern is with language learning and the 'syntactic 
structures' that underlie different languages. But his views have wider 
moral and political implications which show the strength of essentialism 
and innateness. Chomsky’s social and political commentaries, in which he 
criticises totalitarian power and politics, are informed by the same 
rationalist philosophical assumptions. 
 
Chomsky's work in linguistics is predicated on a rationalist theory of mind. 
The empiricist tradition emanating from Locke holds that the mind is a blank 
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slate, a 'tabula rasa', at birth. Against this, Chomsky argues that the mind is 
constrained in its operations by certain innate structures. For Chomsky, all 
languages share, at a fundamental level, a universal structure, or grammar. 
Rather than being something that is learnt through teaching and experience, 
as in the empiricist tradition, this universal grammar is 'hardwired' in our 
brains. 
 
The idea of a universal grammar may be explained thus. Although there 
are some 5,000 known varieties of human language, they are all constrained 
by certain parameters above and beyond their many surface differences. 
These principles are innate, and unique, to the human mind. The grammatical 
rules are hardwired in the mind and do not need to be learned. The early 
exposure to language merely acts as a trigger and the child develops a 
linguistic competence at an accelerated rate. 
 
For Chomsky, this hardwiring is an aspect of our human nature. And this 
applies to our other cognitive faculties. 
 
The argument that there is such a thing as an innate linguistic structure, and 
by extension an innate moral grammar, is an essentialist argument. Chomsky’s 
argument revolutionised linguistics, but had fundamental implications for our 
notions of the human mind and human nature.  
 
Chomsky’s view has political implications. Those brought up on the 
idea that we choose our existence over against our essence are inclined 
to see these ideas of innateness as implying a biological or natural 
determinism.  
Atomists and empiricists can only see necessity in the form of determinism in 
such arguments. They embrace the illusion that human life and culture can 
proceed apart from foundations and can therefore be ‘made-up’ in some way. It 
is the old existentialist conceit and supports a superficially libertarian rhetoric, 
the idea that one can choose one’s identity. But it’s an illusion, and a potentially 
inhuman one at that. Such a view confines human beings to the surface level of 
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appearance and accident, frustrating inherent potentialities for a better, richer 
life. It also permits external agencies, the state, business, the military, to 
intervene and shape a pliable human nature this way or that to fit  
 
Human beings end up serving ends which are external to them – economic 
growth, military conquest, state power etc. There are now developments in 
biotechnology which are encouraging scientists with a commercial interest 
claiming that we can engineer the future. They mean that they intend to 
engineer human beings. Such a notion is entirely comprehensible if we deny the 
idea of human essences and innate structures. 
 
And here we see the damage that an atomist and empiricist metaphysics has 
done. Anti-foundationalist libertarians and feminists have been potty trained to 
see structures and essences as determinist constraints on freedom, so they 
choose the arbitrary freedom of surface level events. And thus walk straight into 
the new behaviourism that is emerging with human and planetary engineering. 
Constructing identities whilst being chained to empirical desire and impulse is 
an illusory freedom. It’s the easiest to understand and the easiest to attain for a 
reason – it’s already under our noses as the world of appearance. 
 
Edemariam has no idea how to deal with the bedrock of Chomsky’s 
argument that there are such things as innate structures. She writes that the 
idea of an innate capacity ‘has interesting, even troubling ramifications for his 
politics. If we are born with innate structures of linguistic and by extension moral 
thought, isn't this a kind of determinism that denies political agency? What is the 
point of arguing for any change at all?’ 
 
As though the existence of innate structures yields a passive 
determinism that denies change and agency. The argument completely 
misses the fact that an innate moral grammar, for instance, remains a 
moral position, implying the capacity to identify and choose between right 
and wrong, good and bad, and to assume responsibility and act. In fine, 
there is nothing passive or inevitable about the possession of a nature or 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
281 
an innate capacity. The nature has to be realised, the capacity has to be 
used.  
Many have become so accustomed to Popper’s ignorant liberal assau lt on 
Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx as totalitarian ‘enemies of the open society’, 
that they no longer see the philosophical issues at stake. An essentialist 
metaphysics is all about change, but change that proceeds in a necessary way 
according to the realisation of inherent potentialities. That is precisely what 
flourishing is all about. That is precisely why Marx argued for a social order that 
enhanced the human ontology rather than inhibited it, that is why Marx 
demanded a social order that corresponded to creative human nature rather 
than contradicted it, that is why Marx repudiated the autonomy-impairing and 
denying structures of the capital system as a dehumanisation and a 
determinism. And Marx did so in the name of a revolutionary-critical praxis that 
placed the accent on creative human agency. Here we see the high price we are 
now paying for the excesses of post-modernism and post-structuralism, the 
inflation of discourse and the replacement of class struggle with identity politics. 
The left no longer has a moral and intellectual language and so cannot see 
beyond the slogans of the surface. Chomsky makes short work of Edemariam’s 
objections. 
 
"The most libertarian positions accept the same view." he answers. "That 
there are instincts, basic conditions of human nature that lead to a preferred 
social order. In fact, if you're in favour of any policy - reform, revolution, stability, 
regression, whatever - if you're at least minimally moral, it's because you think 
it's somehow good for people. And good for people means conforming to their 
fundamental nature. So whoever you are, whatever your position is, you're 
making some tacit assumptions about fundamental human nature... The 
question is: what do we strive for in developing a social order that is conducive 
to fundamental human needs? Are human beings born to be servants to 
masters, or are they born to be free, creative individuals who work with others to 
inquire, create, develop their own lives? I mean, if humans were totally 
unstructured creatures, they would be ... a tool which can properly be shaped by 
outside forces. That's why if you look at the history of what's called radical 
behaviourism, [where] you can be completely shaped by outside forces - when 
[the advocates of this] spell out what they think society ought to be, it's 
totalitarian." 
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The charge of determinism or totalitarianism can be thrown back against the 
existentialists. This idea that we may choose our existence over against our 
essence may sound liberatory, certainly if it is the individual agent doing the 
choosing. But that’s the point, in a world of supra-individual forces, the 
individual is always set within a context of collective powers and beliefs and 
norms. If existence prevails over essence, then there is nothing to stop an 
external agency, a state, a political movement, an organisation of any kind, 
mobilising to manipulate and manage an individual according to purposes which 
are external to them. This external manipulation is entirely possible if the 
individual human being is merely the blank sheet of Lockean empiricism, or the 
unconstrained free agent of existentialism. For Chomsky, it is the fact that we 
possess a nature that prevents us from being subjugated by external forces and 
directed by anything other than our own purposes. Our innate, essential nature 
is our best protection against tyranny and totalitarianism. The range of possible 
political structures that we can tolerate is limited. Those who still cling to the 
idea of freedom as some unconstrained choice may reject this view as narrow. 
But if the view rules out some of the more fanciful utopias of the human mind, it 
also checks oppressive political systems, such as Orwell's 1984 or Huxley's 
Brave New World. In constraining us to realities, the rationalist view has the 
merit of focusing on the realisation of our natures, as against the libertarian and 
repressive fantasies that lead us astray. The point is that external agencies, 
whatever their political colours, cannot completely mould our minds, however 
much they may try. In an era of all manner of biological determinisms, from 
behaviourism to neuro-Darwinism, the concept of innate rationalism needs to be 
recovered as our best defence against tyranny. Our thoughts are not, as 
behavioural psychologists had argued, conditioned responses to repeated 
stimuli. Now we have neuroscientists arguing that they have ‘explained’ the 
processes of the human mind. So what? The philosopher John Searle’s 
question to neuro-determinists and reductionists remains unanswered: 'How is it 
possible for physical, objective, quantitatively describable neuron firings to 
cause qualitative, private, subjective experiences?' (Searle 1995.)  
 
Innateness comes with uniqueness, and that is what gives human beings 
autonomy in thought, morality and politics. And here we appreciate the political 
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implications of Chomsky’s linguistics. The concept of being a 'free agent' is as 
hardwired into our nature as the constraints that act on our forms of speech. Those 
who would denounce this belief as a delusion are working against innate human 
nature, seeking to diminish or destroy the very capacity that protects us against 
external manipulation.  
Chomsky's linguistic theory can therefore be developed in the social, political and 
moral landscape. The nature of language reveals the nature of the human mind, not 
simply in the sense that language is a uniquely human activity, but because language 
'is the vehicle of thought' and therefore uniquely placed to illuminate the essence of 
the human mind. By 'mind', Chomsky means the cognitive principles and processes 
that underlie human behaviour. 
 
Chomsky’s 'innatist' theory is part of a tradition which goes back to Plato’s innate 
ideas and embraces such key figures of philosophy as Leibniz, Descartes, and Kant. 
According to this philosophy, the human mind is endowed with innate ideas or 
categories that shape who and what we are, what we can know. With the dominance 
of mechanical materialism and atomist and empiricist methods, this tradition has 
been neglected. Detached from realities grounded in innate ideas and essential 
natures, human beings have entered the realm of fantasy and fiction and, mistaking 
this madness for freedom, have shot for the stars. The tradition of organic, 
essentialist rationalism will pull us back to realities and focus us upon the realisation 
of real purposes. Essentialism is a constraint in the healthiest sense, ruling out 
fantasies and focusing us upon genuine potentialities. Essentialism points us the 
direction of an emancipated society which corresponds to the free and full realisation 
of our nature.  
 
In complete contrast to the essentialist conception, an atomist metaphysics sees 
change only in terms of discrete 'events', which together have no overall meaning or 
direction. Change is just accidental change, leading nowhere particularly or 
essentially.  
 
Since the scientific and industrial revolutions, atomist and empiricist thought has 
been in the ascendant, with essentialist categories coming to be 
misunderstood, distorted, caricatured, and rejected accordingly. The mandarins 
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of politics and culture have a vested interest in the world being complicated rather 
than simple, all discrete events with no connecting thread or meaning. With an 
atomist metaphysics, the world is broken up into discrete entities, made the 
possession of the bureaucrat. In the same manner that a pretentious savant will 
prefer to put ‘the truth’ in inverted commas and rendered unsayable and left 
unsaid. When it comes to the inflation of discourse, the grandiloquent language 
conceals the paucity of thought. And there is a political dimension to this 
bureaucratisation of knowledge under an atomist metaphysics. The denial of real 
essences in favour of a view which sees the world as the accidental occurrence of 
discrete events suits those who wish to see, manage and manipulate reality and 
human beings as they see fit. Terry Eagleton exposes the potential for 
manipulation that exists in the post-structuralist view that there is 'no necessary 
relation’ between economic position and political and ideological positions. He 
comments wryly that the idea that there is 'no logical connection whatsoever' 
between class position and the political/ideological means that it is wholly 
coincidental that all capitalists are not also revolutionary socialists. (Eagleton 1991: 
214). This denial of necessary relations leaves politics and ideology free to 
determine all that there is. The material world, it appears, does not exist until it is 
defined into existence; it is clay in the hands of the politicians and the 
intellectuals. 
 
Eagleton thus exposes the determinism that is implicit in the anti-essentialist 
position. ‘If the working class has no interests derived from its socio-economic 
conditions, then there is nothing in this class to resist its being politically or ideologically 
'constructed' in various ways. All that resists my own political construction of the class 
is someone else's. The working class, or for that matter any other subordinate group, 
thus becomes clay in the hands of those wishing to coopt it into some political 
strategy, tugged this way and that between socialists and fascists.’ (Eagleton 1991: 
214). 
 
An essentialist position that can reveal what capital and labour are, can reveal the 
fundamental nature of social relations and forms, can show that workers’ interests 
necessarily entail socialism. But the argument that workers have no necessary 
interests, only those interests they are 'constructed' into, cannot explain why workers 
should bother to become socialists rather than, say, fascists. An essentialist 
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metaphysics sees necessary relations and lines of development leading workers to 
pursue the realisation of the inherent potentials of creative labour in a society of the 
associated producers. Without that conception of necessity – which is not a 
determinism, which entails creative human agency in actualising potentials – the 
working class will become socialists only when their existing identities have been 
transformed by the process of becoming socialist. But, Eagleton asks, how would 
they ever come to embark on this process? ‘For there is nothing in their conditions 
now which provides the slightest motivation for it. The future political selves they 
might attain have no relation whatsoever to their present socio-economic ones. There 
is merely a blank disjunction between them, as there is for those Humean 
philosophers for whom what I was at the age of twenty has no relation at all to what I 
shall be at the age of sixty.’ (Eagleton 1991: 215).  
 
An essentialist metaphysics can provide the interest, explanation and motivation in 
that present conditions always contain an inherent potential which is to be realised. 
Eagleton asks why should someone become a socialist, feminist or anti-racist, if these 
political interests are in no sense a response to the way society is? Without an 
essentialist foundation, there is no reason at all. Eagleton reminds us that in Hindess and 
Hirst's view, society doesn’t even exist until it has come to be politically constructed in 
a certain manner. ‘Of course, once Hindess and Hirst begin to spell out why they 
themselves are socialists they will find themselves ineluctably referring to something 
very like 'the way society is'; but strictly speaking this notion is inadmissable to 
them.’ (Eagleton 1991: 215). Quite, such a notion is available only to those who 
proceed from an essentialist understanding. Without those essentialist categories, 
politics becomes a manipulation rationalised by an impotent moralism, without any 
grounding in natural essences. Such a position suits all political and intellectual 
positions which are made up and sold over the heads of people. It is an open 
invitation to the theoretico-elitist model of power and politics. Society, and the 
individuals composing the demos, become anything the bureaucrats of knowledge 
and power choose. An essentialist metaphysics is the surest guard against 
totalitarianism since, if human beings are essentially something, and something 
essentially, then however much you engineer them in one way or another, social, 
political, bio-tech, you cannot alter what that something is unless you change it. 
The same point pertains to society as essentially something, and something 
essentially. The only real change that is possible is a matter of the realisation of 
real essences, inherent potentials in the process of becoming actual. Those 
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engaged in the politics of management and manipulation - and the same applies 
to those intellectuals engaged in the ‘construction’ of perspectives and persons – 
have a vested interest in denying essential natures. The absence of essential 
natures blurs the line that separates accidental changes at the level of 
appearances from fundamental changes at the level of a deeper reality, and makes 
it possible to remain within an existing system rather than see and pursue a line of 
development that moves beyond it.  
Without essentialism, there is no possibility of developing a genuine teleological 
conception that is capable of understanding change in history. Essentialist 
metaphysics provide the categories required for identifying the nature of a system 
and for distinguishing necessary change from accidental change in a system. 
Without essentialist categories, history can only come to be understood as it appears, 
as the interplay of unrelated 'factors' and discrete events, signifying nothing. Without 
essentialist categories revealing necessary relations, we cannot see the wood for 
the trees. We end up lost within the thicket of accident, unable to see any meaning 
or direction or unity or interconnection. The bureaucrats of knowledge and power 
take control of a world that is as they say it is.  
 
The essentialist idea that there is purpose and direction in the world now stands 
condemned as an illusion born of a mythical belief in 'progress', deriving from 
religious eschatology and naïve Enlightenment rationalism. In truth, John Gray is 
saying nothing new here. Since the last blast of Hegelianism in the shape of the 
likes of the Oxford Idealists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and 
the likes of Croce in Italy, and Marxists like Gramsci and Lukacs, philosophical 
orthodoxy has been atomist and empiricist. The ‘progress’ which John Gray 
considers to be so spectacularly misfiring in the contemporary world is a product 
of this orthodoxy, not of teleological thinking at all. Organicism and essentialism 
have been systematically denigrated and destroyed, expunged from the political 
and moral and intellectual world. Karl Popper in The Open Society and its Enemies 
selected his targets well – Plato, Aristotle, Hegel and Marx. The only figure 
missing was St Thomas Aquinas. These are the key figures in the essentialist 
tradition and, as such, are the main threats to any status quo content to reside in 
the realm of appearance. Essentialists are habitually accused of reasoning 
according to a 'biological analogy', meaning that the categories which are 
appropriate to natural forms come to be applied illicitly to human society and 
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history. This is plain wrong and merely reveals that the critics are simply ignorant of 
Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel and Marx. That direct biological analogy is precisely what 
they don’t do. Essentialism is not a Social Darwinism or socio-biology, quite the 
contrary. Human agency, morality, culture etc – the subjective factor – possess a 
key creative role in realising potentials. That is why accusations of determinism 
also fail. The categories of essentialist philosophy such as law, form, matter, 
necessity entail an organic dialectics which pertain to both natural and historical 
processes of coming-to-be and passing-away within whole entities or systems, 
whether one refers to Nature, the physical universe or the social organism.  
There is still a tendency to identify Karl Marx as an economist and to read 
Capital as a work of economics. Actually, Capital, like Marx’s other works on 
economics, was a critique of political economy. Marx was not offering a 
correct economics to replace an incorrect economics. Failure to understand 
that point will continue to mislead people. Marx was engaged in a project of 
human self-knowledge, bringing the Socratic tradition of the examined life to 
its highest stage of development. Those with dominant positions within the 
social system have a vested interested in denying the possibility of such 
knowledge, certainly in denying it to those whose alienated sovereignty and labour 
forms the basis of the social system and its reproduction. So they have struck hard 
at the basis of human self-knowledge – necessary relations and lines of 
development, essentialist categories and organic dialectics. The effectiveness 
of this assault can be judged by the extent to which atomism has taken the place 
of essentialism within Marxism itself, in the form of analytic and rational choice 
marxism (Elster 1985; Cohen 1978; Roemer 1986) We can also see the 
effectiveness of the atomist assault in the linguistic turn in philosophy and cultural 
studies, in the way that identity politics has encouraged a narcissism of differences 
to the neglect of universal themes.  
 
In January 1997, Chomsky gave a talk at a conference in Washington DC entitled 
The Common Good. Chomsky based his talk on Aristotle's Politics, ‘the foundation 
of most subsequent political theory.’ Chomsky explains what the talk was about: 
 
Aristotle took it for granted that a democracy should be fully participatory (with 
some notable exceptions, like women and slaves) and that it should aim for the 
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common good. In order to achieve that, it has to ensure relative equality, 
"moderate and sufficient property" and "lasting prosperity" for everyone.  
In other words, Aristotle felt that if you have extremes of poor and rich, you can't 
talk seriously about democracy. Any true democracy has to be what we call 
today a welfare state—actually, an extreme form of one, far beyond anything 
envisioned in this century. (When I pointed this out at a press conference in 
Majorca, the headlines in the Spanish papers read something like, If Aristotle 
were alive today, he'd be denounced as a dangerous radical. That's probably 
true.) 
 
Chomsky 2012: 209 
 
That is true. Witness Karl Popper’s tendentious assault on Aristotle as one of the 
‘totalitarian’ enemies of the ‘open’ society. (The charge is that Aristotle is not a liberal. 
So what? How ‘open’ is a society that cannot tolerate criticisms of the liberal position?) 
It’s not that Aristotle was a ‘dangerous radical’, it’s just that the people in charge of the 
business and politics of the world have gone to extremes. Aristotle was a man of 
moderation, proposing universalistic values which are firmly grounded in natural 
essences. 
 
Eric Hobsbawm emphasised that universalistic values are crucial to the project of 
the Left. He asked what the turn to identity politics implied, given that the political 
project of the Left is genuinely inclusive in extending emancipation to all. Hobsbawm 
argued that the Left, given its universal agenda, cannot base itself on identity politics 
as such. 'Now the wider agenda of the Left does, of course, mean it supports many 
identity groups .. and they, in turn look to the Left.. What united them was the hunger 
for equality and social justice, and a programme believed capable of advancing both' 
(Hobsbawm NLR 217 May/June 1996:43/4). Social justice and equality are universal 
themes, they incorporate identities but do not reduce to them. There is, in other 
words, such a thing as the common interest and this defines the Left in politics as 
something other than an identity politics. Hobsbawm thus fears the 'increasing 
tendency' 'to see the Left essentially as a coalition of minority groups and interests' 
(Hobsbawm NLR 217 May/June 1996:44). He points out the dangers. The 'danger of 
disintegrating into a pure alliance of minorities is unusually great on the Left because 
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the decline of the great universalising slogans of the Enlightenment, which were 
essentially slogans of the Left, leaves it without any obvious way of formulating a 
common interest across sectional boundaries. The only one of the so-called 'new 
social movements' which crosses all such boundaries is that of the ecologists. But, 
alas, its political appeal is limited and likely to remain so' (Hobsbawm NLR 217 
May/June 1996:45).  
 
In this respect, Gitlin asks a pertinent question: ‘What is a Left if it is not, plausibly 
at least, the voice of the whole people? ... If there is no people, but only peoples, there is 
no Left’ (Gitlin 1995:165).  
Common interests, common dreams, universal themes – the common good. We 
can see now how right Hobsbawm was. Universal values are crucial to the project of 
the Left. A congeries of sectional interests and constructed identities is no basis for a 
common life based on universal values. So what, comes the reply of those content 
within the politics of difference. It means that a superficial liberty at the level of 
accident and appearance has been exchanged for a deeper, richer freedom that 
comes through the realisation of the social essence of human beings. The challenge 
is to realise universal values within a common good in such a way as to incorporate 
plural social identities. And my point is that without an essentialist metaphysics, there 
is no possibility of distinguishing appearance from reality, accidental change from 
necessary change. We remain content with a superficial made-up libertarianism 
through the assertion of identities. A genuine freedom requires that we move beyond 
constructed identities to the realisation of the inherent potentials within essential 
natures, most of all those contained in the nature of the whole social organism.  
I would argue that the plausibility of the atomist view in the contemporary age is 
due not to some general ‘delusion of progress’, whether Christian or secular (with 
respect to the promises of industry, economic growth and technology) but to a bad 
and bogus teleology deriving from the alienation of social power, the inversion of 
subject and object, ends and means, and from the frustration of necessary lines of 
development. The solution to modernist delusions is not to abandon ‘progress’ and 
ideas of patterns and directions in history, but to recover a genuine essentialist 
metaphysics and to start doing progress right. Progress is more that economic growth, 
scientific advance and technological innovation. That is the false teleology that is 
inevitably misfiring in the modern world. That is not a case for abandoning teleology 
but for recovering the telos of historical development as the necessary realisation of 
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inherent potentials, necessary, that is, in the sense of an entity completing itself 
by turning potential into actual.  
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16 ESSENTIALISM, PURPOSE AND HUMAN AGENCY 
 
As the creations of human agency come to be invested with existential 
significance, the human creators come to be divested of subjectivity. ‘Things’ 
come to acquire a living quality independent of human beings. Capital and the 
state, money, commodities etc are the new gods and come to develop an 
independent existence as powers in their own right. The teleology identified by the 
likes of John Gray as a delusion is in fact the external determinism imposed by 
these new idols. But this is not teleology at work here at all. Telos, purpose, is 
something proper to a natural essence and its realisation, and it is precisely this that 
has been replaced by imperatives and functions, particularly the accumulative logic of 
capital. Instead of the potentials of essences and their realisation, ‘things’ have 
acquired an existential significance and, in the process, replaced purposes with 
functions and imperatives. 
With great irony, the rejection of ‘progress’ as the rejection of teleology returns us to 
the false essentialism in which capitalist social relations and forms – the very things 
which lie behind the secular myth of (industrial, technological) progress - come to be 
naturalised, rendered inevitable and permanent. Rather than see the end of the capital 
system, the end of history is asserted, and the future becomes no more than the 
present enlarged. With a genuine essentialist metaphysics, Marx can see a way out of 
the impasse of bourgeois delusions by identifying a proper end of history. Instead of 
naturalising historically specific capitalist relations, Marx explained the power of 
objectified labour to be the social power of labour in alienated form. In other words, 
behind any ‘delusions of progress’ lies not teleology but its denial. Rather than the 
realisation of the human essence through labour, there is the frustration of this 
essence through alienated labour. And behind this alienation lies specific social 
relations of production.  
 
Marx’s general point comes out clearly in the way that he praises Hegel in the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: 
 
The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phanomenologie . ..  lies in the fact 
that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives 
objectification as loss of object, as alienation and as transcendence 
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[supersession] of this alienation; that he therefore grasps the essence of labour 
and conceives objective man — true, because real man — as the result of his 
own labour. The real, active relation of man to himself as a species-being, or the 
realization of himself as a real species-being, i.e. as a human being, is only 
possible if he really employs all his species-powers -which again is only possible 
through the cooperation of mankind and as a result of history - and treats them as 
objects, which is at first only possible in the form of estrangement.  
 
Marx EW EPM 1975: 386-387 
 
The human essence has a history. That is, natural essence is not a passive, 
given state, fixed for all times, but is developed through social relations. The 
argument that essentialism entails a determinism is simply false.  
This passage makes it clear that Marx is concerned with alienation as a 
denial of the essence of a thing, labour, and that any genuine ‘progress’ has to 
be conceived in terms of the ‘transcendence of this alienation’ and the realisation 
of this essence. That is precisely what is denied by capitalist relations of 
production and that is precisely why the promises of salvation contained in the 
secular mythology of progress misfire. That is the case not for abandoning 
teleology but for abandoning its fetishised form within capitalist social relations of 
production, in which social production is subordinated to the private appropriation 
and accumulation of surplus value, the alienated form of surplus labour. 
The secular myth may have the appearance of Christian salvation, but it has none 
of the reality.  
The delusions of progress are not accidental, but neither are they the result of 
teleology in its proper sense. Rather, they are determined by the alienated character 
of the social relations of production, whose reproduction is mediated through the 
indirect supply of social labour through the value form. That alien mediation 
frustrates the realisation of necessary lines of development and it is that  frustration 
which lies behind the destructive fantasies and illusions at the heart of the secular 
myth of progress.  
In fine, it is the domination of an atomist and empiricist metaphysics which has 
denied us the essentialist categories which alone can make sense of human social 
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development through history and which gives us a secular mythology in the 
absence of a genuine teleology. General references to some purpose at work in 
history is neither here nor there as either description or criticism. This is to take the 
fake teleology at work in an alienated world at face value. 
 
The form of teleology that Marx, in line of descent from Aristotle, uses is not an 
occultism in which some hidden force acts causally upon events, nor is it a 
superstition in which change is the fulfilment of the design of Providence. Rather, it 
is a philosophical position solidly grounded in the fact that whole entities or 
organisms have essential natures and hence have potentials to be realised and 
lines of development to be furthered. Such teleology entails no supra-historical or 
supra-natural force since in fully coming-to-be, these entities or organisms are simply 
realising the potentials which are inherent in their natures. Immanence and 
transcendence are joined together in the existence of potentials and the realisation of 
potentials. 
Of course, atomistic metaphysics cannot discern a pattern in history, and of 
course, the functions and imperatives of alienated powers cannot redeem their 
promises of progress. What we have here is something that is neither fish nor 
fowl, a secular mythology that has appropriated the form of teleology but, 
inverting means and ends, object and subject, has none of the essentialist 
content. That is why the secular myth cannot deliver the progress it promises, 
only extend the nihilistic cycle of means being accumulated for the sake of 
further means. As philosopher Ross Poole argues, the instrumental rationality of 
the capital system ‘is concerned with production for the sake of further 
production, consumption for the sake of further consumption, and above all, 
profit for the sake of further profit. In other words, it is concerned not with ends 
in themselves, but with ends insofar as they may be used to pursue further 
ends.’ (Poole 1991: ch 4). And that is a nihilism in that it is endless, it lacks 
moral ends. It is world in which means have come to be enlarged to take the 
place of ends. That is the dis-godded world of modernity analysed by Max 
Weber. 
Atomism and empiricism gives us a bad teleology that is congenitally 
incapable of fulfilling its promises of freedom and happiness through economic 
growth, incapable of delivering salvation, precisely because it is divorced from 
the essential natures and potentials that alone give content to telos. The 
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solution to the bad teleology behind the delusions of progress is not the 
rejection of teleology as such but the rejection of an atomist metaphysics and 
the alienated social relations that are its accompaniment, and the development 
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17 ARISTOTLE AND ESSENTIALISM 
 
Essentialism is Aristotelian in origin: ‘What each thing is when fully developed, 
we call its nature’ (Aristotle). It follows that each thing is to be fully developed, 
completed, in accordance with its nature. This is a necessary development. A thing 
is an organism which has a telos, a purpose, which is to be fully developed in order 
to realise its nature. This telos forms the basis of a genuine teleology. 
Aristotle's philosophy is infused by essentialist categories. This is what lies 
behind his view that 'poetry is a more philosophical and serious thing than 
history, as it speaks rather of the general history rather of the particular'. In the 
various histories of his day, Aristotle found nothing general, merely accounts of 
particular events that took place in certain times and places, with nothing to 
connect them together. All that there was was chance or accident, and for 
Aristotle this formed no basis for science. In Aristotle’s view, 'what happens always 
or for the most part' happens, not fortuitously, but 'by nature'. (Physics 2. 
198b33ff).  
Things happen by virtue of some essential nature whose reality is 
manifested by the fact that certain kinds of thing tend to happen 'always or for 
the most part'. For Aristotle, then, science reveals essential forms, natures or 
'causes', the very things he found to be lacking in the histories of his day. 
Whereas history dealt with particularity, science dealt with generality in the 
particular. For Aristotle, 'we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause' 
(Post. An. 71b30f) and 'the general is honoured because it reveals the cause.' 
(Post. An. 88a5) In other words, to have scientific knowledge we must look for 
the general and identify a line of necessity with a view to revealing the cause. 
Such an approach is possible only with a view of a whole organism in whose 
development according to its nature (ergon or telos) the necessity lies. 
 
In the Politics, Aristotle sets out his essentialist methodology in the clearest 
terms: 'He who considers things in their first growth and origin, whether of a state 
or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. (Politics 1.1252a24.) 
 
Aristotle’s approach can be compared to Plato who, when seeking to discern 
the truth of a thing, would first look to the general and then to the particular. 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
297 
Thus, to discover the true nature of political and social justice, Plato argued that it is 
necessary to ‘first look for its quality in states, and then only examine it also in the 
individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less’ (Plato, 
Republic, trans. Paul Shorey, in Hamilton and Cairns, eds., Collected Dialogues, 
368e-369a). In similar fashion, Immanuel Kant tended to state his argument in the 
architectonic form: 'there is yet another consideration which is more 
philosophical and architectonic in character; namely to grasp the idea of the 
whole correctly and thence to view all parts in their mutual relations' (Preface to 
the Critique of Practical Reason).  
 
Such views can only be understood in the essentialist and organicist sense of 
relating the parts to the whole organism.  
 
The categories of atomist and essentialist thought are completely incompatible, 
but without being aware of it, the critics of the delusions of progress are attempting to 
read teleology in terms of the atomism and empiricism which is all they understand. 
This is profoundly anti-essentialist. It is not surprising, then, that the result is a 
doom-mongering pessimism with no way of avoiding the end of the world. If 
John Gray has an alternative, I have yet to hear it, other than a letting go of 
the self and of striving in favour of some blissful immanence. I’m not sure that 
that is the correct reading of nature and I’m certain it makes no sense of 
human striving and yearning. A closer examination reveals that the problem is 
not teleology but its appropriation by an alienated system of production and its 
presentation of theological assumptions and teleological categories as a 
secular myth of progress. There is no purpose at work here, only systemic 
imperatives, there is no end point here, only the endless accumulative dynamic 
of capital, and there is no progress, only more of the same in greater 
quantities on a planet of finite resources. Whatever else the capital system is, 
it has nothing to do with the realisation of potentials, with the unfolding of 
natural essences and with the fulfilment of human social nature.  
 
The problem is not teleology but mechanicism and atomism. This comes 
out clearly when comparing contractarian political thought to the ancient 
conception of politics as creative human self-realisation. Plato’s discussion with 
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Adeimantus in Book 2 of the Republic, concerning the ‘first principles of social 
organisation’ (Plato, Republic 369b-371e). makes it clear that the ancients 
considered co-operation among individuals as social beings to be the basis of the 
state, ensuring a more efficient and abundant supply of physical goods, 'the provision 
of food ... shelter ... clothing of various kinds'. ‘'Quantity and quality are therefore 
more easily produced when a man specializes appropriately on a single job for 
which he is naturally fitted, and neglects all others.' 
 
That's certainly true.' 
 
'We shall need more than four citizens, then, Adeimantus, to supply the needs 
we mentioned. For the farmer, it seems, will not make his own plough or hoe, or 
any of his other agricultural implements, if they are to be well made. The same is 
true of the builder and the many tools he needs, and of the weaver and 
shoemaker.' (Plato 1987:61/2). 
And so on and so forth, as Plato proceeds to build the state out of the human 
need for cooperation. This is part of the realisation of the human essence. 
Aristotle took the discussion beyond such humdrum and utilitarian justification to 
present the case for human association in terms of the good life. Aristotle therefore 
made the telos of human association central to his practical philosophy. For Aristotle, 
'a state's purpose is not merely to provide a living but to make a life that is good'. 
The state provides something more than 'a military pact of protection against 
injustice' in a society concerned with the 'exchange of goods'. The state is not 
morally neutral but is directly concerned with 'the virtue and vice of the citizens'. 
Without the conception of the good 'the association is a mere military alliance .. and 
law .. a mere agreement', 'a mutual guarantor of justice' which is 'unable to make 
citizens good and just' (P Ill.ix 1981:196). 
For Aristotle, the telos of human association (or the state) is to make citizens 
good and just. Human beings are zoon politikons, social beings, requiring a politkon 
bion or public life to realise their potentialities. The state is the larger community of 
the smaller communities, all formed with a view of the good in mind. Human 
association, from the lowest level upwards, is about the higher provision of 'the good 
life' in order to realise the potentialities inherent in the essence of man. (Politics 1252b29). 
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The great achievement of Hegel and Marx is to have located this unfolding of the 
telos of human association within the historical process as the realisation of inherent 
potentiality of human beings as social and rational beings. There is, in other words, 
a telos of human history, in that history is the unfolding of human purpose. 
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18 HEGEL AND THE TELOS OF HISTORY 
 
As against the dominant categories of mechanicism and atomism, Hegel’s 
dialectical philosophy is firmly based upon Aristotelian categories of essentialism 
and organicism. Hegel’s great achievement is to have developed essentialist 
categories into dialectical form. Marx praised the advance that Hegel made here: ‘It is 
a great step forward to have seen that the political state is an organism and that, 
therefore, its various powers are no longer to be seen as organic but as the product 
of living, rational divisions of functions.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975:67). The various 
aspects of the constitution, the various state powers are related organically and 
rationally to each other. This, Marx writes, is a tautology. It may be. But it is an 
essentialist conception in which the parts are understood in relation to each 
other and in relation to the whole. In other words, although Marx’s point here is 
specific, his argument implies a general significance. 
 
Hegel's philosophy is infused by essentialist Aristotelian categories from first to 
last, although he applies them to history and to society to a greater extent than did 
Aristotle. Indeed, there is a strong case for arguing that Marx’s own Aristotelianism 
came more from his reading than from Aristotle.  
 
Hegel advances a number of Aristotelian and essentialist theses.  
 
1) Hegel affirmed that law and order rather than chance is the basis of 
phenomena. Hegel criticises Epicurus 'who ascribed all events to 
chance'. (Hegel 1953: 14). And whilst Anaxagoras thought the world to be 
lawlike, in Hegel’s view 'he did not apply the universal to the concrete. (Hegel 
1953: 13/4) Hegel praises Socrates for taking the first step of comprehending 
the union of the concrete and the universal'. (Hegel 1953: 15). 
2) Hegel conceives the form of law in terms of the realisation of potentialities 
in a whole organism which possesses an essence in which those potentialities 
inhere. 'A principle, a law is something implicit, which ... is not completely 
real (actual) ... not yet in reality ... a possibility.’ (Hegel 1953: 27). 
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3) The phenomena of history arise from a whole which possesses an 
essence which has an end or telos and undergoes transformation of form. 
The essence of history is 'that freedom of spirit (which) is the very essence 
of man's nature', (Hegel 1953: 24) and the telos of world history is 'the 
actualisation of this freedom' which Hegel identified as 'the final purpose of 
the world'. (Hegel 1953: 15). Hegel conceives history as 'the union of 
freedom and necessity. We consider the inner development of the Spirit ... 
as necessary, while we refer to freedom the interests contained in men's 
conscious volitions. (Hegel 1953: 31). Necessity is immanent in the line of 
development in which a nature attains fulfilment or completion by realising 
its potential. We may call that freedom or flourishing.  
 
The realisation of essential potentialities within the whole organism brings about 
the union of the concrete and the universal, necessity and freedom. This is the 
resolution of the dialectic of immanence and transcendence. It is this that allows us to 
ground progress in realities rather than fantasies, natural purposes rather than 
technical powers. 
 
World history passes through stages and each stage has its own 'principle' or 
law. A higher level of human consciousness of freedom is attained at each of these 
teleological stages. (Hegel 1953: 70). Hegel is frequently accused of having 
proposed a Reason operating behind the backs of individuals in history. Hegel 
certainly argues that individual actions can produce consequences they had not 
intended but which move history on further, which is a very different notion. In 
historian E.P. Thompson’s apposite phrase, that refers to history as an 
unmastered practice. That is the very thing that Hegel, and Marx after him, is 
trying to overcome. Hegel offers a way of achieving the mastery of historical 
practice. And this highlights the creative role of conscious human agency. For 
Hegel, for the potentiality of an essence to become actual, 'a second element 
must be added ... namely activity, actualisation', and this is human will, passion 
and interest. Hegel thus argues that 'the main efficient causation' behind the 
movement of history are 'the actions of men (which) spring from their needs, their 
passions, their interests ...'. (Hegel 1953: 26).  Hegel therefore values creative 
human agency in the historical process. There is no purpose here which is 
detached from human beings and their actions, interests, wills, passions etc.  
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There is no distance at all from here to Marx's view that human beings are 
able to adapt society to themselves in order to realise inherent human potentials, 
rather than adapting to society (or to unmediated nature and its imperatives). This 
social self-mediation overcomes the split between transcendence in the sense of  
a Megamachine detached from Nature, and immanence in the sense of a purely 
physical Nature. Aristotle’s Politikon Bion, Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, Marx’s truly human 
society entail human beings as social, moral and rational beings consciously 
determining their ends over against the requirements and imperatives of some 
wider entity, whether this is Nature or a social metabolic order of alien control 
which frustrates the human essence, even though it is a human creation. The end 
of an essentialist metaphysics is a social order which corresponds to rather than 
contradicts the human ontology, and such an order is the truly human society 
achieved by the realisation of the social essence of human beings. 
The necessary line of development entailed by essentialism is not direct and 
unmediated, but mediated by human praxis and therefore frustratable.  
Hegel distinguishes between natural and historical change in terms of the 
different manner in which organic categories apply in human society and in 
organic nature. 'Change in nature, no matter how infinitely varied it is, shows only 
a constant cycle of repetition. In nature nothing new happens ... one and the 
same permanent character continuously reappears, and all change reverts to it.' 
(Hegel 1953: 68). Again, Hegel’s teleological conception values creative human 
agency. Human will, thought, activity etc has a creative role in the realisation of 
immanent purposes. 'Only the changes in the realm of Spirit create the novel. 
This characteristic suggests to man a feature entirely different from that of 
nature - the desire towards perfectibility. This principle, which brings change itself 
under laws, has been badly received ... by states which desire as their true right to 
be static or at least stable. (Hegel 1953: 68). There is no distance at all from here 
to Marx's view that human beings are able to adapt society to themselves in order 
to realise inherent human potentials, rather than adapting to society (or nature) 
and to the requirements and imperatives of some wider entity, whether this is 
Nature or a social metabolic order which frustrates the human essence, even 
though it is a human creation. Marx is seeking a social order which corresponds to 
rather than contradicts the human ontology, and such an order is the truly human 
society achieved by the realisation of the social essence of human beings. 
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The historical development of human beings is a much more complex 
process than the development of organic natural entities. An essentialist 
metaphysics does not argue by way of biological analogy and is much more 
sophisticated than a socio-biology. An essentialist metaphysics recognises that 
whilst lines of development may be necessary for the realisation of potentials, 
they may be frustrated. The process of historical development is internally more 
complex than natural development, with the interplay of component forces 
capable of advancing, slowing or frustrating development in various ways. This 
reveals the dialectical aspect of the whole process. The line of necessity is not direct 
and unmediated, but mediated and frustratable. Once more, the creative role of 
human agency is emphasised by Hegel: 'The transition of its potentiality into 
actuality is mediated through consciousness and will.' (Hegel 1953: 69). The 
subjective factor is, therefore, the crucial difference between the natural and 
historical process of development. This point is worth emphasising given the 
tendency to write off teleology as a mode of thinking which sees purpose and 
direction operating independently of human agency. Not in Aristotle, not in 
Hegel, not in Marx. This accusation applies most of all to the false teleology of 
the capital system, whose imperatives are not purposes at all, only the 
determinist logic of alien powers. Here, vast processes of employment, 
investment and production operate independently of individuals, with the 
promise of salvation being made in terms of economic growth. But this is neither 
the Judaeo-Christian eschatology nor essentialist teleology, merely what the 
capitalist world offers in the absence of either - the secular myth of progress, 
theological and teleological assumptions detached from purposes and attached 
to functions and imperatives. It’s a world of false gods and false idols, false 
fixities and determinisms, false promises. It’s a world organised around capital’s 
endless process of accumulation. 
 
The criticism also applies to those who see development purely in terms of 
biological nature. Again, that does not apply to the essentialism in the tradition of 
Aristotle, only to those who would collapse humanity back into natural cycles and 
physical causality. Essentialism is not a socio-biology or Social Darwinism, it 
emphasises the creative moral agency and praxis of human beings.  
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Hegel shows how immanence and transcendence relate in an essentialist 
metaphysics. A nature is not preserved through history, it is developed through 
successive forms. 'If we consider the genus as the substantial in this 
transformation, then the death of the individual is a falling back of the genus into 
individuality. The preservation of the genus is then nothing but the monotonous 
repetition of the same kind of existence.' (Hegel 1953: 93). 
With respect to historical development, the situation is much more complex: 
 
a moral whole [by which Hegel means the state as an organism] as such, is 
limited. It must have above it a higher universality which makes it disunited in 
itself. The transition from one spiritual pattern to the next is just this, that the 
former moral whole, in itself a universal, through being thought (in terms of the 
higher universal), is abolished as a particular [that is, raised into the 
universal]. The latter universal, so to speak, the next higher genus of the 
preceding species, is potentially but not yet actually in the preceding one. This 
makes all existing reality unstable and disunited.  
 
Hegel 1953: 38 
 
This makes all existing reality a field of inherent potentiality in the process of 
becoming actuality. In being elevated into the universal, a species transcends its 
former state. The instability here is the contradiction between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought-
to-be’, between what exists as potential and what it is in the process of becoming. The 
‘is’ of existing reality is the ‘ought-to-be’ in the process of becoming, the potential in the 
process of becoming actual. The ‘is’ contains potential for the complete state which 
defines what a thing is. Hegel describes this potential as 'the opposite' of the 
actual, meaning that what exists contains both itself and its opposite (as potential). 
Hegel therefore proposes a dialectical process which unfolds through contradiction 
and the resolution of contradiction. Hegel does not propose some passive evolution 
which proceeds through a gradual unfolding of essences. Rather, the opposite, the 
potential, is the 'germ', 'impulse' or 'urge' within the existing world which 
generates change towards completion through the realisation of potential . 
'Possibility points towards something which shall become real; more precisely, 
the Aristotelian dynamis is also potentia, force and power.' (Hegel 1953: 71). 'The 
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Imperfect, as involving its opposite, is a contradiction, which certainly exists, but 
which is continually annulled and solved.' (Hegel 1953: 59). 
I shall shortly come to the way that Marx critically appropriated the organic 
dialectics developed by Hegel develops and employed them to expose the 
contradictory dynamics of the capital system. For the moment it is sufficient to 
note that the relation between Aristotle, Hegel and Marx in terms of an 
essentialist metaphysics is clear. The main difference lies in the understanding 
of the character and relation of natural and historical change. Further, there is 
a greater emphasis upon contradiction in Hegel and Marx, change as a 
dialectical process through history. What in Aristotle is the telos of human 
association becomes in Hegel and Marx the telos of the historical process, 
human beings acting to realise their social and rational natures. This is what 
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19 MARX’S ESSENTIALIST METAPHYSICS 
 
I want now to examine the role of immanence and transcendence in Karl 
Marx. Marx is interesting in the way that his essentialism draws on the 
Aristotelian tradition of potential becoming actual and his dialectic is based on 
the Hegelian sense of locating the ideal within the realm of the real. I also 
want to return to the question of idolatry as adumbrated earlier. Marx’s critique 
of alienation makes him very interesting on this question. Alienation is a 
condition in which the human creators come to be dominated by their own 
creations – money, capital, commodities, the state, bureaucracy etc. Human 
beings come to be reduced to the status of determined things as things come 
to acquire an existential significance. The obvious solution is to this inverted 
world is to put subject and object back in their right places. Marx sought to 
recover, both conceptually and practically, the constitutive role of human 
subjectivity from behind the alienated structures and relations which constrain 
human beings in an external and deterministic sense. Through this alienation, 
human powers come to confront the human subjects as external, objective 
'things' with an independent life of their own. 
 
In seeking 'the laws of motion of modern society', Marx employed 
conceptions of law, form and necessity which derive from an essentialist 
metaphysics of Aristotelian origin and which are and quite opposed to empiricist 
and atomist perspectives. Marx therefore endorsed the view of an early reviewer 
of volume one of Capital who wrote that he [Marx] sought 'the law of the 
phenomena ... of their development, i.e. of their transition from one form into 
another ... the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions' 
(Afterword to the Second German Edn., Cap. I).  
 
Without an understanding of an essentialist metaphysics, it is well-nigh 
impossible to make sense of Marx’s arguments. This certainly applies with respect 
to what Marx meant by abolition, Aufhebung as overcoming, transcendence, 
preservation and realization at the same time. Essentialism provides the key to the 
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understanding of Marx's meaning, how Marx can be both an immanentist and a 
transcendentalist at the same time. 
 
In Marx's Theory of Ideology, Bhikhu Parekh writes: 
 
On the basis of the already developed and developing human needs and 
capacities, as well as the prevailing level of technological development, Marx 
formulates a vision of the historically immanent society, and uses it as a 
standard with which to criticise the prevailing social order.  
 
Parekh 1982: 178 
 
A ‘vision’ of the historically immanent society is an ideal which is located within 
the real lines of development of a prevailing social order but which points beyond 
that social order, that is, transcends it. By referring to these essential lines of 
development, Marx exposes the evils of the prevailing society, ‘and demonstrates 
that these can be eliminated in a differently structured society which is both 
possible and necessary.’ The key word is necessary. That concept of necessity 
derives from Marx’s essentialist metaphysics. This concept is more than a weak 
or vague possibilism or a strong inevitabilism but points to necessary lines of 
development in the process of the realisation of an essence.  
 
Parekh’s words not only highlight Marx’s immanentism, but also his 
transcendentalism.  
 
In other words he confronts the capitalist society with an image of its own 
possibilities. His criticisms of it are not abstract but historically grounded, not 
superficial but radical, not dogmatic but based on a realistic assessment of its 
potentialities, not sentimental and moralistic but based on the actual needs of 
men, and not external but based on what is historically both possible and 
necessary. 
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Parekh 1982: 178 
 
Parekh is correct to argue that Marx sought the realisation of the historically 
maturing possibilities immanent within existing lines of development. But Parekh’s 
words need to be re-written in terms of an essentialist metaphysics. Marx is referring 
to something much more than possibilities. Communism is more than just one 
possibility amongst many others, it is the necessary society if existing lines of 
essential development are to be realised. Reference to potentialities in the process of 
becoming actualities makes sense of communism as the historically necessary, but 
not inevitable, society. Lines of development can be frustrated. There is a role for 
creative human agency, and hence for politics and morality, in the realisation of these 
immanent potentialities. And that is the role of formulating an ‘image’ or an ideal of 
the potential future society. 
 
Marx's emancipatory project is based on the realistic grasp of historically 
emerging potentialities yielded by categories of essence, form, law and 
necessity. I would argue that these categories lie at the heart of any serious 
theory, hence my attempt to link them to the rejection of determinism and 
reductionism in biology.  
 
Resolving the issues of immanence and transcendence requires that these 
essentialist categories be placed on a firm foundation. Essentialism and the 
categories of essence, law, form and necessity are bound up inextricably with 
dialectics. These categories are central to Marx’s conception of the real nature 
of the historical process, showing how necessary lines of development will lead 
(unless frustrated) to the full realisation of human society and thereby to the full 
realisation of the social nature of humankind.  
 
The dialectics of Aufhebung thus entail an expanding field of human capacity to 
understand and experience the world as infused with human subjectivity and conscious 
purpose, as against an alienated condition in which the world confronts human beings as 
Dr Peter Critchley  Immanence, Transcendence and Essence 
309 
an objective and external datum. This process will issue ultimately in the truly 
human society. 
 
Marx’s metaphysics of essentialism derive from Aristotle via Hegel. This 
gives Marx’s arguments a peculiar flavour. The dominant methodology since 
the scientific and industrial revolutions has been empiricism, atomism and 
reductionism, the breaking up of entities into dissociated discrete parts. Where 
Marx believes in essences and necessary lines of development, the dominant 
methodology sees single events and accidents.  
I would argue that essentialist and organicist categories are crucial to the 
resolution of the problem of immanence and transcendence, and are the source 
of revealing the way to a happy and fulfilled life. 
Marx offers a way of transcending the status quo by way of realising its 
potentials to the full. That is, Marx’s view is firmly founded on the ‘necessary 
essence of things’ and how their completion points beyond the existing order. 
Marx conceives societies as whole organisms and employs the categories of an 
essentialist metaphysics to examine and understand the changes they undergo - 
essence and form; form and matter (or content); necessary and accidental 
change; potential and its realisation; law; adequate form, finished form, etc. 
 
This essentialist metaphysics is clear in the centrality Marx accorded to the value-
form in Capital. Marx proceeds from 'the elementary form of value' through the 
money form’, the commodity form, and so on, revealing the necessary developments 
of the value form as it comes to be universalised over society as a whole in its final 
form, capital. These developments are necessary, in that they realise potentials 
immanent within the value-form. They are not inevitable, since necessary lines of 
development can be frustrated by accident. 
Marx's emancipatory project is based on the realistic grasp of historically 
emerging potentialities yielded by categories of essence, form, law and 
necessity. I would argue that these categories lie at the heart of any serious 
theory, hence my attempt to link them to the rejection of determinism and 
reductionism in favour of self-organisation and homeodynamics in biology.  
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I would argue that essentialist and organicist categories are crucial to the 
resolution of the problem of immanence and transcendence, and are the source 
of revealing the way to a happy and fulfilled life. 
Resolving the issues of immanence and transcendence requires that these 
essentialist categories be placed on a firm foundation. Essentialism and the 
categories of essence, law, form and necessity are bound up inextricably with 
dialectics. These categories are central to Marx’s conception of the real nature 
of the historical process, showing how necessary lines of development will lead 
(unless frustrated) to the full realisation of human society and thereby to the full 
realisation of the social nature of humankind.  
 
The organic dialectics of Aufhebung – abolition as a positive transcendence and 
realisation - thus entail an expanding field of human capacity to understand and 
experience the world as infused with human subjectivity and conscious purpose, as 
against an alienated condition in which the world confronts human beings as an 
objective and external datum. This process will issue ultimately in the truly human 
society. 
 
It’s not just that teleology is central to Marx's thought, as it was to Aristotle’s 
philosophy, it’s the form of teleology employed that is important. There is an 
implicit and bad teleology at work in the secular myth of progress that dominates 
the modern world. Marx’s teleology concerns the unfolding and flourishing of 
natural essences. The modern teleology of progress operates according to a 
supra-human, supra-natural – in Marx’s sense of alien – force – capital, 
technology, industry, what Nietzsche referred to as the ‘new idols’ of modernity.  
 
The practical reappropriation of these alienated human powers and their 
reorganisation as social powers realises ‘human emancipation’. (Marx OJQ EW 
1975: 234). Marx defines communism as the 'regaining of self’ (Selbstgewinnung) 
and 'the reintegration or return of man to himself, transcendence of human self-
alienation' (MEGA III 113/4 in Tucker 1964:151). Everything that Marx writes with 
respect to communism belongs to this essentialist conception of nature and human 
nature. Marx therefore saw the emergence of the generic human self in a new stage 
of history. 
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Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State is not so much a rejection of 
Hegel as an attempt to make his essentialist philosophical structure live up to its 
potential. Marx is concerned to check the tendency for Reason to become detached 
from real natures and thus determines to rest essentialist categories on the most 
fundamental ontological level of human social being. Time and again, Marx accuses 
Hegel of inverting the true relations between things, not of falsehood. Marx makes 
constant references to ‘real relationship’, ‘real mediation’, ‘real subjects’. His 
teleology is firmly grounded in the concrete reality of real individuals.  
 
For Marx, individuals, the family and civil society are ‘real parts of the state, real 
spiritual manifestations of will’, the ‘state's forms of existence’ and the ‘driving 
force’ of the state. However, Marx accuses, Hegel makes them the products of the 
real Idea: ‘it is not the course of their own life that joins them together to comprise 
the state, but the life of the Idea which has distinguished them from itself.’ (Marx 
CHDS EW 1975: 69). Whether or not Marx’s criticism of Hegel is correct is not the 
issue. (My view is that Marx has written hastily and has missed the extent to which he 
is in agreement with Hegel. It is interesting that Marx has been accused of the very 
things that he accuses Hegel of, of making some overarching Reason independent of 
real individuals.) More important is to establish the extent to which Marx shares 
Hegel’s essentialist metaphysics. Marx accuses Hegel of inverting true relations: ‘If 
Hegel had begun by positing real subjects as the basis of the state he would not have 
found it necessary to subjectivize the state in a mystical way.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 
78). Marx posits ‘real subjects’ as the basis of political and social reality so that he has 
no need to subjectivize human creations such as the state or capital ‘in a mystical 
way.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 78). The solution to a false teleology is clear – put 
subject and object the right way round and posit real subjects as the basis of all social 
forms. For Marx, all human history is human social individuals and the forms that they 
engender. 
 
Proceeding from the fundamental ontology of ‘real human existence’, Marx criticises 
the modern inversion which ‘does not proceed from the real person to the state, but 
from the state to the real person.’ This results in the subjective coming to be 
converted into the objective and the objective into the subjective with the inevitable 
result that an empirical person is uncritically enthroned as the real truth of the Idea.’ 
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(Marx EW CHDS 1975: 99). The implication is that a true account establishes the right 
relation between subject and object and thus proceeds from the real person to the 
state and all other social forms.  
It is also worth noting how the inversion of subject and object through the 
alienation of social power to the state and capital results in a situation in which ‘an 
empirical person is uncritically enthroned as the real truth of the Idea’. Whilst Marx’s 
criticism here refers to a specific aspect in Hegel’s political philosophy, the point is 
capable of generalisation. As an alienated system of production, capitalism is 
characterised by the inversion of subject and object. Human beings are ‘thingified’, 
made appendages of objects as their creations come to acquire existential 
significance. In this condition, human ends come to be displaced by means whilst the 
extension of an instrumental rationality disenchants or removes purpose from the 
world. But we do not lose teleology or theology. Instead, someone or, more likely, 
something comes to be ‘uncritically enthroned’ as the real purpose of history. And that 
is precisely what I mean about the problem of capitalist modernity being not a genuine 
teleology at all but a substitute or fake teleology which rationalise the imperatives 
involved in the secular myth of progress.  
The solution to this bogus teleology is to put subject and object in their true relation, 
with the human creators coming to take conscious moral and collective responsibility 
for their creations. For Marx, the social forms created by human praxis should be 
brought under the conscious common control of the associated individuals, as part of 
the process leading to the truly human society. 
For this reason, Marx can retain the powerful philosophical essentialism 
developed by Hegel, employing it to examine the human social organism, the 
nature of both whole and parts, their relation and movement. 
According to Marx, in Hegel 'what should be a starting point becomes a 
mystical result and what should be a rational result becomes mystical starting 
point'. For Marx, the true starting point of social and historical analysis are real 
individuals as the concrete universal: 'the real essence of the finite real, i.e. of 
what exists and is determined' and ‘real existent things as the true subject of the 
infinite.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 81). For Marx, real individuals are the ‘real state’. 
‘The state is an abstraction. Only the people is a concrete reality.’ (Marx CHDS 
EW 1975: 86). Marx writes of the inversion of true reality which comes from 
ascribing ‘living qualities to the abstraction’ (Marx CHDS EW 1975: 86).  
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Marx endorses Hegel's organicism and repudiates mechanistic materialism 
for its neglect of the active side of human subjectivity (Theses on Feuerbach). 
Against Hegel, Marx seeks to develop a materialist organicism on the basis of the 
'various powers' of a thing being determined and explained by their underlying 
essence. Those powers develop so as to express or manifest that essence, that 
is, the necessary line of development is located within an actually existing essence 
rather than, as with Hegel (in Marx’s view), being derived from the 'nature of the 
concept', or from 'the universal relationship of freedom and necessity'. (Marx EW 
CHDS 1975: 75 65). 
 
Marx affirms that the concrete reality behind the state, the executive power, 
the monarch, the bureaucracy, etc., is the existence of people. The significant 
point, in Marx's view, is that: ‘In democracy no moment acquires a meaning other 
than what is proper to it. Each is only a moment of the demos as a whole ... 
democracy is the essence of all political constitutions, socialised man as a particular 
constitution.’ ‘In democracy, man does not exist for the sake of the law, but the law 
exists for the sake of man, it is human existence, whereas in other political 
systems man is a legal existence. This is the fundamental distinguishing feature 
of democracy.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 87 89). 
 
But this is democracy considered not as a radical political movement, but as the 
realisation of a social essence, a genuine universality. To understand this we need to 
understand the term Aufhebung, which Marx uses when writing of the abolition of 
alienation. Aufhebung means abolition as a positive transcendence, something which 
preserves and realises through the completion of an immanent potential. Marx's 
Aufhebung is a philosophical term with clear dialectical connotations when it comes to 
the relation between immanence and transcendence. In his various 1843 essays, 
Marx refers to the Aufhebung des Staates. Marx conceives the state to be caught 
between the ideal of universality, transcending the particularistic interests of civil 
society, and the reality of having to serve these interests themselves. 
 
For Marx, the universality which human beings as social beings require is 
frustrated in atomistic civil society through the institution of private property; the result 
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is that this universality comes to be projected upwards to the alien state. Universality 
thus exists in the state as an ideal realm. 
 
The perfected political state is by its nature the species-life of man in opposition 
to his material life. All the presuppositions of this egoistic life continue to exist 
outside the sphere of the state in civil society, but as qualities of civil society. 
Where the political state has attained its full degree of development man leads 
a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, not only in his mind, in his 
consciousness, but in reality. He lives in the political community, where he regards 
himself as a communal being, and in civil society, where he is active as a private 
individual, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and 
becomes a plaything of alien powers. The relationship of the political state to civil 
society is just as spiritual as the relationship of heaven to earth. The state stands 
in the same opposition to civil society and overcomes it in the same way as religion 
overcomes the restrictions of the profane world, i.e. it has to acknowledge it again, 
reinstate it and allow itself to be dominated by it. Man in his immediate reality, in 
civil society, is a profane being. Here, where he regards himself and is regarded 
by others as a real individual, he is an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on the 
other hand, where he is considered to be a species-being, he is the imaginary 
member of a fictitious sovereignty, he is divested of his real individual life and filled 
with an unreal universality.  
 
Marx EW OJQ 1975:221 
 
For Marx, universal suffrage is not just the realization of a radical democratic political 
vision but the Aufhebung of the state which realises a true universality. For Marx, the 
suffrage is the extension and the greatest possible universalization of the vote, i.e. of 
both active and passive suffrage. (Marx EW CHDS 1975: 191). And this 
democratisation as universalisation would amount to ‘the abolition [Aufhebung] of 
the state and of civil society.' The important point to grasp is that the Aufhebung of the 
state requires that the political structure comes to realise all of its potentialities. In other 
words, Aufhebung is abolition in the sense of being transcended, realised and 
preserved. The realisation of the ideal universality of the state is only possible through 
the abolition of the state. In becoming identical with its universal content, the form of the 
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state, always partial, ceases to be mere form, and universalisation becomes a 
democratisation with respect to concrete reality.  
 
Aufhebung is a dialectical process of transcendence, a social praxis which 
creates a new reality, resolving an ideal universality into a true universality. 
 
Only when civil society has achieved unrestricted active and passive suffrage 
has it really raised itself to the point of abstraction from itself, to the political 
existence which constitutes its true, universal, essential existence. But the 
perfection of this abstraction is also its transcendence [Aufhebung = abolition]. 
By really establishing its political existence as its authentic existence, civil 
society ensures that its civil existence, in so far as it is distinct from its political 
existence, is inessential. And with the demise of the one, the other, its opposite 
collapses also. Therefore, electoral reform in the abstract political state is the 
equivalent to a demand for its dissolution and this in turn implies the dissolution 
of civil society. 
 
Marx CHDS EW 1975:191 
 
Marx’s reasoning here follows Feuerbach, according to whom Christianity is self-
destroying in that its historical appearance abolished the need for religion. To 
paraphrase Jesus Christ, the fulfilment of the law would amount to its abolition. This is 
how Aufhebung functions in Marx. Democracy as an active and universal suffrage 
amounts to the abolition (Aufhebung) of the political constitution, i.e. the realisation 
and transcendence of the state.  
 
‘Democracy is both form and content. Monarchy is supposed to be only a form, but it 
falsifies the content.’ (Marx EW CHDS 1975).  
 
In democracy the constitution itself appears only as one determining 
characteristic of the people, and indeed as its self-determination. In monarchy 
we have the people of the constitution, in democracy the constitution of the 
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people. Democracy is the solution to the riddle of every constitution. In it we find 
the constitution founded on its true ground: real human beings and the real 
people; not merely implicitly and in essence, but in existence and in reality. The 
constitution is thus posited as the people's own creation. The constitution is in 
appearance what it is in reality: the free creation of man.  
 
Marx EW CHDS 1975: 88/9 
 
So Marx is resolving power on its true ground of real individuals, affirming the 
political constitution as the ‘free creation of man’, ‘the people’s own creation’.  
 
In democracy, man does not exist for the sake of the law, but the law exists for 
the sake of man, it is human existence, whereas in other political systems man is 
a legal existence. This is the fundamental distinguishing feature of 
democracy.’(Marx EW CHDS 1975:88/9). 
 
‘For the sake of’ denotes purpose, telos, related to the realisation of essential 
potentiality. We can only understand Marx’s reasoning here if we grasp the Hegelian 
meaning of the term Aufhebung as abolition, transcendence and preservation 
simultaneously. Both the state and (atomistic) civil society are abolished and 
transcended in such a way that their contents are preserved at a higher level – a 
genuine universality. The Aufhebung of the state means that once its universal 
nature comes to be fulfilled, the state becomes superfluous as a separate 
organization embodying only an unreal universality. Thus, Marx's demand for 
universal suffrage is not based upon radical democratic traditions and politics but is 
a dialectical tool designed to bring about the simultaneous abolition of the state 
and civil society, bringing both of them to their apex and transcendence. The 
granting of universal suffrage will be its last act of the state as a state. For Marx, 
democracy is the realisation of the universal postulate of the state so as to abolish 
the institution of the state. 
These remarks also apply to what Marx writes with respect to private property. In 
opposing the "rule of man" to the "rule of property", Marx is demanding that a 
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repoliticization overcomes a condition of depoliticization so that “universally human 
emancipation” entails (Marx OJQ EW 1975: 216).  
 
Political emancipation from religion is not complete and consistent 
emancipation from religion, because political emancipation is not the complete 
and consistent form of human emancipation.  
 
Marx EW OJQ 1975: 217/8 
 
Complete and consistent human emancipation requires the extension of 
democratization as a universalisation to social relations, and not the projection of a 
universality denied in real civil society upwards and outwards to the abstract level of 
the state. The transcendence that Marx has in mind is the positive 
transcendence/abolition of the state and private property through the practical 
reappropriation of alienated human powers and potentialities. Only Aufhebung in the 
dialectical sense of abolition, transcendence and preservation at a higher, i.e. more 
universal, level will realise in a humanity no longer split between the general and the 
particular. With the humanisation of the world, both cognitively and practically, humanity 
comes to realise itself fully.  
 
This dialectical conception of Aufhebung runs throughout Marx’s writing, so that 
communism is the positive transcendence of capitalism, entailing the realization of those 
potentialities which are immanent within but frustrated by the social relations of the capital 
system. It is in this sense that Marx refers to share capital and the joint stock 
principle as ‘the abolition [Aufhebung] of the capitalist mode of production within the 
capitalist mode of production itself, and hence a self-dissolving contradiction, which 
prima facie represent a mere phase of transition to a new form of production.’ (Marx 
C3 1981 ch 27 pp569/70) 
 
Aufhebung is the abolition of an alienated form through the realisation of content. 
The unity of form and content amounts to the restoration of human powers to human 
control. The human creators regain conscious and common control of their free 
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creation. The truly human society is based upon the free creative self-realisation of 
human power. 
 
The telos of history doesn’t belong to some supra-natural entity at work in the 
historical process, but to the purposes of real individuals. Concrete reality 
remained Marx's starting point throughout the rest of work. For Marx, human 
history is about real individuals and the forms they engender. The character 
of the telos of history as Marx employs it is apparent in what Marx writes of 
Hegel. Marx emphasises that 'the importance of Hegel's Phenomenology ... lies in 
the fact that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as 
loss of object [Entgegenstandlichung], as alienation and as supersession of this 
alienation; that he therefore grasps the nature of labour and conceives objective man - 
true, because real man - as the result of his own labour. The real, active relation of 
man to himself as a species-being, or the realization of himself as a real species-
being, i.e. as a human being, is only possible if he really employs all his species-powers 
- which again is only possible through the cooperation of mankind and as a result of 
history - and treats them as objects, which is at first only possible in the form of 
estrangement. (Marx EW EPM 1975: 386/7). 
 
For human beings to realise their social natures in the truly human society, the 
supersession or positive transcendence of alienation is required. But – and this is the 
crucial point – real individuals and concrete reality form the basis of Marx’s essentialist 
metaphysics. ‘The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of 
living human individuals.’ (The German Ideology 1999: 42). Marx’s teleology is 
connected to the purpose immanent within human beings and their social praxis.  
 
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real 
premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They 
are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under 
which they live, both those which they find already existing and those 
produced by their activity. These premises can thus be verified in a purely 
empirical way.  
The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living 
human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical 
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organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of 
nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of 
man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself—geological, 
orohydrographical, climatic and so on. The writing of history must always set 
out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history 
through the action of men.  
 
Marx GI 1999: 42 
 
That passage merits being quoted at length because it cuts through the easy 
accusations that teleology as such entails some supra-natural or supra-individual 
force whose abstract purpose unfolds inexorably over the heads of human agents. 
That’s a caricature of teleology. And it’s not the issue with respect to the secular 
mythology at work within capitalist modernity. The forces operating independently of 
conscious, acting, choosing human beings are not God or Reason or any kind of 
telos properly understood, but the alien power of capital. With alienation, we enter the 
world of unintended consequences, false fixities and systemic imperatives and all 
manner of societal and biological determinisms. It is not purpose that is the problem 
but functional necessity and determinism in their many forms, but most of in the basic 
form of capital accumulation. ‘Globalisation’, ‘there is no alternative’, ‘economic 
growth’, ‘it’s the economy, stupid’, ‘investment’, ‘jobs’ etc. etc., these are only the 
terms by which the mouthpieces of capital employ as they proselytise for the flock. 
And on top of these are the various neurodeterminisms and genetic determinisms 
being proposed by natural scientists who see nature as a purely physical realm. 
 
In the above passage from The German Ideology, Marx makes it clear 
that his organic dialectic proceeds from real premises – individuals in their real 
relations within an empirically verifiable process of development under definite 
conditions. It is mediation between associated individuals in society, nature and 
the social organism which counts, not some purpose detached from this 
mediation and identified with an entity apart from human praxis. 
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The reference to 'socialised man' in the Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the 
State points to the idea of fundamental essence in human history as forming the 
basis of Marx’s ontology. Marx develops this idea further with respect to the class 
of ‘concrete labour’. In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx writes of 
the concrete universal of human labour, which manifests itself through a series of 
social forms in history, organic social wholes defined according to the specific way 
in which social labour is supplied. Each social metabolic order has its own specific 
laws or realisable potentials which, in coming to be, move history on until, 
finally, the essence is realised to its fullest potential to bring about a realised 
society of realised human beings. 
 
For Marx, the fundamental entities that compose society are essences 
manifested in different ways within specific social relations. On this essentialist 
basis, Marx identifies a line of historical development as a broad threefold 
demarcation of pre-capitalist formations - 'primitive communism’, ‘clan society', 
feudalism – capitalism and class division; then socialism or classless society on a 
high technological level (Kiernan 1983:61; Gould 1978:1 4 5). This also appears or 
as 'tribalism - slavery - feudalism - capitalism - communism’ (Gandy 1979:5). 
Individuals become fully human and fully social beings through coming to realise 
human potentialities in the course of historical development. These schema pertain 
to three basic forms of social relations: community based upon personal 
dependence; individuality and external sociality resting upon personal independence 
based upon objective dependence; communal individuality based upon free social 
individuality (Gould 1978:4/5). 
 
In the Grundrisse Marx outlined three stages of human development by reference 
to the social forms through which human productivity is developed. These are the three 
social metabolic orders in history. 
 
Relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous at the outset) are the first 
social forms, in which human productive capacity develops only to a slight extent 
and at isolated points. Personal independence founded on objective dependence is 
the second great form, in which a system of general social metabolism, of universal 
relations, of all round needs and universal capacities is formed for the first time. 
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Free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and on the 
subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth, is the 
third stage. The second stage creates the conditions for the third. 
 
Marx Grundrisse 1973:158 
 
The social relations appropriate to these three stages may be defined as 
community, replaced by individuality with external sociality, giving way to communal 
individuality (Gould 1978:4-5). Marx refers to the third stage in terms of 'free 
individuality'. The guiding principle of development through these stages is toward 
the 'universal development of individuals and the 'subordination of communal, social 
productivity as social wealth’ (Marx 1973:158). 
 
 
Stated in broad outline, Marx appears to be indulging in a bad teleology that 
induces scepticism these days, as though history is propelled forwards by some 
supra-human Providence or supra-individual Reason. That is precisely what Marx is 
seeking to avoid by references to social forms and metabolic orders within 
historically emerging social relations. It is impossible to make true sense of Marx’s 
argument without an understanding of his essentialist metaphysics. In light of this 
essentialism, Marx’s view may be stated thus. The historical development of 
human society is the development of the value-form, from its coming-to-be to its 
becoming a general and universal social metabolism to its passing-away and 
supersession. The history of human society is the history of forms of extraction of 
surplus labour, from relations of dependence or unfree labour to the indirect 
supply of social labour through the value-form (wage-labour) to the direct supply 
of social labour through the freely associated producers. The whole process 
concerns the realisation of the essence of human beings in society, which is, at the 
same time, the realisation of the social essence of human beings.  
 
Understanding Marx’s essentialism is key to understanding how Marx resolves the 
issue between freedom and determinism. There has been a tendency to identify 
Marx with the very determinism he sought to overcome – the inexorable logic and 
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imperatives of alien powers. Against this, Marx human freedom in terms of human 
self-determination through the reappropriation of alienated social powers and their 
conscious control and exercise on the part of the freely associated producers (O 
Neill 1973:12/3). Indeed, Marx is not merely accenting the social individual of 
Aristotle, the zoon politikon or social being, but the free individual: 'society for the 
individual under communism changes quite substantially. It is not the social 
individual that communism allows for the first time, but the transcendence of that 
individual’ (Forbes 1990:xviii).  
Marx is therefore doing more than asserting an undifferentiated species 
essence, the realisation of which brings about a homogeneous communal existence. 
Marx’s essentialism distinguishes between individualism, which contradicts the 
social nature of human beings, and individuality, which corresponds to that social 
nature. Whereas pre-capitalist formations are characterised by a unity without 
differentiation, and capitalism is characterised by a differentiation without unity, 
communism produces a unity with differentiation. Marx highlights the extent to which 
a human's individualness is social and is connected to the development of the 
human essence in history. The human potential to be an individual is connected to 
the way that social labour is supplied through history. ‘This means that Marx 
transcends individualism by laying the foundation for an understanding of 
individuality. Individuality in Marx's thought relates to the extent to which the 
potential inherent in a person's human nature is realised in becoming a free creative 
individual in society. This is another way of suggesting that human individuals will 
ultimately be autonomous with regard, to the material base of society, because it will 
be in their control’ (Forbes 1990:33). 
Marx’s view is firmly grounded in the view that society has an essence and 
that the accidents and necessities that comprise the stuff of history are more 
than discrete events but are to be properly understood only by reference to that 
essence. Capitalism, as a class society, is in its essence a social metabolic order 
for the extraction of surplus labour from one class by another, which it achieves 
through the indirect supply of social labour through the value form. Marx 
articulates his essentialist understanding of human development with perfect 
clarity in Capital III: 'The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is 
pumped out of the direct producers . . . reveals the innermost secret, the hidden 
basis of the entire social structure. 
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Marx defines human freedom in terms of the practical reappropriation of alienated 
human power and its recognition, reorganisation and exercise as social power. 
 
All emancipation is reduction of the human world and of relationships to 
man himself.  
Only when real, individual man resumes the abstract citizen into himself 
and as an individual man has become a species-being in his empirical life, his 
individual work and his individual relationships, only when man has 
recognized and organized his forces propres as social forces so that social 
force is no longer separated from him in the form of political force, only then will 
human emancipation be completed.  
 
Marx EW OJQ 1975: 234 
 
Human beings are to be in conscious control of their own creations and powers. 
Marx takes his stand on ‘the people’s own creation’ and ‘the free creation of man’. 
Human creation and power are at the heart of Marx’s demand for the truly human 
society.  
 
This becomes interesting when Marx draws the analogy between religious and 
secular alienation. In one sense alienation is a form of idolatry. The domination of the 
human subjects by the objects which they themselves have created denotes a 
condition of alienation. The state, capital, commodities and money become the new 
idols which dominate human beings. 
 
It follows from this that human beings only realise themselves as human to the 
extent that they objectify essential, generic powers. Alienation is a dehumanisation and 
a depersonalisation. The abolition of alienation is not just a rehumanisation and 
repersonalisation, it is a rehumanisation and repersonalisation at a higher level. How 
high a level? The complete fulfilment of the human species essence. Marx sees the 
process as ending in the truly human society of truly human beings.  
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But since for socialist man the whole of what is called world history is nothing 
more than the creation of man through human labour, and the development of 
nature for man, he therefore has palpable and incontrovertible proof of his self-
mediated birth, of his process of emergence. Since the essentiality [Wesenhaftigkeit] 
of man and of nature, man as the existence of nature for man and nature as the 
existence of man for man, has become practically and sensuously perceptible, 
the question of an alien being, a being above nature and man - a question which 
implies an admission of the unreality of nature and of man - has become 
impossible in practice. Atheism, which is a denial of this unreality, no longer has 
any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, through which negation it asserts 
the existence of man. But socialism as such no longer needs such mediation. Its 
starting-point is the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man 
and of nature as essential beings. It is the positive self-consciousness of man, no 
longer mediated through the abolition of religion, just as real life is positive 
reality no longer mediated through the abolition of private property, through 
communism. Communism is the act of positing as the negation of the 
negation, and is therefore a real phase, necessary for the next period of 
historical development, in the emancipation and recovery of mankind. 
Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle of the 
immediate future, but communism is not as such the goal of human 
development - the form of human society.   
 
Marx EPM EW 1975: 359. 
 
Note the terms, ‘essentiality’, ‘essential beings’, ‘necessary form’, ‘dynamic principle 
of the immediate future’. Marx’s argument is set within the framework of an essentialist 
metaphysics concerning potentiality in the process of becoming actuality, essences in 
the process of realisation and completion. Such essentialist metaphysics offers the 
basis for a genuine teleology, restoring meaning to the world. Purpose is connected to 
the realisation of the human essence, to human growth, not the endless expansion of 
things and accumulation of quantities. History has a goal, an end point. 
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Humankind could be developed to such a degree that it constituted a 
powerful enough historical force for the destruction of social organisations 




This is a liberatory vision, certainly. The full realisation of human capacities and 
abilities implies a defetishised social order which has transcended the alienation of 
power. The key is the abolition of an alienated system of production. A condition of 
alienation entails an inability to comprehend the social forms engendered by 
human subjects as human products, mistaking them instead for entities with an 
independent existence of their own. What critics of the delusions of progress 
identify as teleology is actually the determinism of alienated social powers that 
have escaped human comprehension and control, and which in their 
independence come to impose their alien logic upon human subjects from the 
outside. The solution to this bad teleology is to understand these powers as 
forms possessing an underlying essence, which comprehensible and controllable 
by the human agents who are the originary power. And this requires a recovery 
of essentialist categories and teleological thinking in terms of real individuals, 
concrete reality, the relation of the part and the whole, notions of necessary and 
accidental change, the real natures of history's successive organic wholes and 
social metabolic orders, an understanding of their specific social forms, potential 
and the realisations of potential in the coming-to-be of the truly human society of 
truly human beings – true as defined in terms of an essence, and purpose as 
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20 THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE IMMANENT CONTRADICTIONS OF 
CAPITAL 
 
There are clear affinities between the organic dialectics which Hegel develops 
and Marx's concern with the contradictory dynamics of the capital system, what 
Marx called an ‘immanent contradiction’ with respect to various aspects of 
capitalist production (Marx 1976 ch 15 pp 531/3). Chapter 15 of Capital III is titled 
‘Development of the Law’s Internal Contradictions’. The contradictory dynamics of 
the capital system are at the heart of Marx’s critique of political economy. In 
unravelling these immanent contradictions, Marx thus showed how the capital 
system pointed beyond itself to a new social metabolic order of social control. 
Hence Marx’s emphasis upon the critique of political economy. Marx was 
exposing the realities behind the value form, the commodity form, the money form 
etc.  
 
Political economy has indeed analysed value and its magnitude, however 
incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms. But it 
has never once asked the question why this content has assumed that particular 
form, that is to say, why labour is expressed in value, and why the measurement 
of labour by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the 
product. 
 
Marx CI 1976: 174 
 
The approach that Marx takes and the categories he uses are essentialist to 
the core. The references to form and content presuppose the existence of a 
substance that is essentially something and something essentially. Marx is 
attempting to penetrate beyond surface level appearance to expose the true 
reality below. Without an essentialist metaphysics, we remain on the terrain of 
immediacy, suffering the effects of capital’s contradictory dynamics, but unable to 
apprehend them cognitively and practically. 
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Marx did not offer a political economy of his own, he offered a critical 
approach designed to bring to consciousness the internal realities at work in the 
capital economy, showing how capital’s form transcended itself. Of course, this is 
not a passive or automatic evolution, hence Marx’s emphasis on the subjec tive 
factor in history. Capital creates its own grave digger in the form of the proletariat. 
(Marx MCP Rev1848 1973). 
 
The sense of contradiction, of potential as an opposite which points beyond 
existing reality, is evident in the following passage from Marx.  
 
But on the other hand, in its capitalist form it reproduces the old division of 
labour with its ossified particularities. We have seen how this absolute 
contradiction does away with all repose, all fixity and all security as far as the 
worker's life-situation is concerned; how it constantly threatens, by taking 
away the instruments of labour, to snatch from his hands the means of 
subsistence, and, by suppressing his specialized function, to make him 
superfluous. We have seen, too, how this contradiction bursts forth without 
restraint in the ceaseless human sacrifices required from the working class, in 
the reckless squandering of labour-powers, and in the devastating effects of 
social anarchy. This is the negative side. But if, at present, variation of  labour 
imposes itself after the manner of an overpowering natural law, and with the 
blindly destructive action of a natural law that meets with obstacles 
everywhere, large-scale industry, through its very catastrophes, makes the 
recognition of variation of labour and hence of the fitness of the worker for the 
maximum number of different kinds of labour into a question of life and death. 
This possibility of varying labour must become a general law of social 
production, and the existing relations must be adapted to permit its 
realization in practice. That monstrosity, the disposable working population 
held in reserve, in misery, for the changing requirements of capitalist 
exploitation, must be replaced by the individual man who is absolutely 
available for the different kinds of labour required of him; the partially 
developed individual, who is merely the bearer of one specialized social 
function, must be replaced by the totally developed individual, for whom the 
different social functions are different modes of activity he takes up in turn.  
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Marx CI 1976 ch 15 619 
 
Also worth noting is the way that Marx identifies capital as a new god 
or idol demanding human sacrifice. Marx exposes capitalist development 
as a fake teleology which operates independently of human agency and 
purpose, impacting upon human society in the ‘manner of an 
overpowering natural law’. Marx emphasises the extent to which the 
contradictory dynamics and systemic imperatives of capital have all ‘the 
blindly destructive action of a natural law’. (Marx CI 1976 ch 15 619). To 
repeat, against critics of teleology, this is not a genuine teleology at all. 
The problem of capitalist modernity is that the disenchantment of which 
Weber and Schiller wrote has never been a thoroughgoing 
secularisation, and maybe never could have been. Whilst nature and 
labour, which Marx identified as the two sources of wealth, have been 
profaned or ‘dis-godded’, (Schiller’s term), divinity as such has not been 
extirpated and, as a necessary transcendental ideal, never could be. 
Instead, theological assumptions and teleological categories have been 
detached from their true objects and re-attached to the alien powers of 
the capital system. These are the powers which impact in ‘overpowering’ 
and ‘blindly destructive’ fashion, in the manner of a natural law. But it is 
a bogus teleology in being detached from natural purposes. We need to 
reinstate these purposes. Human beings are teleological beings who 
require and seek meaning in life. It is as well as to recognise that fact 
and abandon the project of dis-godding and instead seek the re-
enchantment of the world, in the sense of recovering a genuine sense of 
purpose. 
 
Marx’s purpose in bringing out the immanent contradictions within the 
capitalist mode of production is to reveal the potential for further 
development in the social forms created by human activity. Marx is worth 
quoting at length here, just to indicate the extent to which he is 
identifying the content that exists as an innate but repressed potential 
within capitalist forms. Marx’s essentialist approach is designed to 
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liberate potential and bring about the realised society of realised human 
beings. 
 
To express this contradiction in the most general terms, it consists in the 
fact that the capitalist mode of production tends towards an absolute 
development of the productive forces irrespective of value and the surplus-
value this contains, and even irrespective of the social relations within which 
capitalist production takes place; while on the other hand its purpose is to 
maintain the existing capital value and to valorize it to the utmost extent 
possible (i.e. an ever accelerated increase in this value). In its specific 
character it is directed towards using the existing capital value as a means for the 
greatest possible valorization of this value. The methods through which it attains 
this end involve a decline in the profit rate, the devaluation of the existing 
capital and the development of the productive forces of labour at the cost of the 
productive forces already produced.  
The periodical devaluation of the existing capital, which is a means, immanent 
to the capitalist mode of production, for delaying the fall in the profit rate and 
accelerating the accumulation of capital value by the formation of new capital, 
disturbs the given conditions in which the circulation and reproduction process 
of capital takes place, and is therefore accompanied by sudden stoppages and 
crises in the production process.  
The relative decline in the variable capital as against the constant, which goes 
hand in hand with the development of the productive forces, gives a spur to the 
growth of the working population, while it continuously creates an artificial 
surplus population as well. The accumulation of capital, from the point of view of 
value, is slowed down by the falling rate of profit, which then serves yet again to 
accelerate the accumulation of use-value, while this in turn accelerates the 
course of accumulation in terms of value.  
Capitalist production constantly strives to overcome these immanent barriers, 
but it overcomes them only by means that set up the barriers afresh and on a 
more powerful scale. 
 
The true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself. It is that capital and its 
self-valorization appear as the starting and finishing point, as the motive and 
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purpose of production; production is production only for capital, and not the 
reverse, i.e. the means of production are not simply means for a steadily 
expanding pattern of life for the society of the producers. The barriers within 
which the maintenance and valorization of the capital-value has necessarily to 
move - and this in turn depends on the dispossession and impoverishment of the 
great mass of the producers - therefore come constantly into contradiction with 
the methods of production that capital must apply to its purpose and which set 
its course towards an unlimited expansion of production, to production as an 
end in itself, to an unrestricted development of the social productive powers of 
labour. The means - the unrestricted development of the forces of social 
production - comes into persistent conflict with the restricted end, the 
valorization of the existing capital. If the capitalist mode of production is therefore 
a historical means for developing the material powers of production and for 
creating a corresponding world market, it is at the same time the constant 
contradiction between this historical task and the social relations of production 
corresponding to it.  
 
Marx C3 1981 ch 15 pp 358/9 
 
The most flagrant contradiction within the capital system is the 
distinction between social production and private appropriation. Capital 
is less a work of economics than a book of human self-knowledge and 
self-understanding. Or, given the highlighting of the social nature of the 
human essence, Capital is a book of ‘co-understanding’ seeking to aid 
human beings in the realisation of their true natures in the society of the 
associated producers. 
 
They are conditioned by a low stage of development of the productive powers 
of labour and correspondingly limited relations between men within the process 
of creating and reproducing their material life, hence also limited relations 
between man and nature. These real limitations are reflected in the ancient 
worship of nature, and in other elements of tribal religions. The religious 
reflections of the real world can, in any case, vanish only when the practical 
relations of everyday life between man and man, and man and nature, 
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generally present themselves to him in a transparent and rational form. The 
veil is not removed from the countenance of the social life-process, i.e. the 
process of material production, until it becomes production by freely associated 
men, and stands under their conscious and planned control. This, however, 
requires that society possess a material foundation, or a series of material 
conditions of existence, which in their turn are the natural and spontaneous 
product of a long and tormented historical development. 
 
Marx CI 1976: 173 
 
Marx is clear that the form by which social labour is supplied is part of a 
necessary teleological process in which social labour as such is developed. Marx 
evaluates the alienation of labour under the capital system as a progressive force in 
that it represents a development which, through reappropriation, culminates in a form 
of society which achieves the full realisation of the potentials of the social nature of 
human beings. 'It is precisely in the fact that the division of labour and exchange 
are configurations of private property that we f ind the proof, both that human life 
needed private property for its realisation and that it now needs the abolition of 
private property. ' 
Marx therefore sees historical development as progressing in terms of the 
unfolding of the telos of the social nature of human beings and, indeed, the human 
nature of society. The teleology that Marx identifies within the historical process is 
the realisation of human social nature within the truly human society.  
For Marx, the historical process is a teleological process whose premises are 
real individuals and their social natures of human beings and whose telos the 
realisation of humanity’s inherent potentials in their fullest and highest form. 'The 
entire movement of history is therefore the actual act of creation of this 
communism — the birth of its empirical existence — and, for its thinking 
consciousness, the comprehended and known movement of its becoming.'' (KMEW, 
1975: 348). 
 
History is the truly human society of truly human beings in the process of 
becoming. The essence of historical development is the concrete universal of 
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human labour, and its different 'principles' are the specific social forms which 
mediate the supply of social labour at different stages. The end or telos of history 
is the realised society of realised individuals, an end which is necessary if human 
beings are to realise their inherent potentials fully, but which is also frustratable – 
if human agency fails to act in accordance with its purposes, if the defenders of 
civilisation block an ascending class and arrest historical development, then 
these necessary lines of development can indeed be frustrated, with all manner 
of damaging and destructive consequences. Crashing economies, bankrupted 
states, despoiled environments are all possible. Such an eventuality would 
deprive human beings of the fullest realisation of the potential of human society.  
 
But atheism and communism are no flight, no abstraction, no loss of the 
objective world created by man or of his essential powers projected into 
objectivity, no impoverished regression to unnatural, primitive simplicity. They are 
rather the first real emergence, the realization become real for man, of his 
essence as something real.  
 
Marx EW EPM 1975: 395/6 
 
I find Marx’s association of atheism and communism here significant. I want 
later to come to the question of idolatry and the extent to which Marx believed 
that human beings could become as gods. I want also to examine the extent to 
which such a notion slides into a kind of teleological thinking that works 
independently of human purposes, thus violating the real premises I have 
developed above. 
For the moment, I want to emphasise the extent to which the realisation of the 
truly human society and the realisation of the social essence of human beings is 
inextricably connected. For Marx, the individual and the social are two aspects of 
the same essence. Marx therefore is concerned to emphasise that the realisation 
of the social essence of human individuals and the realisation of the human 
essence of society are part of the same process. 
Again, Marx is at pains to ground his essentialist categories in real human 
beings, ensuring that any telos remains on the ground of concrete reality and 
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doesn’t become detached in some supra-individual determinism as under the 
capital system. 
 
It is above all necessary to avoid once more establishing 'society' as an 
abstraction over against the individual. The individual is the social being. His 
vital expression - even when it does not appear in the direct form of a 
communal expression, conceived in association with other men - is therefore 
an expression and confirmation of social life. Man's individual and species-life 
are not two distinct things, however much - and this is necessarily so - the 
mode of existence of individual life is a more particular or a more general 
mode of the species-life, or species-life a more particular or more general 
individual life.  
 
Marx EW EPM 1975: 350/1 
 
The full realisation of the potentiality of the social essence inherent in the 
human species is also the full realisation of the potentiality inherent in the 
essence of human society considered as a social organism. Individuality and 
sociality are both realised in being the two sides of the same human essence.  
Marx’s 'species being' (Gattungswesen) refers to the real essence or nature of 
the human species, not an ideal human being divorced from biology and history. 
Marx’s argument proceeds from potentialities which inhere in human beings as 
species essence. These potentialities can only be realised historically within 
human society and the specific social forms which human beings develop in 
order to supply social labour. Man's process of 'realisation of himself as a real 
species being ... is only possible through the co-operation of mankind and as a 
result of history'. (KMEW, 386). The important point to establish here is that 
Marx binds the telos of history firmly to the real essence of human beings as a 
social species. (And as a rational species. It is worth underlining Marx’s 
similarity here with Aristotle and, intriguingly, with St Thomas Aquinas).  
Marx’s reference to species essence is a core element in Marx’s 
essentialist metaphysics and is the foundation of his conception of history as a 
teleological process. The social nature of human society and the human nature 
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of society are two aspects of the same thing. The Aristotelian conception 
which Marx develops in his early writings reappears in his later writings.  In the 
Grundrisse, Marx writes  that 'the human being is in the most literal sense a zoon 
politikon, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself 
only in the midst of society. Production by an isolated individual outside society - 
a rare exception which may well occur when a civilized person in whom the 
social forces are already dynamically present is cast by accident into the 
wilderness - is as much of an absurdity as is the development of language 
without individuals living together and talking to each other.’ (Marx Gr 1973: 
85). 
I rather like Marx’s bad tempered comment that ‘there is no point in dwelling on 
this any longer’, calling the individualist argument ‘twaddle’. Marx, it seems, 
assumes that Aristotle’s view is so obviously correct that hardly needs restating. 
Suffice to say that Marx’s argument is Aristotelian. ‘Man is the rational animal' said 
Aristotle. Man is a zoon politikon,  a social animal, said Aristotle. “He who is unable 
to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be 
either a beast or a god'. (Aristotle Politics). Marx said all these things. So too did St 
Thomas Aquinas.  
To conclude, the realisation of the social essence of human beings and the 
human essence of society are integral to each other. There is no telos of history 
apart from real individuals and it is the detachment of historical development from 
these real premises that had led to all kinds of misunderstanding with regard to 
teleology and the operation of purpose within history.  
The identity between individual and social essence is explicit in Thesis six in the 
Theses on Feuerbach: ‘the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single 
individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.’ Marx accuses 
Feuerbach of failing to enter upon a criticism of this real essence, with the result that 
he is compelled ‘to abstract from the historical process’. I would argue that what is 
happening within capitalist modernity is that in an alienated system of production 
the historical process is being abstracted from real individuals, with the result 
that creative human agents are being made the objects of alien powers invested 
with existential significance. This seems to be news to those disillusioned with 
‘progress’ and its delusions. But Marx has said this from the first. The only 
problem is that necessary lines of development are frustratable. We have just 
seen a hundred years war against socialism, with victory going to the defenders 
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of capitalist civilisation. The result is economic crisis and environmental disaster. 
No wonder contemporary critics of progress and teleology seem plausible. My 
point is that they have badly missed the real target and that progress to the truly 
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21 ALIENATION, HUMANISATION AND IDOLATRY 
 
I want to try to tie this debate concerning teleology and progress up by 
examining the essentialist argument of Marx for evidence not only of an 
abstraction of reason from the concrete reality of real individuals, but of 
idolatry. The delusions of progress are not resolved if, by reappropriating 
alienated powers, we come to venerate those powers as a form of idolatry. 
We move from one delusion to another. Marx argued that the human world is 
human-made and is therefore capable of being known, comprehended and 
controlled by human beings. I want to know if Marx also believed that men 
could become as gods as a result. 
 
The argument here proceeds from Vico’s New Science and the principle verum 
ipsum factum. This states that knowing the truth of something is conditional upon 
having made it. Vico’s argument is that whereas Nature is made by God, and 
therefore knowable only by God, the human world is a human creation. Vico’s central 
epistemological thesis is the identity of the true with what is made or done, that is, 
with that which owes its very being to having been made. This is the verum-factum 
concept. The human world is a human creation and is therefore capable of being 
known by human beings. The state and politics, trade and commerce, war and 
peace, etc are all the product of creative human agency; the world of nature is the 
province of God. Creating is an activity and that it thus logically requires a creator. 
Human agency is the creator, the human world is the creation. How do the human 
creators relate to their creation? Does the Creation in some way reflect a divine 
power and glory upon the human creators?  
 
Marx writes of human beings becoming the sovereign of circumstances. He 
justifies the English rule in India in terms of progress from a condition characterised 
by nature worship and domination by external circumstances to a condition in which 
human beings are in conscious control of these circumstances. 
 
We must not forget that these little communities were contaminated by 
distinctions of caste and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external 
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circumstances instead of elevating man to be the sovereign of circumstances, 
that they transformed a self-developing social state into never-changing natural 
destiny, and thus brought about a brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its 
degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees 
in adoration of Kanuman, the monkey, and Sabbala, the cow. 
 
Marx AIC SE 1973: 307 
 
Marx explicitly repudiates the ‘back to nature’ argument in any of its forms. He 
refers to the ‘brutalizing worship of nature’ as a ‘degradation’ in that ‘man’ is ‘the 
sovereign of nature’. Who says that man is the ‘sovereign of nature’? There is no 
scientific basis for this claim. Darwin argued that human beings differ from other 
animals only in degree, not in kind. The biologist EO Wilson emphasises the 
centrality of insects to life on Earth. If the insects were wiped out, life on Earth would 
end within a year; if the human species were wiped out, life on Earth would flourish. 
The argument that ‘man’ is the ‘sovereign of nature’ is a theological argument’ it 
stems from the idea that God made man in his own image and it stems from the 
Judaeo-Christian view of human uniqueness and moral autonomy. 
 
I want to return to a passage quoted earlier. 
 
But atheism and communism are no flight, no abstraction, no loss of the 
objective world created by man or of his essential powers projected into 
objectivity, no impoverished regression to unnatural, primitive simplicity. They are 
rather the first real emergence, the realization become real for man, of his 
essence as something real.  
 
Marx EW EPM 1975: 395/6 
 
Once more, Marx rejects the ‘back to nature’ argument as an ‘impoverished 
regression to unnatural, primitive simplicity’. Human beings acting upon nature, 
transforming both nature and themselves, is natural for human beings. Camile Paglia 
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is restating Marx’s view here when she writes that ‘the Buddhist acquiescence to 
nature is neither accurate about nature nor just to human potential.’ (Paglia 2001: ch 
1).  
But Paglia’s next sentence makes this clear assertion of human progress most 
interesting: ‘The Apollonian has taken us to the stars.’ (Paglia 2001 ch 1). To the 
stars, to the heavens. How many ways are there to the stars? Do we ascend to the 
heavens? Or draw the heavens down to earth? Heaven on Earth? This would reveal 
that the progress that Marx is advocating, the transcendence of alienation so that 
man becomes the conscious sovereign of circumstances, itself a secular myth. 
Marx’s statement is more positive and more creative, certainly. Marx is demanding 
the projection and realisation of the essential powers of human beings so as to 
overcome domination by an alien and external objectivity, bringing about 
circumstances which are ‘humanly objective’, in Gramsci’s apposite phrase. 
Alienation implies a failure on the part of human agents to comprehend the social 
world as their own creation, and hence as amenable to human intervention, 
alteration and control.  
 
My question is how far does Marx take this ‘sovereignty’ of man? For Vico, 
Nature is the realm of God, therefore unknowable and uncontrollable with respect to 
human agency. Marx draws no such line. Marx disparages human subjugation to 
‘never-changing natural destiny’. Marx is surely correct in his assumption that there is 
no longer some ‘Nature’ apart from the human world, that the human interchange with 
and transformation their environment has brought Nature within the province of the 
human social world. There are countless books which make this point. (Morris ed 
2003; Simmons 1996; Odum 1993; Chapman and Reiss 1999; Doyle and McEachern 
2001; Barry 1999; Harris ed 2004). 
 
So, Marx is correct to emphasise the importance of human transformatory 
activity. But when he disparages ‘natural destiny’ we need to question what, exactly, 
he is getting at. Notions of human beings being the ‘sovereign of circumstances’ 
being somehow able to evade or escape ‘natural destiny’ suggest much more than 
human beings are realising their essential powers creatively in the world that they 
create. It implies that that social world created by human beings somehow trumps the 
natural world. It implies that human beings in their social world have transcended 
Nature and the eternal cycles of birth, life, death and rebirth.  
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Marx, at points, strays over into teleology in the bad sense – as a telos unfolding 
over the heads and against the wills of individuals. 
 
The question is not what goal is envisaged for the time being by this or that 
member of the proletariat, or even by the proletariat as a whole. The 
question is what is the proletariat and what course of action will it be forced 
historically to take in conformity with its own nature. (Marx: The Holy Family).  
 
That is the kind of argument that brings essentialism into disrepute. That 
argument does imply that the realisation of a natural essence is given and that a 
course of action is inevitable regardless of will, choice, morality etc. The passage 
needs to be re-phrased to take account of the delicate sensitivities of modern 
liberals, brought up to believe that identity is a matter of free choice and design. An 
essentialist metaphysics is teleological. Note Marx’s identification of a goal, 
something given by the nature of an essence. If the proletariat is to realise its nature, 
then it must take a course of action which corresponds to, rather than contradicts, is 
nature. By using the terms ‘forced historically’, Marx is stating the essentialist case 
too strongly. A necessary line of development is not an inevitability and, as he rightly 
argues, ‘history does nothing’. What Marx means is that if the working class is to 
realise its nature as the class of concrete labour, the value creating class, then it 
needs to institute the society of the freely associated producers. For Marx, there is a 
necessary relation between the working class as the producers of value and a 
socialist society in which social labour is supplied directly through the free 
association of the producers, rather than indirectly through the value form. Those 
who object to that essentialist argument, who deny such a necessary relation 
between class position and political ideology, who deny the nature of an essence, 
can have no objection to the proletariat being politically constructed for a slave 
society, a Fascist society, can have no necessary objection to the proletariat 
remaining within the exploitative relations of capitalist society.  
 
Marx expresses himself too strongly in the above passage, minimising the 
importance of the subjective factor, the extent to which the proletariat has to develop 
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its organisational, political, moral capacities in the process of self-emancipation. That 
process of self-development is all part of the proletariat coming to realise its nature.  
 
Marx is similarly over-emphatic in the Manifesto of the Communist Party. He 
writes: ‘What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-
diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable.’ (Marx MCP 
Rev1848 1973). If the fall of the bourgeoisie and the triumph of the proletariat are 
inevitable, why bother writing the Manifesto, why urge ‘working men of all countries, 
unite!’? Of course, one can appreciate the statement of inevitability as an attempt to 
inspire hope and boost confidence in the middle of a political battle. But it is still worth 
highlighting, just to be on our guard against a bad teleology that steals political and 
moral responsibility out of human hands and invests it in some external agency. 
 
I want to come to more substantial cases, beyond manifesto speak, when Marx 
does seem to defend human action in more philosophical terms, terms which are all 
of a piece with the secular myth of progress through industry, science and 
technology. Marx admits that England is ‘causing a social revolution’ in India for the 
‘vilest interests’. ‘But that is not the question’, he states. ‘The question is, can 
mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia ? If 
not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of 
history in bringing about that revolution.’ (Marx AIC SE 1973). Marx brushes past the 
actual actions and wills of human agents, the cases put for and against English 
intervention in India, and reverts to the bad old device of human actors being ‘the 
unconscious tool of history’. If human beings are ‘unconscious tools’ in this manner, 
then they cannot also be sovereigns of circumstances. There is none of the moral 
autonomy here that comes with assertions of human uniqueness in the Judaeo-
Christian tradition. We are back to Hegel’s slaughterbench of history. ‘Then, 
whatever bitterness the spectacle of the crumbling of an ancient world may have for 
our personal feelings, we have the right, in point of history, to exclaim with Goethe: 
'Should this torture then torment us Since it brings us greater pleasure? Were not 
through the rule of Timur Souls devoured without measure?' (Marx AIC SE 1973: 
320). 
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To be fair to Marx, his defensible point is this, any hope for overcoming the moral 
and social failures of capitalist modernity does not lie in the past, neither in Nature 
worship nor in the ancient or medieval communities but in the present, in those 
necessary lines of development which point towards an alternative future in which 
human beings can objectify their powers without having to alienate them. Marx is 
looking to build new solidarities through a re-personalisation at a higher level of 
develop, not defend or revert to older solidarities appropriate to social relations that 
no longer exist. The liberal criticism of Marx as offering a 'thickly textured 
communitarianism' (Femia 1993:170) is simply wrong. Marx, like Hegel before him, 
takes the high road of modernity, seeing alienation as a progressive force, 
objectifying human power in such a way that they can be reclaimed in future at a 
higher level. Marx was well aware of conservative critics of the capital system, 
whose rejection of modernity was absolute and who took refuge in those remnants 
of the past which continued to exist in the modern world. Such solidarities are 
beyond recall and presuppose a social identity that no longer exists. Marx has no 
sympathy with the crumbling of an older world. Against the nostalgic mode, Marx 
looked to redeem the potentials contained in the alienated social world, finally 
making progress live up to its name.  
 
But questions remain. Take Schumpeter’s point that capitalism is a moral 
parasite, living off the moral capital created by past civilisations, but doing nothing to 
replace it? Take the evidence that it is those nations, such as Germany, who most 
held onto their feudal structures and practices, who have shown greater social 
resilience as well as long term economic success. In False Dawn The Delusions of 
Global Capitalism, (1999) John Gray accuses Marx of modelling capitalism on the 
particular British experience of the nineteenth century. Such a capitalism leaves us 
with no ties other than the nexus of callous cash payment. 
 
In the two passages quoted above, Marx uses the term ‘destiny’ in two different 
ways. He justifies English intervention in India in terms of a social revolution which 
allows human beings to escape a ‘never-changing natural destiny’. Fine, human 
beings transform nature and in the process transform themselves, coming to express 
and manifest more and more of their essential powers in history. I have argued 
strongly that that telos is strongly grounded in real human being. Yet Marx does, at 
times, detach the historical process from human actors and thus abstract purpose 
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from human self-realisation. In this manner he asks: ‘The question is, can mankind 
fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia ?’ The idea 
of humankind fulfilling its destiny strongly suggests a supra-individual purpose at work. 
In the same way Marx writes of human actors being ‘the unconscious tool of history’. 
 
Marx’s argument can be salvaged from such bad teleology. It needs to be, since 
stated thus, Marx is clearly an adherent of the secular myth of progress. Destiny 
implies a fate that is out of the hands of human agents. This could just simply be a 
case of an inappropriate word. Marx’s meaning is teleological in the good sense of 
human beings realising their essential powers, fulfilling their species essence within 
the historical process. Human beings as ‘the unconscious tool of history’ is more 
difficult. However, the view is consistent with the idea of alienation as a progressive 
force, with human beings objectifying their powers in such a way that, at first, they 
become alien forces determining social action with inexorable, external force. At this 
stage, human beings are indeed unconscious tools, in that they do not comprehend 
these alien powers as their own social powers in alien form, and in that human 
action is determined from the outside by the imperatives associated with these alien 
powers. The condition of alienation is characterised by human beings becoming 
instruments of their own powers. 
 
The morally dubious aspect of Marx’s argument is his justification of this 
‘unconscious’ instrumentalism in alienated social conditions as progressive, his 
dismissal of moral objections and protests. It begs the question at what point does 
this ‘unconscious’ progress over the heads of human actors cease and human 
beings finally assert moral ends over technical means? Because precisely these 
same justifications for progress are being made in the contemporary world, in favour 
of ‘globalisation’, industrial development in India and China, the BRIC nations and 
everywhere, in favour of drilling in the Arctic and on the ocean bed, in favour of GM 
food and biotechnology.  
 
If, as Marx argues, ‘personal feelings’ don’t matter when set against ‘history’, we 
need to ask what does? I think Marx is wide open to the criticism that he has failed to 
take morality seriously and that his historicism makes his argument prone to end up 
with what Popper called a ‘moral futurism’.  
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Marx seems to historicise the Judaeo-Christian principle of moral autonomy from 
nature and its imperatives and cycles. And that entails a denial of the view that 
morality is autonomous from progress as defined in the realisation of essential 
human powers. The danger is, in alienated conditions, such a position could end up 
transferring moral responsibility to the a ‘history’ which proceeds in some degree of 
abstraction of human individuals. Alienation is a progressive force for Marx (and 
Hegel). The danger is that we can easily remain within a progress that treats human 
beings as the unconscious tools of history. 
 
Kolakowski is certainly right to point out that such a position invites a moral 
wasteland. Kolakowski recovers the moral responsibility that lies at the heart of the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition: ‘No one is relieved of either positive or negative 
responsibility on the grounds that his actions formed only a fraction of a given 
historical process… Thus we profess the doctrine of total responsibility of the 
individual for his deeds and of the amorality of the historical process… (Kolakowski 
1969: 161/2). 
 
For Kolakowski, the moral failure of Marxism in this respect that made its 
political failures not only understandable but inevitable. So there is a need to 
take morality seriously. ‘Morality matters’ (Trigg 2005). Marx’s morality is 
implicit in the progressive unfolding and full realisation of innate human 
potentials and powers. Marx denies any autonomy of morality from the telos of 
human self-realisation in history. The position is defensible, although it 
underestimates the extent to which human social praxis is also a moral praxis. 
Marx could present creative human self-realisation as a moral ideal grounded 
in the human species essence and its unfolding. Such an ideal could work in 
the Kantian sense as the object of our willing, motivating and inspiring human 
beings to act and obligating them in a common cause leading to the fuller 
expression of essential human powers. 
 
But, even so, there remains the danger of mistaking essential human powers for 
the objectified products of those powers. In the simplest case, that would denote a 
condition of alienation. The problem runs deeper than that, though. Even with the 
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transcendence of alienation there is the danger that Marx, uniting human creators 
and human creation, is engaging in a form of idolatry. This is to define idolatry as the 
worship of the products of the human hand or, more generally, as the worship of 
human powers. It could immediately be objected that Marx is simply calling for the 
proper fulfilment of the human essence, human beings coming to recognise the 
social forces dominating the world as their own powers in alien form. Human 
fulfilment, the telos of the historical process, requires that the human creators 
assume conscious control of their human powers. Fine. But what are these human 
powers? Do they also pertain to the products of human power? Where is the line 
drawn? 
Surprisingly, Marx makes very few references to Vico, despite the pertinence of 
Vico’s verum-factum principle to the issue of objectification, alienation and human 
self-knowledge and self-realisation. I am aware of only the one reference to Vico in 
Marx’s writings, and it is only a footnote. Nevertheless, it is a highly significant 
passage. 
 
Darwin has aroused our interest in the history of natural technology, i.e. in the 
formation of the organs of plants and animals, as instruments of production 
for sustaining life. Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of 
organs that are the material basis of all social organization, deserve equal 
attention? And would not such a history be easier to compile, since, as Vico 
says, human history differs from natural history in this respect, that we have 
made the former, but not the latter? Technology discloses man's mode of 
dealing with Nature, the process of production by which he sustains his life, 
and by which also his social relations, and the mental conceptions that flow 
from them, are formed. Any history of religion even, that fails to take 
account of this material basis, is uncritical. It is, in practice, much easier to 
discover by analysis the earthly core of the misty creations of religion, than, 
conversely, to infer from the actual relations of life at any period the 
corresponding 'spiritualized' forms of those relations. But the latter 
method is the only materialistic, and therefore the only scientific one. The 
inadequacy of the abstract materialism of natural science, which leaves out of 
consideration the historical process, is at once evident from the abstract and 
ideological conceptions of its spokesmen, whenever they venture beyond the 
bounds of their own specialism. (Capital I (1867) VA I, p. 389, footnote 89). 
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Marx argues that the history of the productive organs of man, the material 
basis of social organisation, deserves equal attention with the history of natural 
technology, the formation of the organs of plants and animals, as ‘instruments of 
production for sustaining life.’ Marx cites Vico’s distinction between human history 
and natural history to the effect that human beings have made the former, but not 
the latter. The key argument in this passage is that ‘technology discloses 
man's mode of dealing with Nature, the process of production by which he sustains 
his life, and by which also his social relations, and the mental conceptions that flow 
from them, are formed.’ Marx describes the failure to take this material basis into 
account as ‘uncritical.’ He is referring to religion. It is significant, however, that the 
passage starts with a quibble about Darwin’s exclusive concern with natural 
technology and ends with a criticism of ‘the inadequacy of the abstract materialism 
of natural science’, as evidenced by the ‘abstract and ideological conceptions of its 
spokesmen’ who leave the historical process out of their considerations. 
 
The point to emphasise is Marx’s critique of abstracting tendencies in all their 
forms. Marx’s accent is upon human productive powers as they develop in history 
and form the material basis of all social organization. The emphasis is upon the 
process of production by which human beings mediate their relation with 
nature and produce the conditions which sustain human life. Any materialism 
which is detached from this process is an abstract materialism. Marx is thinking of 
natural science here, but he also condemns mechanical materialism in similar terms. 
And it makes the point that Marx combines both immanence and transcendence. 
The actual world is a field of immanent potentiality in the process of completing itself 
and becoming something else.  
 
So Marx can be cleared of the charge that his self-knowledge through the 
connection of human creators and their social creation entails immanence as an 
enclosed world of human self-importance.  
 
But the danger of idolatry remains. In associating ‘atheism and 
communism’ Marx is attempting to emphasise the positive expression of 
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essential human powers, human creators in conscious control of the world 
that they have created.  
 
But atheism and communism are no flight, no abstraction, no loss of the 
objective world created by man or of his essential powers projected into 
objectivity, no impoverished regression to unnatural, primitive simplicity. They are 
rather the first real emergence, the realization become real for man, of his 
essence as something real.  
 
Marx EW EPM 1975: 395/6 
 
But one has to question why Marx doesn’t just simply refer to communism. Why 
atheism? Marx knows Vico’s distinction between human and natural history. Nature 
is God’s creation, argues Vico. In truth, Marx well knows that the human exchange 
with nature renders such a distinction obsolete. Hence his call for natural scientists to 
give up their abstract materialism and recognise that the material world is a human 
world. 
The question is whether Marx goes further than human self-realisation and steps 
into the idolatrous realm of human self-veneration. Instead of fulfilled human beings 
realising their powers within a whole organism they see as a human creation, we 
enter the realm of ‘men as gods’ absorbing the greater substance into themselves. 
In examining this question we need to start from Marx’s argument that religion is 
the ‘opium of the people’. Marx does not condemn religion as a delusion which is 
made up by the ruling class to dupe and stupefy the masses. That popular view is a 
crude caricature which actually inverts Marx’s real meaning. If religion is a drug then 
it is a drug that is self-administered.  
 
Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering 
and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed 
creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is 
the opium of the people.  
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Marx EW CHPR:I 1975 
 
Religion is the ideal expression of a condition people yearn for but which is 
denied in real life. Religion is the cry of alienated individuals living within an atomistic 
market society. Within such conditions, these individuals can overcome the separation 
experienced in the real world only by projecting the unity and commonality desired 
upwards into the realm of fantasy. Fantastic religious ideas will only be dissipated when 
human commonality is achieved in real society and the alienation and atomism 
associated with the ‘rule of property’ has been overcome.  
Marx is not therefore simply saying that religion is wrong or false, quite the contrary. 
Religion expresses a real human yearning and need in abstract, fantastical form. Marx is 
criticising not just illusion but most of all the social conditions which require illusion. 
 
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand for 
their real happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions about their condition 
is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The criticism of 
religion is therefore in embryo the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion is 
the halo.  
 
Marx EW CHPR:I 1975 
 
Real human happiness, then, requires social transformation so that human 
beings no longer have need of recourse to illusions in nourishing their heart 
and soul. But the implications go further than this. Such a social 
transformation implies the abolition of religion. This would be abolition in the 
sense of positive transcendence, so that religion ends to the extent that it 
realises its ideals. That, surely, is what every religion aims at? But, with 
Marx, this self-abolition of religion implies something more: it implies that 
human beings become the centres of their own Earthly Heaven. 
 
The criticism of religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act and fashion his 
reality like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that 
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he will move around himself as his own true sun. Religion is only the illusory sun 
which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself.  
 
Marx EW CHPR:I 1975 
 
‘Man’ moving around himself as his own true sun is a clear statement of the ‘men 
as gods’ thesis. There is plenty wrong with this optimistic thesis, not least the abundant 
evidence from history that human beings are nowhere near as rational and free and 
humane as humanists believe. That, in itself, doesn’t change much, given that we are 
dealing with a teleological argument that ends when human beings have fully realised 
themselves as free and rational and truly human beings. But the idea of human beings 
revolving around their own sun is a clear statement of self-absorption, implying an 
egoism and narcissism that eats away at the soul. Human beings need to come out of 
their own egos and see themselves as part of a greater whole, see themselves in 
relation to others. Marx, of course, knows this and, throughout the main body of his 
work, develops this intersubjective and communitarian thesis at length. My concern is 
with a certain strain in Marx’s argument which could tip a legitimate interest in creative 
human self-realisation over into full blown idolatry and the bad teleology of a ‘history’ 
abstracted from human purpose. My concern is with the dangers of moving from a 
legitimate concern with the fulfilment of human powers to a veneration of the products 
of those powers. 
 
Marx is concerned with exposing the fetish systems of politics and production by 
revealing their basis in the material world of human power. He is concerned with truth 
as against both illusion and the alienated social conditions which generate and require 
illusion. 
 
It is therefore the task of history, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to 
establish the truth of this world. It is the immediate task of philosophy, which is in 
the service of history, to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms once the 
holy form of human self-estrangement has been unmasked. Thus the criticism of 
heaven turns into the criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of 
law and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics.  
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Marx EW Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction 1975: 245 
 
Note the references to the ‘task of history’ and philosophy in ‘the service of history’. 
What ‘history’? Is this ‘history’ in abstraction from human purpose? Marx’s essentialist 
metaphysics is grounded in the essential natures of human beings and the essential 
nature of human society. But references to ‘history’ like these above are not so firmly 
grounded. To be fair, Marx does state that ‘to be radical is to grasp things by the root. 
But for man the root is man himself.’ But even this begs the question what is this 
‘man’ that Marx is referring to. In these passages, Marx seems to be referring to an 
ideal human being outside of the historical unfolding of the human essence in 
specific social relations. And this uncoupling from socio-historical reality can easily 
slide into a more ethereal realm. 
 
Clear proof of the radicalism of German theory and its practical energy is the 
fact that it takes as its point of departure a decisive and positive 
transcendence of religion. The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that 
for man the supreme being is man, and thus with the categorical imperative to 
overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and 
contemptible being - conditions that are best described in the exclamation of 
a Frenchman on the occasion of a proposed tax on dogs: Poor dogs! They 
want to treat you like human beings! 
 
We return to the conception of positive transcendence, an abolition that 
preserves, raises up and realises as it puts an end to something. The abolition of 
religion amounts to the realisation of religious ideals. But what are those ideals? In a 
condition of alienation, Marx notes that human beings are treated like dogs. But his 
statement actually reads as dogs being treated like human beings. Marx wants more. 
The abolition of religion realises the doctrine that for man the supreme being is man. 
‘Do you mean God?’, the young boy in the film Time Bandits asks. ‘ We don’t know 
him that well’ comes the reply. 
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There is no doubt that Marx is on the ground of theology here. He refers to 
Germany's revolutionary past in the form of the Reformation, drawing an analogy 
between the monk and the philosopher in whose brain the revolution begins. (Marx 
EW CHPR:I 1975). Marx wants to complete the job of the Reformation. 
 
Luther certainly conquered servitude based on devotion, but only by 
replacing it with servitude based on conviction. He destroyed faith in 
authority, but only by restoring the authority of faith. He transformed the 
priests into laymen, but only by transforming the laymen into priests. He freed 
mankind from external religiosity, but only by making religiosity the inner man. 
He freed the body from its chains, but only by putting the heart in chains.  
 
Marx EW CHPR:I 1975 
 
A thoroughgoing Reformation is a lofty ideal. It requires the complete abolition of 
religiosity. That he is asking for Heaven on Earth is clear enough. But he seems also 
to be asking that human beings become saints and philosophers. Are human beings 
so free and rational and humane? Is Marx implying that human beings could 
become gods, supreme beings? One recalls here Kant’s statement that out of 
nothing so crooked can something entirely straight be made. Kant also referred to 
the irrational use of reason. An attempt to straighten something so crooked is prone 
to rebound spectacularly. So Marx is sailing into dangerous waters. 
 
Marx is seeking to trace the products of the human hand and the human mind 
back to source – human praxis in the material world. 
 
The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not 
make man. Religion is indeed the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man 
who has either not yet won through to himself or has already lost himself again. 
But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man, 
state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted 
consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world.  
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Marx EW CHPR:I 1975 
 
It soon becomes clear, however, that Marx isn’t actually repudiating religion at all. 
Marx writes of ‘irreligious criticism’ but in truth his statement proceeds to list all the 
qualities of religion which Marx demands to be realised in the world. 
 
 Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic 
in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, 
its solemn complement and its universal basis of consolation and justification. It is 
the fantastic realization of the human essence since the human essence has not 
acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is therefore indirectly the 
struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.  
 
Marx EW CHPR:I 1975 
 
In fine, Marx’s case is not against religion but against an irreligious world in 
which religious ideals can obtain only illusory form. Marx is demanding the true 
realisation of the human essence. Religious ideals are the fantastic realisation of the 
human essence in conditions which block that essence obtaining true reality. 
 
Religion remains the ideal, unsecular consciousness of its members because 
it is the ideal form of the stage of human development which has been 
reached in this state.  
 
Marx EW OJQ 1975 
 
The realisation of the religious ideal implies a further stage of human 
development in the sense of realising fully innate human potentials. The abolition of 
religion as a positive transcendence implies the replacement of an unsecular 
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consciousness by a secular consciousness. But this is tricky in the sense that Marx 
defines religion as the ‘fantastic realisation of the human essence’. This implies that 
giving the human essence a true reality is a material realisation of the religious 
ideal. And this would seem to imply that Marx is committed to the realisation of the 
theological assumptions underpinning the figure of God, even as he is prepared to 
abolish God as no more than the projection of the human essence in ideal form. It is 
easy enough to get rid of God; it is much more difficult to shed the theological 
assumptions which have been the necessary accompaniment of the belief in God 
throughout history. My point is that far from producing the secular conscious that 
Marx demands, his positive transcendence of religion implies communism not as 
atheism but as a disguised religion. And it is this which opens up the route from the 
fulfilment of the human essence to the worship of the products of human powers, 
from the realisation of human species being to ‘man’ as the ‘supreme being’, from 
the good teleology which culminates in the realised human society of realised 
human beings to the bad teleology of a ‘history’ abstracted from human purpose and 
in the service of the alien powers of industry, technology, capital, the state, 
bureaucracy etc. etc.  
In fine, we need to be careful in reconstructing Marx’s essentialist metaphysics 
so as to avoid turning Marx’s positive transcendence of religion into the secular myth 
of progress, the false teleology which dominates the alienated world in the form of 
the false fixities of economic growth, capitalist accumulation, technological 
imperatives, state encroachment, state expansion, bureaucratisation, urbanisation 
… 
Marx is well aware of the sin of idolatry. He sets idolatry within the context of an 
alienated system of production. 
 
Money is the jealous god of Israel before whom no other god may stand. Money 
debases all the gods of mankind and turns them into commodities. Money is the 
universal and self-constituted value of all things. It has therefore deprived the 
entire world - both the world of man and of nature - of its specific value. Money is 
the estranged essence of man's work and existence; this alien essence dominates 
him and he worships it.  
 
Marx EW OJQ 1975 
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And, long before John Gray and the exposure of the delusions of progress, Marx 
is very well aware of the extent to which ‘progress’ can become a secular myth 
undertaken through the agency of alien power. ‘The god of the Jews has been 
secularized and become the god of the world. Exchange is the true god of the Jew. 
His god is nothing more than illusory exchange.’ (Marx EW OJQ 1975).  
 
Marx is criticising alienation but also idolatry. Does it then follow that the 
abolition of alienation is also an abolition of idolatry? That isn’t necessarily the 
case.  
Alienation is the condition in which human creations come to dominate the 
human creators. Idolatry is the worship of the products of one’s own hands. It 
would therefore seem possible that the practical reappropriation of alienated 
human powers could still be a form of idolatry. It all depends upon whether 
human powers are being exercised in such a way as to enhance human 
flourishing and fulfilment or whether these powers are being venerated as 
power as such, that is, not in terms of their effects with respect to creative 
human self-realisation. Marx’s commitment to a truly human society would 
seem to clear him of the charge of idolatry, but things are not so simple. It all 
depends on how one reads Marx’s critique of religion. The question depends 
upon the extent to which what Marx proposes as the free and full 
development of individuals could also be construed as the claim that human 
beings could become as gods. 
Marx does draw the direct analogy between what human beings invested in God 
as an alien power and capital and the state as alienated social powers. The practical 
restitution of human power therefore implies that human beings no longer project 
their divine power upwards to the ideal realm of God but instead become in some 
sense deities themselves.  
 
Finally it follows that even when man proclaims himself an atheist through the 
mediation of the state, i.e., when he proclaims the state an atheist, he still 
remains under the constraints of religion because he acknowledges his 
atheism only deviously, through a medium. Religion is precisely that: the 
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devious acknowledgement of man, through an intermediary. The state is 
the intermediary between man and man's freedom. Just as Christ is the 
intermediary to whom man attributes all his divinity, all his religious 
constraints, so the state is the intermediary to which man transfers all his non-
divinity, all his human unconstraint.  
 
Marx EW OJQ 1975 219 
 
Just as the working class invest their labour in capital, and the demos invest their 
sovereign power in the state, and thereby create alien powers which dominate them, 
so human beings invest their divinity in God, and so create the abstract Christ who 
dominates them. The implication of this is that Marx believes that human beings 
could indeed become as gods.  
 
Marx is certainly aware of the dangers of following false gods. 
 
Mill aptly sums up the whole essence of the matter in a single concept when he 
describes money as the medium of exchange. The nature of money is not, in the 
first instance, that property is externalized within it, but that the mediating function 
or movement, human, social activity, by means of which the products of man 
mutually complement each other, is estranged and becomes the property of a 
material thing external to man, viz. money. If a man himself alienates this 
mediating function he remains active only as a lost, dehumanized creature. The 
relation between things, human dealings with them, become the operations of a 
being beyond and above man.  
 
Marx EW JM 1975: 261 
 
Alienative social relations result in the estrangement of the products of human 
activity. As a result, the existential significance which properly belongs to human beings 
coming to be invested in a material thing external to human beings. Marx, here, refers to 
money. In time, with a more thorough critique of political economy, Marx would come to 
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identify capital as the principal ‘agent’ of a historical development that proceeds above 
the heads of the ‘lost, dehumanized’ human actors. The false teleology at work in the 
secular myth of progress therefore describes a condition of alienation. Capital and its 
imperatives reveal are ‘the operations of a being beyond and above man’.  
 
Marx demands the social self-mediation of associated producers against the alien 
mediation of things. Alien mediation is a false religion with a false god. 
 
Through this alien mediator man gazes at his will, his activity, his relation to others 
as at a power independent of them and of himself - instead of man himself being 
the mediator for man. His slavery thus reaches a climax. It is obvious that this 
mediator must become a veritable God since the mediator is the real power over 
that with which he mediates me. His cult becomes an end in itself. Separated from 
this mediator, objects lose their worth. Thus they have value only in so far as they 
represent him, whereas it appeared at first that he had value only to the extent 
to which he represented them. This reversal of the original relationship is 
necessary. Hence this mediator is the lost, estranged essence of private 
property, private property alienated and external to itself; it is the alienated 
mediation of human production with human production, the alienated species-
activity of man. All the qualities proper to the generation of this activity are 
transferred to the mediator. Thus man separated from this mediator becomes 
poorer as man in proportion as the mediator becomes richer.  
Christ originally represents (1) man before God, (2) God for man and (3) man for 
man. 
In the same way money originally represents (1) private property for private 
property; (2) society for private property; (3) private property for society.  
But Christ is God alienated and man alienated. God continues to have value 
only in so far as he represents Christ, man continues to have value only in so far 
as he represents Christ. Likewise with money.  
 
Marx EW JM 1975 
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Marx draws a directly analogy between the alienation of social power and God. 
The more that human beings invest in an object, the less they are in themselves.  
 
All these consequences are contained in this characteristic, that the worker is 
related to the product of his labour as to an alien object. For it is clear that, 
according to this premise, the more the worker exerts himself in his work, the 
more powerful the alien, objective world becomes which he brings into being over 
against himself, the poorer he and his inner world become, and the less they 
belong to him. It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he 
retains within himself. The worker places his life in the object; but now it no longer 
belongs to him, but to the object. The greater his activity, therefore, the fewer 
objects the worker possesses. What the product of his labour is, he is not. 
Therefore, the greater this product, the less is he himself. The externalization 
[Entdusserung] of the worker in his product means not only that his labour 
becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, 
independently of him and alien to him, and begins to confront him as an 
autonomous power; that the life which he has bestowed on the object confronts 
him as hostile and alien.  
 
Marx EW EPM 1975 325 
 
Marx defines human emancipation and freedom in terms of the practical 
reappropriation of the power alienated to the state and capital and its reorganisation 
and exercise by associated individuals as their own social power. (Marx OJQ EW 
1975). ‘Not the gods, not nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over 
men.’(Marx EW EPM 1975). But, if the above analogy between alien power and God 
applies, that is, if God is the human essence in ideal form, then it follows that the 
practical restitution of human power not only dissolves God but at the same time 
turns human beings into gods. In Marx’s defence, if this is indeed what the abolition 
of alienation entails, then all human beings will become gods. But maybe Marx’s 
meaning here is very different.  
 
Marx’s view can be compared to the view of the Catholic C.S. Lewis. 
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Man's conquest of nature, if the dreams of some scientific planners are realized, 
means the rule of a few hundreds of men over billions upon billions of men. 
There neither is nor can be any simple increase of power on man's side. Each 
power won by man is a power over man as well. Each advance leaves him 
weaker as well as stronger. In every victory, besides being the general who 
triumphs, he is also the prisoner who follows in the triumphal car. (C.S. Lewis 
The Abolition of Man 1947). 
 
Such a view is entirely consistent with Marx’s conception of democratisation as a 
universalisation. 
 
The sovereignty of man - but of man as an alien being distinct from actual 
man - is the fantasy, the dream, the postulate of Christianity, whereas in 
democracy it is a present and material reality, a secular maxim.  
 
Marx EW OJQ 1975 
 
That would be a thoroughgoing secularisation, not a secular religion of progress. Is 
it possible? It requires nothing less than universal human emancipation.  
 
The question is: What is the relationship between complete political emancipation 
and religion? If in the land of complete political emancipation we find not only 
that religion exists but that it exists in a fresh and vigorous form, that proves that 
the existence of religion does not contradict the perfection of the state. But since 
the existence of religion is the existence of a defect, the source of this defect 
must be looked for in the nature of the state itself. We no longer see religion as 
the basis but simply as a phenomenon of secular narrowness. We therefore 
explain the religious restriction on the free citizens from the secular restriction 
they experience. We do not mean to say that they must do away with their 
religious restriction in order to transcend their secular limitations. We do not 
turn secular questions into theological questions. We turn theological questions 
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into secular questions. History has been resolved into superstition for long 
enough. We are now resolving superstition into history. The question of the 
relationship of political emancipation to religion becomes for us the question of 
the relationship of political emancipation to human emancipation.  
 
Marx EW OJQ 1975 
 
We are still engaged in the process of answering that question.  
Under what stars to plough the earth?  
Have we a better answer than the one given by Dante? 
 
